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Abstract 
During the first half of the twentieth century, state officials, international lawyers and 
polar experts struggled to apply an underdeveloped and unclear international legal 
discourse on territorial acquisition and the establishment of state sovereignty to the harsh 
environment and unique conditions of the Arctic and Antarctic. Drawing upon fresh 
archival research undertaken in several countries, as well as a thorough interrogation and 
synthesis of existing historical and legal scholarship, this dissertation explores the 
knowledge production that occurred on terrestrial polar claims, thus reconstructing the 
transnational web of ideas, adaptations, strategies and best practices developed to address 
the confusion and uncertainty that infused the anomalous legal space of the polar regions. 
By applying a global and bi-polar framework, this study offers a novel conceptual history 
of polar sovereignty and its constituent parts, including the sector principle, the doctrines 
of contiguity, constructive occupation and effective occupation, and other arguments used 
to justify territorial claims. Identifying the specific countries and individual lawyers, 
advisers and experts that shaped the legal and political context of the Arctic and 
Antarctic, this dissertation scrutinizes the complex interplay between the law, power, 
polar diplomacy and state practice.  
An exploration of state sovereignty strategies, legal policies, and the historical 
sociology of international law underlines the central contention of this dissertation: 
national experiences with polar sovereignty have to be situated in a broader global and bi-
polar context. It is only through such a bi-polar framework, which reconstructs the nexus 
of connections, intersections and networks that enmeshed the polar regions, that this 
international legal history can be understood without losing the larger currents of practice 
and thought in the detail of national histories.  
By reconstructing the bi-polar legal landscape, this study demonstrates that 
sustained legal uncertainty represents the most important and prevalent force shaping the 
international legal history of the polar regions. Within this legal uncertainty, international 
law and legal argumentation had a significant impact on state behaviour. The official 
iii	  
appraisals of state legal advisers and the opinions of private international lawyers often 
guided state decision-making, decided internal debates, and created polar policy.  
 
 
Keywords 
Twentieth century, Arctic, Antarctic, polar sovereignty, international legal history, sector 
principle, contiguity, effective occupation, constructive occupation, Hughes Doctrine, bi-
polar, contextual turn, Australia, Britain, Canada, Norway, United States.
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Introduction 
The Anomalous Legal Space of the Polar Regions 
The differences between the polar regions and other parts of the earth create 
problems which appear to require special development of international law. 
- Samuel Whittemore Boggs, Geographer of the State Department, 21 
September 1933.1 
It now seems probable that the Antarctic area rather than the Arctic will provide 
the field for working out general rules of international law…There is a long way 
to go, however, before a generally recognized definition of what constitutes 
effective occupancy can be developed. 
- Hume Wrong, Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, 30 December 
1946.2 
The question is whether any formula could be found for having one rule in the 
Arctic and another in the Antarctic; or must any rule apply equally to both areas. 
- Brian Roberts, Foreign Office Research Department, 14 November 
1952.3 
When state officials, international lawyers and other experts investigated polar 
sovereignty in the first half of the twentieth century, they visualized the uninhabited 
territory of the Arctic and Antarctic as an interconnected legal space that presented 
significant barriers to the application of international law. In trying to justify state claims 
in the polar regions, these actors crowded the international legal landscape with a wide 
array of arguments, adaptations, novel ideas and competing principles. The prevailing 
legal discourse on territorial acquisition and the establishment of state sovereignty, which 
remained underdeveloped and unclear throughout this era, both hampered and aided these 
efforts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 S.W. Boggs, Department of State, Office of the Historical Adviser, The Polar Regions: Geographical and 
Historical Data in a Study of Claims to Sovereignty in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions, pg. 113-114, 21 
September 1933, United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 59, CDF 
1930-39, Box 4522, File 800.014, Arctic/31. 
2 Hume Wrong to Lester B. Pearson, 30 December 1946, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, Vol. 
2145, File A-2/2-10, pt.1. 
3 Note by Brian Roberts, 14 November 1952, National Archives (NA), FO 371/100885. 
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In his landmark study on territorial acquisition, legal scholar Robert Jennings 
noted that “the mission and purpose of traditional international law has been the 
delimitation of the exercise of sovereign power on a territorial basis.”4 Since Columbus 
set sail in 1492, popes, jurists and empires have constructed legal arguments to justify 
Europe’s territorial aggrandizement and seizure of land often occupied by Indigenous 
Peoples, most notably using the doctrines of discovery, cession, occupation and conquest. 
While there was “remarkable stability in these doctrines,” legal historian Andrew 
Fitzmaurice observes, “they were subjected to ceaseless reinterpretation.”5 States and 
jurists adjusted the law of nations to suit a wide range of legal and political 
circumstances, and no clear, absolute formula for territorial acquisition emerged. The 
rules proved incredibly flexible and expendable in shifting historical and geopolitical 
contexts.  
In their quest for overseas territory, European empires developed complex and 
varied interpretations of sovereignty to deal with different geographical and geopolitical 
realties.6 “Empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of 
holes, stitched together out of pieces, a tangle of strings,” legal historian Lauren Benton 
explains. She articulates the concept of “anomalous legal space” to classify places for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1963), 2. Steven Ratner has insisted that the resolution of conflicting territorial claims has “long 
stood at the heart of the project of inter-national law…has been a defining struggle for our field, 
demonstrating to some its promise and to others its futility.” Steven Ratner, “Land Feuds and Their 
Solutions: Finding International Law Beyond the Tribunal Chamber,” The American Journal of 
International Law 100, no. 4 (2006): 808. 
5 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “Discovery, Conquest, and Occupation of Territory,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 840; Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univesity Press, 2014); Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal 
Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Anthony Pagden, 
“The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic, to c. 1700,” in The Origins of 
Empire, ed.Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 34-54. 
6 For the best description of these legal and political developments, see Lauren Benton, A Search for 
Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1460-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). See also Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Lauren Benton and 
Benjamin Straumnann, “Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European 
Practice,” Law and History Review 28, no. 1 (2010): 1-38; Georg Schwarzenberger, “Title to Territory: 
Response to a Challenge,” The American Journal of International Law 51, no. 2 (1957): 308-324. 
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which European officials struggled to determine the nature of sovereignty.7 These 
difficult-to-define areas inspired “spatial variations” of imperial control that forced states 
to conceive of new ways of conceptualizing sovereignty and its relationship with global 
law.8 Far from being black and white, the tangled web of juridical writings and state 
practice made the legal regime on territorial acquisition murky and grey.  
The growth of Europe’s formal empires at the end of the nineteenth century, 
particularly in Africa, utilized multiple legal justifications in support of imperial 
sovereignty, especially arguments based on effective occupation, prescription and 
contiguity. Legal jurists insisted that states had to establish an effective occupation over 
territory to which they wished to acquire a definitive title. As legal scholar Humphrey 
Waldock explained in 1948, “the word 'occupation' itself is…a legal term of art; it is the 
Latin occupatio meaning appropriation, not occupation in its sense of 'settling on’…it 
means, in international law, the appropriation of sovereignty.”9 For many state officials 
and jurists, proper effective occupation demanded actual physical settlement and use of 
the territory by the claimant state, while others emphasized the establishment of state 
control and administrative functions. State practice also endorsed prescription or adverse 
possession, the idea that sovereign rights held over a long period of time could perfect a 
territorial title, no matter how defective.10 Contiguity held that the effective occupation of 
part of a region entitled a state to all the territory (or hinterland) close enough to be 
considered a single geographic unit.11 Even as these legal constructions appeared to 
become more consistent and cohesive in scholarly accounts, lawyers and states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Benton explains that, “it might be said that the whole of the imperial world represented a zone of legal 
anomaly vis-à-vis the metropole.” Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 28-29.  
8 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 2, 5, 9.  
9 C.H.M. Waldock, “Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies,” British Yearbook of 
International Law 25 (1948): 317 fn. 2. 
10 Legal scholar Vaughn Lowe explains that, “Prescription is international law’s way of deciding when it is 
appropriate to draw a line under the untidiness of history.” Vaughan Lowe, International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 145. See D.H.N. Thomas, “Acquisitive Prescription in International Law,” 
British Yearbook of International Law 25 (1950): 332-354; Hersch Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty Over 
Submarine Areas,” British Yearbook of International Law 27 (1950): 427. 
11 Hans Kelsen, “Contiguity as a Title to Territorial Sovereignty,” in Rechtsfragen der internationalen 
Organisation: Festschrift für Hans Wehberg, eds. Walter Schätzel and Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer (Frankfurt 
am Main: Klostermann, 1956), 200-210. Also called proximity, propinquity, hinterland, adjacency, 
continuity, geographic unity, region of attraction. Donat Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 28. 
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consistently found room for interpretation and exception.12 The arbitration and judicial 
settlement of territorial disputes brought little clarity as jurists sought to establish which 
state had a stronger title, rather than “formulate generally applicable rules.”13 In 
particular, state practice and legal treatises offered few guidelines for how states could 
apply these principles to establish sovereignty over uninhabited areas and harsh 
environments, remote from centres of power and where, as legal scholar Donald Rothwell 
observes, “there was no immediate intent to colonise as distinct from acquire.”14  
Historians who examine state claims in the polar regions have largely overlooked 
or bypassed this convoluted legal environment. This dissertation argues that this complex 
legal setting formed the key context in which state officials and international lawyers 
started to draw the Arctic and Antarctic into the realm of international law. However 
vague and uncertain the rules and practices of territorial acquisition remained at the end 
of the nineteenth century, they still served as essential building blocks for the polar legal 
landscape. Working from a weak legal foundation, officials and lawyers faced a bevy of 
complicated questions. What rights did a state acquire when one of its citizens discovered 
new land and performed purely symbolic acts, such as planting a flag or installing a 
cairn? Was it necessary to provide interested states with formal notification of a territorial 
claim? How could states extend their jurisdiction over inhospitable and often 
uninhabitable lands? What level of occupation, control or settlement would be required to 
secure title to land in the polar regions? Did the unique polar conditions allow for a 
relaxation of the rules used in more temperate zones or demand a completely new legal 
regime? These questions proved exceedingly difficult for officials and lawyers to answer.  
Despite international legal decisions in the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and 
Eastern Greenland cases that clarified the requirements of territorial acquisition in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Milos Vec, “From the Congress of Vienna to the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 672. See also Daniel-Erasmus Khan, “Territory and Boundaries,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 225-49. 
13 Schwarzenberger, “Title to Territory,” 309. As legal expert Steven Ratner has stressed, territorial 
settlements have usually been more a reflection of power and politics, rather than “norms” or “principled 
solutions.” Ratner, “Land Feuds and Their Solutions,” 815-816. 
14 Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 2. 
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1920s and 1930s, the judicial nature of polar sovereignty remained ambiguous in the 
minds of practitioners at the time. In his 1946 assessment of sovereignty in the Arctic, 
American intelligence officer James H. Brewster highlighted this uncertainty in his 
conclusion that 
Today it is useless to pretend that the currently accepted legal principles on this 
subject have crystallized into unchangeable laws, no longer subject to 
questioning. International law is composed chiefly of a body of customary 
rules and practices, supplemented by conventions or treaties to which the great 
majority of civilized states have subscribed. In the absence of a supra-national 
legislature competent to enact binding laws, the test of the validity of an 
international rule of conduct is the fact of its general acceptance. As the 
practice of nations changes, so does the law. Thus the content of the 
international legal system is permanently in a state of flux, and the uncertainty 
as to the actual meaning of the law at any given time is increased by the lack of 
any official organ of interpretation whose dictum is binding upon all states. It 
follows, then, that there is no unanimity among the authorities as to the correct 
statement of the international rules governing the establishment of sovereignty 
over Polar regions. This confusion is heightened by the tendency of many 
writers to champion the interpretation which, under the circumstances, affords 
maximum benefit to the states of which they happen to be citizens.15 
To borrow Benton’s language, the polar regions represented quintessential 
anomalous legal space, and in this climate of uncertainty lawyers and state officials 
stitched together various and often competing versions of polar sovereignty out of a wide 
array of ideas and arguments. As Frank G. Klotz notes in his study of Antarctic politics, 
“each government seized on supposed principles of international law that best suited its 
particular historical circumstances.”16 In 1929, Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson 
captured the sentiment of many commentators when he argued that the Arctic’s harsh and 
unique conditions, “unlike any visualized by international lawyers in the past,” called for 
new rules and practices. His biographer John English notes that Pearson made the case 
for “Arctic exceptionalism, the assertion that the Arctic did not fit neatly into existing 
international law.” Indeed, every state with interests in the Arctic and Antarctic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Report on the Arctic, Atlantic Division Air Transport Command, Headquarters, Atlantic-Division Air 
Transport Command, Report on the Arctic, July 1946, NARA, RG 319, Entry 82 (A1), Box 2975. 
16 Frank G. Klotz, America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues (Washington: National Defence University 
Press, 1990), 11. For similar arguments see Roberto E. Guyer, “Antarctica’s Role in International 
Relations,” in Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and Political Issues, ed. Francisco Vicuna 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 267, and F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics, 
(London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982), 6.  
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contemplated the implications of polar exceptionalism and considered unique legal 
responses. Some officials and legal experts insisted that the requirements of effective 
occupation should be lower in the uninhabited polar spaces, while others asserted that 
discovery and symbolic acts should play a greater role, or that contiguity and other 
geographic arguments should hold more weight.  
For his part, Pearson believed that the sector principle represented the best 
“practical solution” to the problem of polar sovereignty.17 British diplomat Laurence 
Collier explained in early 1930 that “the most recent history of territorial claims in the 
Arctic is really the history of the development of what is now known as the ‘Sector 
Principle.’”18 The British used this principle to expand their claim to the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies (FID) in 1917 and to carve out the Ross Dependency for New Zealand in 
1923. Canada applied it in 1925 to its polar regions, followed by the Soviet Union (1926), 
Australia (1933), France (1938), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1942) in various contexts.  
The sector principle allowed states to claim all explored and unexplored land 
between lines of meridian stretching to the North or South Poles. In both the Arctic and 
Antarctic, states framed sectors as geographical extensions of territory that they 
considered firmly under their sovereignty. In both regions, but particularly the Arctic, 
officials tried to bolster this argument by asserting that sectors emanated from the close 
proximity of a claimant state, which placed it in the best position to control and develop 
the enclosed space.19 As this study demonstrates, British and Commonwealth officials 
constructed the most elaborate legal foundation for the principle in the interwar years, 
locating its basis in treaty law and contiguity, and insisting that sectors flowed out of a 
state’s control over the coastline and other points of access to a polar hinterland. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 John English, Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic Council (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013), 64. 
For more on Lester B. Pearson’s introduction to polar issues, see Gordon W. Smith, A Historical and Legal 
Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North: Land, 1870-1949, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, forthcoming 2014), 305-306, and Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes, Acts of 
Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty, 1918-25 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 245-246. 
18 Laurence Collier, Memorandum Respecting Territorial Claims in the Arctic to 1930, 10 February 1930, 
NA, DO 35/167/7, Territorial Claims in the Arctic. 
19 Waldock, “Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies,” 339-340. For overviews of the 
sector principle, see Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law; Leonid Timtchenko, “The 
Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present,” Arctic 50, no. 1 (1997): 29-35; Oscar Svarlien, “The 
Sector Principle in Law and Practice,” Polar Record 10, no. 66 (1960): 248-263. 
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extension, Foreign Office legal advisers argued that effective polar control only required 
occasional or seasonal visits of state officials, the issue of licenses to foreigners operating 
in the claimed area, and the establishment of paper administrations. The Canadian 
government went a step further by establishing a thin line of permanently occupied police 
posts in the Eastern Arctic. 
 In his masterful examination of the sector principle from an international legal 
perspective, Donat Pharand concluded that the idea “has not developed as a principle of 
customary law, neither general nor regional, and cannot serve as a root of title for the 
acquisition of sovereignty.”20 Pharand’s dismissal obscures how many international legal 
experts and state officials, particularly in Britain and the Commonwealth, believed that 
the sector principle stood on the verge of acceptance as a customary rule of law in the 
1930s. Accordingly, the internal logic behind state usage of the sector principle warrants 
more careful academic scrutiny.21 In its historical context, the principle’s supporters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law, 79. For criticism of the sector principle see, 
Smith, A Historical and Legal Study in the Canadian North, Chapter 8. For an overview of the sector 
principle, see Svarlien, “The Sector Principle in Law and Practice,” 248-263. 
21 In the Canadian context, historians Janice Cavell, Jeff Noakes and Gordon W. Smith have explored the 
early origins of the sector principle and Canada’s ambivalent approach to it in the early 1920s. See Janice 
Cavell, “Sector Claims and Counter-claims: Joseph Elzéar Bernier, the Canadian Government, and Arctic 
Sovereignty, 1898-1934,” Polar Record 50, no. 254 (2014): 293-310.; Cavell and Noakes, Acts of 
Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty; Smith, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the 
Canadian North, Chapter 8. Peter Kikkert and Whitney Lackenbauer have also examined the issues created 
by Canada’s use of the sector principle after the Second World War. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter 
Kikkert, “The Dog in the Manger – and Letting Sleeping Dogs Lie: The United States, Canada and the 
Sector Principle, 1924-1955,” in The Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honour of Donat Pharand, eds. Suzanne 
Lalonde and Ted McDorman (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 216-239; and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter 
Kikkert,“Sovereignty and Security: The Department of External Affairs, the United States, and Arctic 
Sovereignty, 1945-68,” in In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009, ed. Greg Donaghy and Michael Carroll (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2011), 101-120. For overviews of the Russian application of the sector 
principle, see William Elliott Butler, Northeast Arctic Passage (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1978); Timtchenko, “The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present,” 29-35, and Peter Toma, 
“Soviet Attitude Towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic,” The American 
Journal of International Law 50, no. 3, (1956): 611-629. In the Antarctic context, historians and legal 
scholars have acknowledged the use of the sector principle by claimant states, but have done little to 
explore the internal logic behind its application. Beck has commented on the earliest utilization of the 
principle by the British Empire. See Peter Beck, “British Antarctic Policy in the Early 20th Century,” Polar 
Record 21, no. 134 (1983): 475-483; and Peter Beck, “Securing the dominant ‘place in the wan Antarctic 
sun’ for the British Empire,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 29 (1983): 448-461. Gillian Triggs 
has explored historical aspects of Australia’s use of the sector principle. Gillian Triggs, International Law 
and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica (Sydney: Legal Books Limited, 1986). The best overview of the 
application of the sector principle in the Antarctic stems from the documents and editorial commentary in 
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rationalized and supported it as the foundation of a new bi-polar legal regime that would 
effectively resolve territorial claims – a convenient solution to a problem that traditional 
international law could not solve in the anomalous legal space of the polar regions. This 
dissertation reveals how, through their articulation and employment of the sector 
principle, Britain and the Commonwealth countries of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand became the primary shapers of the bi-polar legal landscape in the years before 
the Second World War, an important consideration that has been overlooked in the 
historiography and legal scholarship. 
While some state authorities insisted on relaxed or radically altered rules for the 
polar regions, others refused to accept that traditional principles should be drastically 
changed because of harsh environmental conditions. The United States and Norway 
emerged as the staunchest defenders of a more stringent version of effective occupation. 
Both states eventually condemned the sector principle as a legally dubious tool used by 
states to unjustly seize large tracts of unoccupied, unused, and even unexplored polar 
territory. The Hughes Doctrine, crafted by the U.S. State Department in 1924, demanded 
the physical settlement and utilization of polar lands as a requisite of territorial 
acquisition.22 Historians Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis identify the U.S. as the 
“chief architect of law and policy for the Antarctic,” and praise Washington for it 
“consistency and continuity.”23 Such an assessment downplays the legal uncertainty 
evident in American officials’ appraisals and the selective manner in which they asserted 
their country’s perceived rights.24 As this dissertation reveals, Washington often seriously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
W.M. Bush, ed., Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents 1-
3 (New York: Oceana, 1982-1988). 
22 Gordon G. Henderson, “Policy by Default: The Origin and Fate of the Prescott Letter,” Political Science 
Quarterly 79, no. 1 (1964): 76-95; and H. Robert Hall, “The ‘open door’ into Antarctica: An Explanation of 
the Hughes Doctrine,” Polar Record 25, no. 153 (1989): 137-140.  
23 Christopher Joyner and E.R. Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The US in the Antarctic (Hanover: University 
Press of New England, 1997), 1 and 109. 
24 While this dissertation focused on the uncertainty in American legal appraisals, other scholars have 
highlighted the inconsistencies in overall American Antarctic policy. Frank G. Klotz has characterized the 
U.S. polar policy in the first half of the twentieth century one of “benign neglect” and concluded that 
“Policy toward the region traditionally has suffered from a lack of strong direction from the top and a 
corresponding air of ambivalence.” Klotz, America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues, 18 and xv. Moore 
and Shapely have highlighted that the Antarctic could only hold the interest of senior leadership for brief 
periods. Jason Kendall Moore, “A ‘Sort’ of Self-Denial: United States policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–
59,” Polar Record 37, no. 200 (2001): 13-26; Jason Kendall Moore, “Tethered to an Iceberg: United States 
Policy Toward the Antarctic, 1939-1949,” Polar Record 35, no. 193 (1999): 125-134; Jason Kendall Moore, 
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considered adopting less rigorous requirements designed specifically for the 
establishment of polar sovereignty in the decades before 1959 – a formula for territorial 
acquisition that officials labeled “constructive occupation.” Nevertheless, the Hughes 
Doctrine remained the core of American polar legal policy. Systematic research into the 
Hughes Doctrine’s origins, its application, the reactions it inspired in the other polar 
claimant states, its impact on the sector principle and how it became the dominant feature 
of the polar legal landscape, yield significant new insights into American thinking, 
political posturing, and international legal culture. Even though Washington never used 
the Hughes Doctrine to make its own territorial claim, its consistent public espousal of 
the doctrine eventually led Britain, the Commonwealth and other claimant countries to 
accept the necessity of physical settlement and use to secure title to territory.  
Reconstructing the Bi-Polar Legal Landscape 
This dissertation examines how state officials, legal advisers and international lawyers 
attempted to unravel the tangled “Gordian knot of polar sovereignty” between 1900 and 
1955.25 Drawing upon fresh archival research undertaken in several countries, as well as 
a thorough interrogation and synthesis of existing historical and legal scholarship, it 
explores the knowledge production that occurred on terrestrial polar claims, thus 
reconstructing the transnational web of ideas, adaptations, strategies and best practices 
developed to address the confusion and uncertainty that infused the anomalous legal 
space of the polar regions. By applying a global and bi-polar framework, this study offers 
a novel conceptual history of polar sovereignty and its constituent parts, including the 
sector principle, the doctrines of contiguity, constructive occupation and effective 
occupation, and other arguments used to justify territorial claims. Identifying the specific 
countries and individual lawyers, advisers and experts that shaped the legal and political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America, and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946-1961,” 
Polar Record, 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30; Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a 
Resource Age (New York: Earthscan, 2011). Peter Beck has noted, “The continuing inconsistencies of US 
Antarctic policy – indeed, some have questioned whether there has ever been any real or coherent US 
policy – in respect to territorial claims have not prevented non-recognition and no-claims becoming 
consistent themes in American statements.” Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica (London: 
Croom Helm, 1986). See also F.M. Auburn, “United States Antarctic Policy,” Marine Technology Society 
Journal 12, no. 1 (1978): 31-36. 
25 Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber, “Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of Polar Sovereignty,” Reciel 1, no. 
1 (2008): 27-40. 
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context of the Arctic and Antarctic, I scrutinize the complex interplay between the law, 
polar diplomacy and state practice.  
Although this study begins with an overview of polar exploration and the 
development of international legal ideas stretching back centuries, its primary temporal 
focus starts at the beginning of the twentieth century, when states started to seriously 
consider polar sovereignty. It ends in 1955, with Britain’s failed unilateral application to 
the International Court of Justice for a judicial settlement of its dispute with Argentina 
and Chile over the Falkland Islands Dependencies – a pivotal event in the legal 
development of the south polar region and a decisive moment on the path towards the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. By this point, the legal trajectories of the Arctic and Antarctic 
had diverged for almost a decade, after American recognition of Canada’s sovereignty 
over the islands of the Arctic Archipelago left the terrestrial claims in the north polar 
region settled, save for a few peripheral areas.  
Geographically, this dissertation focuses on polar spaces that lacked permanent 
Indigenous inhabitants and where sovereignty remained contested or undetermined at the 
turn of the twentieth century: the Antarctic continent and adjacent islands, the 
Subantarctic islands,26 and the islands of the High Arctic, particularly those above 
Lancaster Sound and Parry Channel in the Canadian Archipelago (now called the Queen 
Elizabeth Islands).27 Greenland (especially its sparsely populated eastern coast) and the 
Svalbard Archipelago also play important, but secondary roles, given their unique 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 As Maria Pia Casarini notes, defining the limits of the Antarctic and Antarctica has been a subject of 
longstanding debate. “It is now officially accepted that the term [‘Antarctica’] refers to the continent 
itself and the off-lying islands, while the term ‘Antarctic’ indicates the area south of the Antarctic 
Convergence, a belt around the continent at about 56°-58°S where the cold Antarctic surface water, 
flowing northwards, sinks beneath the warmer sub-Antarctic water.” Maria Pia Casarini, “Activities in 
Antarctica Before the Conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty,” in International Law for Antarctica, 2nd Ed., eds. 
Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1996), 628. 
27 Generally, the High Arctic is defined as the islands lying in the maritime Arctic, including Svalbard, the 
northern part of Greenland, Franz Joseph Land, Severnaya Zemlya, Novaya Zemlya and the Queen 
Elizabeth Islands. Historically, the Thule people (the ancestors of the modern Inuit) lived across the 
Canadian High Arctic, but the region was depopulated during the Little Ice Age. Aside from occasional 
visits from Inughuit or Inuit hunting parties from Greenland and the southern archipelago, the region lacked 
a permanent human presence at the turn of the twentieth century.  Canada’s High Arctic islands now fall 
within the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement settlement area and the territory of Nunavut.  On Inuit 
settlement processes in this region see, Milton Freeman, Inuit Land-Use and Occupancy Project (Ottawa: 
Thorn Press Ltd., 1976) and Lyle Dick, Muskox Land: Ellesmere Island in the Age of Contact (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2002). 
11	  
political and legal development. It focuses on the legal approaches and activities of the 
British Commonwealth and the U.S. as the primary shapers of the bi-polar legal 
landscape. To properly reconstruct the transnational network in which states and people 
thought about polar sovereignty, however, it also examines the arguments and strategies 
endorsed by the international legal community and the other polar claimants, particularly 
the Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark, Argentina, Chile and France. Each of these actors 
added texture and layers to the bi-polar legal landscape.  
Scholarly accounts of the historic legal situation in the polar regions often apply 
current legal standards to analyze past practices and whether these support a country’s 
current position, rather than discerning how historical actors viewed and understood 
events and legal developments as they unfolded.28 Such studies fall into the trap of what 
David Bederman calls “Foreign Office International Legal History,” succumbing to the 
“siren sound of historic instrumentalism.”29 These accounts try to make sense of the past 
through what it “has brought about and not for what it meant to the people living it” – an 
approach that Randall Lesaffer has criticized as one of the major pitfalls in legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Triggs, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5-61; Rothwell, The Polar Regions 
and the Development of International Law, 59-61; A.C. Castles, “The International Status of the Australian 
Antarctic Territory,” in International Law in Australia, ed. D.P. O’Connell (Canberra: Law Book Company, 
1966), 341-367; Christopher Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1992), 55; Emilio J. Sahurie, The International Law of Antarctica (New Haven: New Haven Press, 1992); 
Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Antarctic Mineral Exploitation: The Emerging Legal Framework (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Christopher C. Joyner and Sudhir K. Chopra, eds., The Antarctic Legal 
Regime (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); Susan J. Rolston and Ted L. McDorman, “Maritime 
Boundary Making in the Arctic Region,” in Ocean Boundary Making, eds.Douglas M. Johnston and Phillip 
M. Saunders (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), 16-73; Jonathan Charney, “The Antarctic System and 
Customary International Law,” in International Law for Antarctica, eds. Francesco Francioni and Tullio 
Scovazzi (Milan: Giuffre Editore, 1987), 55-99; Donald Rothwell, “Arctic Sovereignty and its Legal 
Significance for Canada,” ANU College of Law Research Paper 13, no. 19 (2013): 1-20; Todd Jay Parriott, 
“Territorial Claims in Antarctica: Will the United States Be Left Out in the Cold?” Stanford Journal of 
International Law (1986): 67-121; Rolph Trolle-Anderson, “The Antarctic Scene: Legal and Political 
Facts,” in The Antarctic Treaty Regime, ed. Gillian Triggs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
57-64; Svarlien, “The Sector Principle in Law and Practice,” 248-63; Christopher D. Beeby, “The Antarctic 
Treaty System: Goals, Performance and Impact,” in The Antarctic Treaty in World Politics, Arnfinn 
Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng eds. (London, Houndmills 1991): 5-7; Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. 
Taubenfield, Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959); Michael Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 
Ivor Richardson, “New Zealand’s Claims in the Antarctic,” New Zealand Law Journal 33 (1957): 38-42. 
29 David J. Bederman, “Foreign Office International Legal History,” in Time, History and International 
Law, eds. Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 44, 
46, 47. 
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history.30 This observation certainly applies to the historiography on the polar regions. 
Through the ahistorical reconstruction of the legal past, scholars have oversimplified the 
legal history of the Arctic and Antarctic and ignored many of the different attitudes and 
interpretations that existed on polar sovereignty.  
To reconstruct the complex polar legal landscape, this dissertation embraces the 
contextual turn in legal history, which considers legal ideas and concepts as products of 
their time, of historic systems of thought and of cultural and political environments.31 
Legal scholar Matthew Craven maintains that understanding the political-social context 
of a particular legal idea is “critically important for an understanding of what those ideas 
actually meant to those using them.” 32 A conceptual history of polar sovereignty must, as 
Martti Koskenniemi advises, take “legal vocabularies and institutions as open-ended 
platforms on which contrasting meanings are projected at different periods, each 
complete in themselves, each devised so as to react to some problem in the surrounding 
world.”33  
This contextual approach is pivotal to explain how officials and lawyers grappled 
with the problem of determining the definition and function of sovereignty in the polar 
regions.34 Sovereignty “is not a legal term with any fixed meaning,” international lawyer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Randall Lesaffer, “International Law and its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love,” in Time, History 
and International Law, eds. Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2007), 35. 
31 See Martin Koskenniemi, “Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for a Critical View,” 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 27, no. 215 (2013): 215-40; Bardo Fassbender and 
Anne Peters, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Law,” in Oxford Handbook of 
History of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012),13. 
32 Matthew Craven, “Introduction: International Law and its Histories,” in Time, History and International 
Law, eds. Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 17. 
See also David Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion,” 
Quinnipiac Law Review 17 (1997). 
33 Martti Koskenniemi, “A History of International Law Histories,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 968. 
See also Martti Koskenniemi, “Why History of International Law Today?” Rechtsgeschichte 4 (2004): 61-
66. As Fassbender and Peters note, “Concepts change over time. They are no more solid than the period or 
context in which they originated. Therefore, the analysis of a legal concept should include a reflection 
about the social and political context of the concept, and the political agenda behind it…” Fassbender and 
Peters, “Introduction,” 13. 
34 The issues of defining sovereignty more broadly are well documented. See for instance, F.H. Hinsley, 
Sovereignty, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: 
The Basis of International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); James Crawford, “Sovereignty as a 
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Michael Akehurst notes. “It is doubtful whether any single word has ever caused so much 
intellectual confusion.”35 Political scientists Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber point 
out that sovereignty “can be considered as an institution, a discourse, a principle, a 
structure, or a context” or conceptualized as a set of practices.36 Legal scholar Malcolm 
Shaw also presents territorial sovereignty as a flexible concept, a collection of legal 
rights, powers, liabilities and duties, the exact extent of which depends on the 
circumstances of a particular case.37 In short, seeking a fixed and general definition of 
sovereignty is both futile and ahistorical. In her excellent study, Benton captures this 
central tension. “How do we reconcile these two kinds of knowledge about sovereignty, 
our certainty about its definition and our recognition of its elusiveness? One way would 
be to refine the theoretical understanding of sovereignty; another, to retell its history.”38 
Biersteker and Weber echo this idea, arguing that scholars must not “dehistoricize 
sovereignty.”39 Polar sovereignty has never been a static concept. As this dissertation 
demonstrates, this ever-evolving legal, political and intellectual construct must be 
understood and analyzed in historical context. 
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Ideas Shaped Modem International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). On 
sovereignty as resting on contradictory principles and practices, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Problematic 
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Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and 
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Review of International Studies 10, no. 1 (1984): 1. 
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So too must the historian situate in appropriate context the appraisals, policy 
advice and arguments prepared by the international lawyers, legal advisers and other state 
officials who studied the problems of polar territorial claims. Accordingly, any analysis 
of the international legal history of the Arctic and Antarctic must take into account 
different national traditions or attitudes towards international law.40 The classical legal 
ideology held by many of the decision-makers in the State Department in the first 
decades of the twentieth century shaped their response to polar sovereignty and the 
crafting of the Hughes Doctrine, just as the British emphasis on state practice led them to 
support the sector principle. Furthermore, any study of international law that 
encompasses non-European and American countries needs to engage the issues of 
universality. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did imperial expansion produce a 
set of doctrines that was applied to all states.41 In Latin America or the Soviet Union, 
legal scholars questioned why European ideas and beliefs should dominate international 
law.42 As Arnulf Becker Lorca reminds us, “The use of comparative analysis requires 
recognizing that international law can have different meanings in various geopolitical 
locations.”43 The polar regions were not immune to this reality and should be understood 
through a “decentering critique of international law,” which recognizes that different 
states have applied the law in their own particular context.44 Alternative 
conceptualizations of polar sovereignty often stemmed from alternative 	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of International Law from Latin America,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 23 (2005): 145-172; 
Arnulf Becker Lorca, “International Law in Latin America or Latin American International Law? Rise, Fall 
and Retrieval of Tradition of Legal thinking and Political Imagination,” Harvard International Law 
Journal 47, no. 1 (2006): 283-306; Arnulf Becker Lorca, “Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century 
Histories of Imposition and Appropriation,” Harvard Journal of International Law 51, no. 2 (2010): 475-
552; Umut Özsu, “Agency, Universality and the Politics of International Legal History,” Harvard 
International Law Journal 52 (2010): 58; Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in 
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43 Lorca, “International Law in Latin America or Latin American International Law?” 282, n. 2. Martti 
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(2009): 1-8; At its most basic level, CIL simply entails the textual comparison of different doctrinal 
positions on a given international law topic. Boris Mamlyuk and Ugo Mattei, “Comparative International 
Law,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 36, no. 2 (2011): 385-452. 
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conceptualizations of international law. In the Soviet Union, this manifested in new 
arguments in support of the sector principle,45 while Chile and Argentine employed 
several arguments unique to “Latin American International Law,” namely the doctrine of 
uti possidetis juris (uti possidetis, ita possideatis – “as you possess, you may continue to 
possess”).46  
While different conceptions of the law played a significant role in the 
development of polar legal landscape, in the end, power dynamics smoothed out 
differences created by competing national traditions and conceptualizations. As Shaw has 
noted, “law cannot be divorced from politics or power.”47 Jurist Charles de Visscher 
explained the role of power when he compared the growth of customary international law 
to the formation of a path across vacant land. Over time, as the majority of travelers 
started to follow the same path, they transformed it into a well-worn road accepted as the 
only regular way. In a similar manner, state practice and acceptance could convert a legal 
proposal into a customary rule consistent with international law. De Visscher further 
stressed, “Among the users are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their 
footprints than others, either because of their weight, which is to say their power in this 
world, or because their interests bring them more frequently this way.”48 The activities 	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47 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 7th Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 56. Nico 
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law, and have made extensive use of the international legal order to stabilize and improve their position.” 
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Legal Order,” The European Journal of International Law 16, no. 3 (2005): 383. For an exploration of the 
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In the Antarctic context, Shirley Scott has insisted that powerful states used the law to provide a convenient 
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48 Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), 149. See William Pitt Cobbett, Leading Cases on International Law 1, 4th Ed., by Hugh H.L. 
Bellott (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1922), 5. On customary international law, see Michael Akehurst, 
“Custom as a Source of International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 47, no. 1 (1975): 1; 
Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (London: Cornell University Press, 1971); 
D.J. Biederman, Custom as a Source of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Byers, 
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and arguments of powerful states, especially those closely connected to a specific issue 
area, take on greater significance in shaping and universalizing the law. As a result, 
custom has largely reflected the state practice approved of by the powerful.49 In contrast, 
legal scholar Wilhelm Grewe has noted the difficulty that small states can experience 
when trying to enforce their legal claims against a great power.50 To balance the 
influence of power on the law, minor states often try to negotiate international rules or 
agreements in multilateral forums, where they can wield greater influence.51 This 
dissertation displays how these power dynamics played out in the polar regions, where 
first Britain and then the U.S. brought their weight to bear on the legal path to polar 
sovereignty, and smaller states such as Norway, Argentina and Chile consistently tried to 
constrain their influence through multilateral talks and conferences. 
 Imperialism and empire also constitute essential elements of the context that 
shaped the legal history of the polar regions.52 States, after all, started to pursue polar 
territory at a time when “Territorial accumulation became both a symbolic and material 
index of national powers and international standing.”53 Furthermore, the legal discourse 
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that developed around polar territorial acquisition initially stemmed from sites of imperial 
competition in Africa and Asia.54 As legal scholar Antony Anghie argues, European 
imperialism was central to the formation and expansion of international law, especially 
its basic doctrines on territorial acquisition and sovereignty.55 From a national policy 
perspective, several scholars have highlighted the imperial dynamics at work in the 
formation of the polar strategies of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa in the first half of the twentieth century.56  
While this dissertation draws on the conclusions of these national studies, my aim 
is not to elaborate on what Britain and the Dominions’ engagement with the polar regions 
can tell historians about the broader imperial relationship, but how the imperial 
relationship shaped the legal discourse on polar sovereignty. I discern how Canadian, 
British, Australian and New Zealander officials co-created knowledge in their discussion, 
appraisal and formation of the transnational legal ideas at the core of polar sovereignty, 
and how profoundly this exchange shaped international law in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
Political geographer Klaus Dodds has argued that scholars need to re-conceptualize the 
British Antarctic as a web of relations and places.57 He agrees with imperial historian 
Tony Ballantyne’s assertion that there is a “need to reconstruct the networks that 
structured the empire and trace the transmission of ideas, ideologies, and identities across 
space and time.”58 This suggestion is reflected in a wave of recent studies that investigate 	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the production and transfer of knowledge within the empire, and that map out the 
movement of ideas between its component parts.59 This dissertation explores the sharing 
of information and legal ideas that occurred in Imperial Conference and Polar Committee 
meetings, diplomatic exchanges, and informal conversations.60 Through this knowledge 
production, Britain and the Commonwealth left a large footprint on the bi-polar legal 
landscape. 
The imperial web, however, was only one nexus in which officials and legal 
experts came to understand polar sovereignty. This dissertation recreates the historical 
sociology of the bi-polar legal landscape, portraying state experts and international 
lawyers as products of various socio-political scenarios, reflections of often opposing 
national legal traditions, and members of an international legal community – an “invisible 
college of lawyers” that dealt in transnational ideas, principles and practices.61 It views 
historic legal appraisals as state officials and legal experts would have viewed them, 
within the context of the authors.62 By exploring how their thinking unfolded in response 
to contemporary political and legal developments, this dissertation exposes the complex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Tony Ballantyne, “Colonial Knowledge,” in The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah 
Stockwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 177-199. See, for example, Christopher Alan Bayly, 
Empire and Intelligence: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saul Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, 
Sensibility and White South Africa, 1820-2000 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000); and Amiria JM 
Henare, Museums, Anthropology and Imperial Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Several legal histories have also shown the interconnectedness of empire and the exchange if ideas within it. 
See Shaunnagh Dorsett and John McLaren, eds., Legal Histories of the British Empire: Laws, Engagements 
and Legacies (Oxford: Routledge: 2014); and B.L. Berger, A.R. Buck and H. Foster, eds., The Grand 
Experiment: Law and Legal Culture in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008). 
60 The Foreign Office that, “Since Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are especially concerned with 
the Antarctic, and the main British interest in the Arctic is Canadian, it has been particularly important that 
British polar policies should be agreed between the Commonwealth nations concerned, and the Polar 
Committee provided a convenient method of informal consultation between them.” Territorial Claims in 
the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, 1 May 1945, National Archives of Australia (NAA), 
A4311, 365/8, [British Document]. 
61 “A third direction of historical sociology might connect international law's development to the 
development of international law as a professional practice. Who have the international lawyers been? How 
have they been trained? What types of activity have they been engaged in? Have foreign offices followed 
their opinions? Some of such work already exists, but more would be needed, and from different parts of 
the world. The possibilities for a historical sociology of international law are, in fact, almost limitless.” 
Koskenniemi, “Why History of International Law Today?” 65. On the “invisible college of lawyers,” see 
Oscar Schachter, “The Invisible College of International Lawyers,” Northwestern University Law Review 
72, no. 2 (1977-1978): 217-226. 
62 Lesaffer, “International Law and its History,” 38. 
19	  
interaction between state legal appraisals, academic studies, national-policy making, and 
the evolving doctrine surrounding territorial acquisition. 
By avoiding a teleological approach and adopting a narrative and chronological 
methodology, I deliberately chart the twists and turns that characterized legal and 
political developments in the polar regions. This technique facilitates a deeper 
understanding of the complexities and uncertainties associated with polar sovereignty, the 
ways that transnational concepts evolved through space and time, and how events and 
ideas affected national deliberations as they unfolded. Global historian Lynn Hunt 
advocates such an approach, suggesting that “Stories by definition have beginnings and 
ends, and it is very difficult not to read the end of the story back into the past.” Rather 
than “start from the present and look backward,” historians should start at a point in the 
past and “ask how different alternatives sorted themselves out going forward.” In this 
way, scholars can “effectively sidestep the teleological trap.”63  
 My exploration of state sovereignty strategies, legal policies, and the historical 
sociology of international law underlines the central contention of this dissertation: 
national experiences with polar sovereignty have to be situated in a broader global and bi-
polar context. While national,64 inter-state65 and regional histories66 provide important 	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foundations upon which to build a truly international history, I demonstrate that it is only 
through a bi-polar framework, which reconstructs the web of connections, intersections 
and networks that enmeshed the polar regions, that this legal history can be understood 
without losing the larger currents of practice and thought in the detail of national 
histories.67  
Many scholars have argued that comparisons between the Arctic and Antarctic 
should be avoided. Once past the scenery and low temperatures, commentators suggest 
they are “poles apart”68 that, when grouped together, only allow for simplistic and 
misleading comparisons.69 Geographically, the two polar regions are distinct. While the 
Arctic is an ocean surrounded by land, the Antarctic is a glacially covered continent, 
surrounded by an ocean. While parts of the Arctic are home to Indigenous groups, the 
Antarctic has never experienced large-scale, permanent human settlement. Polar historian 
Michael Bravo recently pointed to a growing “realization that the political and policy 
synergies between the polar regions are far less substantial than assumed by previous 
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U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949,” Journal of Latin American Studies 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-738. 
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Southern Oceanic Rim (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1997); David Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 
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generations of polar explorers and scientists.”70 While such a conclusion is sound in 
terms of physical geography, it obscures synergies in law, politics and diplomacy that call 
for a bi-polar approach. 
Some legal experts and political geographers have been willing to examine the 
connections between the Arctic and Antarctic. Legal scholar Natalia Loukacheva has 
argued that contemporary “polar law” must be viewed in a “bipolar nexus,”71 and the 
work of Donald Rothwell emphasizes similarities in legal responses adopted by states 
working in the unique conditions of the Arctic and Antarctic.72 Political geographer 
Sanjay Chaturvedi has compared the legal, political, environmental and scientific 
development of the two regions, noting how deeply “the sovereignty discourse, the 
geography of imperialism and the geopolitics of state power” have affected the polar 
regions.73 Furthermore, critical geographer Klaus Dodds frequently examines the 
geopolitical relationship between the Arctic and Antarctic.74 In recent discussions about 
the future of the circumpolar regions, scholars also cite the Antarctic Treaty as a possible 
model for the Arctic, highlighting (usually superficially) the continuing connections 
between the polar regions, particularly in governance structures.75 Still, these legal pieces 	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81. 
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rarely engage with the legal history of the polar regions, and ignore the transnational 
historical context in which states thought about and applied the law.  
 In certain fields, historians have also embraced the benefits of examining events 
in a bi-polar context. For example, histories of polar exploration often highlight the 
involvement of explorers in both regions, and the lessons they drew from their 
experiences in these final frontiers.76 Histories of science and the environment have often 
bridged the Arctic and Antarctic, especially accounts of the International Polar Years and 
International Geophysical Year.77 Still, northern studies scholar Urban Wråkberg has 
recently called for more studies that situate the polar regions in their international settings 
and illuminate the parallels and diversions in their historical paths.78    
Several historians have attempted to illustrate the historic political and legal 
developments that connected the Arctic and Antarctic. Historian Peter Beck explores how 
Canada’s perception of the Antarctic was shaped by its own experiences in the Arctic.79 
Given Norway’s territorial interests and rich history in both the Arctic and Antarctic, 
Norwegian scholars have often engaged in bi-polar analysis.80 In his study of Norway’s 	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historic polar policy, scholar O.G. Skagestad concluded that early polar politics tied the 
regions together as states determined how to guide activity in “the formerly unregulated 
territories on the Earth’s ‘Frozen Frontiers.’”81 In a master’s thesis, historian Thorlief 
Thorleifsson explores the Canadian-British-Norwegian negotiations for territory in the 
Arctic and Antarctic in the late 1920s and notes that the two regions “were intrinsically 
connected as political moves in either of the continents could, and did, develop legal 
precedents in the wider bi-polar context.”82 Although these authors have adopted a bi-
polar outlook, they have conducted their studies through narrow national perspectives. 
No previous historian has attempted to research and write a bi-polar study of the 
international legal history of the polar regions. Accordingly, the typical fixation on a 
single nation’s experience or international interactions regarding one of the poles has 
obscured the historic legal development of a bi-polar world. Transnational legal ideas and 
arguments took on different meanings and evolved as they flowed between the poles and 
across the borders of the polar claimants. State officials and international lawyers 
understood that legal developments and state practice in the Arctic had a dramatic impact 
on the Antarctic and vice versa. When they visualized the uncertainties of polar 
sovereignty in the first half of the twentieth century, they saw the Arctic and Antarctic as 
a conjoined legal space that suffered from the same problems and demanded similar 
solutions.  
The Law Mattered 
A reconstruction of the bi-polar legal landscape illustrates how much the law affected 
state behaviour in the Arctic and Antarctic.83 In making this point, this dissertation builds 	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1930” (Simon Fraser University: Master’s Thesis, 2006), 3.  
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off the pioneering work of Donald Rothwell’s landmark legal treatise, The Polar Regions 
and the Development of International Law, which argues that the polar regions “represent 
examples of areas in which international law has been actively applied and adapted to 
meet special conditions.” Given the difficulties of applying international law at the global 
or regional level, “the polar regions then represent important case studies for an 
understanding of the development and application of international law.”84  
Generally, in the polar regions international law fulfilled its primary functions in 
world politics, “providing rules of the game, fostering stable expectations, positing 
criteria by which national governments and others can act reasonably and justify their 
action, and providing a process of communication in a crisis.”85 The law provided the 
normative framework and a set of resources through which they could justify their claims 
and behaviour.86 As legal scholar Michael Byers has noted, constructivist explanations 
for the development of international law highlight that the “evolution of shared 
explanations through communicative processes among technocratic and political elites 
can give rise, not only to normative structures, but also to associated, deeply felt 
conceptions of legitimacy, which then contribute to resilience of norms.”87 In the polar 
regions, claimant states consistently used legal arguments and explanations to defend 	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their territorial title and attain the recognition of other powers.88 When disputes arose, 
states generally engaged legal dialogues rather than shows of force (although the trilateral 
disagreement between Britain, Argentina and Chile veered towards the latter).89  
The same unique polar environment that made the application of traditional rules 
so difficult also gave the law added importance. States struggled to display a 
preponderance of power, or even a modicum of control, that would clearly indicate state 
ownership over the harsh, uninhabited polar space. Adding to the problem was the 
reluctance of states to invest in the study, administration or development of the polar 
regions, which weakened the official presence within these claims even more. Legal 
arguments and justifications provided a significant and cheap tool for polar claimant’s 
looking to support territorial claims in which they had little physical presence.  
As a result, within the state decision-making apparatus, international law played a 
significant – often leading – role.90 Legal scholars Anthony Carty and Richard Smith 	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have argued that legal advisers usually operate in the context of decided policy, and their 
job generally involves checking and re-checking the application of the law to strengthen 
existing strategies.91 In state deliberations on the polar regions, however, legal 
considerations often guided decision-making, decided internal debates and created policy. 
The legal advice offered by officials such as Charles Cheney Hyde, solicitor of the State 
Department between 1923 and 1925, Foreign Office legal advisers Cecil Hurst, William 
Eric Beckett and Gerald Fitzmaurice, and geographers Samuel Whittemore Boggs and 
James White in the U.S. and Canada, had a profound impact on the formation of national 
polar policies and on the broader bi-polar legal landscape. The legal analysis offered by 
state officials and international lawyers, for instance, explains Canada’s establishment of 
police posts on uninhabited islands where there was no one to police, state support of 
polar science and why permanent human inhabitation came to the Antarctic continent.  
The ambiguity and complexity of the law throughout the period covered in this 
dissertation only increased the importance of legal appraisals as states came to grips with 
polar sovereignty. Without a clear formula for territorial acquisition, state officials and 
legal experts could formulate creative arguments in defence of territorial title. This 
ambiguity, however, served as a double-edged sword. Without clear guidelines for the 
establishment of sovereignty, territorial disputes hinged on which state displayed the 
stronger title – a reality that worried many officials. For example, the indeterminacy of 
the law allowed the U.S. to impose the standards of the Hughes Doctrine on the polar 
regions. In this uncertain context, states recognized that official foreign recognition –
particularly from powerful states such as the U.S. and Britain – offered the only sure way 
of securing sovereignty. As a result, states had to determine whether to aggressively seek 
international recognition and risk inspiring official foreign rejection, or quietly strengthen 
their position and hope that in time other countries would consider it unchallengeable. 
This dilemma, and the search for alternatives, shaped state polar policy deliberations for 
decades.  
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Alongside the uncertainty of the rules, this dissertation shows how considerations 
of time and technological developments, within the context of Judge Max Huber’s theory 
of intertemporal law, played a profound role in the development of state legal policies on 
territorial title in the polar regions – a dynamic that previous scholars have failed to 
examine.92 Huber advanced this theory during his arbitration of the Palmas Island case in 
1928, through which he sought to explain how the changing requirements of certain legal 
principles should be applied to territorial disputes. His important distinction between the 
creation of a right and the maintenance of a right stressed the malleability of law in 
concept and practice.93 According to Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Huber argued that “in 
concrete terms, acts must be assessed against the law of the time when performed…but at 
the same time the claimant…must keep up with the law” as it evolved over time to 
“maintain their title.” This theory highlighted Huber’s belief that lawyers must strive for 
a “dynamic understanding of international law in accordance with the changing 
international society rather than cling to a static interpretation of rules.”94 By implication, 
no state title could be considered perfected for all time, particularly if a country’s 
occupation had not been continuous or if it had exercised control and administrative 
functions inconsistently.95 The continued validity of a territorial right depended on a state 
keeping up with developments in the changing requirements of international law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Time’s impact on international law requires more study generally. See Edward McWhinney, “The Time 
Dimension in International Law: Historical Relativism and Intertemporal Law,” in Essays in International 
Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, ed. J. Makarczyk (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 179-199; 
Rosalyn Higgins, “Time and Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem,” The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1997): 501-520; Yoshifumi Tanaka, “Reflections on Time Elements 
in the International Law of the Environment,” Zeitschrift fuer Auslaendisches Oeffentliches Recht und 
Voelkerrecht 73, no. 2 (2013): 139-175. 
93 “As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is to be applied 
in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be made between the creation of 
rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects the acts creative of a right to the law in 
force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued 
manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law.” Island of Palmas Arbitration, 
Award of 4 April 1928, 2 UNRIAA, 845.  
94 Daniel-Erasmus Khan, “Max Huber as Arbitrator: The Palmas Case and Other Arbitrations,” The 
European Journal of International Law 18, no. 1 (2007): 167. 
95 Huber ruled that, “A distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. 
The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, 
demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the 
conditions required by the evolution of law.” T.O. Elias, “The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law,” The 
American Journal of International Law 74, no. 2 (1980): 292. 
28	  
Huber’s theory of intertemporal law has faced criticism since he released it in 
1928, with legal scholars arguing that its application would “encourage spurious claims 
and…foster widespread uncertainty as to title to territory” and threaten the stability of the 
international legal order.96 For state officials involved in polar claims, however, Huber’s 
theory raised troublesome possibilities. Every lawyer understood the indeterminate nature 
of international law and Huber’s intertemporal theory underlined the impact that changes 
in the law could have on territorial claims. Consequently, beyond considering the 
contemporary requirements of effective occupation, officials also had to worry about 
what the requirements might become due to environmental changes or technological 
innovation. Judge Dionisio Anzilotti’s dissenting opinion in the Eastern Greenland case 
captured this sentiment when it argued, “natural conditions prevailing in Greenland and 
their importance changed appreciably as a result of technical improvements in navigation 
which opened up to human activities a part of that country, especially the East coast, 
which previously, although known, had been practically inaccessible.” Due to the impact 
of technological changes, “the question of Danish sovereignty over Greenland presented 
itself in a new light.” 97 Officials considered the impact that long-range aircraft, 
mechanical vehicles, advanced icebreakers and stations that allowed people to overwinter 
relatively comfortably in the polar regions would have on the requirements of occupation 
and territorial acquisition. All state officials worried about how the law might evolve in 
the decades that followed Huber’s ruling in the Palmas Island case. It only added further 
tension and confusion to the anomalous legal space of the polar regions. 
The tension created by actual and potential changes to the law is evident in 
Chapter 1, which sets an essential context by summarizing the history of polar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 7th Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 167. 
According to Professor Malanczuk, “…the wide terms in which Max Huber expressed himself seem to 
virtually deny the effect of the rule that the validity of an acquisition of territory depends on the law in 
force at the time of the alleged acquisition.” In the past conquest could confer title on the conquering state. 
In the present time, it does not. “Do old titles based on conquest now become void?” Peter Malanczuk, 
Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th Ed. (London, Routledge 1996), 156. For critiques 
of Huber’s theory of intertemporal law, see Philip C. Jessup, “The Palmas Island Arbitration,” The 
American Journal of International Law 22, no. 4 (1928): 740; Anthony D’Amato, “International Law, 
Intertemporal Problems,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt 
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1992), 1234-1236.  
97 Dissenting Opinion of M. Anzilotti, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ), Series A-B, No. 53, 84. 
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exploration and the development of the international law on territorial acquisition. 
European explorers ventured into the polar regions for commercial prospects, resource 
exploitation and national prestige. Although these explorers often planted flags and held 
elaborate ceremonies to claim new territory, at the official level states had little desire to 
acquire polar territory and rarely thought about the requirements of polar sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, discovery, acts of possession and flag planting formed the foundation of all 
territorial claims in the polar regions and played an important role as states and legal 
scholars finally started to consider polar sovereignty at the turn of the twentieth century. 
While the unclear and ambiguous international law on territorial acquisition provided a 
poor roadmap for states hoping to secure polar claims, it clearly indicated that discovery 
was not enough to perfect a title, even in the Arctic and Antarctic. Hampered by 
underdeveloped rules, state officials and legal experts explored the additional steps 
countries would have to take to support their polar claims. This first wave of legal 
appraisals debated whether states had to support their claims through physical settlement, 
or if a measure of control or arguments of contiguity would suffice. Another stream of 
legal thinking questioned if polar territory could be brought under state sovereignty at all, 
or if parts of the polar regions should be considered a common possession of all mankind.  
Chapter 2, stretching from 1907 to 1924, lays out the polar opposite polar policies 
that came to dominate the legal space of the Arctic and Antarctic in the interwar years: 
the sector principle and the Hughes Doctrine. By bringing disparate literatures and new 
primary research into dialogue, this chapter charts how the sector principle evolved from 
its initial suggestion by Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier in 1907, into a transnational 
legal idea used in Britain’s Letters Patent for the FID in 1917, and the Ross Dependency 
claim of 1923. It also explains the complex origins of the Hughes Doctrine, which the 
U.S. State Department crafted in 1924. This chapter argues that these polar policies 
developed out of a British tradition of international law that emphasized state practice 
and the classical legal ideology held by many of the decision-makers in Washington. It 
also maintains that the search for solutions to the problems of polar sovereignty must be 
understood against the backdrop of the dynamic and flexible character of the international 
legal landscape that took shape during the interwar years. In a flexible legal system 
attuned to state interests and practices, and constructed to resolve international issues 
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expediently and efficiently, there was room to consider a new polar legal regime based on 
the sector principle.  
Chapter 3 argues that 1925 and 1926 constituted pivotal years in the legal 
development of the polar regions, suggesting the need for a new periodization. During 
these two years, both Canada and the Soviet Union publicly declared their use of the 
sector principle. At the same time, an internal debate – which scholars have ignored or 
overlooked to date – raged amongst British officials about whether London should 
continue to utilize the sector principle. This argument forced officials to articulate clear 
and defensible positions on polar sovereignty and the sector principle. The debate 
culminated in the Imperial Conference of 1926, where British and Commonwealth 
officials adopted a bi-polar legal policy based on the sector principle, and a new version 
of effective occupation for the polar regions that emphasized control over the coastline 
and other points of access leading to a polar interior – whether it be the Arctic 
Archipelago or the Antarctic interior. In the harsh polar environment, they insisted that 
control could consist of the occasional visit by state officials, administrative acts, 
legislation and, in the Canadian context, a small number of occupied police posts. More 
than ever, British and Commonwealth officials recognized the legal and political 
connections that bound the Arctic and Antarctic together, and sought bi-polar solutions. 
They insisted that a regime based on their understanding of the sector principle was the 
best answer to the anomalous legal space of the polar regions. 
At the same time, the Norwegian government arose as a defender of a more 
stringent version of effective occupation and started to question the polar claims of 
Britain, the Dominions and the Soviet Union. While Norway anticipated that the 
Americans might use the Hughes Doctrine to protest the Canadian and Soviet sector 
claims, Washington remained officially silent, although they seriously considered 
challenging Canada’s sovereignty over the northern islands of the Archipelago. Within 
the State Department, officials wrestled with the issue of polar sovereignty, what to do 
about the sector principle, and how to apply existing international law in the polar 
regions. This chapter reveals that the State Department’s confusion and internal debates 
inhibited its ability to develop a definite policy towards polar sovereignty. At the same 
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time, political considerations played an important role in constraining America’s use of 
the Hughes Doctrine, a trend that would repeat over the ensuing decades. All of these 
factors allowed Britain to emerge as the dominant shaper of the bi-polar legal landscape 
in the interwar years. 
Nevertheless, in the late 1920s, the sector principle remained an untested doctrine. 
Scholars have done little to flesh out state thinking on the sector principle after 
governments initially applied it to make territorial claims. To address this oversight, 
Chapter 4 provides a fresh appraisal of the archival record to reveal how British and 
Commonwealth officials came to believe that the principle stood on the verge of general 
acceptance as a rule of customary international law for the polar regions in the early 
1930s. They based their assessment on the results of Britain’s bi-polar diplomacy and 
negotiations, and the sustained silence of the international community, which officials 
took as tacit acquiescence to the use of the sector principle and their territorial claims. 
The continued official silence of the U.S. in particular invested British and 
Commonwealth officials with hope in the future of the sector principle. While the State 
Department considered using the Hughes Doctrine to challenge Britain’s Antarctic 
claims, the political repercussions of such an action and its continued struggle with the 
meaning of polar sovereignty once again inhibited its actions.  
As this chapter reveals, only Norway remained a persistent objector to the sector 
principle as it launched renewed attempts to safeguard its interests in the polar regions 
after 1926. Norway acknowledged the need to sustain good relations with Britain, 
however, and proved amenable to negotiations and diplomacy, promising to respect the 
British Empire’s territorial interests in the Antarctic and recognizing Canada’s 
sovereignty over all the Arctic Archipelago. As silence, negotiations, and the passage of 
time strengthened the legal positions of Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia in 
the polar regions, optimism and confidence in the polar claims of the members of the 
British Empire and in the sector principle culminated with the establishment of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory in 1933. British and Commonwealth officials, in the 
context of the time, anticipated that the broader world might accept the sector principle as 
the basis of a bi-polar legal regime. 
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 Chapter 5 engages with broader developments in the law on territorial acquisition 
during the interwar years and their impact on state legal understandings of polar 
sovereignty. The Palmas Island (1928), Clipperton Island (1931) and Eastern Greenland 
(1933) cases all dealt with title over uninhabited, or sparsely populated territory, and 
became the touchstones for all those looking into territorial sovereignty. Many scholars 
insist that the judicial decisions brought instant clarification to the requirements of 
territorial acquisition – allowing states to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their 
claims. However, this chapter reevaluates the discussions and legal appraisals at the time 
alongside subsequent scholarly assessments to show how confusion and uncertainty 
continued to define the rules on territorial acquisition. While these three cases (especially 
Eastern Greenland) clarified elements of the law and set a modest threshold for 
“effective occupation” in regions like the Arctic and Antarctic, they did not lay out 
specific requirements or establish a simple formula for polar sovereignty. Huber’s theory 
of intertemporal law further confused the legal situation for officials and international 
lawyers studying polar territorial claims. Accordingly, the international law on territorial 
acquisition remained unsettled in the eyes of legal authorities at the time and the judicial 
nature of polar sovereignty remained as ambiguous as ever. The elusiveness of the law 
allowed states to craft multiple versions of polar sovereignty, and the bi-polar legal 
landscape continued to be filled with different interpretations, principles and 
justifications. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the impact that the U.S. had on the bi-polar legal 
landscape once it finally decided to engage with the polar regions. Spurred on by the 
creation of the Australian Antarctic Territory, the activities of American explorers, and 
growing international interest in the Antarctic, U.S. officials finally considered a more 
active polar policy. Starting in 1934, the State Department started to take stronger action 
to safeguard its legal position, eventually reserving its rights in the sectors claimed by 
Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and France, and insisting that territorial claims required 
permanent physical occupancy and use. Internally, guided by the arguments of former 
solicitor Charles Cheney Hyde, the State Department considered rejecting the Hughes 
Doctrine and adopting the lesser requirements it labeled constructive occupation. For the 
other polar claimants, however, the confident public American espousal of the Hughes 
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Doctrine began to shift legal opinions. Britain and the Commonwealth remained tied to 
the sector principle, a position bolstered by the official recognition that the British, 
Australian and New Zealand claims received from Norway and France, and the latter’s 
formal use of the principle. Still, the American legal arguments and developments in 
aviation slowly led to more questions about the validity of the polar sectors.   
Chapter 7 reveals the pivotal but underappreciated role that Franklin D. Roosevelt 
played in the development of American polar legal policy and polar sovereignty. 
Roosevelt singlehandedly caused the State Department to abruptly shift its support from 
constructive occupation back to the Hughes Doctrine. This chapter connects Roosevelt’s 
experiences with territorial acquisition in the Pacific, where he consistently emphasized 
permanent settlement, to his approach to polar sovereignty. Through his support of the 
Hughes Doctrine and its physical manifestation in the official United States Antarctic 
Service Expedition (USASE), the President inspired the permanent human occupation of 
the Antarctic continent. At the same time, Roosevelt’s private suggestion that the U.S. 
utilize a “new form of sovereignty” to claim territory in the Antarctic, such as a 
condominium or joint control (which also flowed out of his Pacific experiences), 
significantly impacted the region’s legal evolution and laid the groundwork for the 
Antarctic Treaty in the State Department. Through these developments, the U.S. 
supplanted Britain as the primary architect of the polar legal landscape.  
Roosevelt and the Second World War changed the political and legal context of 
the polar regions. This dissertation maps out the dramatic influence that the American 
emphasis on permanent occupation had on the legal policies of the other polar claimants. 
Given how much stock arbitrators and the Permanent Court of International Justice 
placed on which state displayed a stronger title during territorial disputes, the American 
presence was worrisome enough on its own. The USASE also inspired a shift in broader 
understandings about the legal requirements of polar sovereignty. In the British mindset, 
even though the USASE had lasted less than two years, the American effort and 
concurrent technological developments changed the rules by showcasing the possibilities 
of polar settlement. Foreign Office legal adviser William Eric Beckett concluded that if 
countries wanted to maintain their title, they should also establish a permanent presence. 
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This conclusion proved particularly pertinent for Britain when Chile and Argentina 
challenged its position in the FID during the war. The emphasis on a permanent physical 
presence also struck home in wartime Ottawa, where the government faced a massive 
influx of American military and civilian personnel into the Canadian North during the 
war. Although these activities never spread into the High Arctic, they inspired concern 
about the legal status of the unoccupied northern islands, which Washington had never 
recognized as Canadian territory. Although the Chileans and Argentineans introduced a 
bevy of new arguments and concepts into the legal dialogue on polar sovereignty, and 
other claimant states continued to utilize the sector principle and contiguity arguments, 
Roosevelt and the USASE left an indelible mark on the bi-polar legal landscape. From 
this point, many state officials and legal advisers considered widespread permanent 
physical occupancy to be an essential requirement of polar sovereignty.  
With this need for permanent physical presence established as the dominant 
feature of the bi-polar legal landscape, Chapter 8 shows how the use and development of 
claimed territory became the other keys to polar sovereignty. The polar claimants deemed 
the establishment of presence for the sake of presence far less impactful than the 
establishment of presence for a purpose. Legal justifications played an increasingly 
important role in the Antarctic, as territorial competition heated up. Extensive legal 
argumentation became a staple of the dispute between Argentina, Chile and Britain over 
the FID. This chapter reveals how Britain leaned increasingly on legal maneuvers and 
strategies as it perceived its position weakening in the dispute. On several occasions after 
1947, Britain invited Argentina and Chile to take the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice, where London thought it would have the advantage. While its overtures were 
consistently rejected, Britain still brought the case unilaterally to the ICJ in 1955 for legal 
and moral reasons. The failure of the court to hear the case and elucidate on the 
requirements and principles of sovereignty in the Antarctic context ensured that the 
region remained an anomalous legal space, a pivotal requirement for the creation of the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which effectively froze all territorial claims and rights.  
This chapter also maps the different legal trajectories that the Arctic and the 
Antarctic embarked upon after 1947. During the early Cold War, the U.S. pushed for 
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access to Canada’s Arctic islands to build defence facilities. Largely out of sovereignty 
concerns, Canadian officials proved cautious and slow in approving the projects. In the 
negotiations that followed, the U.S. could have invoked the Hughes Doctrine and 
challenged Canada’s use of the sector principle and its claims to the unoccupied islands 
of the Arctic Archipelago. Once again, however, political considerations constrained 
America’s use of the doctrine. Rather than jeopardize its strategic and political 
relationship with Canada, the U.S. recognized Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic 
Archipelago. At the same time, the U.S. avoided publicizing this recognition, given how 
much it would have strengthened the sector principle in other geographical contexts, 
jeopardizing the evolving U.S. legal position in the Antarctic. Nevertheless, the United 
States quietly and privately conceded to Canada what it was not prepared to acknowledge 
in international law more generally: a more relaxed interpretation of effective occupation 
and ownership of territory in polar regions than the Hughes Doctrine allowed.  
The American recognition of Canada’s sovereignty settled the last potential 
source of a large-scale terrestrial territorial dispute in the Arctic. In sharp contrast, 
American recognition of Antarctic claims remained elusive. Nevertheless, political 
considerations continued to keep the Americans from annexing their own Antarctic 
territory. As a result, starting in 1948 Washington consistently worked towards joint 
control or the internationalization of the south polar region. Washington’s decision to 
recognize no Antarctic claims and make none for the U.S. represents another essential 
pre-condition of the Antarctic Treaty. 
The legal paths of the Arctic and Antarctic had diverged, a reality officials and 
legal experts only slowly started to recognize. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the legal status of territorial claims to the uninhabited spaces of the Arctic and Antarctic 
was virtually identical. By 1955, however, terrestrial claims in the Arctic had been fixed. 
Four years later, those in the Antarctic would be frozen.   
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Chapter 1 
1 Explorers and Lawyers: Discovering Land and Law in 
the Polar Regions 
On 6 September 1909, shortly after sailing into Indian Harbour, Labrador, American 
explorer Robert Peary sent a telegraph to the New York Times announcing: “I have the 
pole, April sixth.” After hundreds of years and dozens of failed attempts by explorers of 
various nationalities, Peary told the world that he had finally “nailed” the stars and stripes 
to the North Pole, and taken one of the greatest and last prizes of exploration on the 
planet.1 Unfortunately for the explorer, another American had already taken this trophy. 
Just a week before, the New York Herald told the world that Dr. Frederick Cook 
discovered the Pole in April 1908, a full year before Peary.2 Within days, both men 
started to attack and discredit the other, initiating a war of words that filled the papers in 
the following weeks.3 On 13 September, however, Captain Robert Falcon Scott, the 
experienced Antarctic explorer of the Royal Navy, stole the spotlight with his own 
startling declaration. Riding the wave of publicity created by the discovery of the North 
Pole, and cognizant of potential challenges from proposed German, American and 
Japanese expeditions, Scott promised to “reach the South Pole, and to secure for the 
British Empire the honour of that achievement.”4 In a matter of weeks the world had 
witnessed the discovery of one Pole, and a promise to conquer the other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Peary Discovers the North Pole After Eight Trials in 23 Years,” New York Times, 7 September 1909. The 
message Peary sent to the New York office of the Associated Press read, “Stars and Stripes nailed to the 
Pole.” PEARY.  
2 “The North Pole is Discovered by Dr. Frederick Cook,” New York Herald, 2 September 1909.  
3 The battle between Peary and Cook ignited a controversy that is still waged by historians, although there 
is a growing consensus that both men may have been frauds. See, for instance, Dennis Rawlings, Peary at 
the North Pole: Fact or Fiction (Washington: Robert B Luce Inc., 1973); Bruce Henderson, True North: 
Peary, Cook, and the Race to the Pole (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); Nancy Fogelson, 
Arctic Exploration and International Relations, 1900-1932 (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 1992); 
Robert Bryce, Cook and Peary: The Polar Controversy, Resolved (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 
1997); Pierre Berton, The Arctic Grail: The Quest for the North West Passage and the North Pole, 1818-
1909 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1988). 
4 Quoted in David Crane, Scott of the Antarctic: A Life of Courage and Tragedy in the Extreme South 
(London: HarperCollins, 2005), 397. Scott’s intentioned were first announced by Times and Daily Mail. 
For the motives behind Scott’s announcement, see Roland Huntford, The Last Place on Earth: Scott and 
Amundsen’s Race to the South Pole (New York: Random House Inc, 1999), 236-237.  
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While the public thirsted for the high drama of polar exploration and enjoyed the 
stories of adventure, a small group of international lawyers contemplated the new and 
complicated legal issues created by the actions of Peary, Cook, Scott, and explorers like 
them. A flurry of activity in the polar regions during the first decade of the twentieth 
century worked to illuminate the many blank spots in the map of the Arctic or slowly 
penetrated the little known Antarctic continent, one small piece at a time. “Acts of 
discovery are never politically innocent,” scholar Klaus Dodds has noted.5 When these 
explorers discovered new lands (or ice), or re-discovered old ones, they raised their 
national flags and held elaborate ceremonies claiming large parts of the Arctic and 
Antarctic. Upon Peary’s return to the U.S., for instance, he informed President William 
Howard Taft that he claimed the North Pole for his country and was pleased to present 
the trophy to the President. Taft rejected Peary’s “generous offer” explaining he “did not 
know exactly what [he] could do with it.”6 The proffered gift raised the question: what 
would happen when states decided they wanted these areas, supporting acts of discovery 
with official polar claims? What about the states that already had?  
In the months following September 1909, three prominent international lawyers – 
James Brown Scott, Thomas Willing Balch and René Dollot (who used the pseudonym 
René Waultrin) – published their opinions.7 Several lawyers had written about the legal 
status of Svalbard, an archipelago midway between Norway and the North Pole claimed 
by at least five different countries, and whether it was possible to annex ice in the same 
manner as land.8 The Scott, Balch and Dollot opinions represented the first time legal 
scholars attempted to articulate and clarify the judicial nature of polar sovereignty more 	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6 Quoted in Fogelson, Arctic Exploration and International Relations, 37.  
7 See James Brown Scott, “Arctic Exploration and International Law,” The American Journal of 
International Law 3, no. 4 (1909): 928-941; Thomas Willing Balch, “The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and 
the Law of Nations,” The American Journal of International Law 4, no. 2 (1910): 265-275; René Waultrin, 
“Le probleme de la souverainete des poles,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public 16 (1909): 649-
660. Dollot also had an earlier article that largely dealt with Spitsbergen. Waultrin, “La question de la 
souveraineté des terres arctiques,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public 15 (1908): 78-125, 185-
209 and 401-423 
8 Thomas Baty, “Spitzbergen,” Law Magazine and Review 33 (1907): 83-88; C. Piccioni, “L’organisation 
du Spitzberg,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public 16 (1909): 117-134; Louis Rolland, “Alaska; 
maison de jeu etablie sur les glaces au dela de la limite des eaux territoriales,” Revue Générale de Droit 
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generally, at least outside the narrow confines of government offices and research 
departments. What rights did a state acquire when one of its citizens discovered new land 
and performed purely symbolic acts, such as planting a flag or firing a volley? What if 
the explorer spotted new territory but made no attempt to go ashore? How could states 
extend their control over inhospitable and often uninhabitable lands? Could countries 
actually claim the Poles?  
As these pioneers of polar law looked for answers, they examined not only the 
activities of the previous decade, but also centuries of polar exploration and 
developments in international law stretching back to the Roman Empire. European 
explorers had ventured into the polar regions for scientific interest, commercial prospects, 
resource exploitation and national prestige. Historically, territorial claims were often the 
byproduct of polar exploration rather than the primary goal. Even though state officials 
rarely grappled with the problems of polar sovereignty, they understood that these acts of 
discovery, flag plantings and ceremonies of possession were at the root of all territorial 
claims. Therefore, any reconstruction of the bi-polar legal landscape must begin with 
exploration and the patchwork of claims – both private and state supported – that resulted.  
Scholars must also account for the fact that the polar regions remained outside the 
evolving legal discourse on territorial acquisition. Only in the twentieth century, when 
whaling, exploration and international competition increased state interest in polar 
territorial claims, did the worlds of the lawyer and that of the polar explorer come 
together. Unfortunately, when lawyers tried to visualize the unique natural and political 
environment of the polar regions as legal space, the ambiguous and confused body of law 
on territorial acquisition hampered their efforts. 
1.1 Into Great Unknown: Polar Exploration, 1550-1800 
In the first European forays into the Arctic in the sixteenth century explorers searched for 
a commercial route to the Orient: either a Northwest Passage above northern North 
America, or a Northeast Passage along the coast of Siberia. While on their quests, sailors 
often stumbled upon new land that they usually claimed for their monarchs, even if their 
39	  
missions were privately funded. During three expeditions in the late 1570s, Martin 
Frobisher rediscovered Greenland (the Norse abandoned the area in the early 15th 
century), sailed into the bay on western Baffin Island that now bears his name, and 
claimed the region for Queen Elizabeth I. By 1620, John Davis, Robert Bylot and 
William Baffin followed Frobisher’s route and pushed further north, into Davis Strait, 
Smith, Jones and Lancaster Sounds and charted the eastern coastline of Baffin Island. 
Despite these achievements, the English efforts relocated to the southerly reaches of the 
North American archipelago, where Henry Hudson found his enormous bay in 1610.9 By 
the end of the century, the newly formed Hudson’s Bay Company dominated exploration 
in the North, but its focus on the subarctic fur trade left little incentive to support forays 
into the Arctic Archipelago.10  
 As English sailors slowly pushed into the North American Arctic, a more diverse 
cast of explorers moved into the northern waters above Europe and Russia. Starting in the 
mid-sixteenth century, several English navigators tried to locate the mouth of the 
Northeast Passage north of the Kola Peninsula, but by 1581worsening relations between 
Queen Elizabeth I and Tsar Ivan IV cooled English interest.11 In their place, William 
Barents, an experienced Dutch navigator, made three voyages into the sea that now bears 
his name between 1594 and 1596. On the first he reached the western coast of Novaya 
Zemlya and on the third he discovered Bear Island and the Spitsbergen archipelago12 
(though he perished on the ice soon after).13 Several other expeditions searched for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Andrew Taylor, Geographical Discovery and Exploration in the Queen Elizabeth Islands (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1955), 9. 
10 Peter Newman, Empire of the Bay: An Illustrated History of the Hudson's Bay Company (Markham: 
Viking, 1989), 129. The HBC’s 1670 charter included a provision to search for a Northwest Passage, but no 
Company employees actually ventured into the archipelago for the next century. Explorers like Alexander 
Mackenzie and Samuel Hearne did explore the major waterways to the Arctic Coast, the Mackenzie and 
Coppermine, greatly assisting later exploration efforts.  
11 The first English expedition left in 1553, under Sir Hugh Willoughby, but all died after taking shelter on 
the Kola Peninsula. William James Mills, Exploring Polar Frontiers: A Historical Encyclopedia (Santa 
Barbara: ABC Clio, 2003), 473.  
12 The name Spitsbergen, meaning “pointed mountains” in Dutch was originally applied to the entire 
archipelago until Norway officially adopted the name Svalbard for the archipelago in 1925. Spitsbergen is 
Svalbard’s largest island. 
13 See, Gerrit de Veer, Three Voyages of William Barents to the Arctic Regions (1594, 1596 and 1596) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Barents and his men spent a winter on Novaya Zemlya 
before attempting to reach the Kola Peninsula in their small boats. While Barents perished on the ice, most 
of his men survived the ordeal.  
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Passage in the following decades, but the Arctic ice – particularly around Novaya Zemlya 
– defeated them all.14  
No one conquered either Passage to reach the wealth of the Orient. Explorers 
found a different source of riches – reporting a bounty of whales in the Arctic waters that 
prompted a rush of whalers in the early seventeenth century. In 1614, after establishing 
shore stations on Spitsbergen, English whalers of the Muscovy Company attempted to 
claim exclusive rights to the entire archipelago based on their occupation and their 
annexation of the island in the name of King James I.15 Danish, French, and Dutch 
whalers, who claimed Spitsbergen based on Barents’ sighting, rejected the English claim. 
After ferocious competition, the whalers compromised and partitioned the island without 
any country establishing its sovereignty.16 Soon after, controversy erupted over Jan 
Mayen, an island located 450 km east of Greenland, but Dutch whalers with the 
Noordsche Compagnie settled the issue when they established stations on its rocky shore. 
Over-hunting eradicated the local bowhead whale population and by 1640 the Dutch 
abandoned Jan Mayen, which would not be visited again for two centuries.17 The search 
for new whale populations to harvest led Dutch and English whalers to expand their 
activities to Davis Strait and the western coast of Greenland, although regular and 
intensive whaling did not begin there until 1719.18 In a century, the whalers expanded the 
European map of the Arctic, settled some of its islands for the first time, and made the 
northern waters busier than ever. 
While Frobisher “rediscovered” Greenland and whalers busily plied the waters 
around it, the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway maintained its claim to the enormous island 
that it inherited from the Norse.19 Despite a failed exploratory voyage in 1579, King 
Christian IV sent three expeditions to locate the abandoned Norse colonies and create a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mills, Exploring Polar Frontiers, 473.  
15 R. N. Rudmose Brown, “Spitsbergen in 1914,” The Geographical Journal 46, no. 1 (1915): 15. 
16 Thor B. Arlov, A Short history of Svalbard (Oslo: Norwegian Polar Institute, 1994), 18-19, 60.  
17 Mills, Exploring Polar Frontiers, 333; Louwrens Hacquebord, “Jan Mayen Island in Scientific Focus,” 
NATO Science Series 45 (2004): 229-238.  
18 W. Gillies Ross, “The Annual Catch of Greenland (Bowhead) Whales in Waters North of Canada, 1719-
1915: A Preliminary Compilation,” Arctic 32, no. 2 (1979): 94.  
19 While the last recorded visit of Europeans to the Norse colonies was in 1408, the Danish crown 
continued to claim lordship over Greenland in the following centuries. 
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Danish presence in Greenland between 1605 and 1607. The first two expeditions 
managed to land on the island’s west coast, yet they failed to locate the colonies. The 
third voyage was a disaster.20 Several unsuccessful exploration attempts followed21 until 
the 1720s when Hans Egede, a young Lutheran minister armed with a charter from King 
Frederick IV, created a permanent settlement at Godthåb (Nuuk) on the southwest coast. 
Over the next century, the Danish Crown gave out trade monopolies, banned foreign 
traders from operating in the area, sent naval expeditions and established more 
settlements in western Greenland.22  
As the Danes attempted to solidify their hold on Greenland, Russian explorers 
unveiled vast swathes of northern Siberia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Russians slowly ventured into Siberia, travelling down major waterways like the Ob, 
Yenisey and Lena Rivers to the shores of the Kara and Laptev Seas. Implementing the 
nation-building vision of Peter the Great,23 Vitus Bering and the Great Northern 
Expedition (1733-1742) mapped most of Siberia’s coastline and discovered the Aleutian, 
Commander and Kuril Islands, Bering Strait, and Alaska in 1741.24 In the decades that 
followed, Russian expeditions surveyed and circumnavigated Novaya Zemlya, wintered 
on Spitsbergen, and made several attempts to sail through the Northeast Passage.25 More 
importantly, by 1800 fur traders of the Russian-American Company established several 
permanent settlements in Alaska.26 A Russian-dominated Arctic began to emerge.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Vivian Etting, “The Rediscovery of Greenland During the Reign of Christian IV,” Journal of the 
North Atlantic 2 (2009): 151-160. In 1619, the King sent the Norwegian sailor, Jens Munk, to find the 
Northwest Passage and he made it as far as Churchill, Manitoba.  
21 Spencer Apollonio, Lands That Hold One Spellbound (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2008), 10-
11. Three Danish sponsored expeditions were sent between 1652 and 1654, but none managed to land on 
the Greenland coast, while a crown-sponsored voyage to East Greenland was lost in 1671 with all hands. 
22 Shelagh Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver: 
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(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973).  
23 See W. Bruce Lincoln, The Conquest of a Continent: Siberia and the Russians (New York: Random 
House, 1994), 101-102. 
24 See Lincoln, The Conquest of a Continent, 107-133; Lydia Black, The Russians in Alaska, 1732-1867 
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 At the other end of the globe expert British navigator James Cook opened the 
door to a new polar frontier in the south. In 1772, Cook sailed from England with orders 
to find the “Great South Land” – the missing continent that geographers thought 
dominated the southern hemisphere. French expeditions discovered several islands in the 
Subantarctic, including Bouvet, the Crozet, the Prince Edward, and the Kerguelen 
Islands27 but the explorers stopped short of the Antarctic Circle. On 17 January 1773, 
Cook and HMS Resolution became the first to achieve this feat. Gently picking his way 
through sea ice and bergs, Cook made it to 71°10'S, 120 km from the Antarctic coast, 
before turning back. On his journey north, Cook landed on the Subantarctic island of 
South Georgia, hoisted a flag, fired three volleys, and claimed it for King George III. 
Soon after, he discovered the southern eight islands of the South Sandwich Group 
(though he did little to investigate them).28 Notwithstanding the discovery of new 
territory for Britain, the ultimate object of Cook’s voyage remained unfulfilled: the Great 
South Land lay undiscovered and undisturbed just over the horizon.29  
Despite the work of Cook and the other early explorers, the Napoleonic Wars 
ended further exploratory efforts at the beginning of the nineteenth century.30 No one had 
yet found the Antarctic continent, navigated the Northeast or Northwest Passages, or 
reached the Poles. The British claimed the most easterly part of Arctic North America, 
Russia claimed most of the Siberian coastline and a few of the islands above it, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The French expeditions were also sent in search of the southern continent. When Yves-Joseph de 
Kerguelen-Trémarec discovered a desolate archipelago in the southern Indian Ocean in 1772, he thought it 
was the Antarctic continent. Mills, Exploring Polar Frontiers, 96.  
28 David Day, Antarctica: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10-12. 
29 Although Cook had not found the Great South Land, upon his return to England he explained that such a 
continent probably existed, but warned: “Should anyone possess the resolution and fortitude to push yet 
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Turney, 1912: The Year the World Discovered Antarctica (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 2012), 11.  
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Antarctic islands south of New Zealand during this period. In 1788, just months before the famous mutiny, 
Captain William Bligh discovered a new group of islands and named them after his ship HMS Bounty. In 
1800, Captain Henry Waterhouse, on board HMS Reliance, became the first to chart the Antipodes. Island 
Group British whaler, Captain Abraham Bristow discovered the Auckland Islands in 1806, naming them 
after his friend, William Eden, 1st Baron of Auckland. In January 1810, an Australian sealer, Captain 
Frederick Hasselborough, set off to look for new hunting grounds on the brig Perseverance and discovered 
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Danes established a presence in southwestern Greenland, leaving most of the land above 
the Arctic coastline undiscovered and unclaimed. In the “long nineteenth century” this 
situation changed dramatically. 
1.2 For King and Country: Polar Exploration, 1815-1845 
After Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the Royal Navy ‘ruled the waves.’ 
Without a war to fight, and Britain’s sea-lanes of trade and communication secure, the 
Navy struggled to find an outlet for its energies. Government-sponsored polar exploration 
provided a purpose for the Royal Navy and a testing-ground for its ships and men, while 
adding to British power and prestige.31 Between 1818 and 1845, the Admiralty uncovered 
large parts of the Arctic North America and the Antarctic, its attention oscillating 
between the two polar regions with each major discovery.  
Due to the work of Cook and George Vancouver along the west coast of North 
America, the Admiralty knew that no Northwest Passage existed south of Bering Strait. If 
the passage existed all, it lay somewhere in the ice and labyrinth of islands above the 
continent. The Admiralty sent John Ross to find out in 1818. The captain managed to 
rediscover and raise the flag at Lancaster and Jones Sounds, affirming the work done by 
Baffin and Bylot. He then turned back when he spotted a mountain range in the distance 
blocking his way – a figment of his imagination, it turned out.32 Undeterred, the 
Admiralty sent William Parry to find the Passage. His polar voyage proved one of the 
most successful ever. With extremely favourable ice conditions, Parry crossed the 110th 
meridian in early September 1819, penetrating far deeper into the Arctic Archipelago 
than anyone before him.33 In little more than a year, Parry discovered, named and raised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hugh N. Wallace, The Navy, the Company, and Richard King: British Exploration in the Canadian 
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the Union Jack on Devon, Cornwallis, Bathurst, Byam and Melville Islands. “Though we 
have not completed the North West Passage,” he wrote to his parents, “we have made a 
large hole in it.”34  
As Parry made his incredible voyage into the Arctic, events unfolding in the 
Antarctic also grabbed the Admiralty’s attention. Between 1819 and 1820, explorers 
finally landed on the islands around the Antarctic Peninsula and sighted the continent 
itself (though who did so first remains hotly debated). On 19 February 1819, after getting 
caught in strong winds while sailing to Valparaiso, Chile, William Smith, the captain of a 
British transport, discovered Livingston Island in the South Shetlands, 450 nautical miles 
south of Cape Horn. The following January, Smith guided Edward Bransfield of the 
Royal Navy to his discovery and they landed on several islands in the South Shetlands, 
claimed them for Britain, and started charting their positions.35 On 30 January, the 
expedition spotted the rocks and peaks of a long coastline, which they called Trinity Land 
– likely the northernmost point on the Antarctic mainland. Bransfield, thinking Trinity 
Land might be another island, did not attempt a landing on its icy shore, but did chart part 
of the coast.36  
Other eyes searched the same horizon. On 28 January 1820, two days before 
Smith and Bransfield spotted Trinity Land, a Russian expedition under Captain Gottlieb 
von Bellingshausen saw a solid stretch of ice to the south of their position, which they 
insisted was a piece of the southern continent. Tsar Alexander I sent Bellingshausen to 
explore the Southern Ocean and, as he circumnavigated the Antarctic in 1820-21, he also 
investigated the South Shetlands and South Sandwich Islands, and discovered Peter I and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Glyn Williams, Arctic Labyrinth: The Quest for the Northwest Passage (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2009), 
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Alexander Islands. While he gave Russian names to islands and geographical features, 
Bellingshausen did not land or try to claim territory for his country.37  
Sailing into the South Shetlands in late 1820, Bellingshausen was shocked to find 
the waters full of British and American sealing ships brought south by word of the 
discoveries in the area. On 16 November, one of these sealers, the American Nathaniel 
Palmer, saw “land not yet laid down on his chart” and approached a long stretch of 
coastline to the south of Bransfield’s Trinity Land, a new part of the Antarctic 
continent.38 A few months later, John Davis, another American sealer, proclaimed 
members of his crew the first men to set foot on the continent, though they stayed only an 
hour.39 Discoveries by American sealers led to appeals in Washington for a national 
expedition to claim the newly unearthed lands for the U.S., but the Navy could not spare 
a ship and the idea died.40 
In the course of a few months, three different expeditions flying three different 
flags had likely sighted the Antarctic coast, but the members had no idea if the land they 
saw was part of a continent or new islands. Despite the multi-national discoveries of 1820, 
the British dominated Antarctic exploration for the next decade and a half. British sealers 
claimed the South Orkneys, a group of islands 600 km northeast of the Antarctic 
Peninsula; reached a new furthest south in the Weddell Sea; and raised the flag at Bouvet 
Island, which the French spotted a century before.41 Between 1829 and 1831, an official 
Royal Navy expedition under Captain Henry Foster surveyed parts of the South Shetlands, 
including Deception Island and its exceptional harbour.42 Over the following two years, 
former naval officer John Biscoe became the third explorer to circumnavigate the 
continent (after Cook and Bellingshausen), spotted a section of the Antarctic coast south 	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of Africa that he named Enderby Land after his private sponsor, discovered Adelaide, 
Anvers and the Biscoe Islands, and sailed along a piece of the Antarctic Peninsula south 
of Trinity Land, which he called Graham Land.43 When he raised the Union Jack and 
annexed Graham Land for King William IV, Biscoe made the first territorial claim to the 
Antarctic continent.  
The British added new Antarctic discoveries to their maps, yet the country’s real 
focus never strayed long from the search for the Northwest Passage. Further seaborne 
expeditions by Parry and overland expeditions by John Franklin uncovered large sections 
of the continental coastline, Foxe Basin, and Prince Regent Inlet. In concert with these 
efforts, Frederick William Beechey led an expedition that explored the Alaskan coast 
between Bering Strait and Point Barrow.44 In 1829, John Ross returned to the Arctic on a 
private expedition financed by gin magnate Felix Booth. During the four years they spent 
locked in the ice, Ross and his men explored the Gulf of Boothia, Boothia Peninsula, and 
King William Island. In 1831, his nephew, James Ross, located the North Magnetic Pole, 
a major scientific accomplishment.45 Slowly, the British illuminated more of the Arctic 
Archipelago, but the Northwest Passage itself remained elusive.	  
British efforts easily overshadowed those of other countries in the polar regions. 
The interest of the Russian government in its polar empire lapsed when its strategic 
attention turned to Europe, the Near East and the Pacific after the Napoleonic Wars.46 
Despite Bellingshausen’s successful voyage, the Russians did not send any more ships to 
the Antarctic until the 1940s. Reports of islands somewhere above northeastern Siberia 
led to expeditions by Petr Federovich Anzhu and Baron Ferdinand Petrovich Wrangel, 
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who charted more of the coastline but found no new territories in the ocean above.47 The 
Russians successfully mapped Novaya Zemlya and the New Siberian Islands, and 
continued to hunt in the Spitsbergen archipelago.48 The imperial government safeguarded 
its territorial claims in Alaska from the activities of British explorers on its northern coast 
in the 1825 Treaty of St. Petersburg (Anglo-Russian Convention), which set the 141st 
degree of longitude as the limit between their respective northern possessions.49 
Nevertheless, the financial burden created by Alaska, and the belief that it would be 
indefensible in any war, led the Russians to lose interest in their North American territory 
as the century wore on.50  
After retaining Greenland in the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, which broke up the 
Kingdom of Denmark-Norway, the Danes maintained their presence in Greenland, 
exploring, surveying and administering its western coast, but made little effort to visit its 
eastern or northern coasts.51 On Spitsbergen, Norwegian hunting parties and exploratory 
expeditions from Britain, Norway, Sweden and France pushed into the island’s interior 
and performed in-depth studies of the area.52 By any metric of geographic scope and 
discovery, however, the British remained in the forefront of polar exploration and 
discovery.  
James Ross’ discovery of the North Magnetic Pole piqued the interest of the 
Admiralty, which directed its efforts to finding the South Magnetic Pole in the late 1830s. 
It was not alone. Between 1838 and 1843, three large-scale national expeditions set off 
for Antarctic waters. A French expedition under Sébestien César Dumont d’Urville 	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surveyed the tip of the Peninsula and charted a large section of Antarctic coastline south 
of Australia in January 1840. While d’Urville could not land on the icy coast, he did set 
foot on a rocky islet and claimed the coastline he spotted for France, naming it Adélie 
Land after his wife.53 In December 1839, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes and the U.S. 
Exploring Expedition, as its name suggests an official American effort, sighted a part of 
the coast of eastern Antarctica and claimed to have sailed more than 1300 km along the 
continent’s barrier. Never once did they try to raise the stars and stripes.54 On orders from 
the Admiralty, James Ross took his considerable polar experience to the Antarctic 
between 1840 and 1843. Pushing through heavy pack ice, Ross reached the open water of 
what is now called the Ross Sea, where he discovered a large section of mountainous 
coastline he named Victoria Land after his Queen. He found a sheltered anchorage at 
McMurdo Sound that would serve many future Antarctic explorers, sailed along the 
massive ice shelf that bears his name,55 and confirmed the existence of the Balleny 
Islands, first discovered by an English whaler in 1839.56 Although unable to land on the 
continent, Ross rowed to a small islet just off the tip of Victoria Land and claimed the 
entire area he had explored for Britain.57 Ross, d’Urville and Wilkes added thousands of 
kilometres of coastline to maps of the Antarctic, but no one knew if the unconnected lines 
on the map represented a continent or an archipelago united by ice. 	  
 After the three voyages of 1838-1843 failed to locate the South Magnetic Pole, 
the Antarctic entered into an “age of averted interest.”58 Whalers and sealers continued to 
visit the Southern Ocean, the Royal Navy conducted a few surveys in the sub-Antarctic 
(including one of the Prince Edward Islands),59 and American sailors spotted and 
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54 Kenneth John Bertrand, Americans in Antarctica, 1775-1948 (New York: America Geographical Society, 
1971). Due to some confusion in the American logbooks, Wilkes’ claims have been contested by historians. 
55 Turney, 1912: The Year the World Discovered Antarctica, 19-21.  
56 Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 68.  
57 Turney, 1912: The Year the World Discovered Antarctica, 19-21.  
58 Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions: A Political Geography (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), 
62. 
59 Dodds, The Antarctic: A Very Short Introduction, 27. The Royal Navy’s Challenger expedition, under 
George Nares, performed oceanographic studies of the Southern Ocean and crossed into the Antarctic 
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established shore stations on Heard Island, about 1630 km north of the Antarctic.60 
Exploratory voyages, however, ceased until the 1890s.	  
1.3 The Arctic Takes Shape: The Search for Franklin, the 
European Arctic and Sovereignty Transfers, 1845-1895	  
By the 1840s, overland expeditions by Hudson’s Bay Company explorers had illuminated 
more of the western end of the Northwest Passage. As a result, the Admiralty felt 
confident that a new expedition led by the 59-year-old John Franklin would finally 
conquer the Passage.61 His two ships, Erebus and Terror, were the first to sail through 
Peel Sound but became trapped in the ice near King William Island. Franklin died in 
April 1847, and the remaining crews abandoned the ships the following spring of 1848 in 
a fatal attempt to walk to the closest settlement, hundreds of kilometres to the south. 
Everyone succumbed to starvation and exhaustion.62 The subsequent British searches to 
determine what happened to the expedition, which seemed to vanish without a trace, 
crisscrossed the centre of the Arctic Archipelago by ship and sledge, filling in a large part 
of the map and uncovering three Northwest Passages.63 During this torrent of discovery, 
Edward Inglefield named Ellesmere Island after Francis Egerton, the 1st Earl of Ellesmere 
and president of the Royal Geographical Society. To the west, a Royal Navy expedition 
sent to find Franklin via Bering Strait ran into two islands north of the Siberian coast 
(what would become Herald and Wrangel Islands) that would later occupy an infamous 
place in Canada’s Arctic policy.64  
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Searches for the lost Franklin expedition took a massive toll on the Royal Navy’s 
energy and resources, leading the Admiralty to take a break from polar exploration.65 The 
Franklin search also internationalized exploration in the Arctic Archipelago by drawing 
the first American expeditions to the region. Edwin DeHaven of the U.S. Navy ventured 
into the archipelago in 1850 and discovered a mountainous coastline, the central part of 
Ellesmere Island, which he named Grinnell Land (after the president of the American 
Geographical Society). Dr. Elisha Kent Kane’s 1853-55 expedition travelled deep into 
Kennedy Channel and delineated the northern coast of Greenland before ice and scurvy 
forced their retreat.66 Dr. Isaac Hayes told the press he was looking for Franklin, but he 
really sought “to complete the survey of the north coasts of Greenland and Grinnell Land” 
in 1860-61. He managed to cross the Greenland ice cap before working up the Ellesmere 
Island coast to Lady Franklin Bay – 81°35′N, by his calculation the “most northern 
known land upon the globe.”67 Further American efforts, including the 3000-mile sledge 
journey undertaken by U.S. army Lieutenant Frederick Schwatka for the American 
Geographical Society, added to the geographic knowledge of the southern archipelago.68  
American expeditions joined a bevy of European efforts throughout the Arctic in 
the 1860s and 1870s. Their interest was driven, in part, by the belief that a vast amount of 
land or even a continent remained to be discovered around the North Pole.69 Accordingly, 
the Americans focused on Greenland, Grinnell Land and the pole itself.70 With a grant of 
$50,000 from a Congress interested in the national pride that would flow from planting 
the American flag at the North Pole, Captain Charles Francis Hall sailed north from 
Washington. He reached a record 82°29′N at the northern entrance to Robeson Channel, 
which separated the northern coasts of Greenland and Ellesmere Island. After collecting 
the first data on the northernmost coast of Ellesmere, the expedition returned south after 	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Hall’s mysterious death, possibly from arsenic poisoning.71 In 1879, James Gordon 
Bennet, Jr., owner of the New York Herald, backed a U.S. Navy expedition to the North 
Pole via the western Arctic. While the USS Jeannette and its commander, George 
Washington DeLong, confirmed the existence of Herald and Wrangel Islands, and 
discovered and claimed Bennet, Henrietta and Jeannette Islands above the Russian coast, 
when the pack ice crushed the ship in 1881 only a handful of men managed to survive the 
long trek to safety.72 In an act with important future consequences, a USN expedition sent 
to look for the lost Jeannette, actually landed on Wrangel Island and claimed it for the 
U.S., naming it New Columbia.73 During these years, the stars and stripes flew above a 
vast expanse of the High Arctic, including islands later claimed by Canada and Russia. 
Concurrently, European explorers expanded geographic knowledge of the Arctic - 
including representatives from new nations with rising interests in the region. In 1866, 
German geographer August Petermann (a strong proponent of Germany’s colonization of 
Africa) urged his country to join the international quest for the North Pole to showcase its 
growing power. Two German expeditions set out for the Pole in 1868 and 1869-70, but 
failed to discover any new land (although they explored sections of Greenland’s 
unknown east coast).74 In 1873, an Austro-Hungarian expedition, largely funded by the 
nobility and led by military officers Karl Weyprecht and Julius von Payer, explored to the 
west of Novaya Zemlya where its members discovered and mapped part of the Franz 
Josef Land archipelago. They named it after the Austrian emperor, but did not formally 
claim the island group.75 Thus, while German and Austro-Hungarian explorers sowed the 
seeds for possible polar claims by their respective empires, neither thought the Arctic 
land valuable enough to annex.	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The exploration of Greenland by the Germans did not sit well with the Danish 
government. Following the disastrous Second Schleswig War of 1864 against Prussia and 
Austria, the Danes lacked money for exploration.76 Parliament found a solution in the 
long-term, and relatively inexpensive, research plan of Professor Frederick Johnstrup, 
Professor of Mineralogy at the University of Copenhagen, who led scientific teams to 
West Greenland throughout the 1870s. The government reinforced Johnstrup’s efforts by 
creating the Commission for the Supervision of Geological Exploration in Greenland in 
1879, and started to publish a research series called Meddelelser om Grønland.77 The 
following decade, this Committee supported several expeditions that examined the inland 
ice shelf as well as the Umiak Expedition, which explored and claimed part of the 
southeastern coast (which it named King Christian IX Land).78 Through these efforts the 
Danes continued to solidify their hold on Greenland, although they had yet to visit its 
northernmost parts. The link between science and sovereignty in the polar regions would 
continue to grow stronger in the twentieth century. 
Swedish scientific expeditions also started to make important contributions to 
Arctic exploration. Between 1858 and 1871, more than twenty expeditions investigated 
and surveyed Spitsbergen. Given the leading role taken by its citizens in exploring the 
area, the Swedish government (which also ran Norway’s foreign relations during this 
time)79 informed several European nations in 1871 that it was considering claiming 
sovereignty over Spitsbergen. When the Russians objected to this assertion, the two 
countries entered into negotiations that culminated in the Agreement of 1872, which 
officially designated the Spitsbergen archipelago as land that belonged to no one - a legal 
status it retained until 1920.80 In the late 1870s, Swedish King Oscar II also helped fund 
an attempt to conquer the Northeast Passage. Led by the explorer-scientist Adolf Erik 
Nordenskiӧld, a Finnish-born political exile living in Stockholm, the Vega expedition 
caught the world’s attention by finishing the first complete crossing of the Passage in 	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1879.81 In the space of a few decades, Sweden made its mark on polar exploration and 
politics.  
Exploration and scientific efforts in the Arctic reached new heights with the First 
International Polar Year (IPY) in 1882-1883. Inspired by Karl Weyprecht’s call for 
international scientific coordination in the polar regions, scientists set up fifteen 
geophysical data collection points around the Arctic rim.82 The IPY expeditions included 
a German station on Baffin Island and an Austro-Hungarian party that became the first to 
winter on Jan Mayen since the 1630s.83 Most famous, however, was U.S. army lieutenant 
Adolphus W. Greely’s expedition. With support from the Naval Committee of the House 
of Representatives, Greely led a 25-man expedition that established a meteorological base 
at Fort Conger (Lady Franklin Bay) on the northern coast of Ellesmere Island and 
achieved a new northern record of 83°24′. When his party retreated south after a second 
winter, Greely took copies of his scientific records in three tin boxes (fifty pounds each) 
instead of extra rations—condemning all but seven of his men to death.84 Despite the 
tragedy, Greely’s brief occupation highlighted years of American activity in the Arctic 
and supported the case for American territorial rights in Grinnell Land.  
Confronted with American efforts, the British Colonial Office conceded that if the 
Americans wanted to claim what they called Grinnell Land, Britain would have to let 
them.85 The Americans, however, had no desire to grab an Arctic empire—particularly 
after the political fallout that followed the $7.2 million purchase of Alaska from the 
Russians in 1867.86 Criticism of “Seward’s folly”87 was rampant in the American press 	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and Senate, where politicians questioned why the U.S. had paid so much for an “icebox” 
and “polar bear garden.”88 The future of the U.S. rested in a western frontier, they argued, 
not a northern one. Worse, Washington knew almost nothing about its purchase: “a vast 
wilderness,” Jack London described it, “…as dark and chartless as Darkest Africa.”89 
While some politicians supported the idea that Alaska could one day become an 
American Eldorado, others dismissed the purchase of Alaska as a colossal waste of 
money. The U.S. government declined to claim the land that its explorers discovered in 
the High Arctic.90 After Greely’s disaster, Washington stopped state-sponsored 
expeditions to the High Arctic until the region again captured its political and strategic 
interest in the 1920s. 
Ironically, given the U.S. government’s lack of interest in establishing an Arctic 
empire, concerns about a potential American challenge propelled Britain to transfer its 
sovereignty over the North American Arctic islands to Canada. During the halcyon days 
of Arctic exploration, the Admiralty and Colonial Office spent little time thinking about 
Britain’s claim to the islands. Sir John Barrow, Second Secretary of the Admiralty for 
almost forty years and a major supporter of Arctic exploration, even described planting 
the flag and making claims as a waste of time in a region unable to support European 
settlement.91 In spite of Barrow’s opinion, historian Shelagh Grant points out, the 
Admiralty carefully charted every discovery and claim made by British explorers and 
added them to the imperial map.92 Nevertheless, Britain never formally annexed the 
Arctic islands or clarified its territorial rights in the region. Accordingly, when William 
Mintzer, an American engineer, applied to the British government for a tract of land in 
the Cumberland Gulf in February 1874 to start a mining industry, he greatly alarmed the 
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Colonial Office. Officials pondered how they could clarify British rights in the Arctic 
while forestalling any further American interest.93  
A precedent existed in British North America. In 1869-1870, the Hudson's Bay 
Company sold its vast territories of Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory to 
Great Britain, which subsequently transferred the land to the government of Canada 
(when it became known as the Northwest Territories). The Colonial Office decided that a 
similar transfer would work for the Arctic islands. After careful deliberation, the British 
approved an Order in Council on 31 July 1880 stating that “all British territories and 
possessions in North America, and the islands adjacent to such territories and possessions 
which are not already included in the Dominion of Canada, should (with the exception of 
the Colony of Newfoundland and its dependencies) be annexed to and form part of the 
said Dominion.” By this act, Britain gifted to Canada whatever territories or territorial 
rights it had in the Arctic Archipelago. The completeness of Britain’s own title at that 
time, and the extent of its territories, were uncertain. In 1921, Canadian associate 
archivist Hensley R. Holmden quipped, “The Imperial Government did not know what 
they were transferring and on the other hand the Canadian Government had no idea what 
they were receiving.”94 Fortunately for Canada, no foreign state questioned the transfer 
and no American challenges crystallized.   
For its part, after 1880, Canada did little to consolidate its administrative or 
practical control over its new territorial gift.95 In 1882 Ottawa even passed an Order in 
Council recommending “no steps be taken with the view of legislating for the good 
government of the country until some influx of population or other circumstances shall 
occur to make such provision more imperative than it would at the present seem to be.”96 
Not until 1895 did the dominion bother to draw boundaries on the map and subdivide the 	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Canadian North into administrative districts.97 By the 1890s, the Canadian claim to the 
Arctic Archipelago rested on British acts of discovery and little more. As the ‘heroic age’ 
of polar exploration dawned, the problems of territorial acquisition became far more 
pressing. Foreign expeditions fanned throughout the Arctic and Antarctic, forcing Canada 
– and every other state with interests in the polar regions – to pay closer attention to 
events unfolding there.  
1.4 The Busy Years: The “Heroic Age” of Polar Exploration, 
1895-1909 
In the summer of 1895, the “age of averted interest” in the Antarctic came to an abrupt 
end when the Sixth International Geographical Congress declared that “the exploration of 
Antarctica is the greatest piece of geographical exploration still to be undertaken” and 
urged scientific and geographical societies to promote expeditions to the area.98 In the 
wake of this rallying cry, European countries launched nine major expeditions to the 
Antarctic continent between 1898 and 1910.99 The Belgian Geographical Society’s 
Antarctic Expedition (1898-1900) inaugurated the ‘heroic age’ in the south polar region 
with its attempt on the South Magnetic Pole, but it became locked in the ice west of the 
Peninsula and was the first expedition to winter in the region.100 The British Southern 
Cross Expedition (1898-1900), a privately-funded affair led by the Norwegian Carsten 
Borchgrevnik, became the first to winter on the continent after setting up a camp on Cape 
Adare, Victoria Land. Robert Falcon Scott and the British National Antarctic Expedition 	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(1901-1904) established a base on Ross Island in McMurdo Sound and then set a new 
farthest south record, reaching 82°17'S and discovering the polar plateau.101 While Scott 
“paid little attention to claiming a territory that had no obvious value,” historian David 
Day has pointed out that the explorer’s discoveries, the base he established on Ross 
Island, and his explorations into the continental interior “all added weight to any claim 
that Britain might make.”102 
Between 1901 and 1903, Erich von Drygalski led the first German expedition to 
the Antarctic and discovered a section of coastline in the eastern part of the continent he 
called Kaiser Wilhelm II Land.103 Meanwhile, the Scottish National Expedition 
established a meteorological station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys and explored 
the Weddell Sea.104 From 1901-04, a privately-financed Swedish expedition led by 
geologist Otto Nordenskjöld resurveyed and redrew the charts of the west coast and 
offshore islands of the Antarctic Peninsula onboard the Antarctic. From Snow Hill 
Island, the Swedish party surveyed four hundred miles of the coastline by sledge, 
reaching almost as far as the Antarctic Circle. Heavy ice trapped and sank the Antarctic 
in February 1903, however, and an Argentine relief expedition in the gunboat Uruguay 
came to the rescue, completing that state’s first voyage into Antarctic waters.105 The 
French also engaged in scientific exploration during this era through expeditions led by 
Jean-Baptiste Charcot (1903-1905 and 1908-1910). Charcot proceeded to the west coast 
of the Antarctic Peninsula to carry on the Belgica’s research. He conducted scientific 
investigations on Deception Island and discovered Marguerite Bay, Charcot Island, 
Renaud Island, Millerand and Rothschild Island (and named part of the coast Loubet 
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Land after the President of France), thus defining the basic geography of the western 
coast of the Antarctic Peninsula and the islands south of 65ºS.106  
Between 1907 and 1909, British explorer, Ernest Shackleton, finally reached the 
polar plateau, found the South Magnetic Pole, and made it to a point just 97 geographic 
miles from the South Pole. Here Shackleton performed a ceremony formally claiming the 
plateau for Britain, raising the Union Jack, leaving behind a brass cylinder to mark the 
occasion, and naming it King Edward VII Plateau.107 Thus, while all the expeditions flew 
their national flags in the Antarctic and named geographical features after their monarchs 
or countries, only Shackleton made a formal claim to territory.  
From this point on, Britain – more than any other nation – viewed the Antarctic 
through the lens of its imperial ambitions. Historian Adrian Howkins observes that “from 
the early twentieth century…the history of Antarctica became increasingly caught up 
with the wider history of the British Empire.”108 At first, British imperialists used 
Antarctic exploration as proof of the Empire’s prestige and power, much as they had 
portrayed the quest for the Northwest Passage. Further, they viewed the heroic tales of 
British explorers as a potential cure to the pessimism that was an “all-pervasive” 
characteristic of Edwardian imperialism.109 During the Boer War, the poor health and 
performance of British soldiers shocked the country. Heightened international 
competition, especially from Germany, engendered national doubt, and Antarctic 
exploration and expansionism “resonated in a society beset with anxieties about national 
decline.”110 The efforts of the polar explorers became part of a new drive for British 
efficiency, which included the Boy Scots, conscription, rifle clubs, and imperial 
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motherhood.111 British explorers such as Scott and Shackleton even marketed their 
expeditions as a race against other national competitors and rival empires, which Britain 
was winning.112 The Antarctic became more than a testing ground for British manhood, 
however, when the British government made its first formal territorial claim in the region.  
In 1893, the Foreign Office questioned whether public notification had ever been 
given of Britain’s claims in the Antarctic and worried that no British explorer had visited 
the region since James Ross, fifty years before.113 The British government took steps to 
solidify its claim to South Georgia in 1905 when it granted a lease to the South Georgia 
Exploration Company for a pound a year and a sent a warship to investigate the island.114 
By 1906, the amount of whaling in Antarctic waters increased dramatically and the 
Norwegian whaler, Carl A. Larsen established a settlement at Grytviken on South 
Georgia for his Compañía Argentina de Pesca. Considering the recent British activity on 
South Georgia, Larsen thought it best to apply for a whaling license from the British 
Legation in Buenos Aires, which the Governor of the Falkland Islands granted on 1 
January 1906.115 The prospect of increased whaling and the profits that would flow from 
licensing it forced the Colonial Office to reappraise Britain’s rights in the Antarctic.  
The reappraisal sped up when the Norwegian government, whose citizens 
comprised most of the whalers working in the Antarctic, asked the Foreign Office if 
Britain claimed the South Shetlands or if they were still open to all nations. Norway, 
newly independent from Sweden in 1905, made a strategic error by asking Britain – its 
main rival in the whaling industry – instead of simply claiming the territory for itself. In 
the first public, diplomatic assertion of British possession, the Foreign Office responded 	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that they owned all of the islands and Graham Land based on discovery and repeated acts 
of possession. The whalers could only operate with permission and a licence from the 
governor of the Falkland Islands.116 In July 1908, after Norway pressed London to 
provide the legal basis of its claim,117 the British issued Letters Patent that formally 
claimed South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the South Sandwich 
Islands, and “the territory known as Graham’s Land, situated in the South Atlantic Ocean 
to the south of the 50th parallel of south latitude, and lying between the 20th and 80th 
degrees of west longitude.” Despite a glaring lack of geographic knowledge, the British 
asserted their claim over Graham Land and purposely left the southern extent of the 
territory open.118 In a sloppy mistake, they also included the southern part of Patagonia in 
their wide-ranging claim – an oversight that would cause them future embarrassment. 
Fortunately for Britain, no country formally questioned or protested the annexation.  
Although no one immediately challenged Britain’s position, the two countries 
destined to become its greatest Antarctic rivals, Argentina and Chile, first took interest in 
the region during these busy years, laying the foundations of their own eventual claims. 
The Argentine gunboat Uruguay’s rescue of the Swedish Antarctic Expedition at Hope 
Bay, on the extreme northern end of the peninsula, awakened the country’s interest in the 
south polar region.119 The following year, at the invitation of the Scottish National 
Antarctic Expedition (approved by the British government), Argentina assumed official 	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control over the weather station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys – an important 
action for its future sovereignty claims. While the British viewed the takeover of the 
station as a scientific endeavour, the Argentine press started referring to the South 
Orkney Islands as Argentine Southern Territory. Accordingly, British authorities 
reminded Argentina that the islands belonged to Britain. Upon receiving the note to this 
effect, Estanislao S. Zeballos, the new Argentine Foreign Minister, requested time for 
further study of Antarctic claims. To the British Minister, Seballos expressed that “he 
was never more surprised in his life than to learn that Great Britain claims the group in 
question.”120 Communication between the two countries on the Antarctic ceased, leaving 
behind the seeds of future conflict.  
The Chileans declined sending an expedition but granted private companies 
concessions to operate in the region. Between 1902 and 1906, the government issued 
fishing and sealing concessions to companies for the South Shetlands, the islands further 
south, and the “lands of Graham.”121 The Chilean government also thought the south 
polar regions important enough to include them in its ongoing efforts to clarify the 
country’s boundary with Argentina. In 1907, Chilean officials proposed a treaty that 
would divide between the two countries “the islands and American Antarctic continents,” 
even covering unexplored areas.122 The Argentines quietly ignored the idea, but Foreign 
Minister Zeballos noted “Chile ought to know that England claimed all these lands and 
that we should have to defend them by joint action.”123 Calls for Latin American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 British Note to Argentina Concerning Reference in a Decree to the South Orkney Islands’ Lying Within 
Argentine Southern Territory, 4 January 1907, Document AR04011907, Bush, Antarctica and International 
Law 1, 571-572. Zeballos cited in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 1, 573. 
121 Supreme Decree No. 3, 3310 Granting a Fishing Concession to Pedro Pablo Benavides, 31 December 
1902, Document CH31121902, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 290-291; Application from 
Enrique Fabry and Domingo de Toro Herrera for a Concession for Sealing and other Purposes, 9 January 
1906, Document CH09011906, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 291-293; Supreme Decree No. 
260, Granting a Concession For Sealing and Other Purposes to Enrique Farby and Domingo De Toro 
Herrera, 27 February 1906, Document CH27021906, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 295-296.  
122 Los territorios antárctios en estuidio son material propia de esploraciones aun no completas, que urje 
estimular i a las cuales se habrán de seguir avenimientos que todo hace fáciles entre los Gobiernos chileno i 
arjentino.” “The Antarctic territories under review fall within the domain of explorations that have not yet 
been completed, and which should be encouraged and which should be followed by agreements which 
should not be difficult to reach between the Chilean and Argentine Governments.” Memorial of the Chilean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reporting Discussions With Argentina on Antarctic Territories, 18 September 
1906, Document CH18091906, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 301. 
123 “Convenía que Chile supiera que Inglaterra reclamaba todas estas tierras y, que tendríamos que 
defendernos unidos.” Quoted in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 302. 
62	  
cooperation in the Antarctic would resurface in the 1940s.  
Concurrent to the expanding interest in the Antarctic, the heroic age of polar 
exploration unfolded in the Arctic with dramatic results. Scandinavian expeditions filled 
in the north polar map around the turn of the century.124 Norway’s interest in the Arctic 
grew after Otto Sverdrup and Fridtjof Nansen became the first people to ski across the 
interior of Greenland in 1888,125 and in the ensuing years “the Norwegian state invested 
economic capital – money – to harvest symbolic profit – honour” through exploratory 
activities.126 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the prospect of acquiring new 
Arctic territory also motivated the newly independent Norwegian state.127 In a brilliant 
attempt to reach the North Pole, Nansen drifted across the Arctic Ocean onboard the 
Fram from 1893-96. Sverdrup led the Fram on a scientific expedition to northwest 
Greenland and into the waters of the Arctic Archipelago from 1898-1902, over-
wintering for three years on Ellesmere. From there he set out to discover, claim and 
partially survey Axel Heiberg, Amund and Ellef Ringnes Islands, and King Christian 
Island.128 When Sverdrup returned to Norway, he embarked on a lifelong effort to 
persuade his government to pursue his claims. Inspired by his countryman’s heroic 
exploits, Roald Amundsen “carried the Norwegian flag through the North West 
Passage” in the first successful transit of the waterway from 1903-06, greatly adding to 
the geographic and scientific knowledge of the Arctic Archipelago.129  
As the Norwegians pushed deeper into Arctic North America, the Danes 
expanded their activities on Greenland. In 1894, they established a mission and trading 
post on the east coast at Ammassalik. Between 1898 and 1899, Lt. Georf Carl Amdrup 	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explored the east coast from Ammassalik to Scoresby Sound.130 Between 1902 and 
1904, the Danish Literary Expedition pushed into northwestern Greenland for the first 
time.131 After almost two hundreds years of “steady if unspectacular progress,” however, 
the full geographic extent of the massive island and long stretches of coast to the 
northeast remained undefined. Resolved, Denmark launched the Danmark Expedition, 
its largest venture yet, in 1906. For two years, twenty-six scientists and guides charted 
the entire coastline of unknown northeast Greenland, making sledge journeys of more 
than 6,436 km.132 The expedition published its findings in Meddelelser om Grønland, 
which became important proof of Danish activity on the island. 
The Danes were not alone in exploring northern Greenland. Here Robert Peary 
honed his skills before his attempt on the North Pole.133 During expeditions in 1891-
1892 and 1893-1895, Peary crossed the Greenland ice cap and learned Inuit survival 
techniques. Between 1898 and 1902 he first tried to reach the North Pole, losing several 
toes to frostbite in the attempt. Peary extended this expedition into Ellesmere Island 
(Grinnell Land) and repatriated papers belonging to the abandoned American base at Fort 
Conger. Three years later, he extensively surveyed West Grinnell Land (Ellesmere) 
before mapping northern Greenland. Later he claimed to have spotted new land north of 
Ellesmere, which Peary called Crocker Land – after one of his supporters – noting “if 
confirmed, the island would add to the list of American prizes.”134 
The activities of Peary and Otto Sverdrup in the High Arctic islands, coupled with 
a new flood of American whalers in the western Arctic and Canada’s loss in the Alaska 
Boundary Dispute of 1903, prompted the Canadian government to extend its efforts in 
Arctic North America.135 In Ottawa, officials harboured lingering doubts about the extent 	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of Canada’s northern borders. The Canadian Ministry of the Interior commissioned the 
first study of the question (and the first Canadian legal appraisal of Canada’s claims), 
from Dr. William Frederick King, the chief dominion astronomer. After decades of 
experience as a Dominion Land Surveyor, King was one of Canada’s leading experts on 
territorial boundaries having assisted Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton prepare 
Canada’s case for the Alaska Boundary Tribunal.136 King applied his considerable legal 
and historical knowledge on boundaries and territorial claims to the North American 
Arctic. 
King stressed the ambiguity that surrounded Canadian territorial rights to lands 
inherited from Britain in 1880. The transfer may have handed Canada all the islands 
adjacent to the Canadian coastline, but what about unknown islands that lay 400 miles or 
more from the mainland? King speculated that because British acts of discovery and 
possession were never formally ratified by the state prior to the 1880 transfer, Canada’s 
assumption of authority might not have had full international force. Given the 
uncertainties, King concluded “Canada’s title to some at least of the northern islands is 
imperfect.”137 
Canada responded to foreign activities in the Arctic Archipelago, and ongoing 
concerns about the strength of its title, by embarking “on a long range, though relatively 
low-key, program of finding out more about her northern territories, securing Canadian 
sovereignty, and advancing the frontiers of scientific knowledge,” historian Richard 
Diubaldo explained.138 To regulate American whaling, the North-West Mounted Police 
(NWMP) established a post on Herschel Island in the Beaufort Sea in 1903.139 Following 
the footsteps of earlier Canadian northern voyages led by William Wakeham and Albert 
Peter Low, Joseph-Elzéar Bernier patrolled the waters of Hudson Bay and the Arctic 	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islands, asserting control and indicating Canada’s supervision over the region. Bernier 
intercepted and imposed licenses on foreign whalers, collected customs duties, and 
conducted geographical research.140 Bernier also performed ceremonies of possession on 
many northern islands to reinforce Canada’s sovereignty. His flag flying annoyed some 
Canadian officials who thought his actions might actually sow doubts about Canada’s 
sovereignty in the region.141 Although the government took no action to occupy any of 
the islands in the Archipelago, Bernier’s activities marked an important shift from 
Canadian inactivity in previous decades.142 
As the amount of state activity in Greenland and the Canadian Arctic increased, 
the polar area that experienced the greatest explosion of intensive economic development 
during this era was Spitsbergen. European scientific expeditions continued to study the 
island, and the Norwegians took the lead on mapping the western coastal areas and 	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interior. While Norwegian hunters continued to winter on the island in search of fox and 
bear furs, coal became the sought after treasure by end of the nineteenth century. A 
Norwegian company started the first coal mine along Isfjorden, on the island’s west 
coast, in 1899. Although the British Spitsbergen Coal and Trading Company established 
a mine at Adventfjorden in 1904, the most powerful company to operate on Spitsbergen 
was the American Arctic Company at Longyearbyen. The mining activities brought 
permanent occupation to Spitsbergen for the first time, with miners largely recruited from 
northern Norway. Legally, however, Spitsbergen fell under no country’s sovereignty. In 
1909, Italian international jurist Camille Piccioni first described the archipelago as terra 
nullius. The reference did not mean that the area was open to be claimed by the first state 
to successfully occupy it, but that Spitsbergen was an area without an owner and should 
remain so. Legal historian Andrew Fitzmaurice has observed that over the decades the 
polar regions inspired an “explosion in the use of terra nullius in international law” and 
its meaning and legacy changed over time.143  
By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the level of activity on 
Spitsbergen called out for jurisdiction and administration. When Norway proposed that it 
assume control over the entire archipelago, the British and American companies 
operating on the island opposed the move urging their own governments to make claims. 
Furthermore, to support the exploration activities of Swedish citizens over the previous 
half a century, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm persuaded Swedish 
capitalists to invest in a mining operation on the island – a move the Russians and Dutch 
copied soon after.144 Over the next two decades, competing claims to Spitsbergen and its 
uncertain political status made an important impact on territorial claims in the polar 
regions more generally. 
 Despite the rush of activities occurring all over the Arctic, most popular, global 
attention fixated on the search for the North Pole. Between 1895 and 1909, Swedes, 	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Norwegians, Danes, Americans, Germans, British, and Italians all tried to reach the Pole. 
Finally in September 1909, the world accepted (at least for a time) that the great prize fell 
to an American – either Cook or Peary. In the wake of this news, Robert Falcon Scott 
turned the attention of the world to the South Pole, one of the last great prizes of polar 
exploration.  
More importantly, the quest for the Poles finally forced international lawyers to 
think about the status of the polar regions. The start of the twentieth century witnessed 
states take far more interest in polar territorial claims. Driven by competition, fear of 
foreign intervention, and economic interests – mostly involving the whaling industry – 
several states, notably Britain and Canada, had actively sought to strengthen their legal 
positions in the Arctic and Antarctic. The planting of the American flag at the North Pole 
spurred international legal experts to review state activity in the polar regions. After 
centuries of effort, what exactly had the countries involved in polar exploration 
accomplished? How much value did the law attach to discovery, exploration, flag 
planting, scientific research and efforts at state administration? In the eyes of 
international law, who owned the Arctic and the Antarctic?  
1.5 International Law and the Acquisition of Territory  
Legal thinkers René Dollot, Thomas Willing Balch, and James Brown Scott explored the 
frontiers of international law during the climax of the second age of discovery, as 
explorers pushed into the interior of Africa, the central Asian deserts, the Amazon Basin, 
and the polar regions, and European powers extended their formal empires throughout the 
world.145 These legal experts learned their art during the “zenith of European 
jurisprudence” as international law formulated by European states and jurists spread 
throughout the world.146 From their seat at the pinnacle, lawyers surveyed centuries of 
development in the international law on territorial acquisition.  
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Papal bulls represented the first attempt to regulate and simplify the territorial 
claims of rival empires. In 1493, the two most important bulls, Inter caetera and Dudum 
siquidem, gave Spain exclusive rights to the non-Christian world west and south of a 
pole-to-pole line that ran one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. 
A year later, Spain and Portugal clarified their claims in the Treaty of Tordesillas, 
delivering everything west of a line passing through 60°W latitude to Spain and 
everything east to Portugal. Ostensibly a simple division of the world, the Treaty 
included far more complexity. Tordesillas did not give full title to the Iberian powers in 
their spheres of influence, conditioning sovereignty upon “recurring proofs,” such as 
ceremonies and mapping. The Treaty did not grant ownership over undiscovered lands in 
the spheres of influence it created, but gave each state the right to “seek out and take 
possession of newly discovered lands.”147 From the beginning of European exploration 
and colonial expansion, claiming land involved more than drawing lines on the map. 
 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as imperial competition increased and 
European nations took root in colonial territories with widely different geographic and 
human landscapes, early modern glossators looked to establish clearer guidelines and a 
common legal language for the acquisition of territory. They struggled to determine a 
basic formula for establishing sovereignty. Instead, as legal historians Lauren Benton and 
Benjamin Straumann observe, “asserting and defending [imperial] claims … involved a 
scattershot legal approach, with multiple, overlapping, and even conflicting arguments 
being addressed to various, sometimes imagined, audiences.”148  
To support imperial title and gain international recognition, state agents and legal 
scholars turned to Roman property law, which held that dominium (ownership) of res 
nullius properties (without an owner) could be acquired by occupatio (taking possession), 
which was “an instant conveyor of ownership.”149 Empires often used the doctrine of res 	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nullius to justify their claim to absolute title over lands that they deemed ownerless; the 
presence of Indigenous polities and rival imperial competitors complicated its use.150 
Broader imperial strategies engaged the law of usucapio (taking through use), by which a 
person could acquire title over property that already had an owner through possessio 
(possession) over a period of time. In order to keep possession, the owner simply showed 
his claim superior to that of his competitor. Following this legal tradition, expanding 
European empires focused on acquiring proofs of better title than any possible competitor, 
rather than trying to “establish title tout court” or explaining the “legitimacy of title and 
how the thing in question had been acquired.” While Roman law offered a starting point 
for the legal discourse on territorial acquisition, it became “more resource than road map” 
due to the weak definition of the steps required for acquiring sovereignty.151  
 Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, sovereignty doctrine developed 
alongside European expansion.152 Lauren Benton shows, however, that empires lacked 
one version of sovereignty, but used multiple adaptations to deal with different 
geographical or geopolitical situations. Even in the best of cases, the space of an empire 
was “politically fragmented, legally differentiated, encased in irregular, porous and 
sometimes undefined boundaries.”153 The agents of empire used the word “‘anomalous’ 
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sovereignty.” Faced with anomalous legal spaces, jurists and diplomats looked to “inter- 
and intra-imperial legal politics,” and the sites of imperial competition, as sources for 
international law.154 “A symbolic language of possession” took shape that included 
planting flags or crosses, holding ceremonies, and conducting more tangible acts such as 
constructing forts. The English aristocrat and explorer Walter Raleigh promised that by 
“keeping one good fort, or building one towne of strength, the whole Empyre is 
guarded.”155 Geographic knowledge also developed into an important class of 
information that “played a dual function of making strange landscapes subject to control 
and rendering them as property – one sense of dominium.”156 When polar explorers 
charted and mapped they engaged in an established method of demonstrating state control. 
Although the measures deemed necessary for acquiring title grew over the centuries, 
imperial sovereignty often remained “more myth than reality.”157 
 Opposition to the use of discovery and symbolic acts to claim large tracts of 
territory, and the fictitious sovereignty that they created, steadily grew in both state 
practice and doctrine. Many English colonies of North America, for instance, argued that 
title should go to whatever group managed to cultivate the soil first and rows of corn and 
wheat became incredibly important.158 By the middle of the eighteenth century, most 
jurists agreed with Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel, who argued in his famous The Law 
of Nations, that a state could not “appropriate to itself countries which it does not really 
occupy, and thus engross a much greater extent of territory than it is able to people or 
cultivate.” Such an action violated natural law, which demanded that the earth be 
occupied and used.159 German jurist Georg Friedrich von Martens maintained that a state 
could not acquire territory through first discovery and planting “Crosses, plinths and 
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inscriptions” if it did “not cultivate” the land.160 Accordingly, as explorers discovered and 
claimed huge portions of the Arctic and Antarctic in the nineteenth century, jurists 
devalued discovery’s weight in territorial acquisition.161 Sir Robert Phillimore, arguably 
the most eminent British international lawyer of his generation and author of the first 
comprehensive British treatise on international law in the 1850s, concluded, 
“Discovery… furnishes an inchoate title to possession in the discoverer.”162 First 
discovery gave a state the exclusive right (called an inchoate right) to occupy new 
territory and perfect its title, but this could be lost if the state did not act within a 
reasonable, though undetermined, period. The idea of inchoate rights would come to play 
an important role in the polar regions. 
While nineteenth century jurists made strong conclusions on the role of discovery, 
their findings on the doctrines of prescription and contiguity were less clear. Legal 
scholar Stephen Neff explains that, under prescription, “rights claimed and exercised for 
extended periods of time – even if they had no legal foundation initially – ripen, with the 
passage of time, into true legal rights that other parties are obligated to respect. That is to 
say, the passage of time alone can transform usurpation into right.”163 Yet no jurist in the 
nineteenth century could determine exactly how much time had to pass before a right 
became unchallengeable.164 Others wondered if time really could cure even the most 
doubtful and flawed titles.  
Legal opinion on the doctrine of contiguity, which became prominent in the 
nineteenth century, was even less apparent. Contiguity held that the occupation of part of 
a region entitled a state to all the territory (or hinterland) close enough to be considered a 
single geographic unit.165 According to legal scholar Hersch Lauterpacht, “the principle 
of contiguity played a useful part in the period when some compromise between the 
fanciful assertions of pure discovery and effective occupation best fulfilled the needs of 	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the time.”166 The United States, for instance, used the doctrine in its long-standing dispute 
with Britain over the Oregon territory.167 In 1844, Secretary of State John Calhoun 
informed Britain that contiguity, 
furnishes a just foundation for a claim of territory, in connection with those of 
discovery and occupation would seem unquestionable. It is admitted by all, that 
neither of them is limited by the precise spot discovered or occupied…It is 
evident that, in order to make either available, it must extend at least some 
distance beyond that actually discovered or occupied; but how far, as an abstract 
question, is a matter of uncertainty. It is subject in each case, to be influenced by a 
variety of considerations.168  
Alongside arguments of contiguity, however, the U.S. also based its claim on rights 
transferred from Spain, the work of American explorers, and the establishment of trading 
posts in the region.169 Nevertheless, contiguity caught on in state practice and juridical 
treatises.170 While several territorial disputes involving islands during the second half of 
the century tested the doctrine of contiguity, no one produced a general conclusion on the 
theory’s applicability.171 Out of the theory evolved the concept of the sphere of influence, 
which European powers used to notify other states of the territory they considered 	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geographically or politically bounded to their empire –	  a concept most jurists rejected.172 
Thus, state practice and international jurisprudence left the legal status of contiguity 
unclear in the late nineteenth century. 
The uncertainties surrounding the doctrines of contiguity and prescription 
mirrored the general ambiguity in all international law dealing with territorial claims and 
sovereignty. The last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a concerted effort by 
jurists to address the problem by finally formalizing and fixing the rules of territorial 
acquisition. This push occurred in the context of the flourishing of international law that 
transpired in the 1870s. Legal scholar Martti Koskenniemi has described how the 
peaceful arbitration of disputes, like the Alabama affair between the U.S. and Britain, 
fuelled a growing professional awareness and enthusiasm amongst international legal 
jurists.173 The trend culminated with the creation of the Institut de droit International in 
Ghent and the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Laws of Nations (later 
called the International law Association) in 1873. Through these institutions, “the men of 
1873” promoted their positivist doctrine, which held states as the principal actors in 
international law, bound only by the rules to which they consented.174 Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr, captured their central idea best in 1881 when he noted, “The life of law has 
not been logic: it has been experience.”175 This group wanted to stop studying law as an 
abstract philosophy and turn it into a science, based on the study of real world 
experiences and situations that provided concrete and practical rules states could actually 
use.176 More than anything, the “men of 1873” wanted states to see the value and 
practicality of a coherent international legal system. 
In the creation of Europe’s formal empires, “the men of 1873” found the 
opportunity they sought. For most of the nineteenth century informal empires grew, as 
countries tried to control trade or governments, but states lacked the desire to formally 	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occupy foreign territory. Their attitude changed in the late 1870s when the European 
powers took active steps to build formal empires in Africa, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. 
Koskenniemi highlights that “the end of informal empire meant that European public 
institutions – in particular, European sovereignty – needed to be projected into colonial 
territory.”177 International law and the lawyers that studied it now had a strong sense of 
purpose and a goal. Legal historian Antony Anghie argues that the empire building of the 
late 19th century offered to international law “the same opportunity they traditionally 
extended to the lower classes…the opportunity to make something of yourself, to prove 
and rehabilitate yourself.”178 European states used the law to argue that the millions of 
‘uncivilized’ people they colonized had no such thing as sovereignty or territory, and 
their lands were free for the taking. For international lawyers, the colonies (and the 
competition they generated between Europe’s powers) provided justification for their 
belief that the law could play an important role in the management of international 
relations. In the 1880s, lawyers became “locked in an imperialist matrix that 
compromised their legal aspirations.”179 This atmosphere later shaped the legal work 
done on the polar regions. 
Solving the legal problems created by the “Scramble for Africa,” demanded the 
involved European states iron out the rules for acquiring land. To do this, and to answer 
other pressing questions concerning the freedom of navigation and trade throughout the 
Congo and Niger Rivers, the European powers organized an international conference in 
Berlin. In the summer of 1884, the conference’s two founders, German Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck and French Foreign Minister Jules Ferry, explained that the meetings 
would provide “a definition of formalities necessary to be observed so that new 
occupations on the African coasts shall be deemed effective.” The delegates would try to 
determine how a state could demonstrate adequate proof of possession, without getting 
into legal and moral issues like whether they had a “right to colonize” or the status of 
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Africa’s Indigenous polities.180 When word of the conference seeped out, international 
lawyers looked expectantly for what had been missing over the last centuries: a clear and 
concrete guide for territorial acquisition.181 The lawyers should have realized that, “an 
Empire is never an advocate of an international law that can seem only an obstacle to its 
ambition.”182 
The Berlin Conference opened on 15 November 1884 at the German Chancellor’s 
Palace on Wilhelmstraße. Diplomats from fourteen states, including the U.S., Turkey and 
every European power except Switzerland, attended. On 26 February 1885, every state 
except the U.S. signed the General Act of the conference.183 Unfortunately, the document 
constructed an incredibly weak and vague legal regime. “None of the thirty-eight clauses 
[had]…any teeth,” Thomas Pakenham memorably remarked. “It had set no rules for 
dividing, let alone eating, the cake.”184 In 1942, Sybil Crowe concluded that the Act’s 
resolutions were “as empty as Pandora’s box…a most inadequate piece of legislation.”185 
Chapter VI required that new occupations on the coast of Africa be “effective.” 
The Chapter only had two articles, written as general formulations “whose applicability 
was limited to an almost meaningless minimum.”186 Article 34 required states to make a 
public declaration (formal notice) of new acquisitions to the other signatory states. 
Article 35 stated that “the Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to 
insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the 	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African Continent sufficient to protect existing rights and, as the case may be, freedom of 
trade and of transit under conditions agreed upon.” States eagerly signed on to an act that 
laid out “no criteria for what would constitute ‘effectiveness’” and that applied only to 
acquisitions along the West African coast, where there was already very little land left to 
take.187 The Act watered down the administrative duties thrust on states and generally 
avoided “surges of colonial liabilities.”188 The conference established no golden rule for 
the expectations of colonial sovereignty, or any rigorous general guidelines that might 
hurt imperial claims the world over.189  
The lack of legal clarity meant that states, unbound by a general rule, could 
continue to settle global conflicts on an ad hoc basis between powers. The European 
powers embraced the ambiguity in the decades that followed. In the 1880s, Portugal 
claimed a solid block of land between the Indian and Atlantic oceans, with little attempt 
at effective occupation. France and Germany accepted the annexation in 1886 and Britain 
agreed to it five year later (after claiming a large chunk of the territory for itself). In two 
treaties in 1890, an Anglo-French agreement on western Sudan and an Anglo-German 
one on East Africa, the ‘rules’ established in Berlin played no role. States continued to 
justify extensive hinterland and sphere of interest claims based on their control of small 
sections of African coastline.190 Exclusivity and proof of a stronger title, rather than 
establishing an absolute title, remained the most important part of territorial acquisition.  
 The infamous Fashoda Affair put the last nail in the coffin of effective occupation 
doctrine in Africa. After Khartoum fell to the Mahdi jihad in 1885, the British and 
Egyptians formally abandoned the entire territory. The French took the opportunity to 
challenge the British plan for a Cape-to-Cairo Empire in Africa, disrupting the goal of a 
British sphere of influence over the whole Nile valley. The French Prime Minister, Léon 
Bourgeois, approved the plan to send a small French occupation force through the Sudan 
to establish a presence (occupation) on the island of Fashoda, 469 miles south of 
Khartoum. After a two-year journey, the leader, Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand, planted 	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the French flag at Fashoda on 10 July 1898. The flag flew until a few months later when 
Lord Kitchener defeated the Mahdist army at Omdurman and, on the morning of 19 
September, British troops appeared outside Fashoda. After a tense standoff, the French 
decided to withdraw, explaining the British had “the troops…we only have the 
arguments.”191 The French based their rights on the idea of occupation laid out in Berlin 
and lost. The African agreements that followed did not even pretend to endorse 
occupation. In exchange for recognition of British predominance in Egypt and Sudan, 
France secured a free hand in Morocco and Tunisia. Establishing a suitable quid pro quo 
mattered more to states seizing territory in Africa than articulating a firm legal basis for 
their claims.  
 The British refused to accept that Article 34 of the General Act established the 
need to formally notify other states of their territorial intentions in other parts of the globe. 
In 1900, British law officers reported, “with reference to a suggestion that the annexation 
of Transvaal should be notified to foreign powers,” that “it is not necessary that a formal 
notification should be made to foreign powers.” They concluded that “no rule of 
International Law has been evoked rendering such notification essential to the validity of 
annexation. It is not our usual practice to make these notifications.”192 As a result, when 
Norway questioned Britain’s claims to the Antarctic territories, it replied accurately; “it is 
not the practice of H.M. Govt to notify foreign Govts additions to British territory made 
by annexation, occupation or otherwise.”193 Formal notifications could lead to formal 
challenges – a danger the British sought to avoid, especially in the polar regions.  
 State practice highlights the almost total lack of influence of the Berlin Act on 
imperial policies regarding territorial acquisition. Still, despite their emphasis on finding 
international law in the realities and experiences of state practice, the international 
lawyers of the late nineteenth century continued to “write as if effective occupation were 	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a principal legal requirement of colonial title.”194 They hailed Berlin as a major 
benchmark in the development of international law –	  a sign of its progress from the days 
of the Treaty of Tordesillas, discovery and symbolic acts, despite the fact that state 
practice remained largely unchanged since the fifteenth century.195 While they realized 
Berlin only dealt with the west coast of Africa, most legal scholars believed that doctrine, 
legal opinions and state practice would generalize the rules for the rest of the world. The 
Institut de driot international devoted several meetings and articles to start to fill in the 
details about effective occupation left out of Berlin’s General Act.196 “Taking possession,” 
the Institut concluded, “is accomplished by the establishment of a responsible local 
power, provided with sufficient means to maintain order and assure the regular exercise 
of its authority within the limits of the occupied territory.”197  
Other international jurists expanded the legal discourse on effective occupation, 
some demanding higher levels of state action than the Institut, others less. In 1886, the 
Swiss jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli wrote “temporary or artificial occupation can only 
create an artificial right.”198 Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, the Russian international 
publicist, noted that states had to fulfill the “material occupation of the newly discovered 
land, the introduction of an administration.” Martens stressed that the state must make its 
power felt throughout the entire territory.199 The German jurist-consult Dr. Friedrich 
Heinrich Geffcken examined the colonial efforts of Belgium in the Congo Free State and 
argued, “it is very doubtful whether the Congo State can rightfully claim over a territory 
more than 2,000,000 square kilometers…extending in part over regions entirely 
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unexplored…even though its right to those limits has been acknowledged by other 
states.”200 Geffcken acknowledged the gap between state practice and legal doctrine.  
While Britain embraced spheres of influence and hinterlands around the world, 
the major English treatises all called for effective occupation. William Edward Hall, 
whose major treatise on international law first appeared before Berlin, reflected actual 
state practice and belief best when he argued that a state could justify “moderate 
negligence” in claimed territory if “discovery, coupled with the public assertion of 
ownership, is followed up from time to time by further exploration or by temporary 
lodgments in the country” (as evidence of “continued interest”).201 Legal treatises written 
after Berlin, however, all presented far more stringent versions of effective occupation. 
John Westlake, the Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of 
Cambridge, approvingly cited Geffcken’s conclusions in his 1894 book Chapters on the 
Principles of International Law.202 Lassa Oppenheim, Britain’s leading international law 
expert, who enjoyed close ties to the Foreign Office,203 tried to sketch out the 
requirements of occupation in his magisterial International Law.204 In the most 
authoritative treatise on the subject in the English language, Oppenheim argued a claim 
was only perfected through settlement accompanied by administrative acts – otherwise, 
acts of occupation represented “fictitious occupation” only. Still, like all the other jurists, 
Oppenheim offered few specific examples of what actually constituted effective 
occupation or the level of required activity.205 
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Arbitrations dealing with territorial disputes at the end of the nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth brought little clarity to the situation.206 The British Guiana 
Boundary Arbitration of 1897, for instance, awarded sovereignty based on the concepts 
of contiguity and physical proximity. With no justification, the rules of the arbitration 
also established a period of fifty years as sufficient to create a good title through 
prescription.207 In the British Guiana Boundary Case of 1904 – the clearest decision in a 
territorial arbitration from this period – the arbiter noted that “it is indispensable that the 
occupation be effected in the name of the State which intends to acquire the sovereignty 
of those regions.” Although the arbiter noted that an occupation required “effective, 
uninterrupted, and permanent possession,” he did not lay out specific requirements or 
details. The decision also established that the effective possession of part of a region 
could give a state title to the whole area “which constitutes a single organic whole.”208 
These decisions highlighted many of the problems inherent in arbitration at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Arbitration was for the settlement of disputes, not the establishment of 
rules of law, and often jettisoned the law for what the arbitrator considered a fair and 
equitable result.209 Given their ad hoc nature, it was difficult for arbitrations to build up a 
substantial body of law.210 Arbitral panels were also independent from one other, and 
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“rulings by one [were] not binding on others.” Finally, many arbitrators were not lawyers 
and gave only the barest reasons for their decisions.211All of these issues worked to limit 
the impact that arbitrations had on the development of the rules for territorial acquisition 
and the doctrine of effective occupation.   
By the early twentieth century, despite all the ink spilled, effective occupation 
remained an unclear and ambiguous doctrine, wide open to interpretation. Multiple 
versions of imperial sovereignty persisted, and a formula for territorial acquisition 
seemed as distant and obscure as it had in previous centuries. State practice was clearly 
disconnected from the doctrinal writings of international lawyers. Despite the continued 
emphasis on settlement and state functions, when actually looking at reality “international 
lawyers could hardly continue to insist that colonial title could follow only from setting 
up effective administration.”212 Prime Minister Salisbury captured the situation in 1896: 
There is no enactment or usage or accepted doctrine which lays down the 
length of time required for international prescription, and no full definition of 
the degree of control which will confer territorial property on a nation, has 
been attempted. It certainly does not depend solely on occupation or the 
exercise of any clearly defined acts. All the great nations in both hemispheres 
claim, and are prepared to defend, their rights to vast tracts of territory which 
they have in no sense occupied, and often have not fully explored. The 
modern doctrine of "Hinterland", with its inevitable contradictions, indicates 
the unformed and unstable condition of international law as applied to 
territorial claims resting on constructive occupation or control.213 
After centuries of exploration and territorial claims, the legal discourse on territorial 
acquisition and the establishment of state sovereignty remained underdeveloped, unclear, 	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and shrouded in layers of complexity. In this difficult context, international lawyers tried 
to bring the polar regions into the realm of international law.  
1.6 Situating the Polar Regions in International Law 
In October 1909, the world recognized James Brown Scott as one of the foremost 
authorities on international law: a leading member of the American Institute of 
International Law, editor of the newly created American Journal of International Law, 
and solicitor for the State Department.214 His fellow American Thomas Willing Balch 
was also a successful and experienced legal scholar with several case studies on 
international law under his belt. A keen interest in the Arctic and Antarctic spurred on the 
efforts of both men, especially Balch, whose brother Edwin sought to inspire the U.S. 
government to explore the Antarctic in support of Wilkes’ historic work.215 Together they 
applied legal discourse, created over the two decades since the Berlin Conference, to the 
Arctic and Antarctic. Unfortunately their articles failed to engage the complexities and 
uncertainties of the international law pertaining to territorial acquisition, nor did they 
mention the widely accepted use of spheres of influence and the rejection of effective 
occupation. They overlooked discussions of what rights, if any, states accrued from acts 
like charting, mapping, repeated visits, or issuing licenses and concessions. Instead, they 
compared state action in the polar regions to an ideal of territorial acquisition that did not 
exist. 
Both Scott and Balch agreed that the ice of the North Pole, which continuously 
moved around the Arctic Ocean, should be treated as high seas that could be claimed by 
no nation.216 They argued that the work of many polar explorers was useless because it 
had never been publicly endorsed by their respective states (precisely the worry of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Neff, Justice Among Nations, 301-302. Scott believed that peace and order in international relations 
could be best established through the expansion of international law. At the first conference of the 
American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Scott expressed his belief in “judicial 
decisions according to principles of law, not for compromise according to the standards of diplomacy.” 
Mark Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Great Expectations, 1789-1914 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 156. 
215 For an explaination of Edwin Balch’s activities, see Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 174.  
216 Scott, “Arctic Exploration and International Law,” 938; Balch, “The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and 
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Canada’s chief astronomer, W.F. King, in his country’s case).217 Both thought that only 
the Danish efforts in Greenland came close to the “actual possession” demanded by the 
results of the Berlin Conference.218 Balch attacked Britain’s Letters Patent for the FID as 
an attempt to unjustly claim unoccupied and, even worse, unexplored land in violation of 
international law’s demand for effective occupation.219 No country could justify claiming 
an enormous tract of land by visiting or occupying a small part of its coast.220 Here Balch 
echoed the opinion of Thomas Baty, an international lawyer who, in reviewing the 
Spitsbergen situation, argued that “it is impossible to annex the twenty-third largest 
island of the world by putting up a fish-curing house in one corner.”221 Scott and Balch 
both argued that a territorial claim must be supported through effective occupation. 
Accordingly, they concluded that the Arctic and Antarctic, unoccupied as they were, 
remained like Spitsbergen – terra nullius, a “no man’s land.” While Balch argued that 
these areas should become “a joint possession of all mankind,” Scott thought they were 
open to any state for occupation.222 In denying that states had any real rights to polar 
territory in the absence of actual occupation, the two anticipated an American legal 
tradition that would take form in the Hughes Doctrine.  
The article prepared by the great French lawyer and internationalist René Dollot 
expressed a far more practical viewpoint. He insisted that the rules of acquisition must be 
tailored to the unique conditions of the polar regions. “In these territories one must 
reduce the indispensable formalities, reduce them to the strict minimum, we say,” Dollot 
asserted. “To assure oneself of the legitimacy of the discovery, to regularize the 
possession, to protect it against strangers, such are the fundamental principles.” He even 
suggested that in areas where there was no international competition, “discovery and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Scott, “Arctic Exploration and International Law,” 939. Scott noted that Canada must have come to this 
conclusion as well because of the recent surge in national exploration it was undertaking.  
218 Scott, “Arctic Exploration and International Law,” 940.  
219 Balch, “The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations,” 274.  
220 Balch, “The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations,” 269. 
221 Baty, “Spitzbergen,” 83-88. Later, Baty attacked the British claim to the FID. He argued that no country 
could annex huge slices of territory by “simply saying that they are hers.” He insisted that, “the occupation 
of one of a group of islands could not confer sovereignty in the others…The occupation of a post on the 
continent could not carry with it more than a reasonable adjacent zone.” Baty concluded that the 
international community should “concede a clear sovereignty to the first State whose subjects establish a 
regular occupation” in the polar regions. Thomas Baty, “Arctic and Antarctic Annexation,” Law Magazine 
and Review 37 (1912): 326-328. 
222 Scott, “Arctic Exploration and International Law,” 941.  
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notification to the Powers would appear to constitute for a long period sufficient 
legitimation.” Dollot pointed out, however, that a state had to respond to developments in 
the area claimed. “A desert is not administered like a metropolis, a glacial island like an 
African Bazaar,” he observed. “Where there is fishing, hunting, mining, the same 
organization as there is in a desolate promontory on which an observatory is usefully 
installed, will not do.”223 While Dollot provided few concrete examples of what this kind 
of administration looked like in practice, he embraced the idea of polar exceptionalism 
when he raised the possibility that effective occupation doctrine could be relaxed for the 
polar regions and its “indispensable formalities” reduced. 
By 1909, Britain’s Letters Patent, the Danish claim to Greenland, and the vague 
rights transferred to Canada in 1880 represented the only formal annexations of territory 
in the Antarctic and the High Arctic – and they were by no means secure. The majority of 
territory in the polar regions remained unclaimed. With all the uncertainties involved in 
the law concerning territorial acquisition, and the gulf between those doctrines and state 
practice, countries that wished to make a credible claim in the Arctic and Antarctic faced 
a difficult choice. States could choose to endorse the legal opinions of the American 
lawyers, Balch and Scott, and accept that actual settlement of polar land was required to 
secure title. Further, the state could embrace Balch’s conclusion that an occupation was 
impossible in many parts of the High Arctic and Antarctic and accept that these areas be 
considered a common possession of all mankind. In sharp contrast, states could follow 
imperialistic state practice and use spheres of influence or the hinterland theory to claim 
vast portions of territory where they had done little or nothing to establish their title. 
After all, the British had already embraced the “fictive sovereignty” of their previous 
colonial endeavours in their Letters Patent for the Antarctic. Finally, states could accept 
the exceptional nature of the polar regions and move in the direction suggested by Dollot 
by modifying the regular rules. They could conceive of the polar regions as an anomalous 
legal space that called for fresh solutions and new legal norms.  
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These four ways of looking at territorial acquisition shaped the bi-polar legal 
landscape for the next half-century.224 Would the territorial claims of the future be based 
on occupation, spheres of influence, a combination of both, or some other principle 
adapted to the anomalous legal space of the polar regions? In his study, Dollot had 
mentioned an interesting suggestion set forth by an obscure Canadian senator, Pascal 
Poirier, in 1907: the sector principle. Dollot did not endorse the idea, but the sector 
principle would go on to influence polar law and politics for decades and shape the 
evolution of the polar regions.225  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 
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Chapter 2 
2 Polar Opposite Polar Policies: The Rise of the Sector 
Principle and the Hughes Doctrine, 1907-1924 
On 20 February 1907, Pascal Poirier, a long-serving member of Canada’s Senate, shared 
a thrilling, if fantastic, vision of the Arctic’s future with his colleagues. The region, he 
explained, would eventually “melt” and fill with fields, cities, mines and railroads. “The 
possibilities of our northern hemisphere,” Poirier insisted, “are unlimited.”1 The senator’s 
prophecy, however, included a warning. Canada’s stake in the Arctic’s bright future 
could be stolen by its powerful neighbour, the United States.2 American “navigators” had 
flown the stars and stripes throughout the Arctic Archipelago. The Canadian government 
must “precede our friends to the south, and assert in as public a manner as possible our 
dominion over those lands” instead of idly waiting for Washington to raise the “question 
of title” to Arctic territory, Poirier entreated. With the United States and Britain enjoying 
closer relations than ever before, and the world stage reverberating with “the echoes and 
declarations of universal peace,” Canada had a window of opportunity to secure its polar 
possessions.3  
 Poirier’s legal acumen showed in his compelling case for Canada’s sovereignty in 
the North American Arctic Archipelago. He described the history of British exploration 
in the region and highlighted the territorial rights that Canada inherited from Britain and 
the Hudson’s Bay Company. Alluding to contemporary currents in the international law 
on territorial acquisition, Poirier maintained that Canada was effectively occupying the 
region. He believed in the exceptionalism of polar territory and suggested that “in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Canada, Senate Debates, 20 February 1907, 272. Poirier pointed to the expansion of mining and 
agriculture in northern Alberta and around Hudson Bay as proof that the northern regions could be of great 
economic value. 
2 Since the Alaska Boundary Dispute five years before, Poirier had grown increasingly worried about 
American interest, exploration and commercial activity in the Canadian North. See Canada, Senate Debates, 
20 October 1903, 1662-1663. Poirier commented: “I think it is time we called a halt and looked forward to 
see how many other slices we may be called upon to part with…. The next possible arbitration may be 
concerning Hudson Bay.... Just consider what our position will be if the Americans discover the North Pole 
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case of Arctic wastes and recesses what is…sufficient to establish possessions and give a 
good title, is occupancy as much as occupancy can take place.”4 Nevertheless, the senator 
must have harboured doubts about the strength of Canada’s title, for he offered a fourth, 
and far more definite method for securing sovereignty in the Arctic: the sector principle. 
A year before, a New York-based social group called the Arctic Club held its 
annual dinner and listened to a keynote address by Canadian captain Joseph Elzéar 
Bernier.5 As the night progressed, the club’s members (who were by no means experts on 
international law) started to discuss territorial claims in the Arctic.6 They concluded,  
In future partition of northern lands, a country whose possession today goes up 
to the Arctic regions, will have a right, or should have a right, or has a right to 
all the lands that are to be found in the waters between a line extending from its 
eastern extremity north, and another line extending from the western extremity 
north. All the lands [discovered and undiscovered] between the two lines up to 
the north pole should belong and do belong to the country whose territory abuts 
up there.7 
By employing simple, uncomplicated sector lines Poirier felt that Canada could secure its 
“possession of the lands and islands situated in the north of the Dominion, and extending 
to the north pole.”8 Other Canadian politicians had already argued that Canada had rights 
to all the “contiguous” lands above its coastline to the North Pole.9 More importantly, 
since 1904, Canada’s Department of the Interior had employed the sector principle in a 
quasi-official manner through the publication of a map prepared by geographer, James 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Canada, Senate Debates, 20 February 1907, 268. France, Poirier pointed out, would never be expected to 
cultivate the Sahara, so why should Canada have to take similar action before it could claim its Arctic 
territory. 
5 The polar explorers who largely made up the Arctic club met frequently for annual dinners, reunions and 
presentations. Its membership included prominent explorers like Adolphus Greely and Frederick Cook. The 
group published the Arctic Club of America Bulletin between 1907 and 1912, too late for their discussion of 
the sector principle on 28 January 1906 to be included. 
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Cavell and Jeff Noakes, Acts of Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty, 1918-25 (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2010), 77. 
7 Quoted in Ivan Head, “Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions,” McGill Law 
Journal 9, no. 3 (1963): 203-204; Donat Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988), 9-10.  
8 Canada, Senate Debates, 20 February 1907, 266. This was the actual wording of Poirier’s motion. 
9 For example, in September 1903, Mr. S. B. Gourley of Colchester noted: “So far as I am concerned, I will 
support this proposal because I do not think there is the slightest doubt about Canada owning every foot of 
territory from here to the North Pole. It is contiguous to Canada, and we own every foot of it by right of 
discovery and exploration.” Canada, House of Commons Debates, 30 September 1903, col. 12818, See 
Gordon W. Smith, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North, ed. P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2014), 188-189. 
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White. The map used the 141st and 60th meridians running to the North Pole as Canada’s 
northern boundaries.10 Poirier simply articulated these ideas in a more public, precise and 
comprehensive manner. 
What “transformed Poirier’s resolution from a bit of nationalistic bluster to a 
footnote in international law,” historian Alan MacEachern has explained, “was his 
argument that the equation by which Canada should determine its North was also an 
equation that all other northern nations could apply.”11 Arctic territory should 
automatically be in the hands of the closest state. In his speech to the Senate, Poirier laid 
out the sectors that Norway, Russia, the U.S. and Canada could claim, although he 
excluded a Danish sector emanating from Greenland (perhaps more by oversight than 
strategic intent). The senator insisted that “From 141 to 60 degrees west we are on 
Canadian territory…I hold that no foreigner has a right to go and hoist a flag on it up to 
the north pole, because it is not only within the sphere of possession of England, but it is 
in the actual possession of England.”12  
Sir Richard Cartwright, the government leader in the Senate, concisely rebutted 
and rejected all Poirier’s arguments. Government expeditions operating in the Arctic, the 
custom’s duties they collected, and other “acts of dominion” had secured Canada’s title to 
the Arctic Archipelago, Cartwright argued. The passage of time and various “acts of 
dominion” would strengthen Canada’s territorial title to the point that no foreign power 
would consider challenging it.13 In the face of Cartwright’s firm dismissal, Poirier’s idea 
abruptly died on the Senate floor.  
By bringing disparate literatures and fresh primary research into dialogue, this 
chapter charts how political developments in the polar regions resuscitated the sector 
principle and transformed it into an important transnational legal idea. As polar empires 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Curiously these borders still appear on certain Canadian maps today; Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in 
International Law, 5. Cavell and Noakes have explored the influence James White may have had on the 
development of the sector principle. See Cavell and Noakes, Acts of Occupation, 73-75. 
11 Alan MacEachern, “J.E. Bernier’s Claims to Fame,” Scientia Canadensis 33, no. 2 (2010): 56.  
12 Canada, Senate Debates, 20 February 1907, 271. 
13 Cartwright reserved his opinion on sectors and whether Canada could claim title to all the territory to the 
North Pole, he acknowledged that he could see no “practical advantage” to asserting “jurisdiction quite as 
far north as that.” Canada, Senate Debates, 20 February 1907, 271, 273-274. 
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expanded and state officials grappled with the meaning of sovereignty in harsh polar 
environments, some advocates embraced the sector principle as a simple and cost-
effective solution to a complex and anomalous legal space that avoided difficult questions 
about settlement, state administration and undiscovered territory. Other officials, 
sometimes within the same government, were reluctant to tie their country’s sovereignty 
to a concept that seemed to have little legal precedent and uncertain standing in existing 
international law.  
Britain’s employment of the sector principle ensured that it became one of the 
dominant ideas in the bi-polar legal landscape. Prior to 1925, Canada applied the 
principle inconsistently and Russia flirted with the idea of a sector claim, but officials in 
London used it carve out two sectors in the Antarctic: the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
(FID) and the Ross Dependency. This chapter argues that London’s use of the sector 
principle emanated from the “technical and analytical” British tradition of international 
law that avoided abstract basic principles, focusing on “the law as it is, rather than the 
law as it ideally would be”14 and finding rules “only through an examination of the 
practice of states.”15 Although Poirier’s sector idea represented a novel solution to the 
problem of polar sovereignty, it also reflected popular legal assumptions and centuries 
of state practice. Since the papal bulls of the fifteenth century, states had often used 
meridian lines as territorial boundaries. By using language like “sphere of possession,” 
Poirier referenced the hinterland claims and spheres of influence approach used by 
European states in the partition of Africa. These colonial annexations, like Poirier’s 
sectors, were predicated on the doctrine of contiguity –	  the belief that even the loose 
control or ownership of an area (usually a section of coastline) allowed a state to claim a 
vast amount of adjacent territory. In the British mindset, the sector principle represented 
a logical and proven solution to the problem of sovereignty in the polar regions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Vaughn Lowe cited in Allison Ross, “Making International Law Work,” Global Arbitration Review, 31 
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15 Colin Warbrick, “Introduction to the Symposium,” European Journal of International Law 13 (2002): 
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The U.S. State Department disagreed. In 1924, American officials crafted the 
Hughes Doctrine. The theory held that polar sovereignty demanded actual physical 
settlement and use of territory. Under the Hughes Doctrine, proclamations, repeated visits, 
temporary outposts and a semblance of control did not allow a country to acquire 
sovereignty over polar territory. The U.S. position held that countries had to settle, 
colonize and exploit polar lands before they could successfully claim them. This chapter 
asserts that, as much as the sector principle reflected the British tradition of international 
law, the Hughes Doctrine mirrored the classical legal ideology held by many key 
American officials, characterized by a belief that universal and abstract principles should 
form the basis of a legally regulated world. With Britain’s use of the sector principle and 
America’s support of the Hughes Doctrine, the polar regions became the testing ground 
of fundamentally different legal approaches to sovereignty, and competing national 
traditions of international law. 
2.1 Sovereignty and Sectors During the Heroic Age of Polar 
Exploration and the First World War 
Discovery and exploration continued to dominate polar affairs in the years preceding the 
First World War. Explorers of various nationalities ventured into the many blank spots 
that existed on the maps of the Arctic and Antarctic for personal glory, national prestige, 
scientific curiosity and, on occasion, to claim new territory.16 At the official level, states 
remained relatively disinterested. In the Arctic, Canada, Denmark and Russia took small 
steps to strengthen their polar territorial claims. Various other states closely monitored 
the legal and political status of Spitsbergen. In the Antarctic, the great powers did not 
repeat their actions in Africa by racing to carve up the continent. As historian Peter Beck 
has demonstrated, Britain played the most active role in the region and even it took a 
relatively “low key” approach. A whaling boom in the Antarctic waters and Norwegian 
interest in the South Shetlands drove Britain to officially claim the FID in 1908, but there 
seemed little reason to annex the rest of the continent. Africa, the Middle East and 
burgeoning problems in Europe dominated British politics. Although London permitted 	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hardship, imparting a “heroic quality” to the process of polar exploration. Peter J. Beck, The International 
Politics of Antarctica (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 26. 
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and sometimes encouraged British explorers to make claims, they neglected to officially 
ratify them.17 Only during the First World War did territorial claims and questions of 
sovereignty in the Arctic and Antarctic start to take centre stage.  
Throughout his long career, Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, international lawyer and 
architect of Chile’s Antarctic strategy, argued there was a direct connection between 
Poirier’s proposal and the Letters Patent that Britain issued for the FID in 1908. “As far 
as polar sectors are concerned, their development in the Antarctic was undoubtedly 
inspired by the Arctic,” de la Barra concluded. “It was not by chance that in 1908, a year 
after the debate of the Canadian Senate…the London government adopted the doctrine of 
sectors towards the South Pole and created the Falkland Islands Dependencies.”18 Rather 
than claim all the known and unknown land in a vast sector, however, the Letters Patent 
clearly laid out the five territories Britain claimed “in the South Atlantic Ocean to the 
south of the 50th parallel of south latitude, and lying between the 20th and 80th degrees of 
west longitude:” South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the South 
Sandwich Islands, and Graham Land.19 Although the Letters used lines of meridian as 
convenient boundaries for the Falkland Islands Dependencies (FID), they did not make a 
sweeping claim to all the land stretching to the South Pole.20  	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18 Oscar Pinochet De La Barra, “Some Aspects of the Government of Antarctica,” in Poles Apart: A Study 
in Contrasts, ed. Antoni Lewkowicz (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1999), 179.  
19 See the Letters Patent, Letters Patent Providing for the Government of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 
21 July 1908, Document UK21071908, in W. M. Bush ed., Antarctica and International Law: A Collection 
of Inter-State and National Documents 3 (New York: Oceana, 1982-1988), 251-252. 
20 The British argued that the Letters Patent of 1908 did not represent a clear sector claim in a report written 
for the Imperial Conference of 1926. Imperial Conference 1926, British Policy in the Antarctic, Paper E101, 
National Archives (NA), ADM 116/2386. The wording of the 1908 Letters Patent actually resembles that 
used for West Australia the century before. As Vivian Forbes and Patrick Armstrong pointed out, a sector 
claim was made for Western Australia in 1829. In granting Captain James Stirling authority as the first 
governor of the Swan River Colony in western Australia, the British government letters patent gave him 
command over: “the boundaries of our Territory called Western Australia extending from Cape 
Londonderry, in latitude thirteen degrees forty-four minutes south; to West Cape Howe, in latitude thirty-
five degrees eight minutes south; and from Hartogs (sic) Island on the west coast in longitude one hundred 
and twelve degrees fifty-two minutes...to one hundred and twenty-nine degrees of east longitude reckoning 
from the meridian of Greenwich.” The Commission also noted that the territory would include, “...all 
islands adjacent in the Indian and Southern Oceans within the parallels of latitude aforesaid of thirteen 
degrees fortyfour minutes south and thirty-five degrees eight minutes south and within the longitudes 
aforesaid.” In a fresh letters patent in August 1890, the boundaries were extended to include “...from the 
parallel of thirteen degrees thirty minutes south latitude, to West Cape Howe in the parallel of thirty-five 
degrees eight minutes south latitude…including all islands adjacent in the Indian and Southern Oceans 
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The British made efforts to strengthen their title to the FID by mimicking 
Canada’s acts of dominion in the Arctic Archipelago.21 Prior to the First World War, 
Britain issued 29 licenses to (primarily Norwegian) whaling companies operating in the 
FID. Despite being hesitant to accept British sovereignty to the entire region, the 
Norwegian government encouraged its citizens to apply for the licenses. At this point, 
Norway’s commercial interests were for more important than its territorial ones, and the 
government wanted to avoid aggravating Britain to protect whaling operations.22  
The British considered each Norwegian application an admission of their 
sovereignty, but they still deemed it necessary to supervise whaling companies and 
establish an administration within the FID. As a result, they constructed an administrative 
post and a post office near the large whaling station at Grytviken, South Georgia in 1909. 
Whalers going to the South Shetlands usually stopped at Port Foster, Deception Island 
first, so London made it a “port of entry” (where people could lawfully enter the FID) 
and sent a magistrate there every summer season from 1910 to 1930. To further highlight 
Britain’s jurisdiction in the region, the British government made these administrative 
stations into post offices in 1912. In the summer of 1913 a customs officer provided a 
presence in the South Orkneys for two months, followed by other government agents in 
1914 and 1915. After 1911, Britain enforced conservation measures throughout the FID, 
demanding use of the entire carcass, restricting licenses, and sometimes refusing new 
permits.23 Although these activities only touched a small part of the FID, they still 
provided an official British presence in the Antarctic when no other state could.  
While administrative acts bolstered British sovereignty in the south polar region, 
the quest for the North Pole led to the resurrection of the sector principle. In 1908, 
Bernier took another Canadian expedition into the heart of the Arctic Archipelago, armed 	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with the knowledge that two American acquaintances – Robert Peary and Frederick Cook – were simultaneously trying the reach the North Pole. Faced with a likely American 
claim to the Pole, Bernier took dramatic action to secure Canada’s northern title. On 1 
July 1909, Bernier had his entire crew march to Parry’s Rock on Melville Island.24 At this 
spot, Bernier installed a plaque that took sweeping possession of the “whole Arctic 
Archipelago lying to the north of America from long. 60°W to 141°W up to latitude 
90°N.”25 Historians Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes have explained that Bernier’s sector 
claim far exceeded the instructions he had from the Canadian government of Wilfrid 
Laurier (which authorized him to annex new islands he discovered). His actions, the 
authors argue, actually overshadowed the more legally valuable work that Bernier 
accomplished by regulating foreign whalers operating in the Archipelago.26 Faced with 
Peary’s announcement claiming the North Pole for the United States, however, the 
Laurier government felt pressured to tacitly accept Bernier’s claim.  
In September 1909, publicity on Peary’s journey to the North Pole led Gilbert 
Parker, a Canadianborn member of the British House of Commons, to ask if Canada had 
already claimed the lands around the Pole.27 When officials from the Colonial Office 
examined the matter, they found a copy of Poirier’s speech28 and asked Ottawa “whether 
Canada makes claim upon all land intervening between the American border and the 
North Pole…?”29 Canada’s newly created and inexperienced Department of External 
Affairs answered affirmatively and Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies J.E.B. 
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Seely announced that Canada claimed all the land to the North Pole, though it had “not 
made a formal declaration of the exact limits of their possessions northwards.”30 
 Lucien Wolf, a reporter for the Times of London who often wrote on foreign 
affairs and diplomacy, thought the sector principle had merit. As MacEachern has noted, 
Wolf argued that the claim rested on “the right of discovery and the doctrine of 
Hinterland with a considerable dash of Jacobean Monroeism thrown in.” The journalist 
admitted that the hinterland doctrine remained unsettled in international law, but he 
thought the sector principle gave Canada an “arguable case” to take ownership of all the 
islands of the Archipelago as well as the frozen sea that connected them to the North Pole, 
which he thought, “for political purposes…must be amenable to the same laws of 
acquisition.” Canada had to take an important step before this claim could lead to full 
legal title. “All hitherto recognized Hinterlands have become such by virtue either of 
treaties or of formal notifications to the interested States or of unilateral proclamations or 
decrees,” the reporter pointed out. If Canada wanted to secure its Arctic possession, Wolf 
recommended that it adopt Poirier’s original resolution and assert its rights through an 
official and public sector claim.31  
After 1909, the Canadian government decided against such a formal and public 
strategy. No immediate actions entrenched the sector claim in federal statute and the 
Government issued no official declarations or formal notifications.32 In 1913, the 
Colonial Office warned Canada’s Governor General that the full extent of the land 
transferred to Canada in 1880 lacked formal definition and further cautioned, “as it is not 
desirable that any stress should be laid on the fact that a portion of the territory may not 
already be British” Ottawa should avoid public statements on its Arctic claims.33 In the 
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meantime, Canada continued its policy of quietly extending its knowledge of and 
presence in the Arctic Archipelago.  
The government funded Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s two-pronged Canadian Arctic 
Expedition in the western Arctic from 1913-1918. The last of the “old-fashioned 
expeditions” in the Arctic Archipelago, the main purpose of Stefansson’s northern party 
was to “discover new land along the 141st Meridian” and to map the edge of the 
continental shelf in the Beaufort basin. In the end, the explorer discovered and took 
possession of several hitherto undiscovered Arctic islands north of Parry Channel (Brock, 
Borden, Meighen and Lougheed Islands) adding several thousand square kilometres to 
Canada’s territory. In addition, the team clarified cartographically ambiguous territory 
such as Prince Patrick Island. On 12 March 1914, a small party from the expedition ship 
Karluk, which had been caught and crushed in the ice, straggled onto desolate Wrangel 
Island where they survived for eight months until their rescue. This occupation would 
come to play an important role in polar affairs.34  
Neither Stefansson nor the Canadian government ever referenced the sector 
principle during the expedition. In fact, Stefansson promoted the idea that Canada could 
not hope to retain the Arctic simply by colouring it “red in Atlases published in Canada.” 
Instead, he consistently called for effective occupation of the “friendly Arctic.”35 While 
Stefansson was not an official spokesman for Ottawa, his ideas about the need for 
permanent presence and settlement had a substantial impact on future Canadian polar 
policy-making. 
Much like the Canadians, the Danish government continued to consolidate its 
claim to Greenland through administrative acts and scientific expeditions. In particular, 
the Danes worried about the legal status of the eastern and northern parts of the island. 
Experienced explorer Knud Rasmussen urged Greenland’s administrators to establish a 	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permanent trading station in the north. A committee created to study the situation, 
however, concluded that the area represented a “no man’s land” and that any official 
Danish action might provoke a foreign protest, especially given all the work American 
explorers like Peary had accomplished in the region. However, the committee told 
Rasmussen that a private initiative by him might lay the foundation for a future Danish 
“takeover.” Rasmussen and Peter Freuchen established the Thule Trading Station, then 
the most northerly post in the world. From this station, the Danes launched a series of 
explorations (the Thule Expeditions) into northern Greenland establishing a Danish 
presence for the first time.36 
Concurrently, Russian interest and activities in the Arctic enjoyed a strong 
resurgence, branching out into the ocean above Siberia with the support of the Imperial 
Navy’s small fleet of icebreakers. Between 1910 and 1915, the Arctic Ocean 
Hydrographic Expedition found new land off the Taymyr Peninsula (Ostrov Malyy 
Taymyr), a new archipelago called Zemlya Imperatora Nikolaya II, and further explored 
the islands initially discovered by the survivors of the American Jeannette Expedition in 
the early 1880s.37 This wave of exploration illuminated another swath of the Arctic 
Ocean and added fresh territory to Russia’s Arctic empire. 
The lure of finding an “Arctic Atlantis” near the North Pole inspired American 
explorers who wanted to discover and claim new territory for the U.S., even though 
Washington lacked their enthusiasm. They were spurred on by a report on Arctic Ocean 
currents from the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey that indicated the existence of a large 
landmass or archipelago near the North Pole.38 Experienced polar explorer Donald 
MacMillan managed to attain funding from the American Geographical Society, the 
American Museum of Natural History, and the University of Illinois to find Crocker Land, 	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the mysterious land mass that Peary claimed to have spotted far to the west of Ellesmere 
Island on an earlier expedition.39 Throughout much of 1914, MacMillan and a small party 
explored both Ellesmere, Axel Heiberg and at one point spotted a vast land stretching 
into the horizon, although it turned to be nothing more than a mirage.40 
During the expedition, naval ensign Fitzhugh Green, on loan to MacMillan from 
the U.S. Navy, killed his Inughuit guide Piugaattoq somewhere on the northern coast of 
Axel Heiberg. Green had lost his sled and worried that Piugaattoq would take the 
supplies and leave him behind, so he shot the Inuk in the back – an incident that 
MacMillan deliberately suppressed.41 While MacMillan’s failure to condemn Green is an 
appalling story, had the press broadcast the murder it would have created a jurisdictional 
nightmare for Canada. An Inuk from Greenland had been shot by a U.S. naval ensign on 
a privately funded American expedition to an island ostensibly claimed by Canada, but 
which no British or Canadian explorer had ever visited. In actual fact, the expedition and 
murder never raised the question of who owned Ellesmere and Axel Heiberg at the 
official level, largely because of the State Department’s continued lack of interest in the 
Arctic.42 MacMillan’s efforts added to the large amount of American activity that had 
already occurred in the Archipelago and would influence future American questions 
about Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.  
For international legal experts, in the decade leading to the First World War the 
really interesting developments in the polar regions lay not in exploration activity, but in 
the legal and political status of Spitsbergen. Although mining activities increased on 
Spitsbergen in the first decade of the twentieth century, states and legal experts continued 
to consider the whole archipelago an open space where any group could operate freely. 	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Consequently, Norway suggested to Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
United States – the governments with interests in the archipelago – that there was a 
pressing need to develop a system of administration for the area. The Norwegians 
proposed that, because of their geographical proximity to Spitsbergen (which lay 800 km 
north of Norway), they should take the lead on regulating the archipelago. This proposal 
failed to impress many of the states with interests in Spitsbergen, especially Germany as 
it became more active in the archipelago. In 1911, for instance, a German expedition 
established a meteorological observation hut on Spitsbergen, the first permanent manned 
scientific station on the islands.43  
After the Norwegian proposal, officials from the interested states started to work 
out possible solutions to the problem of governing Spitsbergen. The German station, the 
coal mines, and hunting activities were all cited as signs of occupation by various states.44 
Given the potential for competing claims and the probable legal value that could be 
attached to these various acts of occupation, any decision on Spitsbergen had the 
potential to affect the polar regions more generally. Historian Andrew Fitzmaurice has 
observed that, after several small conferences in Kristiania, Norway, the negotiators 
produced a protocol confirming that, as terra nullius, Spitsbergen was “land without 
owners and that would remain without owners.”45 In short, the international community 
would continue to view Spitsbergen as a common possession of all mankind, just as 
Thomas Willing Balch envisioned it in 1910. The interested powers held a general 
conference in June 1914 to develop an international commission with limited powers to 
administer the archipelago. An aggressive German party waylaid these discussions, when 
it insisted that Germany be granted a much larger role in the administration than the other 
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countries believed it deserved.46 Unable to come to an agreement, the conference ended 
in deadlock. The outbreak of the First World War stopped any further discussions.  
While Spitsbergen intrigued international lawyers, the general public found the 
race for the South Pole – the last great goal of polar exploration – far more interesting. 
Between 1910 and 1912, several expeditions descended on the Antarctic to win the prize. 
On 14 December 1911, after travelling from the Bay of Whales in the Ross Sea, Roald 
Amundsen planted the Norwegian flag at the South Pole and named the polar plateau 
after Norway’s King Haakon VII. Thirty-three days later, Robert Falcon Scott’s 
exhausted British party straggled to the Pole, only to find that the Norwegians had beaten 
them. In one of the great tragedies of polar exploration, all five men perished on the 
return journey.47  
As Amundsen and Scott headed for the Pole, others circled the edges of the 
continent. A privately-funded Japanese expedition explored parts of the Ross Barrier, and 
King Edward VII Land (becoming the first group to land on its coast from the sea), while 
a German party penetrated into the Weddell Sea to uncover a new section of Antarctic 
coastline.48 While these expeditions opened up new areas of the southern continent, they 
focused on science and national prestige, not on territorial claims - unlike the explorers 
sent from the newest Antarctic player: Australia. 
Since the 1880s, Australian academics, geographers and scientists interested in 
the Antarctic had called repeatedly for their countrymen to take a more active role in 
exploration of the region.49 In 1886, Australia’s oldest learned society, the Royal Society 	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of Victoria, alongside the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, established an 
Australian Antarctic Exploration Committee in Melbourne. Reflecting the views of the 
committee, member C.S. Griffiths argued, “the exploration of these regions is a task 
which, by our geographical position and our wealth, is thrown on Australia as a duty 
which we cannot evade if we have any adequate conception of our great position in the 
southern seas.”50 The committee’s search for funding abruptly ended in the 1890s when 
an economic depression rocked the Australian colonies.51  
Calls for action resurfaced after the federation of the colonies in 1901 and the 
birth of the Commonwealth of Australia. The pressure led the Australasian Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to approve plans and funding for a full 
expedition in 1910. Douglas Mawson, the geologist who had drawn up the plan would 
lead the Australasian Antarctic Expedition (AAE). He had explored the Antarctic as part 
of Shackleton’s 1907-1909 expedition and would apply his past experience and skills to 
complete a survey of the 2000 miles of Antarctic coastline lying south of Australia.52 
Mawson had many scientific goals, but made no secret of his hope that the expedition’s 
work would lay the groundwork for Australian territorial rights in the Antarctic. In 1911 
he warned the AAAS that “no time is to be lost. So surely as it lapses a moment foreign 
nations will step in and secure this more valuable portion of the Antarctic continent for 
themselves, and for ever from the control of Australia.”53  
Unfortunately for Mawson, Whitehall’s uncertainty about Britain’s legal position 
in the south polar region and concern over France’s interests waylaid the Australian’s 
desire to claim territory. During his 1840 voyage, Sébestien César Dumont d’Urville had 	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charted and claimed part of the coastline south of Australia and named it Adélie Land. As 
the Australian expedition prepared to depart for the south, the British Foreign Office 
reminded the French of d’Urville’s activities and asked if the sailor had made a territorial 
claim. The French government seized the opportunity, to argue that France had, in fact, 
claimed Adélie Land, although it provided no specific territorial boundaries. (The 
ambiguity of exactly how much territory France claimed would play a prominent role in 
Antarctic politics for almost three decades).54 Britain considered challenging the claim, 
but it realized the French government could easily protest Britain’s title in the FID in 
return. The French explorer Jean Charcot had made many discoveries in the area over the 
last decade. Furthermore, only in 1904 had Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne persuaded 
France to accept the Entente Cordiale, a comprehensive settlement of each state’s 
imperial claims.55 London found little reason to initiate a new territorial dispute with 
France over the Antarctic.56  
The British rejected Mawson’s application to the Colonial Office for a 
commission from the King allowing him to claim territory in the “Australian Antarctic 
Quadrant.”57 Nevertheless, Mawson and his colleagues raised the Union Jack and the 
Commonwealth flag at Cape Denison, on “the Plateau hinterland some 300 miles from 
Cape Denison,” and at the Possession Rocks in Queen Mary Land, and taking possession 
for “the Empire and for Australia more particularly.”58 By the time the expedition 
returned home in 1914, Mawson and his Australians had laid the foundation for 
Australia’s future Antarctic claim.  
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 Before he left for the Antarctic with the AAE, Mawson had travelled to Canada, 
befriended many members of the Arctic Club, and voraciously read literature on the polar 
regions.59 At some point, he became aware of the sector principle and decided it could be 
a useful tool for Australia, which was the nearest continental landmass to the eastern 
Antarctic. When Mawson returned to Adelaide in March 1914, he inspired applause at his 
official reception telling the crowd: “he hoped the Australian government would make 
some claim upon the Antarctic regions. Just as Canada had issued an edict that all the 
lands north of Canada to the Pole belonged to Canada, so Australia might say that all 
lands south of the Commonwealth belonged to it. It would be a grand thing to have one 
country stretching from the equator to the Pole.”60 Regardless of the desires of Mawson 
and his audience, the ultimate decision rested in Whitehall, which promptly decided 
against formally annexing any of the territories explored by the Australians. 
 Ernest Shackleton’s Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition represented the last 
expedition of the “heroic age” of polar exploration.61 Departing just days after Britain 
declared war on Germany in August 1914, the expedition intended to accomplish the first 
land crossing of the continent from sea to sea. Shackleton had marketed the expedition as 
a heroic adventure, a scientific mission, and a chance for “agents of the British nation” to 
fly the flag and strengthen Britain’s Antarctic claims.62 The government provided him 
with 10,000 pounds and, on 5 August, as Britain entered the First World War, the King 
sent Shackleton off with his blessing and a flag to wave. The expedition, however, 
quickly ran into trouble. Ice in the Weddell Sea crushed their ship, the Endurance. The 
28-man party struggled to Elephant Island in the South Shetlands. From there, Shackleton 
and five others successfully made an open boat journey of 800 miles to South Georgia for 	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help.63 Shackleton’s men returned to a country beset by war and a public uninterested in 
stories of Antarctic adventure.   
Although the First World War effectively reduced activity in the polar regions, 
the conflict also profoundly impacted their political and legal development. In the Arctic, 
Norway, which remained neutral during the war, tried to strengthen its legal position on 
Spitsbergen. Despite statements by American Secretary of State Robert Lansing that the 
archipelago should remain terra nullius,64 the Norwegians took the lead in exploration, 
hunting and coal mining in the archipelago. Norwegian coal companies bought out their 
American counterparts, who found it difficult to transport coal to southern markets, and 
succeeded in establishing a strong presence.65 Norway’s government hoped to use these 
activities to support its bid for full sovereignty over Spitsbergen at whatever conference 
ended the war.  
The war also brought an end to the Arctic Ocean Hydrographic Expedition in 
1915, which inspired Russia’s Tsarist government to annex the islands of the High Arctic. 
In 1916, the Russians forwarded an official declaration to several countries, including 
Britain and the U.S., outlining the scope of Russia’s Arctic claim. The Russian note 
named Henrietta, Jeanette, Bennet, Herald, Wrangel, Solitude and the New Siberian 
Islands, even though many of them had been discovered and claimed by American and 
British explorers. Unable to physically settle or administer the High Arctic islands, the 
Russians utilized the doctrine of contiguity to claim all the islands “along the Asiatic 
shores of the Empire” that “form an extension to the north of the Continental expanse of 
Siberia.66 Although it lacked the geographical coordinates of a polar sector, the claim 
rested on a similar conception of contiguity that gave states rights to the polar lands north 	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of their continental coastline. The 1916 communication took the first step towards the 
Soviet Union’s dramatic sector declaration of 1926.  
The war had an even greater influence on the south polar region. “The perceptual 
impact of the First World War had meant that previously remote and inaccessible regions 
such as the Antarctic could be thought of as part of a global mosaic of competitive 
economic advantage and strategic significance,” Antarctic expert Klaus Dodds has 
observed. The war dramatically increased the economic and strategic value of the whales 
in the FID, whose oil contained the glycerin used in explosives. The British military 
stressed the need to secure as large a supply of glycerin as possible. Shackleton’s reports 
of the vast number of whales he encountered in the waters off the South increased the 
region’s potential in the eyes of the British government.67 Given the area’s increasing 
importance, the British government grew worried about its legal position in the FID.68 
While no state had challenged Britain’s claim, London had received several foreign and 
domestic inquiries about the exact boundaries of Graham Land. The Letters Patent of 
1908 deliberately left the southern extent of the British claim open and other states had 
concluded that Graham Land consisted only of the Antarctic Peninsula (and none of the 
hinterland beyond). The standard reply to these inquiries was “it is not possible in the 
present state of geographical knowledge to define the exact extent of territory claimed as 
British in the Antarctic region.”69  
 As Beck has argued, inspiration for how to rectify this situation and clarify 
Britain’s FID claim came from the Russian declaration.70 At this stage in Britain’s history, 
the Admiralty took the lead on legal appraisals concerning the Antarctic. The Royal Navy 	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placed a great emphasis on international law, and lectures on the subject formed a key 
part in the instruction given at the Naval College. 71 The Admiralty made the suggestion 
that an extension of the FID could be legally justified by claiming all of the land 
“contiguous” to the specific territories laid out in the 1908 Letters Patent, even if they had 
not been explored.72  
As a result, on 28 March 1917, the British government issued another Letters 
Patent which delimited the FID as the lands named in 1908 and “the territories adjacent,” 
which “included all islands and territories whatsoever between the 20th degree of West 
longitude and the 50th degree of West longitude which are situated south of the 50th 
parallel of South latitude; and all islands and territories whatsoever between the 50th 
degree of West longitude and the 80th degree which are situated south of the 58th parallel 
of South latitude.” This declaration effectively created a sector ending at the South 
Pole.73 Two decades later, a government legal appraisal of territorial claims in the 
Antarctic described the Patent of 1917 as having “sweeping character” that laid “claim to 
all territories [known and unknown] lying within certain limits of latitude and 
longitude.”74 While Poirier’s Arctic sectors extended northwards from the polar 
coastlines of adjacent states, the British framed their expansion of the FID as a 
geographical extension southwards of Antarctic lands they had already explored and 
claimed.  
London’s use of the sector principle must be understood against the backdrop of 
the British tradition of international law. Sir Cecil Hurst, Foreign Office legal adviser 
since 1902, reflected the opinion of his colleagues and most British jurists when he wrote 
that, “what makes international law is the practice of governments.”75 The British 
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tradition takes “the law as it finds it” and only locates it in state practice.76 Australian 
jurist William Pitt Cobbett argued: “English lawyers are prone to regard international law 
as a collection of amiable opinions rather than as a body of legal rules.” Too often, 
Cobbett explained, the authors of legal treatises described not what was, but what ought 
to be the practice of nations.77 Alexander Pearce Higgins wrote in 1910 that 
“International Law is not a body of rules which lawyers have evolved out of their own 
inner consciousness: it is not a system carefully thought out by University Professors, 
Bookworms, or other theorists in the quiet and seclusion of their studies.” Higgins 
conceived of international law as “a living body of practical rules and principles which 
have gradually come into being by the custom of nations and international agreements.” 
In the creation of this body, “Statesmen, Diplomatists, Admirals, Generals, Judges and 
publicists have all contributed.”78  
At the root of the sector principle rested the old argument that geographical 
position created special legal rights, which state practice had utilized for centuries. 
Britain’s own practice had recently employed the doctrine of contiguity to justify its 
hinterland and spheres of influence claims in the imperial partition of Africa. 
Furthermore, Canada applied the sector principle to the Arctic, and Russia used 
contiguity arguments to claim its High Arctic islands. All three countries made extensive 
polar claims that included a vast amount of unexplored and unoccupied territory, and 
lands discovered by other national expeditions. According to the British tradition, in the 
face of state practice the opinions of international legal scholars who questioned the legal 	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validity of contiguity mattered not.79 The opinion and practice of other states held much 
more importance. The Russians sent official notification to various interested powers, 
Canada’s sector claim had been well publicized, and the British published the Letters 
Patent in the Falkland Islands Gazette of 2 July 1917.80 The public announcements 
elicited no immediate or official challenges to any of these claims. Unwilling, 
uninterested, or unable to articulate policies towards these new developments – or simply 
distracted by the war – governments remained silent. Silence became one of the greatest 
supports to British Antarctic claims after 1919. 
2.2 The Paris Peace Conference, the Polar Regions and 
International Law  
Although the polar regions never featured prominently at the Paris Peace Conference, the 
results of the meeting still held long term implications for the Arctic and Antarctic. 
Germany lost all of its extra-territorial rights at the conference, including any created by 
its pre-war expeditions to the Antarctic and Spitsbergen. The conference’s most 
important impacts stemmed from the Svalbard Treaty, the recognition Denmark won for 
its sovereignty over Greenland, the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye’s stipulations 
on effective occupation, and the general developments it inspired in international law.  
 The Norwegian government emerged from the First World War intent on 
territorial expansion and set its eyes squarely on the polar regions.81 Its wartime efforts at 
occupation in Spitsbergen were reinforced by the news that Germany would abandon any 
rights it had acquired to the archipelago. Supported by arguments from scholars urging 
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something be done to regulate the “anarchy” in the Spitsbergen archipelago,82 the 
Norwegians adeptly maneuvered the issue onto the bargaining table at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Stressing their recent activities, the Norwegians made a strong case for their 
sovereignty over the entire area.83  
Amidst all of the major postwar decisions and territorial adjustments occurring at 
the peace conference, few states cared what happened to Spitsbergen. British Foreign 
Minister Lord Curzon stated during the negotiations that “all the other Allied and 
Associated Powers with vicarious generosity, as they themselves have no interests in 
Spitsbergen, are prepared to give Norway full sovereignty over the islands.”84 On 9 
February 1920, fourteen high contracting parties, including Britain, its dominions, the 
United States, and Denmark, signed the Svalbard Treaty (the Norwegian name for the 
archipelago).85 The treaty recognized Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago, but 
also imposed special safeguards that limited Norway’s rights.86 Regardless of the 
restrictions and even if its administration would not come into effect until 1925, 
Norwegian diplomacy secured the first territory of a polar empire.   
The Svalbard Treaty was a success for both Norway and the international 
community. “Alone among the many experiments of the time – free cities such as Danzig, 
transfers such as the Saarland, and mandates such as Palestine – the Svalbard 
compromise has endured,” historian John English has noted.87 Still, officials looking for a 
formula or model for acquiring sovereignty in the polar regions would be hard pressed to 	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find one in the Svalbard Treaty. The major powers left out references to the doctrine of 
effective occupation and the rules of territorial acquisition in their decision to give 
Norway sovereignty over Spitsbergen. Norwegian citizens had neither discovered the 
archipelago, nor could they claim be its longest occupiers. While Norway’s activities had 
increased over the previous years, they remained quite small-scale and limited to small 
parts of the archipelago.88 During the Paris negotiations, Norwegian officials used 
scientific studies that suggested a geological connection between Norway and Svalbard 
and stressed the geographical proximity of the two areas, but these arguments failed to 
sway powers like Britain and the U.S.89 In the end, the Svalbard Treaty was born out of 
the major powers’ lack of interest in the islands, and their broader desire to ensure a 
lasting peace by fixing state sovereignty over areas that might spark future conflict. 
Considering its neutrality during the war, its successful political lobbying and its non-
threatening status as a small state, Norway seemed like an ideal candidate to bring order 
to the archipelago.90 The Svalbard Treaty failed to clarify international law on territorial 
acquisition, but it did provide a new model for resolving territorial disputes in the polar 
regions.  
While Norway celebrated the Svalbard Treaty, its territorial gain came with a 
price. Much like their Norwegian counterparts, Danish representatives at the Paris 
Conference used the meeting of the great powers to gain recognition of its own polar 
claims. During the war, Denmark had transferred the Danish West Indies to the U.S. in 
return for $25 million and an American declaration that they would not contest the 
extension of Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland.91 With the U.S. agreement in hand 	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at the Peace Conference, the Danes secured the recognition of the other major powers, 
including Britain.92 Securing Norway’s support represented the greatest coup. Their 
neighbour had always been careful to avoid any recognition of Danish sovereignty over 
Greenland because of longstanding hunting and trading interests on the island’s eastern 
coastline. During the negotiations over Spitsbergen, Danish authorities offered to trade 
recognition of Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago in return for Norwegian 
recognition of their claim to Greenland.93 Desperate for Danish support, the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Nils Claus Ilhen, verbally declared that Norway had no objection to 
Danish sovereignty over Greenland.94 The Ilhen Declaration played a key role in the 
political and legal conflict that would develop between Norway and Denmark over 
Greenland in the subsequent decade.  
The revision of the Berlin Act in the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye 
(signed 10 September 1919) attracted the attention of legal experts on account of how 
little it demanded of states taking on new territories in Africa.95 Unlike the original, the 
revised Act did not insist on the formal notification of new acquisitions to interested 
parties. It demanded only that “the Signatory Powers recognize the obligation to maintain 
in the regions subject to their jurisdiction an authority and police forces sufficient to 
ensure protection of persons and of property and, if necessary, freedom of trade and of 
transit” (Article 10). The preamble to the revised act advised that states only had to 
provide “administrative institutions suitable to local conditions,” much like Pascal Poirier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sovereignty over Greenland from a state whose citizens had discovered and explored a large chunk of the 
islands (Kane, Hall, Greely, and Peary). See, for instance, Charles Callan Tansill, The Purchase of the 
Danish West Indies (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1966). 
92 The British wanted the right of first refusal if Denmark ever decided to dispose of Greenland. The U.S., 
however, made it clear that it would accept no involvement in Greenland from other European powers. 
Laurence Collier, Memorandum Respecting Territorial Claims in the Arctic to 1930, 10 February 1930, NA, 
DO 35/167/7, Territorial Claims in the Arctic. 
93 Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Olufemi Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Utrecht: Eleven 
International Publishing, 2005), 13-16. 
94 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997), 78-79, fn. 194. 
95 Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, 70. Historian William Roger Louis has 
argued that “of all the sideshows at the circus of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the African Peace 
Settlement perhaps attracted the least attention.” William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The 
Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 225. 
111	  	  
and René Dollot argued for the Arctic.96 In his landmark study of the epochs of 
international law, Wilhelm Georg Grewe identified the revised act as the beginning of a 
“turning away from the principle of effective occupation.” This trend continued 
throughout the interwar years, during which it found its most “striking expression … in 
the formulation of new legal titles for the acquisition of polar territories.”97  
More generally, the development of the polar legal landscape in the interwar years 
must be understood against the backdrop of the “extraordinarily active period of legal 
innovation” that started at the Paris Peace Conference. The conference and the birth of 
the League of Nations gave rise to a “new hope that international law could have 
substance it previously lacked.”98 Most importantly, the conference laid the foundation 
for the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) - a world court that could settle 
disputes between nations before they evolved into conflict.99 Fortunately for the British, 	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given their emphasis on state practice, Article 38 (1) established international 
conventions and “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” 
as the two primary sources of law. The third source was listed as the “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Finally, the “judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” represented a 
“subsidiary” source of law.100 Legal scholar Ole Spiermann has pointed out that Article 
38 “remained the principal text used by international lawyers in describing the sources, or 
origins, of international law”101 Similarly, the PCIJ would come to play an important role 
in the legal discourse surrounding polar sovereignty.  
Throughout the interwar years, the PCIJ, international agreements that sought to 
secure the postwar settlement (like the Locarno Treaties), the work of the League of 
Nations, the push towards codification and the arguments of legal scholars all strove to 
give international law a greater standing in world affairs.102 This innovation was driven 
by a popular feeling that international law required “rehabilitation” if it was ever to 
achieve its central purpose – “solving the problems of the society in and for which it 	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exists.”103 Legal expert James Leslie Brierly argued that the absence of any “authoritative 
statement of what the rules are” and the quality of the law that states were invited to 
accept hampered these efforts.104 International law remained, to borrow legal scholar 
Wolfgang Friedmann’s memorable phrase, “a very rudimentary system, with vast barren 
stretches between small cultivated areas.”105 The solution, Brierly thought, rested in the 
conception of the international legal system articulated by Professor Roscoe Pound. “The 
legal order must be flexible as well as stable,” wrote Pound, the Dean of the Harvard Law 
School. “It must be overhauled continually and refitted continually to the changes in the 
actual life which it is to govern. If we seek principles, we must seek principles of change 
no less than principles of stability.”106  
In short, interwar legal scholars such as Brierly and Pound insisted that 
international law could “no longer be static,” but must be truly dynamic and flexible, able 
to keep pace with the ever-changing needs of international life. The rules should be the 
“product of necessity,” created as the system required.107 To meet new requirements, the 
international legal system needed to be capable of dramatic change and adaptation. An 
obvious example in the 1920s was the burgeoning body of law created to deal with the 
rapidly increasing amount of international aerial navigation, embodied in international 
agreements such as the Convention on Aerial Navigation (1919) and the Warsaw 
Convention (1929). If an original body of law could be developed to deal with aerial 
navigation – a new and unique problem that demanded novel solutions – why not for the 
polar regions? In a flexible legal system attuned to state interests and practices, and built 
to solve international issues expediently and effectively, there was room to consider a 
new polar legal regime based on the sector principle. 
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2.3 Leopold Amery, the Empire and the Antarctic 
While international law expanded during and in the aftermath of the Paris Peace 
Conference, so too did the British Empire. The Empire grew to its greatest geographical 
extent post-war, adding swathes of territory in the Middle East, the Pacific, and Africa. 
Britain held much of the new territory in a “sacred trust of civilization” as mandated 
under the League of Nations, but for all practical purposes it fell under British control.108 
According to historian Ashley Jackson, the early interwar years marked “the high water 
mark of the British Empire”109 and not even the Antarctic could escape this phase of 
imperial growth. 
In 1919, armed with a strong desire to continue the expansion of the British 
Empire, Leopold Amery became the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. Antarctic 
expert Klaus Dodds has pointed out that Amery attended a 1904 presentation given by 
one of the founding fathers of geopolitics, Halford Mackinder. The presenter spoke on 
the need for Britain to take an interest in the few remaining “empty spaces” on the globe 
before other powers claimed what remained of the earth’s surface.110 Amery took to heart 
the belief that “all real estate was potentially valuable”111 and by 1919 he counted a half a 
million square miles of unclaimed territory in the Antarctic (although he believed the 
continent was actually much larger).112 Amery viewed the continued value of whaling as 
reason enough for Britain to claim the entire south polar region, yet he also stressed that 
wartime developments had proven the southern seas and their islands could be used by 
surface raiders, submarines and even airplanes.113 As a result, the Under-Secretary 
explained to his superior, Colonial Secretary Viscount Milner, that the time had come for 
Britain to secure the entire Antarctic continent. Amery identified the U.S. and France as 	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Britain’s strongest competitors in the south polar region, but he dismissed their claims as 
unfounded, incorrectly suggesting that “no American has actually seen the land in 
question, still less set foot on it” and that there was no “evidence, except in our own 
imaginations, that Americans ever would claim it.”114  
Chief Hydrographer Admiral Sir Frederick Learmonth concluded that in light of 
amount of work accomplished by British explorers, Britain’s claim to most of the 
continent far outweighed that of any other country, except in the South Shetlands, South 
Georgia and Bouvet Island, where foreign expeditions made any annexation “disputable.” 
The territory that Douglas Mawson and the AAE had recently explored in the Australian 
quadrant was also threatened since it was “geographically, a continuation of Adélie Land.” 
While this contiguity argument could have proven detrimental to Mawson’s desire to 
secure the Antarctic sector south of Australia, it benefitted British interests in other 
situations. For instance, although Amundsen planted the Norwegian flag on the South 
Pole in 1911, the British could argue that they possessed a stronger right to the area based 
on Shackleton’s previous exploration of a more southerly part of the polar plateau, of 
which the Pole was a continuation.115  
Amery’s counterpart in the Foreign Office, Cecil Harmsworth, advised differently. 
He recommended that his country gradually extend its control over the Antarctic, lest it 
incite a foreign challenge. Historian Peter Beck has pointed out that the sobering Foreign 
Office conclusion forced Amery to reconsider his proposal for a “once-and-for-all 
takeover.” In January 1920, Amery and his supporters settled on a policy of gradual 
acquisition of the entire Antarctic continent, without consulting either the Treasury 
Department or the Cabinet.116 Although the plan sounded good on paper, in reality the 
British moved very slowly to extend the Empire’s jurisdiction in the Antarctic. The 
government being too preoccupied with Europe’s stability, revolts in Egypt and Ireland, 
new interests in the Middle East, and the protection of India, to invest in the Antarctic.117 	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While Whitehall agreed to provide a small amount of funding to several proposed 
expeditions to create a British presence in the region (including one led by Shackleton), 
these all ended in abject failure.118  
Impressed by the important role played by the Dominions in the First World 
War,119 Amery thought that the real solution to the problem of claiming the whole 
Antarctic for the British Empire required their support.120 In February 1920, Amery sent 
his plan for the Antarctic to the Old Dominions – Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
South Africa. “It is desirable that the whole of the Antarctic should be included within the 
British Empire,” Amery asserted. “While that time has not yet arrived when a claim to all 
the continental territories should be put forward, a definite and consistent policy should 
be followed of extending and asserting British control.” He stressed the potential strategic 
value of the Antarctic, the possibility of mineral riches, new trade routes if the ice 
diminished and the need to control and conserve animal life. He tied the Antarctic to the 
security of Australia and New Zealand, stating that the “increasing radius of action of 	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submarines and aircraft will tend to interest your Government in any territories where 
preparations might secretly be made for raiding operations.” Amery made it clear that the 
Empire should first focus on the “Ross Sea coasts and their hinterland.” Apart from 
Graham Land, this was the most accessible part of the Antarctic continent, and had the 
best potential for whaling operations. While the Under-Secretary asked for Dominion 
assistance in this imperial endeavour and suggested New Zealand or Australia could take 
control of the Ross Sea area, he did not elaborate on the role he wanted each country to 
play. Instead, he suggested the Dominions enter into discussions with one another and 
sort their interests out first.121  
Amery anticipated a quick, enthusiastic reply from Australia and New Zealand. 
After all, both countries had shown an interest in expanding their Pacific empires. Before 
the First World War, Britain transferred Pacific territories to both countries, with 
Australia administering Papua and New Zealand getting the Cook Islands and Niue. 
Following the war, under the Class C Mandate system of the League of Nations, 
Australia was also entrusted with northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and 
the northern Solomon Islands, while New Zealand received Western Samoa. At the Paris 
Peace Conference, Australian Prime Minister William Hughes had fought hard for the 
formal annexation of the German colonies, rather than their administration as League of 
Nation mandates.122 As a result, Australia seemed a likely candidate to take on imperial 
responsibilities in the Antarctic.  
Historian Marie Kawaja has noted that the government of William Hughes treated 
Amery’s proposal as a “discussion paper” rather than settled policy.123 Consequently, the 
Australians took the time to discuss the plan internally and with New Zealand before 
responding. Hughes turned to the Australian naval command to inquire if the Antarctic 	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held any strategic value or risks for the country. The Navy concluded that there did not 
seem to be any immediate prospect of a strategic threat emanating from the Antarctic, but 
speculated that this could change in the future.124 Prime Minister Hughes suggested to 
William Massey, his counterpart in New Zealand, that the two dominions should split 
territory in the Antarctic.125 Refusing to commit, Massey agreed to refer the matter to his 
new High Commissioner in London who could discuss it with the Imperial 
Government.126 In the meantime, Hughes decided to gather more information on the 
Antarctic before he pursued the matter further.  
Unable to find anyone in the Prime Minister’s Department with knowledge of 
Antarctic affairs, Hughes asked three of Australia’s leading Antarctic experts for their 
opinion. Experienced explorers John Davis and Edgeworth David stressed the potential 
value of the continent, and Davis suggested that the Antarctic coastline from 150° East to 
90° East could be placed under Australian control due to the work of the AAE.127 
Douglas Mawson offered a more complete and dramatic vision. He believed that the 
Antarctic should be controlled by one power. A rich history in the region made Britain 
the obvious choice. Given Australia’s exploration activities, he thought it should enjoy 
more territorial rights than New Zealand, which had contributed little to discovery in the 
Antarctic. He envisioned a central administrative centre in the Falkland Islands 
controlling a south polar region divided between Britain, South Africa, Australia and 
New Zealand.128 Mawson concluded that Australia could claim most of the eastern 
Antarctic because of its proximity to the dominion’s southern coastline, even though over 
a thousand kilometres of open sea separated the two continents.  
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Mawson based his vision of polar sovereignty once more on the precedent he 
believed Canada had set in the Arctic: an “axiom accepted by the whole world that the 
uninhabited polar regions should be controlled by the nearest civilized nation.”129 He 
asserted that this axiom – which he called the “Canadian principle” in subsequent years – 
could justify extensive sector claims.130 While Mawson embraced the Canadian-made 
sector principle as the best solution to the problem of polar sovereignty, Canada itself 
showcased a distinct lack of confidence in the idea.  
2.4 Canadian Legal Appraisals, the Danish ‘Invasion’ and 
Acts of Occupation 
As British officials in the Colonial and Foreign Offices worked to determine what roles 
Australia and New Zealand would play in the Antarctic, they advised and assisted Canada 
with an unfolding drama concerning its Arctic sovereignty. The direct catalyst of the 
situation was Danish explorer and trader Knud Rasmussen, who seemed to question 
Canada’s sovereignty over Ellesmere Island shortly before announcing his Fifth Thule 
Expedition, which would travel from Greenland to Alaska across the Canadian Arctic. 
Historians Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes have effectively argued that, in reality, 
Rasmussen and the Danish government never denied Canadian sovereignty in the 
Arctic.131 In private correspondence with Canadian officials, Rasmussen described the 
general area around his trading post as a “no man’s land,” but he was likely referring to 
northern Greenland, not to Ellesmere Island.132 These historians prove that Vilhjalmur 
Stefansson stoked sovereignty concerns in Ottawa hoping to be rewarded with leadership 
of a new expedition to occupy the northern islands. With no proof, Stefansson told Prime 
Minister Arthur Meighen that “the Danes are thinking of colonizing and exploring the 
islands…north of Lancaster Sound.” To save Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, the self-	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interested explorer insisted that Ottawa fund more exploration efforts, additional police 
posts, mapping, and development.133  
Regardless of the actual veracity of the Danish threat, the situation forced 
Canadian officials to rigorously appraise their country’s claims in the Arctic and the 
nature of polar sovereignty more generally.134 Armed with a law degree from Harvard 
University and ample experience as the legal adviser to Prime Ministers Robert Borden 
and Arthur Meighen, Loring Christie wrote a review of Canada’s position at the end of 
October 1920 (although he possessed little experience dealing with international law or 
territorial claims).135 Christie pointed out that Canada’s Arctic sovereignty concerns only 
involved the islands north of Lancaster Sound, many of which foreign expeditions had 
discovered and explored. He insisted that contiguity did not bestow title in international 
law and stressed that occupation was necessary to perfect Canada’s title to these islands. 
In the “special” conditions of the Arctic, however, Christie maintained that repeated local 
acts and “effective control” should suffice in securing Canadian sovereignty, although he 
admitted there was some confusion in international law about the “concrete steps” 
required to achieve a perfect title. Christie surmised that, in the Arctic, it would probably 
suffice to have “periodical sojourns, say, during the summer months.” Along with 
additional expeditions to the region, Christie thought a police administration should be 
set up at strategic points.136 
Several reports from James Bernard Harkin, the commissioner of the Dominion 
Parks Branch and secretary of the Advisory Technical Board that Prime Minister 
Meighen had ordered to investigate the Danish threat, produced an even more worrying 
appraisal of the Canadian position.137 Harkin’s interest in and enthusiasm for Arctic 	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affairs, however, was not backed by any specific legal expertise. As Cavell and Noakes 
point out, Harkin relied heavily on Lassa Oppenheim’s legal treatise, with its demand for 
settlement and administration, and seemed to think it presented concrete rules for states to 
follow.138 Harkin argued that Canada had inherited at best an inchoate right to many of 
the Arctic islands from Britain, but he stressed that no Canadian title existed to others.139 
He insisted that “any other power at any time would be quite within International Law if 
it established possession and administration” on these islands. While the clear and present 
danger was Denmark, Harkin warned that if the U.S. ever realized the value of the Arctic 
islands their neighbour could “take steps to establish sovereignty” over them.140 
An in-depth study of the history of British and Canadian activities in the Arctic by 
Canadian associate archivist Hensley R. Holmden bolstered Harkin’s negative opinion. 
The report concluded that the imperial government had intended to transfer only the 
islands discovered by British explorers, not all of the territory up to the pole. In short, if 
Canada wanted to secure its sovereignty it had to occupy and control the Arctic 
Archipelago.141 
In sharp contrast to the Christie, Harkin and Holmden appraisals, the British 
Foreign and Colonial Offices maintained a calm and unworried posture throughout the 
entire affair. From August 1920, when Ottawa first informed the British about the alleged 
threat, officials sincerely doubted that the Danes intended to challenge Canada’s Arctic 	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claims.142 Britain was in the final stages of negotiations to recognize Denmark’s claim to 
Greenland, a diplomatic success the Danes would not risk by instigating a conflict with 
Canada. (British recognition was finalized in an exchange of notes on 6 September 1920.) 
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office sought reassurances from Rasmussen and the Danish 
government that they had no intention of disputing Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic 
Archipelago.143   
In the spring of 1921, the Foreign Office received several conclusive assurances 
from Rasmussen and the Danish government that they had no intention of challenging 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. While not touching on the legality of Canada’s title in 
international law, in late May the Danish government explained that it would be against 
the friendship shared between Denmark and the British Empire to challenge the claims of 
one of the Dominions.144 Christie insisted that Canada’s continuous assertion of 
sovereignty over the Arctic islands provided a powerful deterrent to any Danish challenge. 
If the Danes ever decided to protest Canadian claims in the Arctic, a firm stand by 
Canada and Britain would quickly disabuse them of the idea. Still, like Harkin and 
Holmden, Christie remained a proponent of greater Canadian administrative efforts in the 
Arctic. In his opinion, effective occupation in the Arctic required “continuous effective 
control.”145 The Advisory Technical Board agreed and outlined a program of occupation 
built on regular land patrols from established police posts, the enforcement of game laws 
and annual government ship-borne expeditions into the waters of the Archipelago.146  
By June 1921, a little over a year after Stefansson raised the initial alarm about a 
Danish threat, the whole affair was over.147 Canadian appraisals had revealed 
vulnerability in Canada’s legal position and, accordingly, “fear about what Denmark 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Cavell and Noakes, Acts of Occupation, 81. 
143 See Smith, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty, 257-258. 
144 Smith, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty, 256-257; Cavell and Noakes, Acts of Occupation, 
11, 132-136. 
145 Loring Christe, Exploration and Occupation of the Arctic Islands, 17 February 1921, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 
4252, File 9057-40, pt. 1. 
146 Shelagh Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver: 
Douglas and McIntyre, 2010), 221-222. For a time, the committee considered employing Ernest Shackleton 
to lead a Canadian expedition to the Archipelago. 
147 Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, 9 June 1921, LAC, MG 30 B-57, Vol. 1, 
Correspondence 1903-1922. 
123	  	  
might do in the archipelago was gradually replaced by concern over what Canada herself 
ought to do,” historian Gordon W. Smith later observed.148 The Danish ‘threat’ and the 
legal appraisals produced inspired the “transformation of Canada’s earlier Arctic policy – 
in which proclamations and other purely ‘formal acts of possession’ were deemed 
sufficient – into a more active and sustained postwar program that emphasized the need 
for ‘acts of occupation’ even on remote and uninhabited northern islands like 
Ellesmere.”149 Of note, none of the major legal reports written in 1920 and 1921 
suggested the government utilize the sector principle or contiguity doctrine in the Arctic. 
The Canadian government still utilized sector lines in official maps and never denied the 
principle, but its emphasis had shifted to administration and occupation. 
When the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King came into power 
in December 1921, it instituted an annual ship patrol in the Eastern Arctic150 and 
expanded the number of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) posts on the Arctic 
islands. In the summer of 1922, the Eastern Arctic patrol established posts at Pond Inlet, 
northern Baffin Island, and at Craig Harbour, on the extreme southeast corner of 
Ellesmere Islands. Each post had two officers and an Inuit family to help them survive. 
The officers usually had no one but themselves to police, and when Ottawa asked them to 
serve as postmasters, they processed their own letters. Nevertheless, Canada established 
permanent presence in the High Arctic, even if only at a few strategic points. Their long 
overland patrols flew the flag even further afield.151 The level of activity was far more 
than Britain, Australia and New Zealand contemplated performing in the Antarctic at the 
time.  
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2.5 Another Polar Sector: New Zealand and the Ross 
Dependency  
Meetings between Britain and the Dominions at the Imperial Conference of 1921 
emphasized that there should be greater joint control and responsibility within the empire. 
In his closing speech to the Conference, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
remarked that when the Empire’s burdens “become so vast it is well that we should have 
the shoulders of these young giants…to help us along.”152 For New Zealand, its burden 
took the shape of an Antarctic sector.  
Tri-lateral discussions between British, Australian and New Zealander officials 
decided the two Dominions should administer separate spheres in the Antarctic, but failed 
to develop a plan to implement this administration.153 In March 1921, the Colonial Office 
sent the Dominions its legal analysis and a detailed plan for extending the empire’s 
claims in the south polar region. Unlike concurrent Canadian appraisals that called for on 
the ground acts of occupation in the Arctic, the British report maintained that these acts 
were only necessary to achieve legal title in temperate zones. In the Antarctic, a state 
could effectively gain title through discovery and exploration, followed by the issue of 
paper administrative instruments to provide for a modicum of state control. As such, the 
Letters Patent of 1917, although they included unexplored lands and territories 
discovered by other expeditions, likely put the British claim to the FID out of dispute. In 
a reiteration of long held British legal policy, the report stressed that formal annexation 
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involving a public statement was unnecessary and conferred no additional rights in 
international law.154  
The Colonial Office plan laid out the separate spheres the two Dominions would 
administer. Given the proximity of its ports to the Ross Sea, the British decided New 
Zealand should administer an area between 150°W and160°E, “the most valuable part of 
the Antarctic outside the Falkland Island Dependencies” because of its accessibility and 
whaling potential. The Australian sphere would include the land between 160°E and 89°E. 
Both claims included the continental coastline, adjacent islands and the hinterland 
enclosed by meridian lines extending to the South Pole. The Colonial Office concluded 
that New Zealand’s sphere could be taken whenever necessary with little worry of 
foreign protest, but the French interest in Adélie Land, which rested in the Australian 
sector, meant that any claim to this region must be pursued more gradually and 
carefully.155  
In the summer of 1922, as Canada’s Eastern Arctic patrol steamed into the Arctic 
Archipelago, the British government received an application from Carl Larsen, owner of 
a Norwegian whaling company, asking for a license to operate in the vicinity of the 
Balleny Islands and Ross Sea. Although Britain had yet to formally assert its sovereignty 
over the area, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, believed a 
granted application implied Norwegian “acknowledgement of Sovereignty” and “would 
be valuable support of British claims.”156 Sensing the beginning of increased whaling 
activities in the Ross Sea area, the New Zealand government, in consultation with the 
Colonial Office, decided that “in the interests of the Empire steps should now be taken to 
vest the jurisdiction over the Ross Sea area in the Dominion of New Zealand,” if the 
British government still wished for the Dominion’s assistance.157  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Colonial Office, Memorandum on Control of the Antarctic, March 1921, NA, ADM 116/2386 and LAC, 
Vol. 1263, File 1920-311. 
155 Colonial Office, Memorandum on Control of the Antarctic, March 1921, NA, ADM 116/2386. 
156 Winston Churchill, 28 June 1922, cited in Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 189. 
157 Cablegram from Colonial Secretary to Governor General of New Zealand, 27 June 1922, in Antarctic – 
Control of, Imperial Conference, 1921, NAA, CA 18, A4311, 362/6, Papers re Imperial Conference 1921 
concerning Antarctic Matters, 1921-1931. 
126	  	  
  The Colonial Office asked Law Officers of the Crown Douglas McGarel Hogg 
(the Attorney General) and Thomas Inskip (the Solicitor General) to report on how to 
best extend New Zealand’s sovereignty over the Ross Sea area.158 The advisors insisted 
that any formal decree should avoid casting the action as a new annexation, which might 
invite a foreign protest. Letters Patent, for example, implied that an entirely new area was 
being claimed. Various British exploration activities in parts of the Ross Sea area over 
the last decades, they argued, provided proof of Britain’s title. Hogg and Inskip advised 
that an Order in Council be drawn up that treated the region as a settlement under the 
British Settlements Act of 1887, to be administered under the authority of New Zealand’s 
Governor General. As such, the Ross Sea area would not actually be incorporated into 
New Zealand’s borders, but would be managed as a dependency. Once the Order in 
Council transferred jurisdiction to New Zealand, the law officers concluded, Britain’s 
existing title could be strengthened through acts of administration.159  
In July 1923 the Privy Council approved an Order in Council that created the 
Ross Dependency. The order gave New Zealand jurisdiction over a sector covering the 
coasts of the Ross Sea along with the “islands and territories adjacent thereto between 
160 degrees of East Longitude and the 150th degree of West Longitude, which are 
situated south of the 60th degree of South latitude” (the two lines of longitude met at the 
South Pole).160 Soon after, New Zealand’s Governor General made the laws of the 
country applicable to the Ross Dependency and appointed the nautical adviser to the 
Marine Department to serve as magistrate, Justice of the Peace, and law enforcement 
officer in the region. 
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Figure 3: Map showing Antarctic sector claims 1933. NAA, A981, ANT 4, Part 10, 
Antarctic Control of. 
“Thus, almost casually, through an accident of geography, New Zealand was 
offered a slice of Antarctica larger than New Zealand itself,” foreign relations expert 
Malcolm Templeton has observed.161 The Dominion, however, proceeded to do very little 
to support its title through acts of administration. With the government unwilling to 
purchase a vessel capable of operating in Antarctic waters, New Zealand’s magistrate 
caught a ride to the Ross Sea with the Norwegian whalers he supposedly regulated. “If, in 
1923, we acquired an empire in Antarctica, we scarcely proved to be born imperialists,” 
J.H. Weir of New Zealand’s Department of External Affairs concluded. “We appointed 	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Administrators to the Ross Dependency but they never set foot in the territory…Our chief 
administrative acts were attempts to regulate whaling. But as we had no gunboats in the 
Dependency to enforce our edicts, they appear to have been for the most part 
disregarded.”162 It was an ignominious beginning for New Zealand’s Antarctic policy. 
2.6 The Curious Case of Wrangel Island and the American 
Awakening  
In the summer of 1923, the Foreign and Colonial Offices not only crafted the Ross 
Dependency’s Order in Council, but also managed a rapidly deteriorating situation in the 
Arctic. In sharp contrast to New Zealand’s inactivity and lack of interest in the Ross 
Dependency, Canada’s Arctic policy grew more energetic and expansionary. Determined 
to set its own national course in the North, intrigued by Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s 
arguments about Wrangel Island’s strategic and economic potential, and with little 
thought to the long-term political and legal consequences, Mackenzie King’s government 
publicly announced that it considered the island to be Canada’s property. Wrangel rests 
140 km off the Siberian coastline. It had been landed on and claimed by an American 
naval expedition in 1881, and annexed by Russia in its 1916 note. Unsurprisingly, the 
Canadian assertion captured the interest of both the Russians and Americans – and 
constituted a “deliberate violation of the sector principle” which still formed a part of 
Canada’s legal strategy.163 In short, Canada opened a diplomatic and legal Pandora’s box.  
The Wrangel Island affair began in 1921, when Stefansson raised the alarm in 
Ottawa about Rasmussen and the Danes. While he had the government’s ear, the explorer 
suggested that Canada should claim Wrangel. By staying on the island for an extended 
period, the survivors of the Karluk wreck had laid the foundation for Canada’s title, 
Stefansson suggested. He encouraged Loring Christie to raise the possibility of 	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“encouraging the quiet, unostentatious settlement of Wrangel Island” by a private 
Canadian enterprise, asserting that this would strengthen Canada’s title.164   
For Canada to claim Wrangel, however, it would have to step away from the 
sector boundaries used on official maps and invoked by Bernier to outline Canada’s 
Arctic possessions. Stefansson informed Christie that Canada’s continued use of the 
sector principle was ridiculous, stating that “it is no more inevitable that every land north 
of Alaska should belong to Alaska… The countries to the north will belong to whoever 
appreciates their value and cultivates them.”165 Christie, in turn, attacked one of the legal 
precedents used to justify the western boundary of the Canadian sector. The Anglo-
Russian Convention of 28 February 1825 defined the boundary between Alaska and 
British North America as the meridian line 141° West “dans son prolongement jusqu’a la 
Mer Glaciale.” Although this definition could be seen as applying only to the land 
boundary and not extending into the Arctic Ocean, the Russo-American treaty of 1867 
ceding Alaska to the U.S. stated that the western limit of the territory “passes through a 
point in Behring Strait on the parallel of 60° 30’ north longitude…and proceeds due north, 
without limitation into the Frozen (Arctic) Ocean.” Inferentially, the eastern limit – the 
border between Alaska and Canada – could be seen as running into the Arctic Ocean, 
which seemed to justify Canada’s sector lines.166 Christie, however, insisted this 
interpretation was nonsense and concluded, “the treaty defining the Alaska boundary 
carried the 141st meridian only ‘to the frozen ocean.’”167 Therefore, Canada’s Arctic 
ambitions were not confined by a western limit and it could feel free to expand into the 
far reaches of the Arctic Ocean.  
After a few short months, Christie’s opinion changed. With time to reflect and 
gather additional opinions, his revised appraisal held that a Canadian claim to Wrangel 
would be unwise. Christie argued that additions to the British Empire should only be 
made for “practical reasons,” and he envisaged little strategic or economic advantage in 	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owning Wrangel. After previously deriding the concept of contiguity, Christie now 
argued that “by wandering outside our own hemisphere and region we would inevitably 
detract from the strength of our case for the ownership of the islands immediately north 
of Canada which we really need and desire.”168 It made no sense to claim Wrangel Island 
and jeopardize Canada’s true Arctic interests. The Canadian government had leant 
towards supporting Stefansson’s plans, but Christie convinced it otherwise.  
Despite Ottawa’s expressed wishes, Stefansson sent a private party of four men 
and an Inuit woman (Ada Blackjack) to occupy Wrangel Island in September 1921. Once 
on the island, the small group raised the Union Jack and held a claiming ceremony.169 
When Prime Minister Mackenzie King came into office in December, Stefansson saw a 
new opportunity to gain official support for his actions. He explained to King that any 
American or Russian rights to the island had disappeared, for any inchoate rights from 
discovery only lasted five years – an assessment with no basis in international law.170 
Stefansson favourably impressed King, who failed to consult with Christie or the other 
senior civil servants who advised against claiming the island. When the opposition in the 
House of Commons asked about the status of Wrangel in May 1922, Minister of Finance 
W.S. Fielding boldly announced that “what we have we hold” and King declared that the 
island was “the property of this country.”171 
King’s announcement horrified many civil servants who, echoing Christie, 
believed that claiming Wrangel Island would severely weaken Canada’s title to the 
Arctic islands contiguous to its northern coastline. After all, if the Canadian 
government claimed an island so disconnected from its own territory, what would 
stop other states from occupying islands off Canada’s northern shore?172 Over the 	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following year, their opinions persuaded King to doubt the wisdom of his decision, 
as did the steady stream of American and Russian inquiries and protests about 
Wrangel Island that made their way to the British Foreign Office.  
As of 1922, the U.S. State Department had spent little time thinking about 
the Arctic and Antarctic issues or the broader legal problem of polar sovereignty. 
When the department became aware of Russia’s 1916 claims and Britain’s Letters 
Patent of 1917, it neither acknowledged them, nor protested them, nor reserved U.S. 
rights to the annexed islands. In place of a coherent polar policy, the U.S. 
government held a vague notion that, apart from the claims it expressly recognized 
(Norway’s title to Spitsbergen and Denmark’s to Greenland), the polar regions 
remained an international arena open to American interests.173 The landing of 
Stefansson’s party on Wrangel, however, led the State Department to re-examine 
American Arctic interests. With little experience in polar affairs or knowledge of 
U.S. activities in the region, officials in Washington struggled to determine which 
state held ownership of the island.174  
A visit to the State Department in March 1922 by Boris Bakhmeteff, the 
only ambassador to the U.S. of the short-lived Russian Provisional Government, 
further muddied the waters for American officials. He highlighted Russia’s 
continued use of contiguity doctrine and took a step closer towards an outright 
sector claim. The official note that the ambassador handed to Russian Division 
chief D.C. Poole argued that the usual norms of international law calling for “use or 
settlement” could not be applied to the Arctic regions. “In the past there has been 
no formal delimitation of sovereignty in the arctic region,” Bakhmeteff’s report 
articulated. “There seems to have been a tacit understanding, however, that arctic 	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lands are naturally held as being within the sovereignty of the country to which 
belongs the continental confines of the Polar Ocean” – an assessment that echoed 
Poirier’s speech and the conclusions drawn by the Arctic Club. Presenting a 
completely opposite conclusion to Loring Christie’s about the Russian-American 
Treaty of 1867, the Russians argued that the agreement’s boundaries “had divided 
the regions north of the Behring Straits into zones belonging respectively to Alaska 
and Russia” running to the North Pole.175 Consequently, Wrangel Island sat within 
the Russian zone of the Arctic Ocean.  
The Russian note and Prime Minister King’s proclamation in the House of 
Commons gave the State Department a lot of information to digest. Over the next 
year, departmental officials instructed the U.S. embassy in London to make several 
inquiries about Canadian and British intentions for Wrangel Island.176 Meanwhile, 
advisors in Washington explored the history and legal status of the island. While 
the State Department Solicitor’s Office speculated that any American territorial 
rights to Wrangel probably dissolved when Washington failed to protest the 
original Russian claim in 1916, it offered no firm conclusions on what U.S. policy 
should be towards the islands, or on polar claims more generally.177 
 The Foreign Office kept Mackenzie King well informed of Russian and American 
inquiries about Wrangel Island. King had not anticipated a strong foreign reaction, and 
was particularly dismayed by the prospect of a disagreement with the Americans with 
whom he was trying to build closer ties, not least because he had just entered into 
negotiations for a treaty to protect the Pacific halibut fishery.178 Unsure how to proceed, 
King sent Stefansson to London in the spring of 1923 to confer with British authorities 
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about how to handle the Wrangel Island situation.179 In regards to Wrangel, King was 
ready to follow Britain’s lead.   
Stefansson sailed to England in May and quickly won the support of two very 
influential figures: Amery, now First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir Samuel Hoare, 
Secretary of State for Air.180 Amery, in particular, was quite taken with Stefansson, and 
seemed almost as excited about the prospect of expanding the British Empire in the 
Arctic as he was about enlarging it in the Antarctic.181 Stefansson next tried to convince 
an interdepartmental committee chaired by Cecil Hurst, the principal legal adviser in the 
Foreign Office. In the deliberations that followed Stefansson’s presentation, the 
Admiralty representatives, reflecting Amery’s opinion, argued that Wrangel could be 
important as a base if Arctic air routes developed in the future. They emphasized “the 
island is the only territory in a vast area to which Great Britain has any claim, and the 
Admiralty consider that it would be short-sighted policy to surrender our claims to it.” 
Foreign Office officials noted that Russia’s claim to Wrangel rested on its proximity to 
the Russian mainland, and the Americans had only briefly landed on the island. If Britain 
or Canada decided claiming Wrangel was a strategic or political necessity, an argument 
could be made based on Britain’s discovery of the island and the occupation of 
Stefansson’s party.182  
From a legal point of view, the Foreign Office concluded a claim would hurt British 
interests in the Antarctic and the Canadian claim to the Arctic Archipelago.183 The 
deliberations on Wrangel Island unfolded as the final touches were placed on the Order in 
Council creating the Ross Dependency – a claim that depended, at least in part, on the 
doctrine of contiguity and the sector principle. Meanwhile, the Canadian government 	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could still cite contiguity and the sector principle to justify its claims to islands that 
remained unoccupied and unvisited in the Arctic Archipelago. Claiming Wrangel Island 
would weaken these arguments and undermine the Empire’s broader position in the polar 
regions. 
Britain also wanted to avoid a territorial dispute with two of the most powerful 
states in the world. Russia would certainly not give up its claim to Wrangel, and with the 
British government preparing to recognize the Soviet Union in early 1924 to increase 
trade relations with the communist state, the Foreign Office could not afford a 
disagreement over the remote island. These officials were even more troubled by 
information from the British embassy in Washington that the U.S. planned to officially 
protest any British-Canadian claim to Wrangel Island.184 Air Attaché Malcolm Christie 
gathered from some of his American naval and air force colleagues that, if Britain or 
Canada claimed Wrangel Island, “it is not unlikely that the incident might be followed by 
American occupation of some other islands to the immediate North of the Canadian 
Dominions, for instance in the neighbourhood of the Parry Islands.” Christie speculated 
that the military officers with whom he spoke suspected that Britain might renew its 
alliance with Japan in case war broke out with the U.S. In this scenario, a British air base 
on Wrangel would pose a significant threat to American military assets in Alaska.185 The 
Wrangel Island affair was inextricably linked to the complexities of the interwar Anglo-
American relationship.  
Historian Brian McKercher has observed that “in the decade separating the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 from the Wall Street collapse in 1929 and 
its immediate aftermath, relations between Britain and the United States were 
distinguished by strain and tension; though masked periodically by outbreaks of goodwill 
and cooperation, this uneasiness a few times threatened to rupture.”186 While many 	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British officials thought that an Atlantic partnership with the U.S. offered the best chance 
of checking a resurgent Germany,187 others feared the growing power of the Americans 
threatened Britain’s position in the world. In the early 1920s, tension between the two 
countries grew due to economic competition and naval rivalry.188 The Foreign Office had 
no desire to add a territorial dispute over an unimportant island in the Arctic that they 
never wanted in the first place to the list of irritants.  
Britain’s wish that the Canadians drop their claim to Wrangel for the sake of 
harmonious Anglo-American relations was granted by harsh environmental conditions 
that sabotaged Stefansson’s plans. In September 1923 a relief expedition arrived and 
found that Stefansson’s entire occupying party, save for Ada Blackjack, had perished. 
The tragedy ended any remaining official interest in claiming Wrangel in Ottawa and 
London, and this news gradually filtered out to the Americans and Russians.189 
Stefansson was as determined as ever and turned his efforts towards Washington, which 
was still trying to articulate a clear policy on Wrangel Island. 
The Wrangel Island affair illustrated the degree to which state officials struggled 
to make sense of the legal and political issues involved in polar affairs. Canadian and 
American officials, in particular, struggled to determine their countries interests, 
approaches, and legal policies in the Arctic. While Canadian officials grappled with the 
complicated legal and political issues involved in Arctic sovereignty, they did not yet 
have the confidence or skill to handle their Arctic affairs independently, particularly 
when powerful states like the U.S. and Russia were involved. This reality stood in sharp 
contrast to the arguments Prime Minister King made at the Imperial Conference of 1923, 	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where he fought for an autonomous foreign policy “taken in Canada, for Canada and by 
Canada.”190  
The British guided the Canadians towards the sector principle and the doctrine of 
contiguity, which would strengthen the Empire’s respective legal positions in the Arctic 
and Antarctic. More than ever before, they framed questions of polar sovereignty in a bi-
polar context and saw that the legal connections between the two regions required a 
united approach. Soon after the Wrangel affair, Canada reiterated its faith in the doctrine 
of contiguity, although it hesitated to evoke the sector principle. In April 1924, Minister 
of the Interior Charles Stewart explained to the House of Commons that “International 
law, in a vague sort of way, creates ownership of unclaimed lands within one hundred 
miles of any coast, even if possession has not been taken. At least there is a sort of 
unwritten law in that respect.” Still, he insisted on the need for Canada’s acts of 
occupation, stating that “possession is a very large part of international law as well as any 
other law.”191  
2.7 Australia Ignored: The Empire’s Antarctic Dream 
Challenged  
On the subject of polar affairs, Australian officials were far closer in spirit to their 
Canadian counterparts than their colleagues in New Zealand. Historians Marie Kawaja 
and Tom Griffiths have shown that the Australians took an active role in shaping 
Antarctic policy, reflecting a general desire for inclusion and consultation in imperial 
matters of interest to their state.192 In the Antarctic, “Australia was no ‘passive witness’ to 	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imperial events but acted according to its own clear and distinctive views and its material 
self-interest in Antarctic affairs.”193 While Australian officials hoped there would be one 
imperial voice on Antarctic affairs, they framed events in the Antarctic in way that 
reflected their own national interests.  
The success enjoyed by the expanding whaling industry into the Ross Sea and 
during the summer of 1923-1924 alerted Australian officials to the prospect of greater 
foreign activity throughout the Antarctic waters.194 Foreseeing a wave of whaling 
companies descending on the region, officials believed it prudent for Australia to claim 
her Antarctic territory as soon as possible. New Zealand had taken control of the Ross 
Dependency in the face of increased activity, and the Australian government could see no 
reason why it should not follow the precedent.195 Prime Minister Bruce, in particular, was 
adamant that a foreign enclave be kept from forming along his southern border, 
preventable only through a claim by Australia to the entire Antarctic sector south of its 
coastline.196 British officials in London insisted that there was no prospect of any other 
country claiming this territory in the near future and thus no need for urgent Australian 
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action.197 Furthermore, two Empire claims in the span of a year violated the British 
government’s gradualist Antarctic strategy and could provoke foreign response. France 
had been quiet on its Antarctic claim for a decade and had taken no action to further 
explore Adélie Land, and the state might lose interest altogether in the region – unless 
provoked by a perceived British land grab. In British eyes, the Australian Antarctic 
Territory could wait. The Australian government continued to push the British to activate 
plans for a claim, but would not act without the sanction of the Empire. 
 Australian concerns were born out when France – spurred on by the Ross 
Dependency claim – looked to safeguard its Antarctic interests. On 29 March 1924, Paris 
published a presidential decree asserting its control over several Subantarctic islands and 
Adélie Land. In November, France followed the decree with a proclamation that attached 
the Antarctic territory to its Madagascar colony for administrative purposes, despite the 
two territories being 8000 miles apart.198 Neither declaration outlined the precise 
boundaries of France’s Antarctic territory, nor did the French government attempt to back 
up its claim with an expedition or physical presence in the region. Nonetheless, it posed a 
direct challenge to Britain’s imperial dreams and to Australian territorial ambitions in the 
Antarctic. 
The Australian government urged the British to challenge the French claim. Any 
concession to France would strip Australia of part of the sphere promised by the Colonial 
Office in 1921. In 1840, D’Urville had only sailed along 240 km of coastline and had 
never even set foot on the continent; activity which paled in comparison to the pioneering 
work of Mawson and the AAE. Walter Henderson, director of the newly-created External 
Affairs branch of the Australian Prime Minister’s Department, advised the Colonial 
Office that “in view of the unanimous agreement as to the importance of the Antarctic 
passing under British control, Commonwealth Government feels that unless there are 
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insuperable obstacles in the way it would be advisable to assert rights over these regions 
at earliest opportunity.”199  
The British weighed other Antarctic and international interests and hesitated to 
challenge France’s position. Chief Hydrographer Learmonth concluded that d’Urville 
first spotted and claimed the land on the Antarctic continent, and insisted that this act of 
first discovery and his excellent charting made the French claim indisputable.200 The 
Admiralty qualified that, while a French claim was indisputable, it could perhaps be 
limited to the section of coastline actually spotted by d’Urville.201 By November 1924, 
however, Leopold Amery returned to head the Colonial Office, and he reiterated that 
there was little the British could do to oppose a French claim. Britain also based its own 
claims in the Antarctic on similar acts of discovery and paper administration (rather than 
effective occupation) and any opposition to the French declaration risked challenged to 
Britain’s claims.202  
The larger issue of Britain’s diplomatic relationship with France loomed in the 
background of these Antarctic deliberations. By 1924, the bilateral relationship was 
growing more acrimonious owing to bitter disagreements over Germany’s economic 
recovery and reparations, as well as heightened imperial rivalry in the Near East. In light 
of these differences, the British government sought to avoid disagreements, believing its 
worldwide imperial interests and communications networks depended upon good 
relations with France.203 In the end, London decided to ignore the Australians and refused 
to issue an immediate challenge to the French Antarctic claim.  
Britain’s worries about the strength of its legal position in the FID shaped its 
response to Australia’s proposal and the French claim. The belief that these claims were 
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“somewhat prejudiced” by incorrect geographic information204 had led to the 
establishment of the Discovery Committee in 1923. The committee had instructions to 
create accurate maps and charts of the FID, and collect information that would allow 
Britain to better manage the still-booming whaling industry. It did not go into operation 
until January 1925 with the establishment of a marine biological conservatory at 
Grytviken, South Georgia. The committee also began a systematic survey of the 
oceanography of the Southern Ocean, including extensive mapping around South Georgia, 
the South Orkneys and the South Shetlands.205 From the start, historian Peder Roberts has 
stressed, the Discovery Committee clearly emphasized the assertion of sovereignty over 
the conservation and management of whales.206 Science could be portrayed as a noble 
pursuit free from nationalistic impulses, but states knew that accurate maps, surveying 
and scientific research also bolstered territorial claims.207 Policy-makers used the 
committee’s scientific activities to highlight Britain’s activity and sovereignty in the 
Antarctic. This activity would prove doubly important as a new threat emerged to 
Britain’s polar interests.  
2.8 The Hughes Doctrine 
As of the beginning of 1924, the U.S. State Department’s interest in polar issues 
remained lukewarm. The political and legal questions surrounding Wrangel Island 
continued to cause concern within the department, especially after Stefansson tried to 
convince Washington that it should claim the island. Stefansson even sold his rights to 
Wrangel to American entrepreneur Carl Lomen, known as the “Reindeer King of 
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Alaska,”208 in the hopes of inspiring Washington to take ownership of the island.209 The 
State Department officials reiterated that the U.S. had rights to the island, but little 
inclination to risk an international incident with the Soviet Union. Consequently, when a 
Russian gunboat removed Lomen’s party from Wrangel Island in the summer of 1924 the 
State Department offered the businessman compensation in private but remained silent in 
public.210  
Unlike the State Department, the U.S. Navy became more interested in the Arctic, 
especially with growing possibilities for aerial exploration in the region. Stefansson’s 
outpouring of popular writings presented the Arctic Ocean as a “polar Mediterranean” 
offering the shortest potential air routes between some of the largest cities in the world.211 
He argued that the emergence of long-range aircraft had finally solved, “after four 
hundred years, the problem of the northwest passage and giving us at last a short route 
from Europe to the Far East.”212 When Captain Bob Bartlett, a Newfoundlander with a 
vast amount of Arctic experience, spoke in front of Navy Department hearings about the 
possibilities of northern aviation in December 1923, he predicted that the “flying route 
across the Pole is the aerial Panama Canal of the future.” Bartlett argued it was as 
important for the U.S. to control the area on the American side of the North Pole as it was 
for it to control the Panama Canal. In these visions of future transpolar air routes, the 
Arctic islands became potential bases.213  
Impressed by these arguments, the U.S. Navy decided to use arctic exploration to 
gain publicity for the service and secure additional funding from Congress. It laid out 
tentative plans to send an airship, the Shenandoah, to explore the million square miles 
between Alaska and the North Pole.214 “We have to photograph those regions and plant 
our flag there first,” Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby told the press in January 1924. 	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“But for myself it is also a matter of great national pride that we shall not let any other 
nation step in between us and this region, which is practically contiguous to the territory 
of the United States; and that is exactly what some nation will do if we do not get there 
first.”215 Despite the Navy’s hopes, Congress rejected the Shenandoah project, and the 
idea was quickly forgotten.  
Denby’s comments, however, attracted a great deal of attention. Anson W. 
Prescott, a prominent Republican and secretary of the Republican Publicity Association, 
asked Secretary Denby about the Shenandoah plan. He also inquired about the legal 
status of Wilkes Land, the section of Antarctic coastline spotted by the U.S. Exploring 
Expedition in 1839.216 While pondering a response to Prescott’s letter, the State 
Department received a letter from the Norwegian government informing the Americans 
of a proposed expedition by Roald Amundsen, who prepared to fly across the unknown 
section of the Arctic Ocean between Point Barrow, Alaska and Spitsbergen. “In order to 
avoid any misunderstanding,” the note explained, “I beg to add that possession of all the 
land that Mr. Amundsen may discover will, of course, be taken in the name of His 
Majesty the King of Norway."217 
The notes forced the State Department to articulate a more coherent polar policy. 
Historian Gordon Henderson has shown that during this period of short, intense policy 
review, one of the most active members of the department was geographer Colonel 
Lawrence Martin, posted to the Division of Political and Economic Information.218 
Martin warned that Britain seemed intent on assuming control over the entire Antarctic 
continent, even though its claims had little substance. He insisted neither the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Speech recorded on front page of the New York Times, 20 January 1924, under headline “Annexation of 
Land to Pole, if Any, Aim of Navy, says Denby.”  
216 Given the legal and political nature of Prescott’s inquiry, Denby did not feel qualified to comment, and 
he forwarded the questions to the State Department, although the Navy Department considered the section 
of Antarctic coastline known as Wilkes Land as under the sovereignty of the U.S. The Navy also 
commented on the potential value of the Antarctic, in terms of possible fuel and mineral deposits, but not 
on the legal problems. U.S. Navy, General Board, Sovereignty of Crozets Island and Wilkes Land, Study 
414-3, 9 December 1924. Cited in Barry Merrill Plott, “The Development of United States Antarctic Policy” 
(Ph.D. dissertation: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1969), 28-29. 
217 Norwegian Minister to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1924, FRUS, 1924, 518. 
218 Henderson, “Policy by Default: The Origin and Fate of the Prescott Letter.” Martin had a deep interest 
in the polar regions and had served on the national boundaries commission at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Frank William, “Lawrence Martin, 1880-1955,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 46, no. 
3 (1956): 357-364. 
143	  	  
States, Norway, nor Great Britain had established a claim to sovereignty over the islands 
of the Arctic Archipelago, leaving them “Terrae Nullius.” Given the difficulties of 
effectively occupying the Arctic and Antarctic, Martin proposed that Washington take the 
lead in organizing Spitsbergen-like treaties for both regions in which all interested 
countries would be granted access for commercial purposes.219 In his conclusions, Martin 
tapped into the opinion expressed by Thomas Willing Balch: that the polar regions be 
considered a “no man’s land” that belonged to the entire human race.220 
Martin’s superiors rejected his plan to create regional treaties in the Arctic and 
Antarctic and they neglected to protest any of the existing territorial claims in the polar 
regions. Instead, they chose a simpler solution. In his appraisal of the Norwegian note, 
A.B. Haupt, who worked in the Solicitor’s Office, cited the demand for effective 
occupation in the leading international treatises for territorial acquisition, and insisted that 
discovery and acts of possession, especially by a pilot flying over a region, could not 
grant a state sovereignty. Haupt’s opinion reflected the legal digest produced by John 
Bassett Moore, international lawyer and past adviser to the State Department, which 
bluntly stated that “Title by occupation is gained by discovery, use and settlement.”221 
Haupt argued that the rules guiding territorial acquisition in temperate zones should not 
be radically altered for application to the polar regions. He advised that, rather than issue 
its own claim to the territory in the Arctic, the U.S. could reserve its rights by explaining 
to the Norwegian government that any land discovered by its nationals could not be 
claimed without occupation.222 The State Department’s solicitor, Charles Cheney Hyde, 
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accepted Haupt’s view and applied his reasoning during the drafting of the official 
responses to the Norwegian note and the Prescott inquiry.223  
The official response to Prescott sent by Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes 
laid out the history of American exploration in the Antarctic, including the discoveries of 
Palmer and Wilkes.  Nonetheless, it also stressed that the U.S. had never supported these 
activities with an official claim. He also pointed out that, despite British claims and 
activity in the Antarctic, these areas lacked permanent population or settlement. Hughes 
explained the State Department’s position demanded that discovery be followed by 
physical settlement, even in the polar regions. The note to the Norwegians insisted that 
discovery and the “formal taking of possession” had “no significance” beyond heralding 
“the advent of the settler,” which he implied might be impossible in parts of the polar 
regions. Even if the department thought the U.S. had rights in the Antarctic, Hughes 
concluded that without “an act of Congress assertative in a domestic sense of dominion 
over Wilkes Land this Department would be reluctant to declare that the United States 
possessed a right of sovereignty over that territory.”224  
Out of these statements was born the Hughes Doctrine, which formed the 
foundation of U.S. polar policy. Under the doctrine, official declarations, occasional 
visits, temporary camps and a semblance of control did not allow a country to acquire 
sovereignty over polar territory. The U.S. position held that countries must settle, 
colonize and utilize polar lands before they could successfully claim them, as in more 
temperate zones. Accordingly, U.S. officials refused to recognize any polar claim that did 
not meet its very strict interpretation of the requirements of sovereignty. While 
safeguarding potential U.S. territorial rights in the region, the doctrine left open the 
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possibility of regional treaties and internationalization, which remained a recurring policy 
option in internal State Department discussions on the polar regions.225 
Scholars have often criticized the Hughes Doctrine as a weak, confused and 
indecisive policy. Legal scholar F.M. Auburn has argued that the doctrine “unsettled all 
claims without giving the United States any benefit” and “later worked against American 
interests by requiring a higher standard than adopted by actual claimants.”226 Jeffrey 
Myhre, in his history of the Antarctic Treaty, insisted that “although the Hughes Doctrine 
was, in actuality, merely a Department of State interpretation of contemporary 
international law, as opposed to a statement of policy, it was bad.” Rather than articulate 
a policy more fitting to the polar regions, the State Department simply chose indecision 
and hid behind a technical legal argument that saved it from making territorial claims that 
it was not ready to make.227 These pointed criticisms reflect a broader traditional critique 
of the interwar Republican Administrations’ foreign policies as uncertain and poorly 
executed.228 Historians have accused Charles Hughes of being uncreative and foolishly 
dependent on law and reason, rather than power, in his foreign policy.229  
These assessments, both of the Hughes Doctrine and American foreign policy in 
the 1920s, are overly simplistic and narrow. Historian Gordon Henderson has defended 
the Hughes Doctrine as a necessary stop-gap measure that the State Department used to 
reserve American rights in the polar regions while providing an inexperienced 
department time to formulate a long-term polar policy.230 More nuanced studies of U.S. 
foreign policy in the 1920s have underlined that the uncertainty previous scholars read 	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into the foreign affairs of the interwar Republican administrations actually represented a 
consistent policy of cautious non-entanglement through which decision-makers sought 
actions that gave them a “free hand” to operate.231 Historian George C. Herring has 
concluded that “the 1920s must therefore be considered on their own terms. Involvement 
without commitment seems the best way to sum up the U.S. approach to the world during 
that period. The nation vigorously promoted its interests while scrupulously guarding 
against entanglements.”232 After the strong opposition in Congress to American 
involvement in the League of Nations, Secretary Hughes perceived a clear need to frame 
cautious policies in foreign affairs.233 The Hughes Doctrine was a cautious, defensive 
strategy designed to ensure potential U.S. rights in the Arctic and Antarctic, without any 
complicated entanglements.  
 The Doctrine also reflects the strain of American imperialism that dominated in 
the early twentieth century. Historian Adrian Howkins has presented it as a modern 
reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine that invoked a similar sense of manifest destiny in its 
“implicit reservation” of American rights in the polar regions.234 Antarctic scholar Robert 
Hall has argued that the Doctrine grew out of the “new imperialism” embraced by the 
U.S. in the early twentieth century. He saw parallels between the doctrine and the 
“imperialism of trade” and Open Door Policy adopted for China, which provided the 
Americans with access to Chinese markets and a “degree of political control” to prevent 
any annexations by other powers. During his time in office, Charles Evan Hughes used 
similar ideas to protect U.S. interests in the Far East and Middle East. “The Hughes 
doctrine was clearly a part of the United States’ imperial design,” Hall concluded, “and 
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did not occur in isolation, removed or divorced from world politics and the basic 
structural changes, such a New Imperialism, which have shaped the modern world.”235  
 Hall’s insights fit with a scholarly approach that highlights informal power and 
fear of territorial commitments as the main attributes of American imperialism.236 The 
U.S. participated in the new imperialism of the late 19th century, acquiring territories in 
the Caribbean and Pacific.  Still, some American statesmen argued that acquired 
territories must be incorporated as states of the union or abandoned.237 Accordingly, the 
government generally preferred the Panama Canal model, where the U.S. secured its 
national interests while avoiding the entanglements of formal and physical territorial 
acquisition.238 As Hughes summarized in his letter to Prescott, the State Department had 
no desire to make a territorial claim in the Antarctic without a congressional mandate. 
 The Hughes Doctrine also reflected a deeply entrenched legal tradition that 
scholarly evaluations of the doctrine have failed to explore. Legal scholar Jonathan 
Zasloff has pointed out that lawyers dominated American international relations in the 
first decades of the twentieth century. Between 1889 and 1945, every Secretary of State 
was a lawyer, and the ensuing relationship between law and foreign policy directly 
affected American diplomacy.239 Many of these men ardently supported the classical 
legal ideology, the legal framework in which elite lawyers in the U.S. worked. This 
highly abstract system of thought, characterized by a strong belief in law and universal 
principles that could form the basis of a legally regulated world, focused on the creation 	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of stability and order through clear international standards and legal regimes. The 
ideology sought a consistent and relatively closed legal system in which rules could 
evolve – but not dramatically.240  
Zasloff maintains that the classical legal ideology “profoundly influenced the 
direction of American foreign policy.”241 Elihu Root, one of the leading lawyers and 
statesman in the U.S. between 1890 and 1920, grafted the classical legal ideology into 
American diplomacy. While serving as Secretary of War for Roosevelt, Root famously 
asserted, “good diplomacy consists in getting in such a position that upon a conflict's 
flaming up between two nations the adversary will be the one which has violated the law.” 
Root wanted to construct a diplomatic environment that focused on whether a state had 
international law on its side and promoted a robust legal system that could set a clear 
standard for state practice throughout the world.242  
Root’s values had a strong influence on his disciples, including Secretary of State 
Charles Evan Hughes and his successor Frank B. Kellogg.243 Historian Mark Janis has 
labeled Hughes, in particular, a “titan of international law in the early twentieth century,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886-
1937 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 12-13 and 123-174. See also Francis Anthony Boyle, 
Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898-1922 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999), 3. See also Mark Janis, America and the Law of Nations, 1776-1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mark Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Great 
Expectations, 1789-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Hatsue Shinohara, US International 
Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Shirley V. Scott, International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Emily Rosenberg, “Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World, in A 
World Connecting,” in A World Connecting, 1870-1945, ed. Emily Rosenberg (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 836; Warren Kuehl, Seeking World Order (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1969); Roland Marchand, The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), 42-51 (148 escribes role of lawyers in peace movement); Calvin 
DeArmond Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and 
International Organization, 1899-1914 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1975); and Calvin DeArmond 
Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
241 Zasloff, “Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy,” 239-373. Kennedy, “Toward an Historical 
Understanding of Legal Consciousness,” 3-24; Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought, 123-
174. 
242 Zasloff, “Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy,” 290. Of course, as Root displayed during 
the Spanish-American War, force could be used to secure adherence to the rules the U.S. wanted states to 
follow. 
243 Zasloff, “Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy,” 370; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 
442. Herring described Hughes as “last secretary to personally manage U.S. foreign policy.” 
149	  	  
who was a “true-believer” in a “utopian vision of international law.”244 In the autumn of 
1925, President Calvin Coolidge, also a lawyer, outlined the measures that his 
government intended take to stabilize the international sphere. “All of these efforts,” he 
declared, “represent the processes of reducing our domestic and foreign relations to a 
system of law. They consist of a determination of clear and definite rules of action.” 
These efforts would succeed, the president asserted, because “it has not been brought 
about by one will compelling another by force, but had resulted from men reasoning 
together. It has sought to remove compulsion from the business life of the country and 
from our relationship with other nations.”245 Classical legal ideology lay at the heart of 
these beliefs.  
The Hughes Doctrine was born out of the same classical legal ideology and the 
legal and diplomatic frameworks that it produced. The Doctrine reflected broader 
currents in American policymaking that tried to set the country’s foreign relations in a 
robust system of law, with clear guidelines and rules of action. Hughes and the State 
Department concluded that even the polar regions should be included within a robust, 
global legal system predicated on reason and order. Furthermore, the Hughes Doctrine’s 
close interpretation of the contemporary international law on territorial acquisition 
represented an attempt to ensure that the U.S. would remain on the right side of the law in 
any future disagreements related to the polar regions.  
Unfortunately, the State Department willingness to fully utilize the doctrine came 
into question only a few months after its creation. During the summer of 1924, as the 
Russian gunboat removed Carl Lomen’s occupying party from Wrangel, a small, 
unsanctioned, privately funded American expedition landed on nearby Herald Island, 
raised the stars and stripes and claimed it for the United States. In response, the Soviets 
reasserted their rights in the Arctic and sent notes to foreign governments insisting that 
they respect the territorial claims the Tsarist government made in 1916. Reiterating their 
note to the Americans in 1922, the Russians argued that the Russian-American Treaty of 
1867 set the Arctic boundary between the two countries as the parallel of 60° 30’ north 	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longitude all the way to the North Pole. As a result, the U.S. could not claim any islands 
to the west of this line, which made the flag raising on Herald a breach of the treaty.246  
 In November, the Solicitor’s Office of the State Department concluded the 1867 
treaty never intended to establish a boundary stretching to the North Pole and therefore 
did not prohibit the U.S. from claiming islands anywhere in the Arctic Ocean.247 The 
State Department considered the Russian claim to be very weak. Herald Island was 170 
nautical miles off the Siberian coastline and could not be considered contiguous with the 
mainland.248 Furthermore, the Hughes Doctrine demanded permanent physical settlement 
to validate territorial claims in the polar regions, which the Russians had not yet 
accomplished on either Herald or Wrangel Island. Thus, Washington could have used the 
doctrine to reject the Russian annexation, just as they had denied Norway’s pretensions 
earlier in the year. At the same time, the Americans realized that their claim to the islands 
was also weak, as was the State Department’s desire to own them. Rather than risk an 
international incident, the State Department chose not to endorse an official challenge to 
the Russian claim, while also refusing to recognize the Soviet Union’s sovereignty over 
the Arctic islands.249 In this instance, politics trumped the clear legal standards 
established by the Hughes Doctrine. It would not be the last time. 
Moving forward, the Americans would have to decide how to utilize the Hughes 
Doctrine and study many of the core questions it left unanswered. What actual steps did a 
state need to take to acquire territory in polar regions? No one in Washington clarified 
what constituted effective state control, use or “actual settlement” in polar regions, and 
the State Department struggled to determine how much area could be “considered 
occupied by a single colony or military post.” Did a physical settlement of one island in a 
polar archipelago allow a state to claim additional adjacent islands? Was the physical 	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settlement called for in the Doctrine necessary or even possible, given the harsh climatic 
conditions of the polar regions?250 Although answers to these questions would have 
created a firmer U.S. polar policy erected on a robust legal foundation, State Department 
officials exerted little effort in trying to address them.  
2.9 On a Collision Course 
With the declaration of the Hughes Doctrine, the polar policies of the United States and 
the countries of the British Empire emerged as polar opposites. Through the Hughes 
Doctrine, the United States adopted the most conservative approach to the acquisition of 
polar sovereignty of any country with interests in the polar realms. As the New York 
Herald Tribune pointed out in 1929, however, “Hughes’ statement does not necessarily 
constitute international law, particularly in Great Britain.”251 In its official use of the 
sector principle in the Antarctic, the British Empire articulated one of the most liberal 
approaches. These fundamentally different conceptions of polar sovereignty set the 
United States and the countries of the British Empire on a collision course. While the 
Hughes Doctrine aligned with the calls for effective occupation found in contemporary 
international legal treatises, the sector principle offered a convenient solution to the 
problem of polar sovereignty. In 1924, the central question remained the approach of the 
other polar states with unrecognized claims. Would Norway accept the Hughes Doctrine 
and its demand for settlement and use? Russia had already utilized the doctrine of 
contiguity: would it extend these arguments into a sector claim? Would France define its 
undefined Antarctic claim using lines of meridian and include unknown land? The 
answers to this question would decide whether the U.S. or Britain would become the 
primary architect of the polar legal landscape. 
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Chapter 3 
3 The Empire’s Principle, 1925-1926 
In early March 1925, celebrated Antarctic explorer Douglas Mawson sat down with his 
academic colleagues on the Australian National Research Council (ANRC) to discuss a 
pressing national concern: territorial rights in the Antarctic.1 The council agreed that 
France’s claim to Adélie Land directly challenged Australia's Antarctic interests. The 
French dependency was closer to the Tasmanian community of Hobart than Perth was. If 
the Australians allowed the French to establish themselves in an area directly to their 
south, what would stop other foreign powers from following suit? The greatest worry was 
an American claim to the coastline discovered by the U.S. Exploring Expedition in 1840. 
The ANRC speculated that internatio nal interest in the Antarctic would only increase 
given its impressive whaling grounds, mineral potential, possibilities for southern air 
routes and the role it could play in global weather forecasting. These practical factors 
combined with “national sentiment” demanded that Australia act quickly to secure its 
polar interests to the immediate south.  
On what basis could Australia lay claim to such a vast swath of territory? While 
the council maintained that Mawson’s 1911-1914 expedition gave Australia “historical 
rights” in the region, international law did not “lay down any general rule for deciding the 
ownership of uninhabited or savage lands,” the ANRC observed. The committee sought a 
stronger foundation for the country’s claim.  
For more than a decade, Mawson had publicly advocated that Australia apply to 
the Antarctic what he called the “Canadian principle” of sector claims. The explorer 
incorrectly informed his ANRC colleagues that the Canadian government had 
successfully used the sector principle to secure “universal recognition of Canada’s claim” 
to “all unoccupied lands, already discovered or to be discovered by future exploration, 	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situated northwards of Canada as far as the North Pole and lying within the meridians of 
longitude bounding Canada itself to the east and west.”2 Echoing Canadian Senator 
Pascal Poirier’s initial sector proposal, the ANRC argued that the root of the “Canadian 
principle” rested in the theory that the polar regions should be controlled by “the most 
closely adjacent civilized Government.” Based on this logic, Australia could claim much 
of the eastern Antarctic. 
Unlike the Canadian model, the Antarctic sector outlined by the ANRC did not 
emanate from the ends of Australia’s southern coastline. Instead, the council argued that 
Australia had a right to the entire section of the Antarctic to which it was geographically 
closest. They calculated the coastline to be between 90°E to 160°E, and the completely 
unknown polar interior that these lines of meridian enclosed, right to the South Pole.3 For 
the “Canadian principle” to work, the ANRC reasoned, there had to be undisrupted 
contiguity between the polar territory and the claimant country. The French claim to 
Adélie Land stood in the middle of the proposed Australian sector. France would have to 
relinquish its polar territorial claim before Australia could make a sector claim. 
Consequently, the ANRC decided that Prime Minister Stanley Bruce should ask the 
British government to challenge France’s claim. Only then could the Australians attain 
“international sanction” to administer their Antarctic sector.4 The sector idea, which had 
failed to secure a seconder on the floor of the Canadian Senate in 1907, formed the core 
of the ANRC’s Antarctic ambitions. 
The ANRC’s call for Australia to take action and claim a sector in the Antarctic 
came at a time of escalating national rivalries for land in the polar regions. Only a few 
months after the council meeting, the London Times proclaimed that a “Scramble for the 
Poles” had begun. Over the previous two years, the British Empire’s creation of the Ross 	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Dependency, France’s claim to Adélie Land, and the Soviet Union’s assertion of rights to 
the islands in the Arctic Ocean highlighted that sovereignty, not exploration, now drove 
polar affairs. Spurred on by a thirst for territory and the search for minerals, whales and 
fisheries, the Times predicted that sovereignty claims would multiply.5 At the centre of 
the scramble for the poles lay the sector principle. This chapter establishes 1925 and 1926 
as pivotal years in the legal development of the polar regions. In the span of ten months, 
Canada and the Soviet Union publicly declared extensive sector claims, and the 
Australian government adopted the ANRC proposal and lobbied London to use the 
“Canadian principle” to carve out a vast polar territory for Australia. By the end of 1926, 
the sector principle had become an integral part of the evolving legal and political 
landscape of the polar regions.  
 Scholarship on Britain’s Antarctic policy has ignored the internal debate that the 
sector principle generated amongst officials in London. While the Dominions and 
Foreign Offices supported the principle, the Admiralty vehemently opposed its 
application, insisting it lacked a basis in international law. The argument that polar 
territory should be in the hands of the closest governments, the Admiralty warned, would 
only encourage countries like Argentina and Chile –	  the closest states to the Antarctic 
peninsula and its adjacent islands – to challenge Britain’s claim to the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.6  
The internal debate forced British officials to study and justify the sector principle. 
When London had first used the idea in the 1917 Letters Patent for the FID, it viewed the 
sector as an extension of the contiguity doctrine and hinterland claims Britain had 
employed in Africa. Now, building upon Canadian legal appraisals, these officials 
(particularly in the newly created Dominions Office7) worked to construct a firmer legal 	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April 1929. 
6 H. Douglas, Hydrographer, Minute, 7 January 1926, NA, ADM 116/2386. 
7 The Dominions Office was created at the beginning of 1925 at the suggestion of Leopold Amery, who 
also became its first Secretary of State (while he served as Secretary of State for the Colonies). The office’s 
mandate was to deal with the Dominions – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland 
and the Irish Free State – and the colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
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foundation for the sector principle. They argued that the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 
and the Russian-American Treaty of 1867 provided a treaty basis for a systemization of 
the doctrine. They also insisted that the unique conditions of the polar regions and the 
limits that they imposed on occupation called for a novel solution. Both Canadian and 
British legal experts concluded that as long as a state occupied or controlled the main 
points of access into a polar territory, it could use arguments of contiguity and employ 
sector lines to claim vast, unoccupied and even unexplored hinterlands. To avoid the 
central problem that the Admiralty had identified, British officials ignored the “Canadian 
principle” and explained that polar sectors emanated from “the eastern and western 
boundaries of territory already held by the Power concerned.”8 In 1926, the British 
argued that sectors had nothing to do with the geographical proximity of the claimant 
state. 
While British officials debated the sector principle between 1925 and 1926, the 
threats to the Empire’s polar ambitions multiplied, particularly from Norway and the 
United States. The Norwegian government attempted to protect its territorial and 
commercial interests throughout the Arctic and Antarctic, and questioned the claims of 
Britain and the Dominions. Norway was the first state that Washington applied the 
Hughes Doctrine against, and the Norwegian government’s new approach towards 
effective occupation reflected the American legal position. Meanwhile, the intrusion of 
an American expedition into the Arctic Archipelago and the real possibility that 
Washington might use its presence as a pretext to dispute Canada’s sovereignty over the 
islands worried Canadian and British officials. Given the strong position on “actual 
settlement” the State Department had adopted in the Hughes Doctrine, Washington could 
challenge the burgeoning use of the sector principle and the weak foundations that 
underlay many existing polar claims.  
This chapter uses new archival evidence to illustrate the struggles that American 
officials had with the issue of polar sovereignty and how to apply international law in the 
anomalous legal space of the polar regions.  The State Department contemplated using 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Laurence Collier, Memorandum Respecting Territorial Claims in the Arctic to 1930, 10 February 1930, 
NA, DO 35/167/7, Territorial Claims in the Arctic. 
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the Hughes Doctrine to officially challenge existing claims, but also considered 
employing the sector principle to claim the area above Alaska, and accepting title to polar 
lands based only on exploration. They even discussed the complete internationalization of 
the polar regions. In the end, the State Department’s confusion and internal debates 
inhibited its ability to develop a definite policy towards polar sovereignty, and political 
considerations played an important role in constraining America’s use of the Hughes 
Doctrine to challenge claims that did not meet its rigid standards.  
In Britain, anxieties about American and Norwegian intentions led experts in the 
Dominions and Foreign Offices to recognize that legal precedents or policy decisions 
established for one region would shape the development of the other. As a result, the 
Empire defined bi-polar policies that safeguarded interests in both areas. Imperial unity 
on the sector principle and congruence in the national legal strategies of Britain and the 
Dominions became more important as the Empire faced new threats in the polar regions 
and continued to struggle with the question of polar sovereignty. Despite the Admiralty’s 
objections, by the end of 1926 the Empire had firmly embraced the sector principle and 
set in motion plans to answer the ANRC’s call for an Australian Antarctic sector. 
3.1 The Scramble Begins 
After securing Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago at the Paris Peace 
Conference, Norwegian officials witnessed mounting threats to their polar interests. To 
the north, Canada claimed sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands, despite their discovery 
by a Norwegian citizen (and that they had never been visited by a Canadian). Russia 
excluded the Norwegians from their traditional fishing grounds in the White Sea and 
seemed intent on expanding into Arctic territories of interest to Norway, such as Franz 
Josef Land. Worst of all, the Ilhen Declaration gave the Danes the upper hand in Eastern 
Greenland. While Norway maintained that the declaration only recognized Danish 
sovereignty in the colonized southwestern corner of Greenland, the statement put the 
Norwegians at a severe disadvantage. When Denmark officially announced that all of 
Greenland fell under its control in 1921, the Norwegians protested, but the Danes 
persisted. Norway’s dream of an Arctic empire was faltering. 
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In the Antarctic, the British Empire’s claim to the FID and the Ross Dependency 
threatened Norway’s commercial whaling interests. How much more territory the Empire 
would claim as a pretext to impose whaling licenses and collect royalties from 
Norwegian whalers was unclear.9 With Norway’s position in both the Arctic and 
Antarctic threatened, the Norwegian government decided to take more aggressive 
political and legal action to defend its polar ambitions.   
The Norwegians realized that as a minor power they had to be careful about 
publicly challenging the polar claims of dominant countries like Britain, or annexing 
territory that was of interest to other more powerful states. Historian Thorleif 
Thorleifsson has observed that Norway embraced a flexible polar policy that matched its 
national status. “Retreat, combined with protest and negotiated agreements to secure the 
rights of Norwegian commercial interests, were often pursued rather than annexations.”10 
At the same time, Norwegian officials and private citizens remained on the lookout for 
new and uncontested polar land to claim.  
The Norwegian government initiated its new approach in 1924. It concluded a 
convention with Denmark on Eastern Greenland that resolved nothing about sovereignty, 
but granted hunting and fishing parties from both countries access to the area, which 
effectively protected Norway’s commercial interests.11 Then, in a flurry of activity, the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry declared Norway’s interest in the whaling grounds off the 
eastern Antarctic coast to the Australian government,12 questioned Ottawa on what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Einar-Arne Drivenes and Harald Dag Jølle, Into the Ice: The History of Norway and the Polar Regions 
(Gyldendal Akademisk, 2006), 292-293; Laurence Collier, Memorandum Respecting Territorial Claims in 
the Arctic to 1930, 10 February 1930, NA, DO 35/167/7, Territorial Claims in the Arctic; Thorleif T. 
Thorleifsson, “Norway ‘Must Really Drop their Absurd Claims Such as That to the Otto Sverdrup Islands.’ 
Bi-Polar International Diplomacy: the Sverdrup Islands Question, 1902-1930” (Master’s thesis: Simon 
Fraser University, 2006). 
10 Thorleifsson, “Bi-Polar International Diplomacy,” 37. 
11 That part of the east coast of Greenland stretching from Lindenov Fjord (60° 27”N. latitude) to 
Nordostrundingen (81° N. latitude) with the exception of the district of Angmagsalik. Shortly after, the 
Danes continued to strengthen their position on the eastern coast by creating the settlement of 
Scoresbysund, where legislation giving Inuit preferential hunting rights blocked the access of the 
Norwegians. 
12 Department of Trades and Customs to the Prime Minister’s Department, 20 November 1924, NAA, 
A4311, 362/6, Papers re Imperial Conference 1921 concerning Antarctic Matters, 1921-1931. 
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grounds Canada based its claim to the Sverdrup Islands,13 and asked the Foreign Office if 
the Ross Dependency included undiscovered land and if its boundaries extended to the 
South Pole. Without declaring sovereignty over the south polar plateau, the Norwegians 
pointed out that Roald Amundsen’s 1911 expedition gave their country a “priority to 
acquire” the area through occupation, along with the territory on both sides of the 
explorer’s route to the Pole.14 Not only had the Norwegians politely challenged the Ross 
Dependency sector claim, they defended their inchoate rights in the region, and upheld 
the need for effective occupation in the Antarctic.  
To British officials involved in polar affairs, Norway’s note on the Ross 
Dependency mattered less than France’s claim to Adélie Land, but still required a 
response. Hyrdrographer of the Navy Henry Percy Douglas insisted the Norwegians had 
no right to the territory around the South Pole.  He argued that Ernest Shackleton had 
already discovered, explored and claimed the entire south polar plateau when he reached 
a point less than a hundred miles from the South Pole in January 1909, two years before 
Amundsen. Douglas believed that Britain’s title to the plateau was so strong that “an 
exact analogy” to Norway’s assertion of rights “would be afforded by a Norwegian 
explorer who, on reaching the summit of Mt. Everest, should take possession of the 
whole of India for the Norwegian crown.” The hydrographer concluded, however, that 
the Norwegian point on undiscovered islands in the Ross Sea was a “fair one.”15 Douglas 
mocked the “preposterous nature in asserting the ownership of land yet to be 
discovered”16 and insisted that Britain’s reply to Norway highlight that “no nation can 
justly lay claim to undiscovered territories which do not form a part of known 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The Norwegian Minister in London, Benjamin Vogt inquired to the Foreign Office about whether 
Norway should send inquires about the Sverdrup Islands to London or directly to Ottawa. In a testament to 
the evolving state of Canada’s relationship with Britain, the Foreign Office told the Norwegians they 
should contact the Canadian government directly. Austen Chamberlain to F.O. Lindley (Oslo), 27 March 
1928, NAA, A981, ANT 51 Part 1, Antarctic – Norwegian Claims; B. Confidential Document for use by 
His Majesty’s Government Prepared by Dominions Office, NA, ADM 116/2494, Arctic and Antarctic 
Regions, 1925-1927 
14 Benjamin Vogt, Norwegian Minister, London to Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary, 24 February 
1924, Document NZ24021925, in W. M. Bush ed., Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of 
Inter-State and National Documents 3 (New York: Oceana, 1982-1988), 48-49. See also Confidential 
Document for use by His Majesty’s Government Prepared by Dominions Office, NA, ADM 116/2494, 
Arctic and Antarctic Regions, 1925-1927. 
15 H. Douglas, Hydrographer, Minute, 16 March 1925, NA, ADM 116/2386.  
16 Memorandum Prepared in the Hydrographic Department, Admiralty, The French Claim to Part of the 
Antarctic Continent, January 1925, NA, ADM 116/2386. 
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territory.”17 Douglas either forgot or ignored the claims to undiscovered territory already 
made by Canada and Britain in the Arctic and Antarctic over the last two decades. 
Before British officials could further contemplate a reply to the Norwegians, news 
reached London that the U.S. government gave its support to an American expedition 
headed into the Arctic Archipelago to search for new land around the North Pole. While 
the Norwegians tentatively questioned the British Empire’s polar claims, Washington 
seemed poised to directly challenge Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. British officials 
recognized that any American action in the Arctic, whether it took the form of a claim to 
newly discovered land or a challenge to Canada’s title, would have a major impact on the 
rules of territorial acquisition in the polar regions. As they anxiously waited for the 
Americans to clarify their intentions, officials temporarily shelved the response to the 
Norwegians. The next few months would be critical, not only for the future of Canada’s 
Arctic, but for the Empire’s broader polar ambitions.18   
3.2 Canada’s Sector Reaffirmed  
In early 1925, American explorer Donald MacMillan joined with Eugene F. McDonald, 
founder of the Zenith Radio Corporation, and retired naval officer Richard Byrd, to 
launch a polar expedition into the unknown area north of Ellesmere Island.19 In February, 
McDonald wrote to Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur that, “As we all know, Canada 
arbitrarily lays claim to all lands north of Canada, explored or unexplored, and we have 
sat pensively by offering no objection in the past because of the supposed uselessness of 
this land.” With the development of possible Arctic air routes, however, McDonald 
stressed that the islands had become more valuable and any newly discovered territory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 H. Batterbee, Dominions Office, to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 6 August 1925, NA, ADM 
116/2386. 
18 A. Document to Be Circulated to Members of Antarctic Committee at the Imperial Conference of 1926, 
Prepared by the Dominions Office, NA, ADM 116/2494, Arctic and Antarctic Regions, 1925-1927; H. 
Batterbee, Dominions Office, to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 6 August 1925, NA, ADM 
116/2386. 
19 Byrd came from a prominent and political Virginia family, was well connected in Washington, and 
counted Admiral William Moffet, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, as a close friend. Still, his attempts 
to secure funding from Ford and Rockefeller were failing, and at a meeting in Moffet’s office at the end of 
March, he decided to team up with MacMillan and McDonald, though the partnership was not a warm one. 
Byrd to The Chief of Bureau of Navigation, 26 March 1925, Byrd Polar Research Center Archival Program, 
The Papers of Richard E. Byrd, Sub-Series I, Donald MacMillan Expedition, Box 113, Folder 4235, 
Personal Correspondence, 1925, pt. 1. 
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should be under American control.20 Using bases at Etah, Greenland, and landing on Axel 
Heiberg and Ellesmere Islands, the MacMillan expedition would test planes and radios in 
polar conditions while searching for new Arctic islands and the “lost polar continent.”21 
The quest to claim new territory around the North Pole won the support of the Navy 
Department, the Bureau of Aeronautics, and even President Coolidge.22 Although the 
National Geographic Society supplied most of the funding for the expedition, the U.S. 
Navy provided Byrd with a Naval Arctic Aviation Unit of three amphibious planes and 
crews, representing Washington’s semi-official support of the venture.23 
The expedition’s planners gave little thought to the legality of territorial claims or 
to Canada’s potential reaction to a semi-official American party establishing bases in the 
Archipelago. Consultation with the State Department in early April led to a quick 
application for the necessary permits from Denmark to allow the expedition to use Etah 
as a base of operations. In contrast, the department completely ignored Canada’s title to 
all the land up to the North Pole, and advised the group that MacMillan could claim for 
the U.S. any land found north of 84°N, the northern edge of the Arctic Archipelago. 
Unsure of the status of Axel Heiberg and Ellesmere, the department asked the Solicitor’s 
Office to study Canada’s claim to the islands.24 In the meantime, the department advised 
against applying for any permits or taking any action that would imply Washington 
acknowledged Canada’s title over the Arctic Archipelago.25 The State Department’s 
focus on avoiding any move that might be construed as acceptance of Canada’s claim 
reflected the incredibly important role recognition played in the realm of territorial claims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 John H. Bryant and Harold N. Cones, Dangerous Crossings: The First Modern Polar Expedition, 1925 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 181. 
21 Harold Cones and John Bryant, “Dangerous Crossings: The First Modern Polar Expedition, 1925,” 
International Journal of Naval History 7, no. 3 (2008). 
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No matter what a state did to secure its territorial title, without international recognition 
the status of its claim remained troublingly uncertain.  
The Norwegian inquiry about the Sverdrup Islands and news of the MacMillan 
expedition arrived in Ottawa within the span of a month, reigniting worries about 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic.26 Ottawa had sent the Eastern Arctic Patrol to the 
Archipelago every summer since the panic inspired by the Danes in 1920-1921. RCMP 
occupied new posts at Craig Harbour, at the south end of Ellesmere Island, Pond Inlet 
and Pangnirtung on Baffin Island, and at Dundas Harbour on the southeastern coast of 
Devon Island.27 The government planned to send the Patrol back into northern waters in 
the summer of 1925 with orders to establish an additional RCMP post.28 Despite these 
efforts, officials in Ottawa knew that Norwegian and American citizens had explored 
areas of the Archipelago that no Canadian or British explorer had ever seen. The State 
Department’s failure to apply for Canadian permits in addition to those requested from 
Denmark confirmed their fears. Even when Ottawa sent an official to inform the 
expedition’s planners of the permits that they required to operate in Canadian territory, 
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the Americans did not forward an application.29 Faced with an imminent challenge to 
their Arctic sovereignty, the Canadians questioned the strength of their legal position. 
To address these concerns, the government of Mackenzie King established a 
Northern Advisory Board (NAB) to study the complicated legal and political issues 
involved in the MacMillan expedition and the Norwegian inquiry, and “to place on record 
with all interested Governments a statement indicating the extent of territory claimed by 
Canada for the British Empire.”30 An increasingly professional External Affairs 
department under the able leadership of O.D. Skelton supported the NAB.31 Showcasing 
a sophistication and independence lacking in the Danish affair of 1920-1921 and the 
Wrangel Island debacle, Canadian officials explored various policy options and set to 
work crafting a response to the American expeditions.32 Skelton even attempted to situate 
Canada’s position within a broader bi-polar political and legal context by studying the 
status of Spitsbergen and Britain’s Antarctic Dependencies.33 Based on their findings, the 
members of the NAB decided to ignore the Norwegian inquiry for the time being. To 
address the MacMillan expedition, the board decided that an act of occupation on 
Ellesmere would dissuade the Americans from challenging Canada’s claim to the island 
and so supported plans for the establishment of an RCMP post on the Bache Peninsula, 
hundreds of kilometres further north than the existing Craig Harbour station. Finally, the 
NAB drafted a new bill demanding that all scientists and explorers entering Canada’s 
North apply for a license from the Canadian government.34 Like the whaling licenses that 	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Ottawa imposed on foreign whalers entering Arctic waters, and that Britain and New 
Zealand continued to use in the Antarctic Dependencies, the Scientist and Explorers 
License demanded positive recognition of Canada’s sovereignty.  
As the Board decided on a strategy to deal with the MacMillan expedition, James 
White, a technical adviser with the Department of Justice, prepared a legal appraisal of 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. White was a geographer with long-standing interest 
and involvement in territorial boundaries and Arctic claims. In 1904, he drew a map for 
the Department of the Interior that used the 141st and 60th meridians running to the North 
Pole as Canada’s northern boundaries – an early, quasi-official application of the sector 
principle.35 Historians Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes have pointed out that over the next 
two decades White continued to support the sector principle, while maintaining that 
Canada’s claim had to be supported through acts of occupation and administration.36 In 
1925 the geographer used his extensive knowledge of Arctic affairs to conclude, 
“Canada's title may be claimed to be, if not unquestionable, at least much superior to that 
of any other nation.” 
White based his conclusion on the special conditions of the Arctic. In such a harsh 
environment, measures of control, of contiguity and of settlement had to be “given very 
much greater weight than would normally be attached to similar measures in more 
temperate and habitable regions.” Previous legal cases, such as the British Guiana 
Arbitration, had indicated that administrative control over Indigenous inhabitants 
constituted effective occupation, but White admitted that no Inuit lived north of Parry 
Channel and Lancaster Sound. In the polar environment, the three existing RCMP posts 
at Pond Inlet, Dundas Harbour, and Craig Harbour that Canada had “placed so as to 
dominate the whole of the archipelago” furnished “all the control required to maintain its 	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title.” Furthermore, White accepted that contiguity was a valid legal doctrine and 
highlighted that even the U.S. government had utilized it in past territorial disputes. State 
practice in Africa and other regions in the last part of the nineteenth century further 
legitimized the use of contiguity doctrine to create hinterlands and spheres of influence. 
The geographer suggested that these “principles of law… materially strengthen the claim 
of Canada.” To White, this legal context proved that in the special conditions of the 
Arctic, a state could cite contiguity to give greater substance to an element of effective 
control.37 Thus, due to the points of control offered by the RCMP posts, Canada could 
use the contiguity doctrine to insist that the unoccupied islands of the Archipelago – and 
any that might still be found further north – were “simply portions” of the same 
“geographical entity,” and immune from foreign claims.  
White insisted that the U.S. had bound themselves to the sector principle through 
the Russian-American Treaty of 1867. White insisted that when the U.S. ratified the 
treaty, which set Alaska’s western limit as a line of meridian that “proceeds due north, 
without limitation, into the Frozen [Arctic] Ocean,” it accepted the principle of Arctic 
boundaries running to the North Pole (an interpretation that the State Department 
rejected). White argued that “inferentially, the United States would make a similar 
contention respecting its eastern boundary – the 141st meridian,” which formed the 
western boundary of Canada’s Arctic sector. To provide additional support to Canada’s 
sector claim, White stressed that the absence of any protest from “all other nations” to his 
official 1904 map, which clearly outlined the sector, revealed “a tacit acquiescence, 
during over a fifth of a century.” Their silence barred the right of any state to protest the 
annexation. He pointed out that the parameters set for the British Guiana-Venezuela 
Arbitration had established that “unprotested occupation for 50 years constituted a valid 
title.” In short, the geographer concluded that discovery, control, contiguity, prescription 
and the Treaty of 1867 all worked to establish Canada’s Arctic “hinterland” as “the area 
bounded on the east by a line passing midway between Greenland and Baffin, Devon and 
Ellesmere islands, and, thence, northward to the Pole. On the west, Canada claims, as her 	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western boundary, the 141st meridian from the mainland of North America northward, 
without limitation.”38  
O.D. Skelton thought that White had crafted a strong case for Canada’s claim to 
the islands of the Archipelago. He did not, however, believe that either the Anglo-
Russian Treaty of 1825 or the Russian-American Treaty of 1867 established territorial 
boundaries extending to the North Pole. He found “no precedent for any claim on our part 
to territorial control over part of the Arctic Ocean or over undiscovered islands in that 
area.” If islands were found above the known Archipelago, Canada could use a “plea of 
contiguity” to claim them, but it would not stand up against foreign discovery and 
occupation.39 Still, as legal scholar Donat Pharand has observed, Canada needed 
something “to assist in establishing her claim to territory of which she did not have quite 
full control or which she thought was perhaps yet undiscovered but contiguous to her 
northern coast and within the sector in question.”40 With this need in mind, the Northern 
Advisory Board advised the Canadian government to issue its most explicit assertion of 
the sector principle yet.  
 On 1 June 1925, Minister of the Interior Charles Stewart stood in the House of 
Commons and boldly proclaimed that all the land from Canada’s northern coast “right up 
to the North Pole” belonged to his country.41 Ten days later, the Minister elaborated 
claiming “the territory outlined between the degrees of longitude 60 and 141.” In this 
speech, Stewart highlighted the Ottawa’s reasons for using the sector principle. He 
admitted the enclosed territory was “so remote that we know very little about it; we know 
only the fringe of it and very little about that, and when you get into the confines of 
Coronation gulf and to the immediate north you are in almost unknown quarters.”42 Only 
through the sector principle could Canada claim the land in the “almost unknown quarters” 	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of the Archipelago. While previous Canadian officials had raised the sector principle, and 
official maps outlined a sector, this official articulation by a Cabinet minister was 
unprecedented. Regardless of the acts of occupation that Canadians were carrying out in 
the Archipelago, their government had officially tied Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic 
to the sector principle. 
 
	  
Figure 4: Map showing Canada's sector. LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4253, File 9057-40. 
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3.3 To Challenge or Not to Challenge: A Summer of 
Indecision  
Stewart’s parliamentary declaration received wide coverage in the American press. 
Journalists criticized the move as an unjustifiable attempt to claim the unknown area that 
America was about to explore.43 MacMillan simply ignored Stewart’s proclamation, 
explaining to Secretary of the Navy Wilbur that he would still claim “all lands discovered 
in the great unexplored area” regardless of “Canada’s protest.”44 On 20 June 1925, 
MacMillan and his party set out for Etah, Greenland. Shortly after, the Eastern Arctic 
Patrol vessel Arctic headed north as well, with orders to establish the new RCMP post on 
the Bache Peninsula and to impose Canada’s laws if it met the American expedition. 
Lacking their own official representation in Washington, Canada requested the 
British Embassy send a note drafted by the NAB to Secretary of State Frank Kellogg that 
highlighted the efforts of the RCMP in the Archipelago, explained the permits required 
for the MacMillan expedition to operate in Canada’s Arctic territory, and offered 
assistance to the Americans.45 Legal scholar W.M. Bush has observed, the “device of 
explicitly consenting to an expedition and offering assistance as a means of preserving a 
claimant state’s position as regards activities of other states within the area claimed” 
became an important tool for Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the Antarctic.46 The 
State Department had already given approval for MacMillan to claim any undiscovered 
land he found, so American officials now focused on whether the U.S. should apply for 
the permits or officially challenge Canada’s claim to the High Arctic Islands.47  	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Charles Cheney Hyde, the experienced lawyer in charge of the Office of the 
Solicitor who had worked on the Hughes Doctrine, questioned whether the Canadians 
had actually achieved effective occupation in the Arctic. He suggested the region might 
still be open to the first country that could “settle and occupy” the islands. The lawyer 
contemplated applying the Monroe Doctrine, the American principle that European 
powers not interfere in the western hemisphere without it being considered an act of 
aggression, to the situation if Washington deemed the Canadian claim to be an act of 
territorial acquisition by Britain.48 Adhering to the Hughes Doctrine’s focus on settlement, 
Kellogg asked what constituted an RCMP post, where the posts were located, how 
frequently they were visited and whether they were “permanently occupied.”49  
While they waited for a reply to Kellogg’s questions, American officials 
continued to study Canada’s Arctic claim. In the Solicitor’s Office, William Roy 
Vallance researched the basis of Canada’s sector claim. He discussed the issue with 
David Hunter Miller, a prominent American international lawyer and expert on treaties 
with a keen interest in polar affairs. Miller explained that he thought the Canadians based 
their sector claim on the treaties of 1825 and 1867, especially the “use of the words 
‘without limitation’” in the latter treaty.50 Vallance was well aware that the State 
Department had rejected this reading of the treaties in the context of the Russian Arctic 
claim. From the American legal perspective, there was simply no treaty basis for a 
systematization of sector claims in the Arctic. 
The State Department learned from the British Embassy that only four RCMP 
posts existed in the whole Archipelago, manned by small contingents of two or three 
constables who also played the role of customs and postal officers, and officials doubted 
this constituted settlement. Irving N. Linnell from the Division of Western European 
Affairs questioned how much territory Canada actually thought it could effectively 	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occupy with the posts, regardless of how much the men patrolled or how many 
administrative roles they played.51 According to the Hughes Doctrine, the Canadians had 
failed to effectively occupy most of the Arctic Archipelago. Department officials 
therefore drew up an official challenge to Canada’s Arctic claim, which asserted, 
The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to these 
territorial claims and is in full accord and sympathy with the endeavors of the 
Canadian Government to extend the rule of law and order to, and to develop the 
resources of, the lands in question. 
It believes, however, that the recognized rules of international law require the 
establishment and maintenance of an effective occupation of news lands as a 
prerequisite to the acquisition of sovereignty and it is not understood that such 
occupation has been effected by Canada in some of the islands within the limits 
referred to above [the sector boundaries].52  
With this note, the Americans could have disputed Canada’s claim to any of the islands in 
the Archipelago, especially the ones without an RCMP post. It would have made for a 
striking application of the Hughes Doctrine had it been sent. 
An explicit and official American challenge to Canada’s Arctic claims remained a 
distinct possibility in the summer of 1925, except State Department officials were wary 
of the diplomatic fallout. William Castle, chief of the Division of Western European 
Affairs, quickly rejected the notion of using the Monroe Doctrine, for he could “imagine 
nothing that could lead to more feeling in Canada, bringing about strained relations for 
years to come.”53 Both Hyde and Linnell stipulated Washington could avoid controversy 
and recognize its neighbour’s claim to the known islands of the Archipelago with a 
“liberal application” of the doctrines of contiguity and occupation leaving sector theory to 
the side.54 Torn between strong legal arguments supporting a challenge to Canada’s claim 
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and political considerations that encouraging a more tactful approach, the State 
Department hesitated and remained undecided in August. 
Learning that the Eastern Arctic Patrol was intent on intercepting the MacMillan 
expedition in the middle of August, the Americans decided on a compromise. In a cable 
to the expedition, the State Department instructed the explorers should obtain a license or 
permit from the leader of the Eastern Arctic Patrol, George Mackenzie, “to land and 
explore Baffin Island or other territory south of Ellesmere Island…to avoid embarrassing 
diplomatic situation.” The cable described the situation as “most delicate,” noting 
Washington could not ask Ottawa directly for a permit.55 While the explorers would 
request a permit to land on Baffin, providing tacit recognition of Canada’s sovereignty, 
they would not do the same for the islands north of Parry Channel.  
In the end, Richard Byrd simply decided to lie about the permits his expedition 
received from Ottawa. When the Arctic visited the MacMillan expedition at Etah, 
Greenland on 19 August, George Mackenzie invited Byrd on board for dinner and asked 
if the Americans had acquired the necessary licenses to carry out flights over Ellesmere 
Island. Donald MacMillan later described to a Canadian friend, “Byrd was in a tight place. 
Here he was under direct orders from his chief in Washington to use no Canadian permits. 
He was smoking Mr. Mackenzie’s good cigars and had enjoyed his hospitality; he could 
not openly tell his orders from Washington.” Instead, Byrd fraudulently explained that 
the American expedition had received all the necessary permits while en route to 
Greenland.56 Although Mackenzie suspected Byrd’s explanation, the radio on the Arctic 
was broken and there was no way for the Canadian to confirm his suspicions.57 Shortly 
after their meeting, both the MacMillan expedition and the Eastern Arctic Patrol retreated 
southwards in the face of worsening weather, the Americans having failed to discover 	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any territory, and the Canadians unable to establish their new RCMP post on Ellesmere 
Island.  
When the State Department learned that the MacMillan expedition failed to find 
new land or establish bases on Ellesmere or Axel Heiberg Islands, it withheld its note of 
challenge. There seemed little reason to create conflict with the Canadians.58 The State 
Department had time to follow Irving Linnell’s advice and flesh out the Hughes Doctrine 
and determine exactly what “would constitute an effective occupation of Polar lands.”59 
By refusing to apply for Canadian permits, the State Department effectively maintained 
its defensive legal position, and by deciding not to challenge Canada’s claim it protected 
U.S. relations with Ottawa and, by extension, London. These decisions aligned with the 
broader context of Washington’s efforts to build a closer partnership with Britain in 1925 
to further its goal of achieving European stability. Throughout the summer, American 
officials had worked behind the scenes in Europe to spur on negotiations for the Locarno 
Pact, which sought to secure the postwar territorial settlement and normalize relations 
with Germany.60 As they worked for stability in Europe, the Americans wanted to avoid 
creating instability in other parts of the world – particularly in an area as marginal as the 
Arctic.  
The British were similarly disinclined to confront the Americans on the 
MacMillan expedition and its failure to apply for permits at a time when the Foreign 
Office wanted closer relations with Washington. Entanglement in an Arctic dispute 
conflicted with the viewpoint recently expressed by Foreign Secretary Austen 
Chamberlain that, “it is a fundamental condition of British policy, I might almost say a 
condition of the continued existence of the British Empire, that we should not be 
involved in a quarrel with the United States.”61 The Canadians felt the same and despite 	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sending a mild protest about the MacMillan expedition to the State Department in 
December 1925, the missive did not demand a response.62 While Canada’s Arctic 
sovereignty survived the MacMillan affair, Canadian and British officials had proof that 
the American government did not recognize its neighbour’s claim to the entire 
Archipelago and the possibility of an official challenge from Washington lingered on.  
3.4 Britain, the Dominions and the Sector Principle  
A month after Charles Stewart’s reassertion of Canada’s sector claim, Douglas Mawson 
and the Australian National Research Council met with Prime Minister Stanley Bruce to 
discuss their proposal for an Australian Antarctic sector. Aside from internal memoranda, 
no state had officially or publicly denounced Canada’s use of the sector principle in the 
Arctic. The council members therefore insisted “a similar definite allocation” should also 
work in the Antarctic. Mawson argued that if all the polar regions were divided along the 
lines of the “Canadian principle” it would “save a great deal of international trouble.”  
The Prime Minister, previously employed as a barrister at a prestigious London 
firm, presented a more critical analysis of the sector principle and polar claims in 
general.63 While Bruce admitted Canada’s sector claim provided an “excellent 
precedent…one had to remember that it was never challenged…as there was no other 
country interested enough to offer protest.” Unfortunately, Bruce elaborated, “the mere 
saying so, unless unchallenged for a long period of time did not give international rights.” 
An Australian sector claim to territory explored by both American and French 
expeditions could lead to protest and would make Paris “a little hysterical” likely leading 
to arbitration. In the end, Bruce could think of no “recognized international law such as 
makes it perfectly certain [Australia’s] rights would be upheld.”64  
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Undeterred, the Australians proposed that London challenge the French claim to 
Adélie Land using the “Canadian principle” and its central idea that the “control and 
administration of the Arctic and Antarctic lands should be in the hands of those countries 
whose territories are situated nearest them.” The Australian government wanted this to 
become a “recognized principle in dealing with Antarctic territories” and thought “it 
should be urged as strongly as possible.” The French, the Australians suggested, might 
surrender their claim to Adélie Land for the portion of Antarctic territory closest to their 
colonial possessions of Kerguelen Island or Madagascar.65 The Australian plan amounted 
to a general territorial settlement in the Antarctic with the sector principle at its core. 
The Australian proposal arrived in London in the summer of 1925, as British 
officials in the Admiralty, Foreign, Colonial, and Dominions Offices attempted to address 
a sudden deluge of polar sovereignty issues.66 They still had to determine a response to 
France’s claim to Adélie Land and craft a suitable reply to the Norwegian note about the 
Ross Dependency. The political and legal situation in the Antarctic was further 
complicated by Argentina’s decision to construct a wireless station alongside the weather 
station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys since 1904. When the British Embassy in 
Buenos Aires had indicated that Argentina would need a license and call sign from the 
Governor of the Falkland Islands for the station, given its location within the boundaries 
of the FID, the Argentinean reply implied that the station lay in their national territory.67 
While officials worked through these challenges, they also considered a new plan laid out 
by Leopold Amery, now the Secretary of State for the Dominions and Colonial Offices, 
for Britain to claim all the land from the western boundary of the Ross Dependency to the 
FID, effectively creating another Antarctic sector from 160° E to 20° W.68 British 
officials also kept a close eye on the events unfolding in the Arctic to assess the strength 
of Canada’s legal position and to gauge if the Americans would deliver a formal 
challenge.69  	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As Sir Charles Davis worked through the polar issues confronting the Empire, the 
Permanent Under Secretary for the Dominions Office could see the growing political and 
legal connections between the Arctic and Antarctic. Davis consistently reminded other 
officials dealing with polar affairs that it was “very desirable to keep the 2 sets of claims 
[Arctic and Antarctic] in mind together” and suggested that Britain craft bi-polar 
policies.70 Within discussions of Amery’s proposed sector claim “stretching down to the 
South Pole,” Davis stressed the need to consult Canada, “in view of the fact that the 
Canadian claim to sovereignty of all lands north of the Canadian mainland, as far as the 
North Pole had now become a matter of practical interest.”71 Davis insisted the British 
Government keep Canada’s legal position firmly in mind so that no action it took in the 
Antarctic would hurt the Dominion’s Arctic sovereignty.  
The Admiralty remained unconvinced and continued to criticize the sector 
principle. While the argument that polar territory should be in the hands of the closest 
government would benefit Canada and Australia given their respective geographic 
locations, Hyrdrographer Henry Percy Douglas noted that it would be “highly detrimental 
to the British position,” given how far away England was from the polar territory it 
claimed. Furthermore, the Argentines, who already seemed intent on challenging 
Britain’s claim, could use these geographic arguments to support their case.72 The 
Admiralty disputed the Canadians and Australians naïve claim that the sector principle 
had won international recognition; the idea was “either openly or tacitly opposed by the 
only two other powers interested – U.S.A. and Norway.” Even if the international 
community eventually accepted the Canadian claim and the sector principle, there was no 
guarantee that the precedent would prove useful to Australia. While the Arctic 
Archipelago formed a continuous chain northwards, divided only by small channels, 
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arguably supporting Canada’s use of contiguity doctrine, the Hydrographic Department 
highlighted the 1400 miles of ocean that separated Australia from the Antarctic.73  
The Admiralty argued that issues of polar sovereignty, especially the use of 
contiguity doctrine and the sector principle, affected the entire Empire. Officials urged 
that the British Empire should only claim polar territory it had discovered, explored and, 
if possible, adequately occupied, “without taking into consideration the continuity or 
otherwise of such land with other land not claimed.”74 As such, the Admiralty advised the 
reply to Norway regarding the Ross Dependency reflect its position on claims to 
unexplored land.75  
To Sir Charles Davis and officials in the Dominions Office, the Admiralty’s 
position was not only a “detriment of the claim of Canada to undiscovered islands to the 
north of the Dominion,” but also to the Empire’s title to the vast and mostly unexplored 
hinterlands of the FID and the Ross Dependency. Without the use of contiguity doctrine 
and sector lines, how could they support claims to sections of the Antarctic that no 
explorer had ever set foot on? In the opinion of the Dominions Office, Britain was 
already tied to the sector principle.76 The internal British debate mirrored the general 
trend in the bi-polar legal landscape, which pitted the proponents of physical settlement 
against the supporters of the sector principle.  
At this stage, the Foreign Office remained relatively uninvolved in the debate and 
“held no strong views” on the sector principle either way.77 In the polar regions 	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occupation consisted of two acts. As Gerald Hyde Villiers, the head of the League of 
Nations and Western Department explained, discovery gave a prior right to annexation, 
but this lapsed if a formal declaration or a public act implying a “definite claim to 
sovereignty” did not occur within a “reasonable period of time.” Britain prioritized this 
because many of their explorers had performed such symbolic acts, while those from 
other states had not. This first act, the actual annexation, created a priority right to 
establish an effective administration over the territory, the second act, which “completed” 
the occupation. Administration could simply take the form of legislation for the whaling 
industry, but was strengthened by the kind of practical work the Discovery Committee 
carried out in the waters off the Antarctic, which provided evidence of the government’s 
continued activity in the territory it claimed. Unlike the Admiralty, the Foreign Office 
explained that as long as an administration was in place for a claimed area, it had “no 
objection” to future British claims “extending throughout the whole sector to the South 
Pole,” even if the vast majority of this territory remained unexplored.78  
 The Foreign Office replied to Norway conveying support for the sector principle, 
and avoiding a more general discussion of the principles of polar sovereignty. It affirmed 
that the Ross Dependency consisted of all the territory enclosed by the sector lines that 
extended to the South Pole. If any undiscovered land remained within this area, the note 
implied, it was already under British sovereignty. The response also stressed that 
Shackleton’s claim to the south polar plateau circumvented any of the rights that the 
Norwegians believed Amundsen had created during his journey to the South Pole.79 The 
British government hoped Norway would stop questioning the Empire’s rights in the 
Antarctic.  
After dispatching its note, the Foreign Office admitted that its conclusions on 
polar sovereignty should be discussed with all interested government departments before 
Britain made any further moves in the Antarctic. Amery and the Dominions Office 
agreed and insisted that Canada, New Zealand and Australia should also be involved in 	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the discussions.80 They concluded that the upcoming Imperial Conference, set for 
October 1926, would provide an ideal setting for deliberation on polar issues and the 
principles the Empire should adopt in pursuing its Antarctic claims. In the meantime, 
legal and political developments in the Arctic dramatically changed the prospects of the 
sector principle. 
3.5 “Not Worth a Damn:” The Arctic Sectors and the United 
States 
The old quest to discover land in the High Arctic and the new pursuit to be the first to fly 
over the North Pole propelled expeditions northwards in 1926. In January, Richard Byrd 
announced his intention to return to the Arctic in the spring in an “independent attempt to 
explore the North Polar regions from the air.”81 On 9 May, Byrd and co-pilot Floyd 
Bennett took off from an airstrip on Spitsbergen and headed north. They returned fifteen 
hours later and declared that they had flown over the Pole, although this claim has been 
challenged by explorers, historians and journalists ever since. 82 A few days later, Byrd’s 
competition, Roald Amundsen, the Italian adventurer Umberto Nobile and wealthy 
American explorer Lincoln Ellsworth took the airship Norge on a transpolar journey from 
Spitsbergen to Alaska via the North Pole.83 At the same time, Australian explorer Hubert 
Wilkins, with financial support from the Detroit Aviation Society, started to fly over the 
unknown area north of Alaska and planned for a crossing of the polar basin from Point 
Barrow, Alaska to Spitsbergen.84 As they slowly uncovered the last blank spots on the 
Arctic map, no aerial explorers spotted any additional land around the North Pole. 
Officials in Ottawa, London and Moscow had preemptively worried about the 
legal implications of the flights on territorial claims in the Arctic. When Byrd first 	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announced his plans, the British Embassy in Washington reported that he could choose 
Ellesmere as his main base and fly to the Pole over the unknown territory enclosed by the 
Canadian sector claim. The possibility inspired Ambassador Esme Howard to warn, “no 
definite expression of opinion has yet been obtained from the United States Government 
as to their willingness or otherwise to recognise Canadian jurisdiction over” the Arctic 
Archipelago. Perhaps the time had come, the ambassador suggested, to send an official 
note to the State Department explaining the basis of Canada’s Arctic title and ask for an 
official understanding on the issue. “It seems to me,” Howard explained, “that 
discussions as to the disputed areas would be likely to cause less feeling if they are 
undertaken before someone plants the American flag, than afterwards.”85 Howard’s 
suggestion embodied a constant tension in Canadian Arctic policy: whether or not to ask 
the Americans for recognition of Canada’s sovereignty over the northern islands.  
Even as Howard urged Canada to seek official American recognition of its polar 
sector, the U.S. Navy Department tried to convince the State Department to officially 
challenge existing claims in the Arctic. The Navy felt that the U.S. had territorial rights to 
many of the Arctic islands based on exploration and symbolic acts of possession, and 
suggested that “all claims…be considered unsettled until title shall have been confirmed 
in accordance with International Law and custom.”86 Within the State Department, 
certain officials sympathized with the Navy’s viewpoint87 and remembered that the 
challenge to Canada’s claim prepared the previous summer remained ready “for use in 
continuing correspondence” with the British if they “raised the question” of Arctic 
sovereignty again.88 Had they been pursued, attempts by London or Ottawa to secure 
American recognition of Canada’s sector claim would likely have ended in 
disappointment. Luckily, however, reason to seek American recognition effectively 	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disappeared with Byrd’s choice of Spitsbergen over Ellesmere Island as his base of 
operations.  
Canadian officials resolved ignored these aerial expeditions heading to the North 
Pole, strengthening Canada’s position instead through queit acts of occupation. In the 
summer of 1926, the Eastern Arctic Patrol once again headed into Arctic waters and 
managed to successfully replace the Craig Harbour RCMP post with one further north on 
the Bache Peninsula.89 From the new post, a police patrol made the long journey to the 
Sverdrup Islands – their first sighting by Canadian eyes.90  
The sector principle played an important role alongside occupation in extending 
Canada’s sovereignty to every corner of the Archipelago and whatever land might still to 
be found north of Ellesmere Island. As if to underline the principle’s relevance, Ottawa 
used Canada’s sector lines to delimit the boundaries of the new Arctic Islands Game 
Preserve.91 Oswald Sterling Finnie, the director of the Northwest Territories and Yukon 
Branch of the Department of the Interior, emphasized that the Game Preserve “and its 
appearance on our maps also has a bearing on British sovereignty in the North and serves 
to notify the world at large that the area between the 60th and 141st Meridians of 
Longitude, right up to the Pole, is owned and occupied by Canada.”92  
Canada’s use of the sector principle received a welcome boost from the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets had made significant strides in polar exploration in the early 1920s 
driven by a hope that they might tap into the Arctic’s economic potential and by the need 
to protect their county’s territorial claims. Backed by the state, the Academy of Science 
formed a Polar Commission in 1923 to study the Russian North, and the Soviet Navy’s 
Hydrographic Department had started to chart various parts of the Arctic Ocean. The 
Northern Scientific-Commercial Expedition (Seveskpeditsiia) continued to expand Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 As the authors of Arctic Front have noted, “Bache Peninsula was the quintessential example of symbolic 
sovereignty.” Though there was no one around for hundreds of miles and the post was visited once a year 
during the annual Eastern Arctic patrol, and could have been stamped in the south. “Since there was no one 
around to arrest, the police ran a post office,” as a display of sovereignty. Coates et al, Arctic Front, 48. 
90 The Canadian Arctic – What Canada Claims, Has Done and is Doing, in the Northland, 1929, RG 25, 
Vol. 4252, File 9057-40, pt. 2. See also see also Lyle Dick, Muskox Land: Ellesmere Island in the Age of 
Contact (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 277-291. 
91 Referred to in Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, 51, and 1929 map on 52.  
92 O.S. Finnie to Dr. O.D. Skelton, 31 August 1926, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4252, File 9057-40, pt. 2. 
	   180	  
knowledge of the North, as did the Committee of the Northern Sea Route (the 
Komseveroput), which controlled the core of the Soviet Union’s Arctic strategy.93 Still, 
by early 1926, the Soviets lacked the aerial capabilities of the western expeditions and 
officials worried one of these flights might discover new land on the Russian side of the 
Pole.94  
The Central Executive Committee (CEC), the highest governing body in the 
Soviet Union, took pre-emptive action to protect its polar possessions.  On 15 April 1926, 
the Committee issued a decree that claimed, “all lands and islands, both discovered and 
which may be discovered in the future…located in the northern Arctic Ocean, north of 
the shores of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics up to the North Pole” between 
32°04'35” E to 168°49' 30"W.95 As British official Laurence Collier explained in 1930, 
the move embraced “the Sector Principle in its most explicit form.”96 Soviet international 
lawyer T.A. Tarcouzio later explained that to safeguard against any potential discoveries 
by western aerial expeditions, Russian officials adopted the position that “irrespective of 
the nationality of the discoverers or explorers, sovereignty to lands discovered 
automatically vests with the state within whose sphere or sector or ‘terrestrial gravitation’ 
the land is found.”97 To support this assertion, the Soviets pointed to the existing sector 
claims of Canada and Britain in the Arctic and Antarctic.   
Soviet jurists amassed legal justifications to support the sector claim. Vladimir 
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Aerial Law for the Soviet Union, argued that effective occupation was not “an 
indispensable condition” of international law, and that the “triple formula” of territorial 
acquisition – discovery, occupation and notification – could not be applied to the Arctic 
and Antarctic.98 He advocated for a “simpler solution” in which “sovereignty ought to 
attach to littoral states according to region of attraction [rayona tyagoteniya],” effectively 
substituting occupation for contiguity.99 Along with leading Soviet legal experts such as 
E.A. Korovin and S.V. Sigrist, Lakhtine asserted that within a sector permanent ice 
should be claimed as land, the enclosed ocean as territorial waters, and the air should be 
under state control.100 Although the Soviet state never re-issued its sector claim to 
officially include the ice, water and air, other countries believed that they had based on 
the writings of the Soviet jurists. 
With one decree the Soviets rendered the international legal doctrines of 
discovery and effective occupation “moot and inapplicable to the lands in the Soviet 
Arctic.”101 Nothing underlines this assessment more than the enclosure of Franz Josef 
Land and Victoria Island by the Soviet sector lines. Franz Josef Land archipelago had 
been discovered by an Austro-Hungarian expedition, explored by several British 
scientific parties, and was used by Norwegian hunting groups on an almost yearly basis 
since the beginning of the century. In comparison, only two Tsarist expeditions had 
ventured to the islands, and the Soviet research vessel Persej had only visited on several 
occasions. Additionally, in 1898 Norwegian sealers had discovered Victoria Island 
(which was only 32 km from the Svalbard Archipelago) but no Russian had ever even 
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visited the island.102 Only through the sector principle could the Soviet Union claim this 
territory.  
The Central Executive Committee’s sector claim must be understood in the 
context of Soviet understandings of the international legal system. Legal scholar Lauri 
Mälksoo has argued that early Soviet leadership and lawyers denied the universality of 
European-dominated international law, which had been the tool of European imperialism 
for centuries. In the 1920s, legal expert Evengy Alexandrovich Korovin envisioned a 
Soviet international law with Russia at the centre, where concepts like the sector principle 
could be entrenched as valid legal doctrines. The Soviet sector claim represented more 
than a convenient solution to the problems of polar sovereignty, it reflected one of the 
primary purposes of Soviet international law (and Marxist-Leninist theory more 
generally): the rejection of European extra-territorial rights in non-western areas, such as 
the Russian Arctic.103  
Despite its utilization of the sector principle, the CEC actually increased the 
Soviet Union’s activity in the Arctic, initiating legislative acts for the region and 
promoting the use of the polar lands by fishermen, hunters and government scientists. In 
1927, Soviet explorers visited the New Siberian Islands and charted parts of the Laptev 
Sea. In July 1928, the USSR issued a five-year plan for scientific research into its Arctic 
territory and established a committee to plan for the construction of observatories on 
Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya, and for Arctic aerial expeditions. Still, actual 
occupation of the Arctic islands remained a long way off and the sector principle 
remained integral to bolstering the Soviet claim.104  
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The Soviet claims awakened American officials to the implications of the sector 
principle. In the span of a few years, a State Department report warned, “the doctrine of 
prior discovery and/or occupation has suddenly been thrust aside by Canada, Great 
Britain and Russia, and an exaggerated doctrine of contiguity invoked” which mimicked 
the “division of the world between Spain and Portugal in the late fifteenth century.” By 
projecting the “meridians of the westernmost and easternmost boundaries of previously 
owned lands” to the Poles, these states had annexed almost half of the polar regions 
“without any physical act of occupation to perfect title,” observed the State 
Department.105 Department officials believed that more sector claims loomed on the 
horizon. Irving Linnell, for instance, flagged a story in the magazine Nature, which 
reported that the Australian government (urged on by the ANRC) planned to use the 
“Canadian principle” to claim an enormous sector of the Eastern Antarctic.106  
State Department officials debated what position the U.S. should take in the face 
of this “rapid absorption of the polar areas by other powers.” William Roy Vallance 
personally told James White that Canada’s Arctic title was “not worth a damn.”107 Some 
officials thought that the U.S. should simply modify the Hughes Doctrine’s requirements 
for actual settlement and join the other polar states in staking a territorial claim. Others 
thought that internationalization with a central governing body comprised of interested 
states was the only appropriate solution because of the impossibility of occupation in 
certain parts of the High Arctic and Antarctic.108 Publicly, the State Department 
continued to utilize the Hughes Doctrine.  
The State Department’s Division of Western European Affairs undertook a broad 
study called “Territorial Sovereignty in the Polar Regions” to better define U.S. policy 
options. The report cautioned that Washington still had to answer key legal questions 
about the role played by effective occupation, contiguity and discovery. The Hughes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Department of State, Division of Western European Affairs, Territorial Sovereignty in the Polar Regions, 
6 August 1926, pg. 49, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, Box 7156, File 800.014/Arctic.  
106 Vice President, National Geographic Society to Linnell, 16 September 1925, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910-
1929, Box 7156, File 800.014/Arctic/11. 
107 Story recounted by H.G. Chilton, British Ambassador, Chilton to Austen Chamberlain, 26 April 1926, 
LAC, RG 25, Vol. 2156, File 30, Arctic Claims. 
108 See Henderson, “Policy by Default,” 91. 
	   184	  
Doctrine called for actual settlement, but what did that mean in “regions where effective 
occupation is in great part impossible to civilization as now constituted?” These questions 
involved broader principles of international law on territorial acquisition, not yet 
“definitely established” by state practice. In the past, the U.S. government had dealt with 
issues of territorial sovereignty “as expediency dictated” and as a result the report found 
its decisions were “insufficient in number and constancy of decision to form a 
background of fixed policies.”  
While the United States had long supported effective occupation as the true test of 
sovereignty in the temperate regions, the U.S. officials understood the doctrine’s 
limitations. International legal practice lacked a “clearly specified or decisive manner in 
which ‘occupation’ becomes ‘effective,’ even in the temperate regions.” The “failure of 
international usage to establish a norm for ‘effective occupation’” worked to the 
advantage of the countries that had already made claims in the polar regions. These states 
could argue that “occasional administrative acts and the retention of power to control 
may be considered sufficient” and that their claims would be “validated through lapse of 
time without great effort and with little or no colonization.” The State Department 
concluded that Canada was the “only nation attempting anything approaching ‘effective 
occupation,’” with “a slender line of patrol posts extending along the eastern boundary of 
the territory claimed.” Even so, the Canadians had strategically placed the RCMP stations 
to control the “entrance offering the least natural physical resistance … to the remainder 
of the Canadian sector.” Canada used its control over the points of access to the 
Archipelago to block the exploration of its sector, except with direct permission from the 
Canadian government. While the State Department report admitted that Canada’s claim 
was stronger than most in the polar regions, its efforts at occupation fell far short of the 
rigid requirements of the Hughes Doctrine. 
State Department officials concluded that “sector projections” were outgrowths of 
the lack of clarity on the rules of territorial acquisition and the hollowness of effective 
occupation doctrine. They speculated that the existing sector claims rested on a mixture 
of formal proclamations of sovereignty, the rights of original discovery, contiguity 
doctrine and control of key points. The report pointed out that in the past the U.S. had 
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held that “the hinterland of a colonized coastline is included within the sovereignty of the 
colonized portion.” But, the polar “sector projections” abused the doctrine of contiguity 
by enclosing territory that remained inadequately explored, or even undiscovered. 
Despite this objection, the report pointed out that the State Department could still step 
away from the Hughes Doctrine, join Britain, Canada and Russia, and claim the Alaskan 
sector between 141°W and 168° 49’ 30”W longitude. This avenue presented an 
interesting prospect given the possibility that land could still be found north of Alaska.  
The report’s strongest conclusion stated that if the U.S. wanted to challenge 
existing polar claims it could not remain silent for much longer. What international law 
made abundantly clear was that the failure of the U.S. government to officially protest the 
polar claims of other states, especially those unsupported by any degree of effective 
occupation, would constitute a strong advantage to these powers in any future dispute or 
negotiations. Just as James White had concluded the year before, the Americans 
recognized that tacit acquiescence could validate a territorial claim over time. The major 
question that remained unanswered was whether or not the Americans wanted to 
challenge the polar claims of Russia and the British Empire – a consideration that was 
more diplomatic and geopolitical than legal in nature.  Future value of the polar lands and 
the strength of the existing claims to these areas required further study. The report 
therefore suggested that an examination of various state strategies and legal policies in 
the polar regions be undertaken “as discreetly as possible” to avoid disturbing “any 
present tranquility of occupational activity.”109 Above all, the Americans did not want to 
provoke the polar claimants to further strengthen their positions. 
The State Department report highlighted that two years after crafting the Hughes 
Doctrine, and a year after the MacMillan expedition, the Americans continued to struggle 
with the meaning of polar sovereignty. While it raised important questions, the report 
provided few concrete answers. As a result, although the State Department recognized the 
need to officially protest the territorial claims in the Arctic and Antarctic to preserve the 
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position and interests of the U.S., it remained silent on the Canadian, British and Soviet 
sector claims. 
 
	  
Figure 5: Map from Laurence Collier showing potential sector claims in the Arctic. 
Memorandum Respecting Territorial Claims in the Arctic to 1930, 10 February 
1930, National Archives of Australia, A981, ARC 1, Arctic, 1956 Map, A1838, 1495-
3-2-1 Part 1. 
   
3.6 Debating the Sector Principle  
Starting in the spring of 1926, British officials from the Admiralty, Foreign, Dominions 
and Colonial Offices started to prepare for the discussion of polar issues planned for the 
upcoming Imperial Conference.  In a series of interdepartmental meetings, legal 
appraisals and political reports, they examined topics such as the level of occupation 
required in the polar regions, the role of contiguity, the Australian proposal and the sector 
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principle. Officials hoped to answer whether the Empire’s future annexations should be 
“limited to discoveries of known land or extended to all land which lies, or may lie, 
within specified sectors of the Antarctic.”110 The Soviet decree intensified the divisive 
debate on the sector principle already occurring within British ranks. The Dominions 
Office suggested that the Empire should recognize the Soviet claim to strengthen its own 
polar sectors while the Admiralty wanted the Soviet annexation publicly rejected. The 
Soviet Union’s use of the Empire’s conduct in the Arctic and Antarctic to support its 
annexation deeply embarrassed Admiralty officials, and they wanted the British 
government to make clear that London did not “range itself on the side of Russia as 
against other Powers” in its approach to polar sovereignty.111  
The sector principle debate shaped discussions in the interdepartmental committee 
examining the future of Britain’s policy for the Antarctic. Fearing that the “Canadian 
principle’s” (and its arguments about geographic proximity) might inspire Argentina and 
other South American countries to make claims in the south polar region, the committee 
rejected the Australian government’s wish to use the concept to justify an Antarctic 
sector claim. Admiralty and Dominions Office officials continued to clash, however, over 
the idea of expanding “the rights conferred by a strictly limited coastal discovery into 
ownership of all land subsequently found to be continuous with this” in “vast unexplored 
areas.”112 As a compromise, the committee accepted the Admiralty’s argument that future 
claims should involve only parts of the Antarctic coastline actually sighted by British 
subjects. The Empire would not use arguments of contiguity or employ sector lines to 
broaden these claims to adjacent, but unexplored parts of the coast. Sector lines would, 
however, still be employed to extend the coastal claims to the South Pole, even if they 
enclosed largely unexplored hinterlands. In practice, the Empire would still use both 
contiguity and the sector principle to claim vast polar interiors, but only from coastline 
deemed “definitely known” or “reasonably probable” based on British exploration. Their 
guiding principle established, the committee agreed that Britain’s future Antarctic claims 
could include Coats Land on the edge of the FID (20° to 164° W), Enderby Land (45° to 	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53° E), Kemp Land (58.5° to 60° E), Queen Mary Land (86° to 101° E), Wilkes Land 
(131° to 135.5° E), King George V Land (142° to 158° E) and Oates Land (157° to 159° 
E). Each of these territories would be “so defined as to include the whole of land lying 
within the various prescribed meridians and between the coast and the South Pole.”113 In 
a bold new approach, Britain’s plan for the Antarctic called for seven polar sectors to be 
overseen by Australia.   
The Dominions received copies of the Antarctic plan in the spring of 1926 before 
the Imperial Conference. The document included Australia’s plan to apply the “Canadian 
principle” to the Antarctic, the legal appraisal of Canada’s Arctic claim and the 
Norwegian note on the Ross Dependency. Despite the united front the British 
government displayed to the Dominions, in London the debate on the sector principle 
worsened in the months before the Imperial Conference. Both sides became even more 
deeply entrenched in their respective positions. 
Although Whitehall’s departments continued to clash, the British government 
endorsed the sector principle, for political, practical, legal and even moral reasons. As 
Foreign Office official Charles Orde explained to Admiralty representatives, “the 
disadvantages of admitting that principle [sector]… must be balanced against the 
practical advantage to the Empire which might arise from accepting it and being, in 
consequence, free to push” claims in the Arctic and Antarctic.114 Charles Davis of the 
Dominions Office believed that Britain was “morally bound” and “officially committed” 
to defend Canada’s claim in the Arctic.115  	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Foreign and Dominions Office officials maintained that sector claims were legally 
justifiable. Like Canadian expert James White, they argued that the unique conditions of 
the polar regions meant that sector claims to vast hinterlands could be justified through 
contiguity and the establishment of some control over a polar coastline or key strategic 
points – especially if a state could show that “present and future discoveries [would] 
ultimately form a geographical whole.” Indeed, the arbiter for the British Guiana case had 
accepted that contiguity could extend a claim based on limited effective occupation over 
a “single organic whole.” Dominions Office officials believed that both the northern 
islands above Canada and the hinterlands of the Antarctic Dependencies formed potential 
“geographical whole[s]” and could be neatly enclosed by sector lines emanating from 
territory already firmly under British or Canadian sovereignty.116  
The work of legal scholar David Hunter Miller supported this contention.117 In 
1925, Miller had explored the relevant judicial writings on international law, treaties and 
even interviewed key legal experts in the Canadian and U.S. governments, including 
White and Vallance.118 Although Miller recognized the problems that surrounded polar 
sovereignty he did not believe the polar regions should be considered terra nullius, which 
he characterized as “an unsatisfactory sort of ownership by everyone.”119 Showcasing 
White’s influence, Miller noted that Canada believed the Archipelago constituted a single 
geographic entity and asserted, “to project this sentiment still farther north, perhaps 	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across a considerable extent of Arctic sea or ice, is less logical but seems equally natural.” 
120 While officials thought that these were strong arguments in support of sector claims, 
they wanted a firmer foundation for the principle in international law.  
The first and clearest source of international law, as elucidated a few years before 
in the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, was “international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting State.”121 Foreign and Dominions Office officials recognized that a treaty was 
thus the strongest foundation the sector principle could have. To provide one, these 
officials extended James White’s earlier argument about the Russian-American Treaty of 
1867 to argue that Britain had “publicly adopted a view” that the Treaties of 1825 and 
1867 established the sector principle – a position endorsed by the British participants in 
the Behring Sea Arbitration of 1893.122  
During the proceedings of the 1893 arbitration, the participants had discussed the 
western limit of Alaska. The British representatives stressed that the official American 
translation of the 1867 Treaty described the western boundary of Alaska as proceeding 
“due north without limitation into the same Frozen Ocean” and this strong language left 
no doubt that the boundary extended all the way to the Pole. Furthermore, the Russians 
and Americans had agreed to this line “as a ready and definite mode of indicating which 
of the numerous islands in a partially explored sea should belong to either Power.” The 
fundamental point, in the eyes of Dominions and Foreign Office officials, was that the 
treaty clearly established state sovereignty over known and unknown land in the Arctic 
based on the simple drawing of sector lines.  
Additionally, the Treaty of 1867 adopted as the eastern limit of Alaska the line of 
demarcation established by the convention of 1825, which was described as, “la même 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Miller, “Political Rights in the Arctic,” 55-57, 59. As a result, Miller could confidently conclude that the 
southern islands of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, just off the coast, were as “certainly Canadian as Ontario.” 
“As to the rest,” Miller noted, “there are various shades of doubt - the doubt increasing generally with the 
latitude.” Miller, “Political Rights in the Arctic,” 51. 
121 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920. 
122 The Behring Sea Arbitration arose out of a dispute between Canada/Britain and the United States over 
seal fishery rights in the Bering Strait. Charles T. Davis to the Admiralty, 12 August 1926, NA, ADM 
116/2494, Arctic and Antarctic Regions, 1925-1927. 
	   191	  
ligne méridienne du 141 degré formera, dans son prolongement jusqu’à la Mer Glaciale.” 
While the British admitted that the language was somewhat ambiguous, they insisted that 
its intent was to extend the boundary between Russian Alaska and British North 
American into the Arctic Ocean. Even if the assumption was wrong, the British stressed 
that the eastern limit of Alaska must be “interpreted in the same manner as the western 
limit,” and, thus, be viewed as extending to the North Pole. The British once more found 
support in Miller’s work, which concluded that the wording of the treaties of 1825 and 
1867 was vague enough to “make it at least arguable that the line runs as far as the 141st 
meridian itself runs, and that means to the North Pole” given that the expression “without 
limitation” was “pretty strong.”123 Such opinions contrasted with the U.S. State 
Department’s belief at the time – and what the leading international legal expert on the 
treaties, Donat Pharand, has concluded since. Pharand maintained that both the language 
used and the original intent of the treaties clearly indicate that the boundary only 
extended to the coastal edge of the Arctic Ocean, not to the North Pole.124  
Dominions and Foreign Office officials maintained that in the two treaties the 
three most powerful states with interests in the polar regions, the U.S., Russia and Britain 
(and by extension the other countries of the Empire), had agreed to use lines of meridian 
meeting at the Pole as an easy way of determining territorial sovereignty over known and 
unknown land in the partially explored Arctic Ocean. As a result, Canada and the Soviet 
Union were completely justified in using the treaties as a basis for their sector claims. 
The legal adviser of the Dominions Office, Sir John Risley, and his counterparts in the 
Foreign Office would have read the work of Lassa Oppenheim, who had argued that 
“law-making treaties” could stipulate new rules for international behavior, or confirm and 
define existing customary laws. While treaties create law for the contracting parties, over 
time and with the tacit recognition of other nations, they can crystallize into universal 	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rules.125 British experts insisted that the treaties of 1825 and 1867 had created such a 
legal norm – the “principle of prolonging meridians of longitude to the Pole” and 
“claiming all land within defined sectors” – and they had the right to apply the new rule 
to the Antarctic.126 In their opinion, the treaties of 1825 and 1867 had created a whole 
new legal regime based on the sector principle. 
The Admiralty insisted that this interpretation was utter nonsense and that the 
sector theory (the Hyrdrographer refused to call it a principle) had developed from a 
fundamental “misconception of the terms” and context of the two treaties. The Admiralty 
argued that in 1825 the Russian and British negotiators had used a line of meridian 
reaching to the Arctic Ocean simply because the map of the Arctic coastline was so blank 
that no fixed point could be specified to mark the boundary.127 The authors of the treaty 
had no intention of extending the line past the unknown coastline into unknown seas to 
claim unknown islands. While Admiralty officials agreed that the use of the language 
“without limitation” in the American translation of the Treaty of 1867 was ambiguous, 
they insisted that the original French text offered a better representation of the treaty’s 
intent. The French description explained that Alaska’s western limit “remonte en ligne 
directe, sans limitation, vers le nord, jusqu’a ce qu’elle se perd dans la Mer Glaciale.” 
Although the French text did not explain where the line ended in the ocean, the Admiralty 
maintained that the “the boundary (which is entirely a land-boundary) should be regarded 
as terminating when it arrives at the Arctic Ocean, and not as proceeding 1200 miles 
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further to the Pole.”128 Lt. Commander Rupert Thomas Gould, who worked in the 
Hydrographer’s Department, argued that if the treaties “intended to define spheres of 
influence extending as far as the North Pole their wording was, to say the least of it, 
unfortunate, since there was nothing in either professing to define, or even suggest the 
existence of a boundary further north than the point where the boundary, as laid down, 
ran into the Arctic Ocean.” Britain had publicly embraced a misinterpretation of the 
treaties in the past, but Gould argued that no country should be “permanently bound” by 
its misunderstanding of an historic legal convention.129 To the Admiralty, there simply 
was no treaty basis for the sector principle and never had been. 
Admiralty officials warned that Canada and Britain continued to use the 
contiguity doctrine at their own peril. After all, as the recognized owner of Greenland, 
Denmark could argue a “contigual claim” to Ellesmere Island, given that the two land 
masses were separated by only a few miles. In the south polar region, the French could 
argue that the entire coastline of the eastern Antarctic belonged to them because it was 
contiguous to Adélie Land. In both the Arctic and Antarctic, the risk of using contiguity 
was not worth the reward. The entire Empire, the Admiralty concluded, should step away 
from “considerations of contiguity.”130  
The Admiralry also suggested that through a public rejection of the sector 
principle and the Soviet claim, London could still annex additional islands in the Arctic 
Ocean, which were valued as potential air bases for future trans-Arctic air routes. In the 
Antarctic, the only way to stave off massive claims from foreign powers like France was 
to insist that no country had the right to claim unexplored land.131 The Admiralty asserted 
that even if states did not use the sector principle to claim sovereignty over the ocean, the 
idea violated Britain’s long-standing support of the complete freedom of the seas by 	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allowing a government to claim “that it had rights over that part of the High Seas which 
were superior to those of any other Power.” Finally, while Britain’s newly proposed 
Antarctic strategy clearly allowed for sector claims to unexplored interiors, the Admiralty 
insisted that the sector principle was inconsistent with the decision not to claim any part 
of the coastline not explored by British subjects.132  
The Empire, the Admiralty concluded, did not need the sector principle and could 
still disown the concept without endangering Canadian, Australian or British interests and 
claims. Chief Hydrographer Douglas argued that the Canadian sector claim had “not yet 
been definitely brought into the field of international politics…so that we have a free 
hand with regard to it.”133 The Admiralty insisted that in the Antarctic, the Empire could 
rely on discovery, exploration and administrative acts to support its claims to the 
Dependencies. Similarly, if Canada continued the “peaceful penetration” into the Arctic 
Archipelago, “extending her effective control,” all foreign powers would have to admit 
her sovereignty.134  
Both sides found support for their arguments in the first wave of legal scholarship 
on the sector principle. International legal expert Paul Fauchille could not support the 
sector principle because he did not support the doctrine of contiguity. At the best, the 
sector provided public notification of the territory a state intended to claim, which 
provided the country with a small window to secure the area through occupation.135 
Others saw the sector principle and the doctrine of contiguity as practical, if not 
altogether legal, solutions to the problem of polar sovereignty.136 David Hunter Miller 	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wrote that the sector principle had a “precedent” in the hinterland claims and contiguity 
doctrine used in the past, and had a legal basis in the Treaties of 1825 and 1867.137 Even 
the sector principle’s supporters believed that only through a multilateral treaty created 
by interested states could the idea become a rule of law and form the foundation of a 
polar legal regime.138 
Going into the Imperial Conference of 1926, the British sector principle debate 
continued unabated, both sides entrenched in their respective positions. The disagreement 
reflected the different pressures, concerns and assumptions that guided Britain’s 
navigation of the bi-polar legal landscape. It also captured the complexity and 
malleability of the rules of territorial acquisition, the uncertainty about the nature of polar 
sovereignty, the difficulties of treaty interpretation and the worries that stemmed from the 
introduction of a novel principle into the international order. Deadlocked by these various 
factors, both sides agreed that the committee set up to study polar questions at the 
Imperial Conference would decide the future of the sector principle.  
3.7 A Bi-Polar Policy for the Commonwealth 
Historians of the British Empire have long celebrated the Imperial Conference of 1926 as 
the landmark moment on the journey towards Dominion independence – the culmination 
of a process towards autonomy that began in earnest during the First World War. The 
meeting of leaders and representatives from Newfoundland, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia, South Africa and the Irish Free State produced the Balfour Declaration, which 
recognized the Dominions as “autonomous Communities within the British Empire.” 
Though “united by a common allegiance to the Crown” the statement stressed that the 	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Dominions were “equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of 
their domestic or external affairs.” Further, these states were “freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.”139 An important stage in the 
evolution of the Empire, the conference became equally significant in the development of 
the polar regions.140 Leopold Amery chaired the Committee on British Policy in the 
Antarctic, which explored the Empire’s future in the south polar region and the Empire’s 
response to the Soviet Union’s sector claim over the course of three meetings.141 By the 
conference’s end, the delegates had embraced a unified polar policy that protected the 
interests of the Commonwealth in both the Arctic and Antarctic.  
 At first, however, the British interdepartmental debate spilled over into the 
conference. At the committee’s opening meeting on 10 November, the Admiralty 
explained to the Dominion representatives that the sector principle could not be justified 
by treaty-law or any other legal doctrine. In response, Amery insisted that the Russian-
American Treaty of 1867 accorded the right to “[claim] all land within defined sectors.” 
Furthermore the British government “definitely enunciated” this principle in connection 
with the FID and the Ross Dependency in unchallenged sector claims. Sir Francis Bell, 
New Zealand’s representative, supported the sector principle by insisting his government 
would consider any additional islands found in the Ross Sea part of the Ross Dependency, 
regardless of the nationality of the explorer that discovered them. When the discussion 
turned to whether there was a danger the sector principle might be used to the advantage 	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of Argentina, Amery ruled out this concern saying he “did not think that the Argentine 
claim need seriously be regarded as a matter of practical politics.”142  
Sir Cecil Hurst, the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, addressed the second 
meeting of the committee with an important appraisal of the requirements of polar claims. 
A man of considerable experience in international law, Hurst was “highly influential” 
within British government circles.143 He held that even with the “flexibility with which 
the principles of international law” could be applied to the “uninhabitable regions around 
the Poles,” an international tribunal was unlikely to support a title based solely on 
discovery and an act of paper annexation. Therefore, Hurst suggested that the Empire’s 
next claim in the Antarctic be preceded by formal assertions of sovereignty “on the spot.” 
In sharp contrast to the Foreign Office’s existing position that territorial claims did not 
have to be accompanied by a formal notification, Hurst insisted that the first step of any 
claim was “an intimation to foreign Powers of the intention to acquire title over the area.”  
In a statement that echoed James White’s arguments about the Arctic Archipelago, 
Hurst insisted that Britain must maintain a better degree of control over its claimed areas 
than any competing state. The legal adviser stressed, “Even in the Polar regions there 
should be a reasonable probability that persons who ignore the will of the controlling 
authority will find themselves in trouble.” In the unique environment of the Antarctic 
state control had to attain whatever level of effectiveness was “reasonably possible along 
the coasts of the areas” to which the Empire wanted to secure its title. Hurst felt periodic 
visits from official state expeditions, with officers commissioned to impose the authority 
of the government, represented the best way to establish such “local control” in the 
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Antarctic.144 Just as White emphasized Canada’s control over the main access points into 
the Arctic Archipelago, Hurst prioritized control over the Antarctic coastline, the access 
point into the vast hinterlands of the Empire’s Dependencies. Both experts agreed that by 
placing key strategic points under its control, a state could claim contiguous territory with 
the sector principle. The key difference between the Canadian and British approaches to 
polar sovereignty was that while the former implemented a program of permanent 
physical presence via their RCMP posts, Hurst maintained that control and state presence 
could be “intermittent or periodical” in the polar regions.  
International legal scholars Paul Fauchille, Mark Lindley and David Hunter 
Miller had all recently agreed that the doctrine of effective occupation had to be modified 
for the polar regions.145 In territory where settlement was difficult or impossible, a state 
had to establish an administration and a level of government control suited to the 
conditions of the area.146 Miller concluded that “there may be effective occupation of an 
enormous Arctic area by the establishment of a few posts, here and there” especially if 
they controlled the means of access into an area like the Arctic Archipelago.147  
By its last meeting, the Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic arrived at a 
“definite and consistent” polar policy for the Empire. The committee members accepted 
that France’s title to Adélie Land was unchallengeable and therefore the Empire would 
have to allow the French to extend their claim to the South Pole using the sector principle. 	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More positively, the committee decided that the Empire should claim Coats Land, 
Enderby Land, Kemp Land, Queen Mary Land, Wilkes Land, King George V Land and 
Oates Land. Although the committee rejected the proposal to use the “Canadian principle” 
to support an Australian Antarctic sector claim, it offered the Commonwealth 
Government the last six territories. Heeding Hurst’s warning that any attempt to 
immediately annex large unexplored areas would lead to protests from foreign countries, 
the committee concluded that the process of bringing the rest of the south polar region 
under British sovereignty would have to be “gradual.”  
The committee formulated a three-stage process for the gradual assertion of 
British sovereignty over the Antarctic, which, as political geographer Sanjay Chaturvedi 
has pointed out, “became a blueprint for future British action.”148 In the first step, the 
committee would publish the names of the seven territories that the Empire intended to 
claim in the Summary of Proceedings for the Imperial Conference, with the explanation 
that these were lands where “British title already exists by virtue of discovery.” The 
actual geographic coordinates of the lands were intentionally left blank, to allow for 
flexibility when making the official claim. An official expedition would then travel to the 
listed areas and perform formal acts of possession on the actual Antarctic coastline. 
Finally, the Empire would issue letters patent formally annexing the areas and making 
provisions for their administration. During this third stage, the committee highlighted, the 
Empire could enlarge “the areas to be annexed” by the application of the sector 
principle.149 
The Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic kept Canada’s position in the 
Arctic firmly in mind throughout its meetings. Its conclusions about the level of 
occupation required in the polar regions (and the acts of administration that created a 
successful claim) supported Canada’s position and were in fact less stringent than 
Ottawa’s. By explicitly embracing the sector principle in its final recommendations the 
committee implicitly rejected the Admiralty’s call for a challenge to the Soviet sector 	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claim. Britain and the Dominions would remain silent on the annexation. The committee 
noted that it was “advantageous for the British Government to be able to treat the silence 
with which the Falkland Island Dependencies Letters Patent and the Ross Dependency 
Order in Council were received by foreign powers as constituting acquiescence.”150 The 
decision makers of the Empire believed that as long as states continued to remain silent 
about sector claims, showing a tacit acquiescence, the legal cases would grow stronger 
and the principle would gain greater legal credibility.  
3.8 The Sector Principle and Customary International Law  
The emphasis the members of the Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic placed on 
state silence reveals their understanding of customary international law. Legal scholar 
Hugh Thirlway has described custom as a practice that develops between states because 
they believe it has advantages or is the most convenient solution to a problem.151 A state 
makes an offer to the international community of a new way of doing things for a 
particular area or issue.152 “At some subsequent moment there is recognition (not 
necessarily unanimous among those concerned, but at least widespread), that this has 
become the way to deal with that particular problem.”153  
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Article 38 of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
established international custom “evidence of a general practice accepted as law” – as 
one of the most important sources of international law. The PCIJ’s decision in the Lotus 
Case of 1927 further “anchored the general principles of international law in customary 
law.”154 The case arose when a French vessel, the Lotus, collided with and sank a Turkish 
ship. The Turkish authorities started criminal proceedings against the French officer on 
watch during the collision, but Paris insisted that Turkey had no right to prosecute. The 
court ruled against the French, arguing that states can “engage in any conduct they wish, 
unless there is a rule prohibiting that conduct.”155 “International law governs relations 
between independent states,” the court’s decision stated. “The rules of law binding upon 
States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or usages 
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims.”156 Customs flowed from the free will of states and their 
collective decisions.  
The problem with customary international law, as Thirlway has pointed out, is 
“when is it appropriate to expect all participants in the society within which the custom 
has grown up, perhaps including some who have…not participated in it, to abide by it 
even when, for those particular participants, or one of them, it is undesired.”157 In short, 
when does the crystallization of the practice into rule occur? The North Sea Continental 
Shelf decision of 1969 set out the two requirements necessary to form customary 	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international law – state practice (the objective element) and opinio juris (the subjective 
element). It described opinio juris as “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it” rather than a political 
obligation.158 The idea dates to the nineteenth century, however, and legal experts were 
referencing it by the 1920s.159 The Lotus ruling, for instance, noted that states must be 
“conscious of having a duty” to follow a rule.160 	  
Maurice Mendelson has questioned whether the world court ever looked for proof 
of opinio juris where there is a “well-established practice.” Usually the PCIJ simply 
assumed the presence of opinio juris. Mendelson argues that “Where there is a constant 
and uniform practice of sufficient generality, in a legal context, it seems legitimate for 
members of the community to expect all others to continue to observe that practice.”161 In 
the “wide and elastic doctrine of customary law” held by many international lawyers in 
the interwar years, state practice played the key role.162 The 1922 edition of Australian 
jurist William Pitt Cobbett’s casebook on international law highlighted the centrality of 
state practice: 
Growth of usage and its development into custom may be likened to the formation 
of a path across a common. At first, each wayfarer pursues his own course; 
gradually, by reason either of its directness or on some other ground of apparent 
utility, some particular route is followed by the majority; this route next assumes 
the character of a track, discernable but not yet well defined, from which 
deviation, however, becomes more rare; whilst in its final stage the route assumes 
the shape of a well-defined path, habitually followed by all who pass that way. 
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And yet it would be difficult to point out at what precise moment this route 
acquired the character of an acknowledged path.163 
The majority of states do not directly participate in the creation of a norm of customary 
international law. The role they play, according to Jörg, has been inferred consent – the 
“qualified silence” of acquiescence taken as evidence that states accept that a practice is 
consistent with international law.164 In 1954, Gerald Fitzmaurice highlighted that “it is 
probably true to say that consent is latent in the mutual tolerations that allow the practice 
to be built up at all; and actually patent in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the 
practice, as constituting a binding rule of law.”165 Although a single act by a single state 
represents insufficient evidence of state practice, it might be enough if coupled with the 
acceptance of other States affected by the act.166 Silence or lack of protest is especially 
relevant in circumstances that demand a response expressing disagreement or objection. 
A state’s inaction is thereby interpreted as an “explicit or implicit consent” to another 
state’s conduct.167 The passage of time is key to this process. “It is undesirable as a matter 
of policy that an activity should be tolerated over a period of time, but later condemned 
as unlawful,” legal scholar Vaughan Lowe has stressed.168 However, international lawyer 
Clyde Eagleton noted in 1933, the amount of time and the level of “common consent” 
required for a practice to become a rule of law are difficult to determine, although some 
customs have developed quite quickly and without anything close to unanimous 	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consent.169 Within this process, there is room for some objection, which does not 
necessarily derail a practice from becoming a customary rule. The persistent objector is a 
state that does not accept a rule and has consistently stated this objection since the first 
application of a new practice.170 
British and Commonwealth officials understood the central role state practice and 
the silence of acquiescence played in the formation of customary international law. As 
long as states directly affected by the sector claims chose not to protest the principle, 
there was a chance it could develop into a well-defined path that all those who 
endeavoured to claim polar territory might follow.  
3.9 The Way Forward 
The Imperial Conference of 1926 produced a coherent bi-polar policy that reaffirmed 
Britain’s goal of “trying to paint the whole Antarctic red.”171 Henceforth, sectors would 
be one of the primary tools of the Commonwealth in the Arctic and Antarctic, justifying 
two years of concerted efforts by officials in Australia, Canada and Britain to construct a 
firm foundation for the principle. Following from its birth in the Treaties of 1825 and 
1867, state practice had continued to develop and shape the principle. Now, when a state 
established a measure of control over the coastline and the other points of access leading 
to a polar hinterland – be it the Arctic Archipelago or the Antarctic interior – it had the 
right to use arguments of contiguity and lines of meridian to extend its sovereignty from 
the boundaries of the territory it controlled to the Pole. Commonwealth officials 
maintained that a regime based on their understanding of the sector principle was the best 
answer to the anomalous legal space of the polar regions. However, the sector principle 
remained an untested doctrine, justified through a contestable interpretation of two 
treaties, the doctrine of contiguity, and the argument that state control over the coastline 
or access points of a polar interior justified claims to the unoccupied and often unknown 
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polar interior beyond. The next few years would be critical as the scramble for polar 
territory intensified, as states decided whether or not to challenge the Commonwealth’s 
sectors and Australia made plans to claim the largest slice of the Antarctic yet. Would the 
tacit acquiescence of foreign powers to the sector principle continue? For the time being, 
Britain’s decisive choice to support the sector principle in the Arctic and Antarctic made 
it the primary shaper of the polar legal landscape. 
For the Americans, this pivotal two-year period created more questions than 
answers about polar sovereignty. Their indecision limited their legal impact on the polar 
regions. When examined from the standpoint of the Hughes Doctrine, the Americans 
could easily conclude that the sector claims of the Soviet Union and the countries of the 
British Empire were “not worth a damn.” However, in light of the shortcomings of 
contemporary international law and no clear blueprint for effective occupation, State 
Department officials accepted that the Empire and Soviet Union might be justified in 
writing a new formula for polar sovereignty. If existing international law failed to provide 
a clear framework for developments in the Arctic and Antarctic, was the Commonwealth 
really wrong in constructing a new legal regime based on the sector principle, contiguity 
and limited measures of control? Like all of the other countries with interests in the polar 
regions, the U.S. needed to answer this question before deciding whether to challenge this 
new formula for polar sovereignty. 
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Chapter 4 
4 At the Zenith of the Sector Principle, 1927-1933 
In January 1948, Foreign Office Legal Adviser Sir William Eric Beckett sat down with a 
Canadian colleague on the Commonwealth’s Polar Committee to discuss the evolution of 
polar sovereignty over the last half-century. Beckett, who joined the Foreign Office in 
1925, had studied territorial claims in the Arctic and Antarctic many times throughout his 
career. When he spoke on matters of polar sovereignty, British and Commonwealth 
officials listened.1 As Beckett reflected on the legal landscape of the polar regions in the 
1920s and 1930s, he confidently concluded that the sector principle had been both 
“fashionable and suitable” at the time. The international community had “widely 
accepted” that once a state established a modicum of control over “the means of access to 
virtually uninhabitable territory” – such as the Antarctic interior or the northernmost 
islands of the Arctic Archipelago – it had the right to extend its sovereignty over these 
areas using lines of meridian running to the Pole.2  
Beckett probably remembered the hopeful conclusions made by the Committee on 
Polar Questions at the Imperial Conference of 1930. Buoyed by positive reports from the 
Foreign Office,3 representatives from Canada, Australia, Britain and New Zealand agreed 
that the Empire’s conception of polar sovereignty was on the verge of approval by the 
international community and that its polar claims were stronger than ever. They 
concluded that the description of effective occupation articulated by Cecil Hurst at the 
previous Imperial Conference, which called for “some continuous show of interest” such 
as the “paying of periodical visits” or the “establishment of some sort of control” over the 
means of access to a polar territory satisfied the legal requirements of territorial 
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acquisition in the High Arctic and Antarctic.4 Even more optimistically, the committee 
members decided that the sector principle was close “to securing general acceptance” by 
all the countries with interests in the polar regions, except Norway.5  
Scholars have done little to map out state thinking on the sector principle after 
governments initially utilized it to make their territorial claims. A fresh appraisal of the 
archival record, however, reveals how British and Commonwealth officials came to 
believe that the principle stood on the verge of general acceptance as a rule of customary 
international law for the polar regions. The conclusions of the Committee on Polar 
Questions stemmed from the international community’s sustained silence on existing 
polar claims. By 1930, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the Soviet Union had publicly 
announced sector claims, thereby asserting a new way of securing title over polar 
territory. Only Norway persistently and publicly criticized their use of the sector 
principle.6 In the eyes of British and Commonwealth officials, this “qualified silence” 
represented acquiescence that inferred state consent to the actual territorial claims, and 
also to the methods and legal arguments used to justify them.7 Should such silence 
continue, officials hoped that the sector principle and the new definition of effective 
occupation in the polar regions would crystallize into rules of customary international law. 
To encourage tacit acceptance, British and Commonwealth officials did what they could 
to safeguard their polar title from official protest and avoided public discussion of the 
sector principle or the legal foundation of their claims.8  
Most important, from a British and Commonwealth perspective, was the 
continued silence of the United States. Customary international law generally reflects the 	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conduct that is approved or tolerated by the powerful – especially a powerful state 
directly influenced by the new rule.9 Despite the growing public interest in polar affairs 
and the U.S. Navy’s condemnation of the sector principle, this chapter reveals that the 
State Department remained indifferent, confused and officially silent on matters of polar 
sovereignty in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When the British sent a note to 
Washington laying out their claims and rights in the south polar region in response to 
Richard Byrd’s Antarctic expedition of 1928-1930 (the first American party to visit the 
continent since 1840) – which seemed to invite a strong American response based on the 
Hughes Doctrine – the State Department chose not to issue the note of challenge it 
prepared. The British, who understood that state silence and a failure to protest were 
especially relevant in situations that called for a response expressing disagreement or 
objection, were greatly relieved.10 Laurence Collier, a Foreign Office expert, concluded 
that Washington’s unwillingness to formally protest the existing sector claims in the 
Arctic and Antarctic meant Americans “recognised the Sector Principle to some extent” 
and were “more or less committed to it in practice.”11  
 Norway was alone in consistently protesting the use of the sector principle. In the 
years after the Imperial Conference of 1926, the Norwegian government launched a 
renewed attempt to secure their own polar empire, threatening Britain’s position in the 
Antarctic and Canada’s in the Arctic. Norwegian expeditions travelled to the south polar 
region every Antarctic summer to find and claim new land to support Norway’s whaling 
interests. At the same time, Norwegian officials questioned the Empire’s conception of 
polar sovereignty, by asserting their country’s rights in the Ross Dependency and 
questioning Canada’s title to the Sverdrup Islands by championing a more stringent 
model of effective occupation. Despite the threat Norway posed to the Empire’s bi-polar 
interests, Britain found the Norwegian government willing to negotiate. The Norwegians 	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recognized that in practice a minor power required good relations with Britain. As a 
result, they agreed to respect the Empire’s existing sector claims and the territory 
Australia planned to annex in the Eastern Antarctic. The British hoped that the 
Norwegians would come to see the benefits of the sector principle and embrace it 
themselves. 
As silence, negotiations and the passage of time strengthened the legal positions 
of Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia in the polar regions, the Empire’s 
optimism and confidence in their polar claims and the sector principle culminated in the 
establishment of the Australian Antarctic Territory in 1933. The Australian sector 
covered 5.9 million square miles – approximately 42% of the Antarctic – the interior of 
which had never been explored. With the creation of the AAT, the sector principle 
reached its zenith.  
4.1 Norway and the Doctrine of Effective Occupation 
Norway’s attempts to safeguard its Arctic and Antarctic interests achieved few tangible 
results and, by the beginning of 1927, had even suffered serious setbacks. The British had 
rejected Norway’s assertion of rights in the Ross Dependency and discussions at the 
Imperial Conference of 1926 revealed the Empire’s intent to claim more territory in the 
Antarctic. The Canadian government had never acknowledged Norway’s inquiries about 
the basis of Canada’s claim to the Sverdrup Islands. The most difficult blow for the 
Danish people was the Soviet’s sector claim – especially its inclusion of the Franz Josef 
Land archipelago, to which the Norwegians believed they had strong territorial rights.12 
Unilaterally, Norway could do little except vigorously protest the Russian claim. Appeals 
to Britain and the U.S. for support went unanswered. The Norwegians continued to send 
hunting and scientific expeditions to the archipelago, but there seemed to be little hope of 
winning the islands from the Soviets.13 
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Despite these setbacks, the Norwegian government decided to take stronger action 
to preserve its polar interests, which included whaling and the acquisition of territory. In 
early 1927, Norwegian Prime Minister Ivar Lykke formally declared that Jan Mayen 
island was in Norway’s sphere of influence, citing a Norwegian meteorological station 
that had been in operation since 1921. The Norwegian government continued to insist 
that Denmark’s sovereignty did not extend to Eastern Greenland because the Danes had 
not effectively occupied the region. The government encouraged its citizens to explore, 
hunt and perform scientific studies in the coastal area of southeastern Greenland, hoping 
to bolster Norway’s rights.14  
Norway also questioned and challenged British claims vis-à-vis the Ross 
Dependency. Norwegian whalers searched for areas unclaimed by Britain where they 
could operate without applying for licenses or paying fees.15 Their efforts found Bouvet 
Island in December 1927, where the crew of the Norvegia – funded by whaling tycoon 
Lars Christensen and supported by the Norwegian government – landed on, claimed and 
built a supply hut.16 On the diplomatic front, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
inquired if the British thought their title extended to the Ross Ice Barrier (Ice Shelf). They 
reasserted that Amundsen’s journey to the Pole gave Norway “a priority to claim 
sovereignty” over the territory on both sides of his route and the south polar plateau. 
They also asked how the British justified their claim to King Edward VII Land in the 
Dependency – an area that had been spotted, but never landed on by Robert Falcon Scott 
in 1902 – when a Norwegian expedition had actually explored, mapped and occupied the 
area a few years later.17 Norwegian challenges to Britain’s Ross Dependency claim had 
become far more pointed than those delivered two years earlier.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Arctic Expansionism, Victoria Island (Russia) and the Bratvaag Expedition,” Arctic 51, no. 4 (1998): 330-
335. 
14 Spencer Apollonio, Lands That Hold Us Spellbound: A Story of East Greenland (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2008), 187.  
15 Einar-Arne Drivenes and Harald Dag Jølle, Into the Ice: The History of Norway and the Polar Regions 
(Gyldendal Akademisk, 2006); Noel D. Barrett, “Norway and the ‘winning’ of Australian Antarctica,” 
Polar Record 45, no. 4 (2009): 360-367. 
16 Ivone Kirkpatrick, “Territorial Claims in the Antarctic from 1908 to the end of 1929,” 31 July 1930, NA, 
FO, 337/95.  
17 Benjamin Vogt to Austen Chamberlain, 13 May 1927, Document NZ13051927, in W. M. Bush ed., 
Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents 2 (New York: 
Oceana, 1982-1988), 57-58. 
	   211	  
 British officials defended the Empire’s title to the Ross Dependency. At the 
Imperial Conference of 1926, the Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic had 
agreed that the Ross Ice Shelf should be considered a “permanent extension” of the coast 
that in many places actually rested on solid ground, and therefore could be claimed as 
land. The Foreign Office repeated this assertion to the Norwegians and further pointed 
out that Britain’s claim to King Edward VII Land stood because no country could show it 
had done more in the area. As Royal Navy Hydrographer Henry Percy Douglas pointed 
out, the Norwegians did not “effectively occupy” the land in 1911. They had journeyed 
some 150 miles from their base, and their “occupation” was a “fortnight’s camping in 
tents, mainly [in] blizzards.” 18 The efforts of the Norwegian explorers, according to the 
British, were legally meaningless in the face of Scott’s prior discovery of the area and his 
effective charting of coastline. Notably, Britain’s reply relied on the contiguity doctrine 
when it argued that from “a geographical standpoint” the area explored by Amundsen on 
his way to the South Pole was “indissolubly connected” to the territory claimed by Ernest 
Shackleton in 1909, and as a result was indisputably British.19  
 While Britain confidently defended the Ross Dependency, Norway’s claim to 
Bouvet Island proved a greater threat to the Empire’s dreams of a “red” Antarctic. A 
British sealer spotted and claimed the island in 1825, but no one had set foot on it until 
the Norwegians rowed ashore in 1927. By this point, Foreign Office experts conceded 
that even in the Antarctic, “where the establishment of any form of continuous control is 
impossible” a state still had to show its intention to retain sovereignty through 
administrative efforts and periodic visits. A hundred-year-old claim was legally 
indefensible.20 Nevertheless, many officials – especially in the Admiralty and Dominions 
Office – were loathe to admit that the Norwegians had a solid legal footing to Bouvet, 
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lest they use it to challenge Britain’s position in other parts of the south polar region.21 
The British Empire was simply not interested in having “neighbours at all in the 
Antarctic.”22  
The Norwegians inadvertently bolstered British claims when, shortly after the 
crew of the Norvegia claimed Bouvet, another Norwegian whaling company applied for a 
license to operate in the general vicinity of the island. The British argued that this 
represented recognition of their sovereignty, explaining to the Norwegian government 
that Britain’s hundred-year-old claim had been referenced in the 1905 supplement of the 
1901 edition of the Africa Pilot – an official Admiralty publication.23 But a defence of its 
title to Bouvet based on prior discovery, a mere mention in an obscure government 
publication and a whaling license issued after Norway’s claim was a weak position. The 
British knew it and so did the Norwegians.   
In April 1928, Norway’s Minister in London, Benjamin Vogt, responded to 
Britain’s rebuttal of the Bouvet Island claim with a detailed legal defence. Despite the 
British argument that their position on Bouvet Island had been made clear in the 
Admiralty publication, Vogt maintained that no official notification had ever been given 
on the status of Bouvet, nor had it been depicted as a British possession in the 
Encyclopedia Britannica or The Times Atlas of the World. Furthermore, the island was 
absent from the list of territories published in the Summary of Proceedings for the 
Imperial Conference of 1926. More importantly, Vogt maintained that his country could 
not accept any claim to territory based on such a weak foundation as a one-time sighting 
by a private citizen. The Norwegian note pointed out that leading British jurists – such a 
William Edward Hall and Lassa Oppenheim – insisted that claims by non-commissioned 
explorers be ratified soon after by their governments – a practice Britain failed to follow 
for Bouvet Island and many other areas in the Antarctic where it claimed to have rights. 
Finally, Vogt insisted that while the Arctic and Antarctic required a lesser degree of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 On the Territorial Status of Bouvet and Thompson Islands, South Atlantic Ocean, NA, ADM 116/2494, 
Arctic and Antarctic Regions, 1925-1927. 
22 R.H. Campbell to A.D.F. Gascoigne, Foreign Office, 18 October 1928, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 1513, File 
1928-206-C. 
23 Austen Chamberlain to Norwegian Minister, London, 15 February 1928, Bush, Antarctica and 
International Law 3, 116. 
	   213	  
effective occupation than temperate zones, it was “generally admitted” that an occupation 
in the polar regions still had to be more than “a matter of form.”  
The British, Vogt continued, had allowed a hundred years to pass before they took 
any official action on Bouvet Island. Even if Britain had acquired an inchoate right in 
1825, “prominent British writers on international law” agreed that this could “not for an 
indefinite time constitute a bar to the occupation by another state.” In sharp contrast, 
Vogt explained, the Norwegian government had commissioned the Norvegia expeditions 
to claim unoccupied lands and a Royal Decree officially and publicly annexed Bouvet, 
imposing Norway’s laws and police authority on the island.24 The actual expedition had 
occupied the island for a month, performed sealing, whaling and scientific studies, and 
constructed a supply hut. They did more in one month than Britain had done in a hundred 
years. Plans were in place for another party to return to the island and possibly construct 
a weather station. Vogt concluded that, “Norwegian title to the island is securely founded 
in international law.”25 
In a few pages, Vogt had summed up Norway’s legal position on polar 
sovereignty. The Norwegians maintained that discovery gave a country special rights, but 
not a valid title over territory. The rights that flowed from first discovery only 
crystallized into legal title when a state ratified the actions of the explorer, provided 
direct official notification to interested governments, and perfected it through effective 
occupation within a reasonable period, which the Norwegians believed were universal 
legal principles established at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.26  
As legal historian Andrew Fitzmaurice has highlighted, during the negotiation 
over Spitsbergen before the First World War, officials and legal experts used the term 
terra nullius to describe “land without owners and that would remain without owners.” 	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The Norwegians, however, used the term to describe unoccupied polar land, such as 
Eastern Greenland and the vast majority of the Antarctic, that could be claimed by the 
first state to properly occupy the territory.27 Although an occupation had to be more than 
a “matter of form,” even the Norwegians admitted that the requirements should not be too 
rigid. While they used a permanently staffed weather station on Jan Mayen to justify their 
annexation of the island, in other polar areas the Norwegians argued that huts – even if 
used only seasonally or temporarily – and repeated visits by whalers or hunters 
represented sufficient effective occupation.28 In the Svalbard Archipelago, the first 
Norwegian governor employed virtually no staff and hired a small boat to take him to the 
various settlements on the islands. “On a territory twice as large as Belgium, with hardly 
any resources available it is obvious that the governor could not exercise Norwegian 
jurisdiction efficiently,” historian Torbjørn Pedersen has pointed out.29 Still, the 
Norwegians consistently tried to institute something more substantive than paper 
administrations in the polar territories they claimed. 	  
With a firmly established legal position, the Norwegian government attempted to 
negotiate with Britain over Bouvet Island. On several occasions, Norwegian officials 
explained that “while they were adverse to applying such heavy machinery” as the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, the level of public interest in Bouvet Island was so high 
that they could not think of giving up Norway’s claim without an official legal battle. 
Such a territorial dispute, they warned, could evolve into a general discussion of claims in 
other parts of the Arctic and Antarctic where British sovereignty was open to challenge 
and where Norway had special rights based on past exploration. Benjamin Vogt pointed 
to the Sverdrup Islands, discovered by a Norwegian expedition a little more than two 
decades earlier, as an example. How could Canada and Britain demand that Norway give 
up its rights to the Sverdrup Islands because they had not been “utilized since the 
Norwegian flag was hoisted,” and then ask Norway to accept Britain’s full title to Bouvet 	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Island.30 Prime Minister Johan Ludwig Mowinckel raised this question at the Norwegian 
Storting. “If Bouvet Island is British, because Captain Norris claimed this island for 
Britain, without any British citizen visiting it since,” the Prime Minister argued, “then the 
Sverdrup Islands are Norwegian to a much more substantial extent indeed.” The 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry supported this assertion with a note to Ottawa in March 
1928, recalling there had been no reply to their persistent inquiries about the basis of 
Canada’s claim to the Sverdrup Islands for three years, and reasserting Norway reserved 
“all rights … under International Law in connection with said areas.”31  
In a flurry of action Norway had threatened the Empire’s position in the Arctic 
and the Antarctic. Britain’s Minister in Oslo, Francis Lindley, suggested his government 
seek “an amicable solution.”32 Benjamin Vogt had suggested two courses of action to 
avoid a territorial dispute between Britain and Norway. First, the two countries could 
agree on an independent expert jurist to decide on the status of Bouvet Island, whose 
private verdict could be accepted without all the formalities and dangers of an official 
arbitration. Or, in a far less complicated course of action, Vogt suggested that Britain 
renounce its claim to Bouvet Island in return for Norway giving up its rights to the 
Sverdrup Islands.33  
Waiting in the wings, Lars Christensen sat ready to send another Norwegian 
expedition to the area of the eastern Antarctic that Australia intended to claim. The 
Australian government feared that the Norwegian expedition would annex any land that it 
came upon, including territory laid out by the Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial 
Conference. Richard Casey, Australia’s political liaison officer in London, started his 
long involvement in Antarctic affairs by insisting that the British government protect 
Australia’s interests in the region. Casey asked Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign 	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Affairs Sir Ronald Lindsay to ensure that “that no diplomatic stone be left unturned to 
warn the Norwegians off.”34 As British officials contemplated how to handle the 
Norwegian threat, they found the situation in the polar regions growing ever more 
complicated. 
4.2 Britain’s Polar Empire at Risk? 
In the summer of 1928, the British set up an Antarctic Committee to better coordinate the 
Empire’s strategy in the region. As the challenges to Britain’s plan for a “red” Antarctic 
mounted, the committee concluded that polar issues had to be “visualized as a whole.”35 
The picture looked bleak for the Empire. In the spring and summer of 1928, the French 
government inquired about the Letters of Patent for the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
(FID), which had absorbed Louis-Phillipe Land, Joinville Island and other territories 
discovered by the expeditions of Jean-Baptise Charcot between 1904 and 1911.36 
Argentina continued to run its wireless station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys 
without a license from Britain, and the government issued its first public enunciation of a 
claim to territory in the FID. The Argentineans explained to the Universal Postal Union, 
“Argentine territorial jurisdiction extends de jure and de facto over the continental 
surface, territorial sea and islands situated off the maritime coast, to a portion of the 
Islands of Tierra del Fuego, the Archipelago of Staten, New Year, South Georgia, South 
Orkneys and polar territory not delimited.”37  
News of the impending Antarctic expedition of American explorer Richard Byrd 
was even more worrisome to the British than potential challenges from Norway, France 
and Argentina. According to historian Tom Griffiths, Byrd was a “systematic colonizer of 	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the ice” who advocated for permanent occupation in the region from the start of his 
Antarctic forays.38 With support from the American Geographic Society, Byrd planned 
for a party of fifty men to complete a two-year stay in the Antarctic supported by three 
aircraft and two ships. Byrd’s expedition would bring mechanized equipment, modern 
communications, aerial mapping and advanced scientific equipment to the Antarctic – 
making it the most expensive and technologically advanced mission to the region. 
Mirroring the plans he made for the MacMillan expedition in 1925, Byrd again decided 
to establish his base on polar territory claimed by the British Empire – this time on the 
Ross Ice Barrier of the Ross Dependency. The site selection, chosen more for 
accessibility than political reasons, could be interpreted as semi-permanent occupation of 
British territory. From this base, his expedition would push into the vast unexplored 
space between the Ross Dependency and the FID, and attempt the first flight over the 
South Pole.39 While the State Department had not indicated any plans to support an 
Antarctic territorial claim based on Byrd’s work, British officials feared the worst. 
Norway’s attempts to bring the Sverdrup Islands into its Antarctic negotiations 
over Bouvet Island forced British officials to also consider Canada’s sovereignty in the 
Arctic. By 1928 there were seven Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) posts in 
Canada’s Arctic, the majority situated along the eastern fringe of the Archipelago. That 
summer, RCMP patrols covered 7500 miles on and between Ellesmere, Axel Heiberg, 
Devon and Baffin Islands.40 Still, Canada’s Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
O.D. Skelton, lamented that “the situation as to the recognition of Canadian sovereignty 
in the Arctic is not entirely satisfactory.” Several American scientific parties had gone 
north after the MacMillan expedition and applied for Canadian permits, but they only 
ventured as far as Baffin Island. As a result, the U.S. government held back its 
acceptance of Canada’s sovereignty over Ellesmere and the other islands north of Parry 
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Channel. On occasion, the American press and legal experts pointed out that the U.S. did 
not and should not recognize Canada’s sovereignty above latitude 75ºN.41 
Unwilling to draw any attention to sovereignty issues, Skelton refused to provide 
a journalist from the Toronto Star with information for an article on Arctic claims 
because he “considered that our position had not been thoroughly satisfactory in the past 
but was steadily improving, and that we deprecated premature discussion.”42 Regardless 
of their desire to avoid public discourse on the subject, Canadian officials feared that 
Norway’s attempts to draw the Sverdrup Islands into ongoing Antarctic negotiations 
would cast an unwanted spotlight on Canada’s Arctic claim.43 The British understood 
Ottawa’s concerns and sought a strategy that would insulate Canada from the fallout of 
the Empire’s Antarctic dispute. 
Despite this dizzying array of polar problems, British officials maintained that 
Empire’s claims were strengthened by acts of occupation conducted by the Discovery 
Committee in the Antarctic and the RCMP in the Arctic. Administrative efforts, including 
Ottawa’s creation of the Arctic Game Preserve and Britain’s control of the whaling 
industry, also bolstered their position.44 Although the French interest in the FID raised 
some alarm, but the Foreign Office doubted they would challenge Britain’s claim.45 The 
possibility of an official Argentine challenge to the FID worried the Antarctic Committee, 
but the Foreign Office maintained that, if allowed to operate their wireless station 
unlicensed on Laurie Island, the Argentines would not publicly test Britain’s title.46 	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Despite this underlying optimism, British officials realized that they required stronger 
responses to the Norwegians and the Byrd expedition if they hoped to defend the 
Empire’s polar interests.  
4.3 A Gentlemen’s Understanding…But Not on the Sector 
Principle 
To dissuade the Norwegians from challenging the Empire’s vast annexations in the 
Antarctic, British officials often leaned on the sector principle. At a meeting on 23 
December 1929, for instance, Ambassador Charles Wingfield explained to Prime 
Minister Mowinckel that “Great Britain has unimpeachable rights to the whole of these 
sectors, including all land down to the South Pole, an extension which was looked upon 
as the inseparable hinterland of the coastal territory in each sector.”47 In defence, 
Norwegian officials consistently pointed out that their country denounced the use of the 
sector principle48 and, as Mowinckel explained, “could not accept [Britain’s] wholesale 
claims to large sectors of [the] Antarctic.”49 
British officials turned to an unlikely argument to bolster the Empire’s position 
against Norway’s rejection of sector claims. In the lead-up to the Imperial Conference of 
1926, British officials had rejected Australia’s request to claim its Antarctic sector on the 
basis of the “Canadian principle”: that polar territory should simply be governed by the 
closest state. Instead, they concluded that sector claims did not emanate from the 
proximity of the claimant state, but from “territory already held by the Power concerned.” 
It was a careful distinction that the British hoped would stop the Argentines and Chileans 
from considering a sector claim in the Antarctic based solely on their geographic 
proximity. Despite their initial rejection of the idea, however, the temptation to use the 
“Canadian principle” against Norway – a northern hemisphere country with no territorial 
possessions close to the Antarctic – proved too much. 50  	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On several occasions over the next few years, Foreign Office officials explained 
to the Norwegians that the projection of the Falkland Islands, South Africa, Australia and 
New Zealand “down towards the Antarctic continent, gave the British empire a very 
special interest in the political rights over those areas.”51 Due to the geographic locations 
of its component parts, the British Empire held the best position to maintain control in the 
Antarctic, and thus had a better right to claim territory there than other countries.52 
Ambassador Wingfield captured the argument best in January 1934 when he noted that 
the Empire’s sector claims sprang “very naturally” from the proximity of British territory, 
which caused its subjects to look at the Antarctic as a “special preserve, which should not 
fall into alien hands.” The sector principle, the ambassador added, was merely an “effort 
to put this very reasonable idea of propinquity and consequent permanent interest into 
legal phraseology.”53 The Norwegians, however, remained unconvinced and continued to 
stress the need for effective occupation.  
Foreign Office officials worried that if they pushed the Norwegians too hard on 
Bouvet Island or the sector principle it might spark an official challenge to the Empire’s 
claims throughout the Arctic and Antarctic.54 The resultant judicial decision from 
arbitration – especially any comments on the principles of territorial acquisition in the 
Arctic and Antarctic – could negatively affect the Empire’s polar claims.55 At this point, 
the Foreign Office preferred legal uncertainty in the polar regions rather than risk a 
definitive legal decision that could have criticized contiguity, the sector principle or set a 
high bar for effective occupation.56  	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While fears about the legal ramifications of an Antarctic dispute pushed British 
officials to seek an “amicable solution” with the Norwegians over Bouvet Island, they 
also appreciated Ronald Lindsay’s desire to take a softer diplomatic approach to the 
situation. The new Permanent Under Secretary did not like the current political tension in 
the Antarctic. “We are embarking on a kind of scramble for territory similar to that which 
took place in the eighties for Africa. This is a reversion to obsolete practices which is 
very much to be deprecated,” Lindsay insisted. He thought that the crux of the problem 
was that Australia and Norway were “new states who lack the experience we enjoy. I 
should have thought that there is room for everybody in the Antarctic, unless Australia is 
deliberately trying to keep everybody out of it except herself, and this is a reductio ad 
absurdium.”57 Lindsay recognized that the Norwegians were heavily involved in the 
whaling industry and thought it only natural that they wanted land bases in the south 
polar region to support their efforts.58 With these considerations in mind, the British 
decided to make a deal with the Norwegians.  
 Britain had to consider the polar interests of Canada, Australia and South Africa 
while deliberating a suitable bargain with Norway. They first thought to protect Canada’s 
Arctic claim by accepting Benjamin Vogt’s proposal and trading the Empire’s 
recognition of Norway’s title to Bouvet Island for the official renunciation of any 
Norwegian rights to the Sverdrup Islands.59 Richard Casey and the Australian 
government, however, argued that if the British were to make a deal with the Norwegians 
over Bouvet Island, it should protect Australia’s territorial interests in the Antarctic, not 
Canada’s in the Arctic.60 Regardless of whether the British chose to protect Australia’s or 
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Canada’s polar positions, recognizing Norway’s claim to Bouvet would direct the 
Norwegians into the Antarctic region south of Cape Good Hope – an area to which South 
Africans officials tentatively considered a claim.61  
In the end, the British concluded that South Africa’s fledgling interest in the 
Antarctic could be sacrificed, while Canada’s position in the Arctic required less 
protection than Australia’s territorial rights in the south polar region. Lindsay decided to 
offer Britain’s unconditional acceptance of Norway’s claim to Bouvet Island, in return 
for a private verbal assurance that the Norwegians would not annex any of the territory 
listed in the Summary of Proceedings produced by the Imperial Conference of 1926.62 
The Antarctic Committee agreed with Lindsay’s assessment and concluded that Bouvet 
Island would serve nicely as a “beau geste” in the game of Antarctic politics.63  
Historian Thorleif Thorleifsson has highlighted that while Norway wanted to 
annex new Antarctic territory for national prestige and to support its whaling interests, 
maintaining a good relationship with Britain remained an essential part of its foreign 
policy.64 As a result, the Norwegians accepted the “gentlemen’s understanding” in 
November 1928 to stabilize relations with the Empire in the polar regions.65 In February 
1929, a Norwegian crew landed on and claimed Peter I Island (first discovered by 
Russian explorer Fabian Gottlieb Thaddeus von Bellinghausen more than a century 
earlier), absent from the Summary of Proceedings – a sign of Norway’s adherence to the 
new agreement. With their claim to Bouvet Island secure, the Norwegians decided to 
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release the Sverdrup Islands as a bargaining chip. If Canada paid Otto Sverdrup a grant in 
recognition of his exploratory efforts, Norway would renounce its rights to the area.66  
The whaling magnate Lars Christensen and other Norwegian citizens wanted 
more territory in the Antarctic. The British had failed to provide specific boundaries for 
the areas listed in the Summary of Proceedings, leaving their extent open to 
interpretation.67 Christensen used this logic to justify sending the Norvegia south again to 
explore Enderby Land, at the western edge of the proposed Australian sector (which had 
not been seen since John Biscoe sighted it in 1831).68 Although Oslo promised to keep to 
the gentlemen’s agreement – to let the lands lie unclaimed – a suspicious Antarctic 
Committee concluded that it was “very difficult to predict with confidence the intentions 
of the Norwegian Government.”69 Concerned about the Norvegia expedition, Richard 
Casey warned the Australian Prime Minister that Norway’s actions should be considered 
“ominous” given the country’s “militancy…in Antarctic matters.”70 
Public statements about sovereignty from Norwegian officials raised further 
concerns from Britain, Australia and Canada. In early November 1929, for instance, 
Prime Minister Mowinckel gave a public speech on Norway’s legal position in the polar 
regions. While his main intention was to safeguard Norway’s rights to Franz Josef Land 
by attacking its annexation by the Soviet Union, he also criticized sector claims more 
generally. The Prime Minister explained that his government embraced the “ordinary 
international point of view” that territorial claims, even in the polar regions, required 
effective occupation.71 In short, Mowinckel painted his country as a principled adherent 
of international law, while Britain, Canada and the Soviet Union ignored the accepted 	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rules. Reinforcing Mowinckel’s arguments, the Norwegian government sent a third note 
to London reaffirming Norway’s rights to the south polar plateau and to Edward VII 
Land in the Ross Dependency.72  
Throughout 1929, British officials grew more annoyed by perceived Norwegian 
intransigencies.73 Laurence Collier, a member of the Foreign Office’s Northern 
Department and a representative on the Antarctic Committee, wanted to inform the 
Norwegian government that its “policy of staking claims all over the world” annoyed 
London. The latest example was the annexation of Jan Mayen – an island that British 
citizens had helped explore. Collier thought the British government should clarify that 
“with regard to this Island there were certain grounds on which we could make trouble if 
we wanted to.” Only if the Norwegians officially dropped their “absurd claims” in the 
polar regions, Collier advised, should the British recognize their title to Jan Mayen.74  
The Antarctic Committee discussed Collier’s idea at a meeting in October. O.D. 
Skelton insisted that from Ottawa’s perspective Canada’s title was strong, resting “on the 
ground both of contiguity and administrative arrangements,” which included RCMP posts 
and patrols. Although confident, Canada desired the “definite and final abandonment” of 
Norway’s rights to the islands and had accepted the Norwegian overtures to compensate 
Sverdrup for his exploratory services in return for such an admission. Sverdrup’s 
representatives, however, had set an exorbitant price of £60,000. Skelton suggested that 
British and Canadian recognition of Norway’s claim to Jan Mayen might serve as an 
“additional counter-weight” in the looming negotiations. Whatever form the final 
agreement took, Ottawa did not want to acknowledge that Norway did, indeed, have 
special rights to the Sverdrup Islands.75 	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Although some British officials characterized additional negotiations with 
Norway as akin to “flogging a dead horse,”76 most thought it prudent to arrive at a 
general settlement with the Norwegian government on polar issues. After the private 
Norvegia expedition planted the Norwegian flag in newly discovered territory between 
Kemp Land and Enderby Land, within the sector Australia hoped to claim, support for 
settlement grew.77 The continued failure of the Canadians and Otto Sverdrup to agree on 
an amount for his compensation added further impetus for the British to seek another 
understanding.78  
By the middle of January 1930, Britain, Norway and Canada all desired to avoid a 
prolonged conflict over polar issues. Norwegian Prime Minister Mowinckel echoed the 
sentiments of all three governments when he advised the national council that, “conflict 
with Britain would only harm our other bi-Polar interests.” The resolution came in a 
triangular agreement. The Canadians and British agreed to recognize Norway’s claim to 
Jan Mayen, while the latter encouraged the Norwegians to annex the largely unknown 
Antarctic sector between Enderby Land and Coats Land on the edge of the FID. In return, 
the Norwegians agreed to confine their search for Antarctic territory to the west of 
longitude 45°E, the western limit of the proposed Australian sector (the Norvegia 
expedition had just discovered new stretches of coastline in this area, which it named 
Dronning Maud Land and Crown Princess Martha Land). They also promised to 
officially recognize Canada’s sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands and deny ever 
having any rights to them as long as Ottawa paid Otto Sverdrup a lump sum (later 
determined to be $67,000) for his maps, personal papers and efforts, and gave Norway 
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hunting and fishing rights in the region (which it would never use).79 With the agreement, 
the complicated bi-polar diplomacy between Canada, Britain and Norway came to an end.  
Despite the concessions it had made, Norway emerged from the tri-lateral 
negotiations with its legal position on the polar regions intact. While willing to recognize 
Canada’s sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands, the Norwegians carefully noted that this 
did not imply their acceptance of the sector principle. Norwegian officials consistently 
highlighted their country’s opposition to sector claims in the Arctic and Antarctic, and its 
support of a more stringent level of effective occupation.80 At the same time, private 
Norwegian expeditions continued to venture into the Eastern Antarctic territory Australia 
hoped to claim.81 Despite Oslo’s insistence that it would respect the new polar agreement, 
in London, Foreign Office officials worried that a change of government could lead to a 
greater willingness to challenge the Empire’s polar claims.82 Nevertheless, British 
officials still hoped that Norway would come to see the benefits of the sector principle, 
and that it would “secure recognition in theory even by the Norwegian Government, who 
have now little to lose, and…some to gain by such recognition.”83  
4.4 The American Challenge that Never Came 
Throughout their negotiations with the Norwegians, British officials feared that the U.S. 
would emerge as a greater threat to the Empire’s interests in the south polar region – a 	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feeling spurred on by Richard Byrd’s Antarctic expedition and his plans to establish a 
base in the Ross Dependency. Esme Howard, Britain’s ambassador in Washington, 
reported that since his arrival in the capital four years earlier, the U.S. government had 
not shown any interest in the Antarctic. In light of the Byrd expedition “and the growing 
desire of the United States to have a finger in every pie which may produce a plum or 
two,” however, Howard predicted that the Americans would challenge the Empire’s 
claims in the Antarctic.84  
Howard’s comment reflected the broader tensions in the Anglo-American 
relationship, which reached a low point between 1927 and 1929. The continued 
disagreements on naval issues (such as how many cruisers each country should be 
allowed) and London’s perception of a lack of consultation by Washington during 
negotiations for the Kellogg-Briand Pact fed the unease.85 The growing economic and 
technological power of the U.S. also concerned many British officials who now perceived 
the Americans as a rival that could replace them as leader in world affairs. Just a month 
after Richard Byrd left for the Antarctic, Robert Craigie, head of the American 
Department in the Foreign Office, admitted that his country faced, “a phenomenon for 
which there is no parallel in our modern history – a State twenty-five times as large, five 
times as wealthy, three times as populous, twice as ambitious, almost invulnerable, and at 
least our equal in prosperity, vital energy, technical equipment and industrial science.”86 
Byrd’s expedition was a manifestation of American ambition, technological 
achievements, energy and resources into the Antarctic and British officials wondered how 
they could possibly match these efforts.  
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Byrd’s ambitious plans for aerial exploration particularly concerned British 
officials.87 As Antarctic expert Klaus Dodds has pointed out, the Byrd expedition raised 
the prospect of the “aerial colonization of the Antarctic.”88 Some officials felt confident 
that flying over new land and dropping flags would never match the legal value of 
actually landing on and taking possession of the territory.89 Others argued that aerial 
exploration created the same inchoate rights as the sighting of a coastline from ships;90 
others suggested that Byrd’s expedition showed that the whole Antarctic could be 
annexed and controlled from the air.91 No concrete answers emerged from these debates, 
and the legal implications of aerial exploration remained unclear and unsettling to the 
British in the years that followed. 
Opinion differed within the Antarctic Committee. Some members speculated that 
any attempt to raise Britain’s Antarctic claims with Washington might inspire the kind of 
challenge the British hoped to avoid; others thought remaining silent on Byrd’s use of the 
Ross Dependency could gravely weaken the Empire’s legal position.92 The British had to 
show that they would not allow a foreign power to operate in the Ross Dependency 
without their permission. In November 1928, the British sent a note to Washington that 
laid out the Empire’s existing territorial claims in the Antarctic, enclosed a copy of the 
Public Summary of Proceedings from the Imperial Conference to show the areas that the 
Empire still planned to acquire, consented to Byrd’s expedition and offered assistance. 
While Ottawa had dispatched a similar note to the Americans in response to the 
MacMillan expedition in 1925, this was the first time that a state tried to preserve its 
claims in the Antarctic by preemptively consenting to a foreign expedition and offering 
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assistance.93 Britain, New Zealand and Australia would continue to use the tactic to 
protect their Antarctic claims from foreign expeditions into the 1950s. 
In reality, the U.S. government had given very little thought to Antarctic claims or 
polar sovereignty since the flurry of research inspired by the Soviet sector decree. The 
head of the map division at the Library of Congress, Lawrence Martin, who had helped 
draft the Hughes Doctrine while with the State Department, pushed for a U.S. Antarctic 
claim. He collected the logbook of Nathaniel Palmer and other documents that could 
prove the primacy of American discoveries.94 The State Department was less enthused. 
When a representative from the Byrd expedition asked the State Department to support a 
claim to any new territory the party might discover, the department remained 
noncommittal and indicated that it would provide an answer only if such a situation 
arose.95 The arrival of the British note in Washington prompted State Department 
officials to once again ponder the problems of polar sovereignty. 
Under Secretary of State Joshua Rueben Clark “dust[ed] off [the] Antarctic files” 
and studied the situation.96 Clark, a prominent lawyer in the U.S., served in the Solicitor’s 
Office for many years and understood that from a legal perspective, this was a very 
important moment. The British note represented the first time that the Empire had 
officially drawn to “the attention of the United States the claim of a British title to the 
areas named.” Clark understood that the note demanded a response or the British would 
use Washington’s silence as proof of tacit acceptance of their Antarctic claims, their use 
of the sector principle and a lax definition of effective occupation. Both the claim and the 
principle were at issue. Clark and other departmental officials maintained that the 
American response must “safeguard…against such claims to sovereignty as have been 	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announced…in the North Polar Regions, by laying down, on maps, sectors running to the 
North Pole from the extreme points of nearest territory owned south of the North Pole by 
the country concerned” and from the use of similar “quadrants” in the Antarctic. To Clark, 
it felt like the U.S. was being squeezed out of an increasingly shrinking polar world. If 
the U.S. government wanted to maintain its territorial rights in the Antarctic and preserve 
its broader position on polar sovereignty, Clark concluded, it had to issue a strong reply 
to the British.  
To preserve his country’s legal position, the Under Secretary drafted a bold 
response that applied the “formula announced by Mr. Hughes” to attack the Empire’s 
polar territorial claims. Clark’s reply highlighted that the U.S. government did not 
recognize any “means or method of acquiring sovereignty” in the polar regions beyond 
those already “accepted as forming part of the rules and principles of accepted 
international law” and which had been used historically by states to support their 
territorial claims. Clark explained that the “principles of international law” attached 
certain rights to the first discovery of territory. He emphasized that the discoveries of 
American explorers, sealers and whalers gave the U.S. as much right to Graham Land 
and Wilkes Land (the coastal area of the eastern Antarctic explored by Charles Wilkes in 
1840) as the British. Discovery, however, only gave a state a preferential right to occupy 
territory, not sovereignty. Clark emphasized that the U.S. government would not accept 
that title to polar territory could “be perfected by a mere temporary possession or by 
unimplemented, annexive declarations, orders, decrees, or laws” or by any other solution 
to the problem of polar sovereignty (such as the sector principle) that did not involve 
actual settlement and use.97 Clark’s note went beyond challenging the Empire’s rights in 
the Antarctic – it attacked the sector principle, upheld the Hughes Doctrine and 
threatened all existing polar claims. It was a response that could have radically altered the 
political and legal status of the polar regions, and seriously challenged Britain’s Antarctic 
ambitions. 	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Since dispatching their note to the Americans, the British had nervously watched 
Byrd and his fifty-four men establish a base on the Ross Ice Shelf in the Bay of Whales in 
December 1928. Byrd called the base Little America and it included a mess hall, barracks, 
an administration building, radio towers, electricity generators, a storehouse, tunnels 
connecting the buildings and a flag pole flying the stars and stripes. From Little America, 
the expedition used airplanes, snowmobiles, skis and dog sleds to explore large parts of 
the Ross Dependency and the Antarctic interior to the east of the Ross Sea, which Byrd 
named Marie Byrd Land after his wife. With his modern communications equipment, 
Byrd was able to keep in regular wireless contact with the U.S.98 Byrd and his expedition 
went a long way to achieving the requirements of the Hughes Doctrine, and set a new bar 
for activity in the Antarctic. 
A wave of public support inspired by Byrd’s expedition increased Britain’s 
concern. Stories and editorials appeared in U.S. newspapers urging Washington to claim 
the land discovered by Byrd and previous American explorers, regardless of whether it 
had already been enclosed by sector lines or not.99 American academics seized the 
opportunity to attack the sector principle and uphold the requirements of the Hughes 
Doctrine. “Wherefore one wonders at the justice of its projecting this claim to the Pole, 
which includes, of course, a tremendous area never seen by any one, even the penguins,” 
asked professor of geography Laura Martin (the wife of Lawrence Martin).100 Professor 
Jesse S. Reeves captured the opinion of many of his peers when he wrote that the world 
had to choose between a polar legal regime based on the unlawful sector principle or the 
Hughes Doctrine, which he called the “correct statement of international law.” 
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Figure 6: Map showing Little America and the Bay of Whales. Map of the Bay of 
Whales - Byrd Antarctic Expedition [from the collection of John King Davis]. NAA, 
P2819, 1364.
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Title in the polar regions required actual settlement and government authority, and claims 
that did not meet these standards, “can hardly be recognized in the present state of 
international law,” Reeves concluded.101 Given the impossibility of effective occupation 
in the traditional sense in the High Arctic and Antarctic, several American scholars 
suggested that Washington take the lead in organizing an international administration for 
these regions.102 Regardless of whether the U.S. decided to endorse the 
internationalization of the polar regions or annex its own territory, Washington had to 
challenge the Empire’s claims in the Antarctic.  
Given the attitude of the press and academics, the British were unsurprised when 
news leaked that the State Department intended to issue a challenge.103 Yet the challenge 
never came because the State Department’s note, outlining its position, was never sent. A 
turnover at the White House waylaid Clark’s plans. When Herbert Hoover became 
president in March 1929, he appointed Henry Stimson and Joseph Potter Cotton as 
Secretary and Under Secretary in the State Department. The new administration promptly 	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shelved and then lost Clark’s draft challenge.104 When, in the fall of 1929, American 
officials finally realized that they had not yet responded to the British, almost a full year 
had gone by. To the great relief of British officials, when the State Department finally 
responded to the British note in November 1929, it apologized for the delay, 
acknowledged the offer of assistance, and offered no comment on claims whatsoever.105 
While the reply purposely avoided recognition of Britain’s claims, it said nothing to 
reserve the rights of the U.S. in the Antarctic. The anticipated U.S. challenge had been 
dodged for the moment. 
Politics also played a part in the American decision not to challenge Britain’s 
Antarctic claims. One of the primary goals of the Hoover administration sought to 
improve Anglo-American relations. The State Department had started to work towards a 
new naval agreement with Britain (which was reached at the London Naval Conference 
of 1930).106 Challenging Britain’s Antarctic claims at such a critical juncture did not 
make political sense – just as the State Department’s note of challenge to Canada’s sector 
claim had not made sense in the summer of 1925.  
 Debate within the State Department over the legal nature of polar sovereignty 
also hampered the Americans taking a more assertive stance. In the summer of 1929, 
Geographer of the State Department Samuel Whittemore Boggs pushed his colleagues to 
articulate a more coherent polar policy.107 He urged the State Department to decide 
whether or not the U.S. should “take steps towards establishing a new kind of 	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international regime in the polar regions.”108 If the department concluded that the U.S. 
should annex its own territory in the Antarctic or Arctic, it had to determine what areas 
the country had territorial rights to based on discovery, occupation and official 
proclamations.109 Once the State Department knew what territory the U.S. could claim, it 
still had to determine the “necessary legal steps in the acquisition of territory.” While the 
Hughes Doctrine called for actual settlement and use, the department remained undecided 
about what constituted effective occupation in the polar regions. Would repeated semi-
permanent occupations of the continent, such as Byrd’s expedition, be sufficient?110 
Personally, Boggs agreed with his British and Commonwealth peers who insisted that 
state control in the polar regions did not have to be “continuous, but effective in a sense 
of practically applicable to regions not habitable in all seasons of the year,” although he 
insisted the issue required further study.111  
Boggs also pushed for a definitive position on the sector principle. While the U.S. 
Navy publicly decried the application of the sector principle in the Arctic as an illegal 
attempt by a few of the world’s powers to unfairly divide up a large portion of the globe, 
the State Department remained officially silent. 112 “The U.S. should have a well 	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considered reason, either for utilizing or for rejecting the idea of claiming a sector [north 
of Alaska or in the Antarctic],” Boggs advised. “The question is partly legal and partly 
political in character.” The role that sector claims were playing in polar affairs demanded 
the Americans decide quickly.113   
Boggs acknowledged that these were all difficult legal questions, but maintained 
that they had to be resolved if the U.S. was going to embrace a leading role in the polar 
regions.114 In his quest to have them answered, however, the geographer was stymied by 
the indifference of his colleagues. On several occasions, Boggs was told that Arctic and 
Antarctic affairs were simply not a priority.115 At this point, many American officials 
probably agreed with the comment made by Laura Martin that unless “penguin eggs 
become the one delicacy necessary for famishing millions, or penguin oil can be burned 
in Fords, or unless some material small in bulk and of great value, like diamonds or 
radium ore should be discovered,” territorial claims in the Antarctic would never be 
overly important.116 The polar regions simply did not rank very high on the list of 
American foreign policy priorities.  
 The State Department let the Hughes Doctrine remain the public face of American 
polar policy.117 Legal scholar Jonathan Zasloff has pointed out that Henry Stimson and 
Joseph Cotton were both legal professionals who embraced the same classical legal 	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Government Printing Office, 1939), 519-520. 
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ideology as Charles Evan Hughes. They believed in a rigid and relatively closed 
international legal system of universal principles, which made them hesitant to act in 
advance of international law.118 As a result, the difficulties of applying the accepted rules 
of international law to the unique conditions of the polar regions, and their unwillingness 
to forge new, radical principles, dissuaded them from pursuing any territorial interests in 
the Antarctic. Furthermore, scholars like Zasloff and Francis Boyle have established that 
in the late 1920s, American officials in the State Department placed a great emphasis on 
defensive legal security, employing international law to avoid war (as embodied by the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact) and other foreign policy entanglements, while protecting U.S. 
interests.119 The Hughes Doctrine fulfilled the function of defensive legal security for the 
U.S. – it could be called upon to challenge polar claims, without sparking the kind of 
territorial dispute that a formal challenge would. Few staff in the State Department shared 
Boggs’ fear that a general statement like the Hughes Doctrine would never carry the same 
kind of legal weight as an official protest, reservation of rights or actual territorial 
claim.120  
As Boggs fought the State Department’s indifference towards the Antarctic, Byrd 
continued his work in the Antarctic. After spending the winter of 1929 locked in the ice, 
the next summer Bryd launched the first successful flight to the South Pole on 28 
November 1929. In December, Congress promoted Byrd to Rear-Admiral in recognition 
of his expedition’s accomplishments. Meanwhile, Byrd’s second in command, the 
geologist Lawrence Gould, took his dog sleds to Marie Byrd Land to provide a physical 
presence in the newly discovered territory and plant the American flag. Following the 
advice of Isaiah Bowman, the director of the National Geographic Society, Byrd aerially 
explored the coastline adjacent to the eastern boundary of the Ross Dependency (150°W). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Jonathan Zasloff, “Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty Years’ Crisis,” 
Southern California Law Review 77 (2003-2004): 682. 
119 Francis Anthony Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 
1898-1922 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 144-145. For instance, in response to Japan’s seizure 
on Manchuria in 1931, the Stimson Doctrine applied the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur (law does not 
arise from injustice), to argue that the U.S. would not recognize international territorial changes executed 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 187. 
120 S.W. Boggs, Department of State, Office of the Historical Adviser, The Polar Regions: Geographical 
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Bowman believed that if the U.S. decided to claim Marie Byrd Land that the interior had 
to be connected with an unclaimed section of coastline that provided independent access 
to the territory.121 After adding a great deal to the map of Antarctica, the Byrd expedition 
left Little America and headed home in February 1930.  
Public interest in an American Antarctic claim was alive. In July, Senator Millard 
Tydings presented a resolution asserting that the U.S. claim “all areas in the Antarctic 
which have been discovered or explored by American citizens.”122 He included Nathaniel 
Palmer’s first significant discovery of the continent’s coastline, Charles Wilkes’ two 
decades later, and Byrd’s expedition, which had discovered even more new land. Tydings 
speculated that Antarctic territory might prove valuable in the future as the site of air or 
naval bases. “It seems to me that the State Department should be aggressive and should 
take advantage of this discovery and claim them for the United States,” explained 
Tydings, “because the citizen of no other nation except our own so far has discovered 
them.”123 The U.S. Senate passed a resolution allowing the President to exercise his 
executive authority to claim new territory, but the State Department remained 
disinterested.124 An obviously annoyed Secretary of State Stimson publicly responded 
that the U.S. had many island possessions, much closer than the Antarctic, which 
required the government’s attention. Stimson “could not see how Members of Congress 
could favor giving up the Philippines and still be interested in distant snow-covered 
territory.”125  
Stimson’s comment came as a relief to British officials. By the summer of 1930, 
the British believed that a strong division of opinion existed in Washington about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 For contemporary accounts see Richard Byrd, Little America (New York: Putnam, 1930) and Laurence 
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Putnam, 1931). 
122 Christopher Joyner and E.R. Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic (Hanover: University 
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whether or not to claim land in the Antarctic.126 Stimson’s dismissive attitude towards a 
claim and the decision not to act on Tydings’ resolution indicated which side was 
winning. Meanwhile, comments made by Byrd upon his return from Little America 
further increased Britain and New Zealand’s optimism. The explorer explained that his 
expedition was a “scientific venture and hopefully a sporting one, and we went down 
there with the utmost respect for the British who had preceded us. Our work should bring 
us closer together and not farther apart.” To the satisfaction of officials in Wellington and 
London, Byrd stressed that, “We have from the beginning recognised the Ross 
Dependency.”127 The great threat posed by the U.S. to the Empire’s Antarctic interests 
had passed. Still, Britain remained vigilant. Until American interest in the Antarctic 
waned completely, they would avoid any action that would “excite interest in the State 
Department.”128 
4.5 The Empire’s Acts of Possession in the Antarctic  
As the British undertook their diplomatic maneuvers with the Americans and Norwegians, 
they realized that political action alone could not preserve the Empire’s position – the 
situation required a “practical demonstration of interest.”129 The Antarctic Committee 
decided that British citizens should physically wave the Union Jack in the Dependencies 
and in the areas Australia intended to claim. This harkened back to the old belief that, as 
Antarctic scholar Christy Collis has explained, “explorers are not just government 
employees or symbolic representatives, but vessels of enormous legal force.”130  
As a first step, in the fall of 1928 the Australians and British gave a whaling 
license to the South African firm, the Kerguelen Sealing and Whaling Company, 
stipulating they plant the Union Jack wherever possible in the south polar region, 
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especially in the areas Australia intended to claim.131 The Antarctic Committee also 
decided to utilize experienced Australian polar explorer Hubert Wilkins – already en 
route to undertake a 1900-mile flight from Graham Land to the Ross Dependency – to 
counteract Byrd’s work by dropping the British flag on any land he might fly over.132 
Wilkins became the first to fly in the Antarctic on 20 December 1928 (beating Byrd by a 
few weeks), clocking 11 hours across Graham Land and covering some 1600 miles. 
Technical and weather difficulties kept Wilkins from travelling to the Ross Dependency, 
however, and he only managed to drop the Union Jack within the boundaries of the 
FID.133  
Still, the British provided Wilkins with further government funds and use of the 
Discovery Committee’s ship William Scoresby when he decided to try again in 1929. The 
Antarctic Committee hoped that Wilkins would match Byrd’s aerial efforts and keep the 
Empire’s “end up in the way of straight discovery.”134 Dogged by bad weather and 	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mechanical issues, Wilkins’ flights were again confined to the FID, where he dropped 
flags and documents three times.135 By this point, the Empire’s emphasis on flag planting 
made some British officials worry that other countries might believe Britain doubted the 
strength of its sovereignty in the Antarctic and accepted polar claims based solely on flag 
planting (or dropping). “Other countries will take advantage of our apparently lax 
procedure to formulate or renew doubtful claims of their own,” Dominions Office official 
Alexander Clutterbuck warned.136 The British-Australian-New Zealand Antarctic 
Research Expedition (BANZARE) – the centerpiece of the Empire’s activities on the 
ground in the Antarctic – would try to address these concerns by mixing its flag planting 
with science.   
During the Imperial Conference of 1926, the Committee on British Policy in the 
Antarctic concluded that Australia had to send an expedition to the Eastern Antarctic 
before it issued Letters Patent or an Order in Council claiming the region. The 
BANZARE expedition project was born. As historians Marie Kawaja and Tom Griffiths 
have pointed out, disagreements between the Australians and British over who should 
finance the project delayed the venture.137 The Australians and British also fundamentally 
differed in legal interpretations regarding the need for another expedition. While 
Australian explorer Douglas Mawson wanted another expedition for scientific purposes, 
he argued that, legally, his previous efforts – between 1911-1914 – had done enough to 
place the entire region under Australian control. He noted that Ottawa did “not ask Great 	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Britain for permission to explore and take possession of unknown lands to the north of 
Canada.” He suggested Australia immediately claim its own sector.138  
Australian External Affairs official Walter Henderson – who had studied law at 
l’Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris and had worked on the Antarctic file – 
argued that the absence of another expedition to the region would not significantly 
weaken an Australian territorial claim.139 For a year, the Public Summary of Proceedings 
from the Imperial Conference had notified the international community of the areas to 
which the Empire believed it had special rights with no protest. The silence of foreign 
powers, Henderson insisted, should be taken as recognition of the Empire’s claim. 
Considering increasing international interest in the Antarctic, Henderson maintained that 
delaying a claim would be more harmful than choosing not to send an additional 
expedition. The Australian government presented Henderson’s argument to the British 
government (stressing the practical difficulties facing the expedition: finding suitable ship 
and the exorbitant cost) and sought permission to immediately issue Letters Patent 
claiming all of the territory explored by Mawson between 160° to 85° East (Queen Mary 
Land, Wilkes Land, King George V Land and Oates Land). The Australians maintained 
that Enderby Land and Kemp Land, which had not been explored by Mawson’s previous 
expedition, could not be claimed until revisited by a British expedition.140  
London concluded that any Australian claim without an additional expedition 
would lead to foreign protest, especially from the Norwegians and Americans. The 
interdepartmental committee, made up of officials from the Admiralty, Colonial, Foreign 
and Dominions offices, stressed that the claims made by Mawson in his earlier expedition 	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had never been ratified by His Majesty’s Government, which weakened their standing in 
international law.141 Foreign Office Legal Adviser Cecil Hurst agreed and warned that if 
the Norwegians performed flag plantings in Enderby Land (which they did in 1929), and 
the Australians did not, it “would be hard to recover the position afterwards by 
diplomatic means or by arbitration as our claim was weak in international law.”142 The 
British repeatedly explained to the Australians that the Empire’s control over the 
Antarctic was at stake and that they had to send an expedition as soon as possible.143 To 
ease some of Australia’s burden, British officials suggested that the Discovery, the ship 
of the Discovery Committee, could be made available. 
In Canberra, Australia’s External Affairs department concluded that the 
Norwegian and American expeditions represented a clear threat to Australia’s Antarctic 
interests and demanded a response. With pressure growing in the Australian press, Prime 
Minister Bruce accepted the need for an expedition in the summer of 1928, and suggested 
Britain and New Zealand participate.144 Although the New Zealand government initially 
considered declining the offer, elder statesman Francis Bell convinced Prime Minister 
Gordon Coates to provide funding in the interest of commonwealth solidarity.145 Months 	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passed, however, before the British and Australians agreed on a suitable cost sharing 
formula.146  
In the meantime, Richard Casey pushed for a two-season expedition, so that the 
party could explore the entire three thousand mile coastline between King George V 
Land and Enderby Land.147 Casey noted that “a certain amount of flag planting is all that 
could be done in one season, but the term 'flag planting' has been used as synonymous 
with 'consolidating British sovereignty.'” In Casey’s opinion, to actually claim as opposed 
to consolidate sovereignty, the expedition had to undertake something “more serious than 
simple landings and placing of flags…such as charting the coast line and some attempts 
at serious contributions towards the scientific knowledge of the area.” To Casey it was a 
waste of resources to take the expedition “laboriously halfway round the world for a mere 
few months' hurried flag planting, that could easily be put in the shade by the Americans 
and others.”148 Casey believed that science, such as the work completed by the Discovery 
Committee, was one of the most important symbols of state sovereignty in the Antarctic. 
He thought that the Australians should explain to the Norwegians that through the 
scientific work of BANZARE, “British sovereignty will be cemented in area from 	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Enderby Land to Ross Sea other than Adelie Land.”149 In the years that followed, the 
pivotal role that scientific work played in state sovereignty strategies would continue to 
increase in importance. 
Only in March 1929 did the Australian government establish an Antarctic 
Committee to plan, organize and coordinate the joint effort. It agreed with Casey’s 
assessment and planned for a two-season expedition. Led by Douglas Mawson, the 
largely ship-borne expedition (along with a small aircraft) would sail along the coast of 
the territory between Enderby Land and King George V Land, plant the flag wherever 
possible on the continent, chart and survey, perform scientific investigations and estimate 
the region’s economic value and whaling potential. 
In its first season, the BANZARE departed from Cape Town on the Discovery to 
take formal possession of Enderby Land and Kemp Land.150 On his first flight over the 
Antarctic coastline on 31 December 1929, Mawson flew an airplane over a new stretch 
he named Mac. Robertson Land, after one of the expedition’s Australian benefactors. Ice 
conditions, however, frustrated Mawson’s efforts to land on the continent.151 On 13 
January 1930, the Australians settled for a small rocky islet off the coast, which Mawson 
named Proclamation Island. Once on the island, Mawson and his men erected a flagpole, 
read an official proclamation that claimed Enderby Land, Kemp Land and Mac. 
Robertson Land, shot some photographs and hauled up the Union Jack in an act of 
ceremonial possession that had been practiced by explorers for centuries.152 As historian 
Tom Griffiths has explained, this act of possession, “clumsily performed with rock, pole, 
plaque, cloth, paper and voice on an island connected only by ice to the mainland… 
vested all territories between longitudes 73 degrees east and 47 degrees east, and south of 
latitude 65 degrees in His Majesty King George the Fifth and His Heirs and Successors 	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for ever.” Harold Fletcher, a young zoologist on the expedition, sarcastically noted that 
“We claimed a huge tract of land which we had not landed on and had not even seen all 
of it.”153 During a flight over the mainland on 25 January, Mawson again performed a 
ceremonial act of possession, dropping a flag while reading a proclamation claiming the 
territory.154 Shortly after, the BANZARE headed back to Australia having failed to land 
on the continent during its first season of work.  
After the Depression hit Australia particularly hard, the new Prime Minister, 
James Scullin, pondered cancelling the second season of the expedition. The Australian 
government accepted, however, that further flag planting and scientific work was a legal 
necessity before a claim could be made. As historian David Day has shown, such a 
territorial annexation was proving ever more attractive to Scullin, who hoped his 
government would be able to tax foreign whalers. He even speculated that a claim in the 
Antarctic might jumpstart Australia’s own whaling industry.155 In 1930-1931, 41 factory 
ships and 232 whale catchers manned by thousands of men operated in the waters off 
Antarctica – it was still a lucrative industry and Australia wanted to benefit.156 In its 
second season, the expedition would chart the coastline from the Ross Sea to Mac. 
Robertson Land, most of which Mawson had explored in his 1911-1914 expedition. The 
Antarctic Committee and Australian government stressed that Mawson needed to land on 
the continent this time.157  
On 5 January 1931, Mawson fulfilled his orders when he landed on the continent 
proper at Commonwealth Bay, where the old hut still stood from his 1911 expedition. 
The small party re-occupied the hut for two days as Mawson prepared to formally claim 
the territory. With the expedition’s cameraman filming the formal ceremony, the party 
built a cairn, raised the flag and Mawson read a proclamation claiming as King George V 
Land all the land between 142º and 160º E extending to the South Pole. One of the 
expedition’s pilots, Stuart Campbell, contemptuously explained, “And thus were 	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thousands of miles of virgin ice clad land claimed for His Majesty King George V by his 
dearly beloved servant Douglas Mawson.” The claiming ceremonies, which Campbell 
called a “bloody farce,” continued.158 During a flight on 9 February, Mawson spotted new 
land, dropped the flag, and named it Princess Elizabeth Land. The expedition made it 
ashore on the coast of Mac. Robertson Land a few days later near a large monolith 
(which Mawson named after Prime Minister Scullin) and conducted a claiming ceremony. 
They held another at the eastern edge of Enderby Land on 18 February 1931.159 Shortly 
after, Mawson’s expedition turned northwards for home. 
Over the course of two seasons, the BANZARE had claimed land, charted the 
coastline, defined the continental shelf, completed an extensive amount of scientific work 
and discovered new whaling grounds.160 The expedition had successfully connected all of 
the territory between 45ºE and 160ºE (the western limit of the Ross Dependency) with an 
unbroken coastline.161 When compared with the temporary settlement and technological 
achievements of the Byrd venture, the activities of the BANZARE seem modest, but 
British and Commonwealth officials argued that the expedition had met the requirements 
for state activity and control in the polar regions articulated by Sir Cecil Hurst at the 
Imperial Conference of 1926. Still, the question lingered: Had the expedition done 
enough to allow Australia to claim the entire sector between 45°E and 160°E?162 At the 
Imperial Conference of 1930, this became one of the central questions explored by the 
Committee on Polar Questions.  
4.6 “All Existing British Claims Have Been Maintained 
Intact” 
In the fall of 1930, leaders and diplomats from the Dominions of the British Empire met 
in London for another Imperial Conference. As these officials discussed the future of the 
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Empire and crafted the historic Statute of Westminster (which offered legislative 
independence to the Dominions), they also attended the meetings of the Committee on 
Polar Questions.  
The late 1920s had produced a host of threats to the Empire’s polar interests, and 
the Committee acknowledged that many still lingered. The U.S. and Norway could still 
challenge the Empire’s polar possessions in the Arctic and Antarctic, while the British 
emphasized the danger Argentina posed to the FID. Earlier in 1930, the Argentines had 
disrupted the status quo in the FID when they sent three military officers to take 
command of the weather and wireless station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys. The 
British still believed their title to the South Orkneys and the FID was strong, based on 
exploration, administrative efforts, the sector principle and historic Argentine acceptance. 
On two occasions, the Polar Committee highlighted, the Argentines had been told the 
islands were British and had not protested. Nor had they objected to the Letters Patent of 
1908 or 1917. As a result, the British believed that they were in a strong enough position 
to protest the latest Argentine actions in the South Orkneys. The close trade relationship 
between the two countries complicated the situation, however, as did the consensus 
throughout London that “Argentina must be regarded as an essential part of the British 
Empire.”163 The British also realized that a protest would lead to arbitration, which they 
still wanted to avoid. Foreign Office official Allen Leeper stressed the danger, noting that, 
“The tribunal could scarcely fail, in giving its decision, to enunciate principles of far-
reaching importance, and the decision itself would tend to become a precedent which 
might be highly embarrassing.”164  
Given Britain’s need to maintain good relations with Argentina and the dangers of 
arbitration, the Polar Committee considered voluntarily ceding the South Orkneys or 
Laurie Island to the Argentines.165 The committee members determined, however, that 
any deal would “lead other powers to take a renewed interest in the Antarctic and revive 	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shadowy claims which they would otherwise have abandoned.” Instead, the British 
decided to continue their policy of maintaining the status quo and avoiding conflicts with 
the Argentines over the FID – a policy it would try to keep throughout the 1930s. At the 
same time, they would also avoid discussing the sector principle with the Argentines, due 
to the long-standing fear that they might use Canada’s sector claim in the Arctic as a 
precedent to support an annexation of their own in the Antarctic.166 The Committee on 
Polar Questions endorsed this strategy.  
Despite concern about the Argentines, the Committee on Polar Questions painted 
a very optimistic picture of the Empire’s position in the polar regions. It celebrated that 
“all existing British claims have been maintained intact.”167 Although concessions had 
been made to Norway, by 1930 the Empire’s bi-polar policies and diplomacy had proven 
remarkably successful. The strategy adopted at the Imperial Conference of 1926 for the 
Antarctic continued to proceed through the BANZARE’s activities. Coordination 
between Britain and the Dominions on polar affairs was better than ever. As a reflection 
of this cooperation, the British changed the name of the Antarctic Committee to the Polar 
Committee, and with representatives from Australia, New Zealand and, often, Canada, it 
adopted a truly bi-polar focus.168  
The Committee on Polar Questions accepted the conclusions of Foreign Office 
officials Laurence Collier and Ivone Kirkpatrick that the sector principle was close to 
“securing general acceptance.” The Soviet Union, Canada, Britain and New Zealand had 
all declared sectors. The British believed that the state practice of these four countries, 
combined with the implied acquiescence of the international community, could 
potentially elevate the sector principle to a rule of customary international law. The 
development would be even more likely if the two other primary players in the polar 
regions, Norway and the U.S., also embraced the sector principle. The British knew about 	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the Hughes Doctrine. But they interpreted Washington’s decision not to challenge 
Canada’s Arctic title during the MacMillan expedition or Britain’s Antarctic rights during 
the Byrd expedition to mean that, in practice, the Americans accepted that the sector 
principle and a show of state control could support a polar territorial claim. Further, the 
Americans had used arguments based on contiguity in the past and signed on to the 
Treaty of 1867, which, the British argued, initially established the principle of boundary 
lines running to the pole. In the Antarctic, the Foreign Office pointed to Byrd’s search for 
an independent coastal access to Marie Byrd Land as proof that the Americans believed a 
state had to control the coastline to claim a polar interior – the central tenet of the sector 
principle. As for the Norwegians, despite their strong views on effective occupation, they 
had been amenable to negotiation and the British still hoped they would recognize the 
benefits of the sector principle in the future.169 
The Foreign Office reports matched the optimism and conclusions of Canadian 
authorities. The agreement with the Norwegians over the Sverdrup Islands had boosted 
Ottawa’s confidence in the strength of Canada’s Arctic title. In January 1930, a Canadian 
General Staff study produced by Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Crerar, then a senior staff 
officer at the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence,170 highlighted how all 
“the sources of national title to lands” – discovery, effective occupation, control, 
contiguity and prescription – were working to strengthen and secure Canada’s title. The 
report stressed that Canada’s sector boundaries had not been challenged since they first 
appeared on the Department of Interior’s map in 1904. This “tacit acquiescence” from 
countries such as Norway and the U.S. over a period of 25 years barred them from 
protesting the Canadian claim, argued Crerar.171  
British and Canadian assessments all supported the view that the passage of time 
and the silence of the international community would continue to strengthen their 	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territorial claims, and bring the sector principle closer to acceptance as a rule of 
customary international law. To ensure that this silence continued, the Committee on 
Polar Questions advised against publicly discussing polar claims or the sector principle. 
The Committee understood the need to avoid any action that might provoke a foreign 
protest – such as broadcasting the legal foundation of the Empire’s claims.172  
Canadian and British experts were also sure that time would prove their 
conception of the doctrine of effective occupation in the polar regions correct. They 
continued to uphold the conclusions of James White and Cecil Hurst that control 
constituted effective occupation in the High Arctic and Antarctic. An investigation of 
Canada’s title to Ellesmere by the External Affairs department concluded that the RCMP 
post on the northernmost island of the archipelago met the requirements of international 
law and state practice, effectively extending Canada’s control and sovereignty over the 
entire island. The document utilized the fourth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law 
which emphasized that a “police sweep” of “remote spots” could show how far a state 
was able to establish authority without permanent occupation.173 The Foreign Office 
stressed that in the harsh polar environment a state did not have to display continuous 
control over every part of its territory, just “some continuous show of interest.” By 
establishing control over the means of access to a polar territory, a state could extend its 
authority over a vast interior.174 Crerar’s report captured this sentiment when he argued, 
“Control may rest on an extension of actual occupation or it may be argued as an obvious, 
even though unexercised, power which geographical propinquity and natural 	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communications confer.”175 The Committee on Polar Questions embraced this vision of 
effective occupation in the polar regions, ruling that state control could be “intermittent 
or periodical, provided, however, that it attains such effectiveness as is reasonably 
possible along the coasts of the areas which are the subject of a claim.” This level of 
control could be shown by periodic visits and scientific studies, and by administrative 
acts, such as those in place to regulate the whaling industry.176  
4.7 Norway’s Occupation of Eastern Greenland and the 
Australian Antarctic Sector  
Despite British hopes that Norway might accept the sector principle, Oslo continued to 
insist on effective occupation in the early 1930s. Shortly before the Clipperton Island 
decision, Norwegian international lawyer Gustav Smedal took up his country’s defence 
of the idea in his treatise Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Regions. Smedal, an 
ardent nationalist, headed Norway’s Greenland Association and wanted his country to 
secure a polar empire.177 The British Dominions Office pointed out that the “ulterior 
motive” of Smedal’s book was supporting Norway’s contention that Eastern Greenland 
was outside Danish sovereignty, but noted his conclusions were not “altogether 
unprejudiced.”178 
Only in the fifteenth century, lamented Smedal, were territorial claims as 
excessive as those currently underway in the polar regions. In the Antarctic, Smedal 
asserted, Great Britain claimed land, “some of which is quite unexplored, has never been 
seen by any human being, and about the conditions of which there is no positive 
information.” The Norwegian argued that the sector principle had no legal foundation and 
no right to become “embodied in international law.”179 Smedal accepted that the Saint-
Germain-en-Laye Treaty (1919) had established that local conditions do matter when 
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considering the requirements of occupation, but only to a degree. Unless a state’s 
occupation was “permanent and efficient” other powers did not have to respect its 
territorial claim.180 Canada’s acts of occupation on the islands of the Arctic Archipelago 
offered a “good precedent for how to take effective possession of polar areas,” but the 
author maintained that its sovereignty did not “extend to the neighbouring territories, 
which are not submitted to control.” Smedal argued that Canada’s police posts only 
established control over their immediate surroundings. Furthermore, even in the case of a 
polar island where a state had attained effective possession, its sovereignty did not extend 
to the other islands in the group. Scientific or exploratory expeditions and establishing 
scientific posts or wireless stations were also insufficient mechanisms employed by states 
trying to gain sovereignty over polar territory.181 Smedal concluded that a vast part of the 
Arctic (such as Eastern Greenland, the northern islands of the Arctic Archipelago and 
Franz Josef Land) and Antarctic were ineffectively occupied and remained terra 
nullius.182 Although he used Huber’s decision to support his arguments, Smedal 
expressed a far more rigorous standard of effective occupation.  
Norway tested its views on effective occupation against Denmark in Eastern 
Greenland. Norway contended that Denmark had sovereignty only over those parts of 
Greenland which she genuinely occupied and administered, that this was all Norway had 
ever acknowledged and that Denmark’s full sovereignty required an extension of this 
occupation. Afraid of Norway’s objection, in early 1930 the Danes issued a three-year 
plan for the exploration of Eastern Greenland that included three ships, two planes and a 	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hundred personnel armed with police authority. In March the Norwegians asked that 
Denmark scale back its planned activities or they would bring the question of Eastern 
Greenland’s ownership to the Permanent Court of International Justice.  
Meanwhile, Adolf Hoel, who was in charge of the Institute for the Exploration of 
Svalbard and Arctic Ocean (NSIU), allied with Gustav Smedal and his friend Frede 
Castberg (legal advisor to the Minister of the Foreign Affairs) to raise public support for 
a Norwegian occupation of Eastern Greenland.183 While Hoel, Smedal and the 
Norwegian Council of Arctic and Antarctic Administration pressured the government, the 
state sought to secure its interests through bilateral talks. After discussing the matter with 
Castberg and the Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Frederik Mastrander, Hoel and 
Smedal decided to initiate a private occupation of Eastern Greenland. In the summer of 
1931 a hunting expedition travelled to Erik the Red Land (Erik Raude’s Land – 71 3’N 
and 75 4’N) with orders to raise the Norwegian flag and declare their occupation of the 
region. Norwegian newspapers endorsed the occupation and pressured the government to 
do the same, which it did on 10 July 1931 with a proclamation declaring Norway’s 
sovereignty over the area. On the following day Denmark submitted the dispute to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in accordance with the previous arbitration 
agreement between the two and also in conformity with the “optional clause” of Article 
36 of the Court’s Statute, previously accepted by both countries. 184 
The British knew Norway would base its case on effective occupation. Smedal 
accompanied the Norwegian delegation to The Hague.185 Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs James Thomas stressed that “in pronouncing judgment the Court may seek to lay 
down general principles regarding the acquisition of sovereignty in polar regions which 
might be embarrassing.” A decision ppholding the vision of effective occupation held by 
Smedal would have a momentous impact on the Empire’s claims throughout the polar 
regions. The judges of the PCIJ could also choose to attack the sector principle if they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Norway established the Institute for the Exploration of Svalbard and Arctic Ocean (NSIU) with orders to 
establish “a polar geopolitical and research policy programme.” Drivenes and Jølle, Into the Ice, 292. 
184 Drivenes and Jølle, Into the Ice, 297-302. See also Skarstein, “Erik the Red’s Land,” 173-179; 
Apollonio, Lands That Hold Us Spellbound. 
185 Charles Wingfield to Sir John Simson, British Legation, Oslo, 1 June 1932, NAA, A981, ANT 4, Part 
10, Antarctic Control of.  
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provided a formula for the acquisition of polar territory.  These concerns led Thomas to 
advise Australia to make its sector claim in the Antarctic “well in advance of the 
conclusion of the Greenland case.”186  
 Australian officials had been seriously considering how to claim their Antarctic 
sector for more than a year before the oral hearings for the Eastern Greenland dispute 
started in November 1932. The optimistic conclusions of the Committee on Polar 
Questions supported Prime Minister Scullin’s belief that the completion of the 
BANZARE’s second season of activity “completed substantially the second stage of the 
process recommended by the Imperial Conference of 1926.” Over the course of the 
previous two years the great portion of the Australian sector between 45°E and 160°E 
had been revisited and British sovereignty proclaimed on multiple occasions. Scullin 
asked the Foreign Office if it was time to implement the third stage laid out in 1926 and 
officially claim the Australian sector.187 Although the Scullin government fell to the 
United Australia party of Joseph Lyons in 1931, the new government also prioritized the 
south polar region. The investment in BANZARE, the thirst for whaling revenues and 
national pride pushed the Australian government towards an Antarctic claim. Lyons 
appointed legal expert John Greig Latham his Attorney General and Minister of External 
Affairs, and requested he determine how to claim an Australian Antarctic Territory.188  
Latham concluded that Mawson’s expeditions afforded Australia a better claim to 
the sector between 45°E and 160°E than any other state “in the unappropriated regions of 
either the Arctic or the Antarctic areas.” While some Australian officials questioned 
whether more must be done to occupy the area Australia intended to claim, Latham 
thought that any attempt at occupation “would necessarily be so limited in character that 
it might have the unfortunate effect of prejudicing, rather than assisting, the claims which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister’s Department, 9 January 1933, NAA, A981, 
ANT 2, Part 1, “Antarctic Control Australian Sector” pt.I. Charles Wingfield to Sir John Simson, British 
Legation, Oslo, 1 June 1932, NAA, A981, ANT 4, Part 10, Antarctic Control of. 
See also Charles Wingfield to Sir John Simon, 13 January 1933, NAA, A981, ANT 2, Part 2, “Antarctic 
Control – Australian Sector” Pt.2; Charles Wingfield to Sir John Simson, British Legation, Oslo, 1 June 
1932, NAA, A981, ANT 4, Part 10, Antarctic Control and Sir Charles Wingfield to Sir John Simon, 12 
May 1934, NAA, A981, ANT 51, Part 3, [Antarctic]. Norwegian Claims Part 3.  
187 J.H. Scullin, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, to Foreign Office, 13 July 1931, NA, DO 
114/34.  
188 Kawaja and Griffiths, “Our great frozen neighbour,” 36-37. 
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may now be made upon the basis of exploration and discovery in regions where effective 
occupation is not possible.”189 Latham explained that once Australia took over its sector, 
it would provide “some measure of control over the area, which will have to be effective 
though not continuous” – which reflected the conclusions of the Committee on Polar 
Questions.190  
Lengthy discussions began between Latham and the Dominions Office over how 
to secure international recognition of the Empire’s Antarctic claims.191 In London, most 
officials agreed that the time had come to claim an Australian Antarctic sector. Australian 
exploratory work and the Foreign Office’s belief that the international community had 
“generally recognised” the sector principle provided a firm foundation for Australia’s 
claim. While some worried that the Australian sector’s vast hinterland had never been 
penetrated, the British found support in the fact that the interior of the FID had never 
been seen when it was claimed in 1917, and no state had officially challenged Britain’s 
sector claim.192 In keeping with the conclusions of the Imperial Conference of 1926, the 
British decided that France’s claim to Adélie Land must be respected, although its 
geographic boundaries remained unknown. When Law Officers of the Crown, Thomas 
Inskip (who had previously reviewed the claim to the Ross Dependency) and Boyd 
Merriman (the Solicitor General), appraised the plan for an Australian Antarctic Territory 
in July 1932, they advised that the claim should proceed using “meridians of longitude” 
running to the pole. As in 1923 with the Ross Dependency, the Law Officers argued that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 In keeping with British policy, in the official notification of an Australian claim, Latham advised that 
“no reference to the grounds of the claim is made, any objection which may hereafter be made may be dealt 
with without the disadvantage of our hands being more or less tied in advance.” J.G. Latham, Australia 
House, to J.H. Thomas, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 30 May 1932, NAA, A981, ANT 2, Part 1, 
“Antarctic Control Australian Sector” pt.I. 
190The government, for instance, would have to provide some regulation of the areas when the international 
convention on whaling came into force. J.G. Latham, Minister of External Affairs, For Cabinet, Antarctic: 
Control of Australian Sector, 6 December 1932 (and June 1932), NAA: A981, ANT 2, Part 1, “Antarctic 
Control Australian Sector” Pt.I 
191 Kawaja, “Extending Australia’s Control Over its ‘Great Frozen Neighbour,’” 29. 
192 H.N. Tait, Dominions Office to Law Officers of the Crown, 31 December 1931, NA, DO 114/34; Triggs, 
International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 94. British officials believed that most foreign 
powers would accept an Australian sector claim, except for the Norwegians. The Australians had not 
implemented the kind of “lasting and real control” that Norway thought necessary. Still, the “gentleman’s 
understanding” between the two countries held, and the British did not think the Norwegians would protest 
an Australian sector claim. Charles Wingfield to Sir John Simon, 13 January 1933, NAA, A981, ANT 2, 
Part 2, “Antarctic Control – Australian Sector” Pt.2 and Telegram (Thomas) to Commonwealth 
Government, 4:45 pm, 4 October 1932, NA, DO 114/34. 
	   257	  
the territory already fell under British sovereignty and a formal act of annexation was 
neither needed nor desirable. All that the situation required was an “unequivocal assertion 
of sovereignty” over the sector.193  
On 8 December 1932, the Australian cabinet recommended that an Order in 
Council be issued claiming an Australian Antarctic sector, but wanted to delay its release 
until 1933 when they could determine what legislation to implement in the new 
territory.194 The British intervened, warning of the potential impact of the Eastern 
Greenland case. With the PCIJ’s decision on the case looming, the British argued that an 
official Order in Council claiming the territory had to be released as soon as possible.195  
On 7 February 1933 the British government issued an Order in Council that 
asserted its sovereignty over “all the islands and territories other than over than Adélie 
Land situated south of the 60th degree of South Latitude and lying between the 160th 
degree of East Longitude and the 45th degree of East Longitude” and placed the sector 
under the authority of the Commonwealth of Australia. In March, Canberra published the 
Order in Council in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette. When the Australian 
Parliament debated the legislation at the end of May 1933, Richard Casey explained that 
the claim capped off twenty years of “continuous and concerted effort.” Casey and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 They also highlighted that the “circumstances are peculiar, and the ordinary principles governing the 
limitation of the territory to which title to sovereignty extends when such title is acquired by discovery 
followed by occupation are scarcely applicable.” T.W.H. Inskip and F.B. Merriman, Law Officers of the 
Crown to Dominions Office, 29 July 1932, NA, DO 114/34. See also, Triggs, International Law and 
Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 93-94, 108-109. 
194 J.G. Latham, External Affairs, 10 January 1933, NAA, A981, ANT 2, Part 1, “Antarctic Control 
Australian Sector” pt. 1. 
195 J.G. Latham, External Affairs, 10 January 1933, NAA, A981, ANT 2, Part 1, “Antarctic Control 
Australian Sector” pt. 1. While the Order in Council Britain used to claim the Ross Dependency had 
utilized the British Settlements Act of 1887, London and Canberra decided to assume control of the 
Australian Antarctic sector using section 122 of the Australian Constitution, which provided that that “The 
Parliament may make laws for the government of any….territory placed by the King under the authority of 
and accepted by the Commonwealth…” J.G. Latham, Minister of External Affairs, For Cabinet, Antarctic: 
Control of Australian Sector, 6 December 1932 (and June 1932), NAA, A981, ANT 2, Part 1, “Antarctic 
Control Australian Sector” Pt.I; J.G. Latham, Minister for External Affairs for Cabinet, Antarctic: Control 
of Australian Sector, 6 December 1932, NAA, A432, 1953/3228 Part 1. Solicitor General George S. 
Knowles concluded that the British Settlement Act worked for territories acquired by settlement, but not for 
those without. What was required for the Australian sector was a formal notification of the claim to 
sovereignty rather than an instrument providing for the government of territories. George S. Knowles, 
Secretary, Solicitor General to the Secretary of External Affairs, Annexation of Territories in the Antarctic, 
2 March 1932, NAA, A432, 1953/3228 Part 1. See also Secretary of State, Dominion Affairs to Prime 
Minister’s Department, 4 October 1932, NAA, A981, ANT 2, Part 1, “Antarctic Control Australian Sector” 
pt. 1. 
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Latham highlighted the territory’s economic potential, the benefits of the whaling 
industry and the role the region could play in Australia’s security. Some Australian 
Members of Parliament questioned whether the League of Nations should administer the 
Antarctic, while others worried the claim might upset the Americans and Norwegians. 
Most agreed with Casey’s assertion, however, that “if we do not take this sector, and 
claim sovereignty over it, some other country will.” The OIC easily passed through 
Australian Parliament.196 On 13 June 1933, the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance 
Act received royal assent, and it came into operation in August 1936.197  
	  
Figure 7: Map showing Australian Antarctic sector. Segment of Antarctica entitled, 
'Australian Antarctic Territory.' Diagram to accompany report to Chief Draftsman. 
NAA, AA1964/7, 23. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Government of Australia, Hansard, 26 May 1933, at 1952, 1956, 2020 
197 Philip Law, Antarctic Odyssey (Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1983), 8. Casey insisted that 
“if we do not take this sector, and claim sovereignty over it, some other country will.” It might prove 
valuable for security reasons in the future, or even as a place to train the Australian Navy. Tom Griffiths, 
“The AAT and the Evolution of the Australian Nation,” Proceedings of the Symposium to Mark 75 Years of 
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4.8 “Sixty-Five Percent” Claimed 
With the creation of the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT), the British Empire used 
the sector principle to claim claim millions of square miles of completely unknown polar 
territory. It was a bold move, spurred by the belief that the passage of time and the 
silence of the international community had strengthened the Empire’s legal position in 
the polar regions. In the process, the British, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians and 
the Soviets had offered the world a solution to the problem of polar sovereignty. By the 
beginning of 1933, British and Commonwealth officials, in the context of the time, 
anticipated that the broader world might accept the sector principle as a rule of customary 
international law and the basis of a bi-polar legal regime. 
The faith British and Commonwealth officials placed in the sector principle 
hinged on the continued silence and inaction of the U.S. Yet, Australia’s sector claim 
broke one of the central tenets of the Empire’s polar strategy – avoiding any dramatic 
action that might “excite interest in the State Department.”198 The sector lines of the AAT 
enclosed Wilkes Land, awakening American officials to the advancing legal situation in 
the polar regions. Anna O’Neill, assistant to the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of 
State, lamented that, in a little over a decade, Britain, Canada and Russia had used the 
sector principle to claim “approximately sixty-five percent” of the Arctic and 
Antarctic.199 This time, American interest in the polar regions was seriously engaged.  
The Australian sector claim outraged the Norwegian public as well. Antarctic 
expert Bjarne Aagard captured their anger in a strong opinion piece in the Norwegian 
Journal of Commerce and Shipping stating, “Norway had bartered her birth-right for less 
than a pottage of lentils.” With the creation of the AAT, Norwegian whaling companies 
that were doing the most work in the Antarctic needed to apply for more licenses and pay 
even more fees. The British and Australians, Aagard persisted, had done nothing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the Polar Committee, 2 July 1930, NAA, A981, ANT 54 PART 1, USA 
Claims I. 
199 Miss Anna O’Neill, the Arctic Sector Claimed by Russia and American Claims Therein, 30 October 
1933, NARA, RG 59, Entry 5245, Box 1, Folder 2, File Polar Regions. Sovereignty. Sector Principle. 
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effectively occupy their Antarctic Dependencies.200 In the years that followed the creation 
of the AAT, the Australians and British would continue to fear a Norwegian challenge.   
 British and Australian officials knew creating the AAT would upset the 
Norwegians, and possibly the Americans. The looming decision in the Eastern 
Greenland case left little choice but to take immediate action. That single decision had 
the potential to dramatically change the entire legal landscape in the polar regions. At the 
time, legal expert Lawrence Preuss captured this sentiment. The court’s judgment, Preuss 
predicted, would determine whether title in the polar regions, “shall be based upon 
effective occupation or upon the principle of sectors.” “In view of the conflicting national 
claims in the Arctic and Antarctic and of the increasing exploitation of the resources of 
these areas,” Preuss concluded, “the pronouncement of the Permanent Court in the East 
Greenland case will be awaited with great interest.”201 
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British Claims for Antarctic Sectors,” NA, CO 78/194/17. 
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Chapter 5 
5 “Far From Settled”: Polar Sovereignty and the Rules of 
Territorial Acquisition in the Interwar Years  
In April 1933, the international legal community anxiously awaited the Permanent Court 
of International Justice’s decision in the Eastern Greenland dispute. The case brought 
together the world’s leading legal minds and polar experts. Professors Gilbert Gidel of 
the University of Paris and Charles de Visscher of the University of Ghent served as 
counsels for Norway and Denmark respectively. Amongst the experts brought to advise 
the Norwegian legal team were the two architects of the Erik Raudes Land occupation, 
Gustav Smedal and Adolf Hoel. Alongside thirteen other judges sat Sir Cecil Hurst, 
known for crafting the Empire’s Antarctic legal policy, and Norway’s former minister to 
Britain, Benjamin Vogt, who served as an ad hoc judge.1 Given the subject of the case 
and the pedigree of the participants, observers expected that the PCIJ’s decision would 
clarify the anomalous legal space of the polar regions.2 One of the major roles of the PCIJ 
was to create a “definite, authoritative statement of the law” in place of the varied 
opinions of international jurists and state officials.3 The opening arguments of the 
Norwegian and Danish legal teams in November 1932 reflected this expectation. Both 
sides highlighted the major impact of the case on the principles of international law: 
testing the existing rules of territorial acquisition; clarifying the doctrine of effective 
occupation; and, determining what a state had to do to establish its sovereignty over polar 
territory.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Both Denmark and Norway had the right to appoint judges to the bench.	  
2 See Lawrence Preuss, “The Dispute Between Denmark and Norway Over the Sovereignty of East 
Greenland,” The American Journal of International Law 26, no. 3 (1932): 469-487; P.T. Federspiel, “The 
Disputed Sovereignty Over East Greenland,” International Affairs 11, no. 6 (1932): 783-811; and Charles 
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“The Codification of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 29, no. 1 (1935): 26. 
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The lawyers in the Eastern Greenland case drew upon the judicial decisions given 
in the two latest arbitrations dealing with territorial sovereignty – Palmas Island (1928) 
and Clipperton Island (1931). The cases redefined the nature of effective occupation and 
brought a degree of clarity to the rules on the acquisition of territory.5 While older legal 
treatises on international law presented a conception of occupation that stressed 
settlement, permanency, use and physical possession – much like the Hughes Doctrine – 
these newer decisions shifted the focus to the display and exercise of state functions. 
Furthermore, the decisions established that the environmental conditions, population size 
and the special circumstances of a territory all influenced the level of activity required to 
prove state title.6 The PCIJ’s final judgment in the Eastern Greenland case upheld the 
approach to the doctrine of effective occupation taken by the two previous cases. Taken 
together the three decisions set a modest threshold for occupation in sparsely populated 
or uninhabited regions like the Arctic and Antarctic.  
Historians and lawyers point to the three cases, especially the Eastern Greenland 
decision, as pivotal moments in the evolution of polar territorial claims. They maintain 
that the legal decisions brought instant clarification to the requirements of territorial 
acquisition, and relief to the states with claims in the polar regions. This uncritical 
approach produces an easy narrative in which the problems of terrestrial polar 
sovereignty were all solved by Eastern Greenland, allowing states to easily judge the 
strengths and weaknesses of their claims. Their clarity is retrospective. Scholars have 
assessed the influence of the decisions reflecting current legal desires, assumptions and 
criteria, rather than discerning how they were viewed and understood by contemporaries 
of the time.7 Through this ahistorical reconstruction of the legal landscape scholars have 	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November 1929. See also Mark Frank Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law: Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion (London, 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1926); and C.G. Fenwick, “Reviewed Work: The Acquisition and Government 
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oversimplified the past and ignored the different interpretations, attitudes and ways of 
thinking the decisions inspired.  
The decisions in question clarified certain elements of the law, but they avoided 
laying out specific requirements, failed to provide a clear formula for territorial 
acquisition and raised fundamental questions about the doctrine of contiguity, the nature 
of occupation and the indeterminacy of the law. States could not be sure that the rulings 
in the three cases would stand the test of time, would not be challenged and overturned, 
or that developments in the polar regions would not render obsolete the criteria for 
effective occupation considered in these decisions. Accordingly, in the eyes of the legal 
authorities at the time, the international law on territorial acquisition remained unsettled 
with no clear, general guide for states with claims in the polar regions. The “Gordian knot” 
of polar sovereignty remained uncut. 
5.1 Re-Defining Occupation: Palmas Island and Clipperton 
Island 
In 1927, American political scientist C.G. Fenwick proclaimed that “no subject could 
better illustrate the deplorably neglected condition of international law during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” than the rules for territorial acquisition, 
especially over sparsely populated or uninhabited territory. Fenwick insisted that the 	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“chaotic legal situation” urgently called for “constructive treatment by the formulation of 
new rules of international law.”8 A year later, Arbiter Max Huber released his decision in 
the Palmas Island case, now hailed as the “classical text on the acquisition of 
sovereignty.”9 Huber recognized the shortcomings of the law and sought to address the 
problem by giving his conclusions universal application. Legal scholar Daniel-Erasmus 
Khan explained that, unlike the decisions in other arbitrations on territorial disputes, 
Huber infused his decision with “certain far-reaching doctrinal statements of a general 
character” that gave it an “unparalleled echo in the international legal community.”10  
The dispute over Palmas Island started in 1898 when the Treaty of Paris ended the 
Spanish-American War and Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. Rather than 
name each of the multitude of islands in the archipelago, the negotiators simply drew a 
large box around all of the territory that the U.S. would acquire.11 On the fringes of this 
box lay Palmas, a small island (two miles long and less than a mile wide with a 
population under one thousand) resting just 48 nautical miles from Mindano, the 
southernmost major island in the Philippines. The Dutch Talaud Islands of the 
Netherlands East Indies were just a few miles from Palams. When an American party 
travelled to Palmas in January 1906, they were shocked to find a Dutch flag rising from 
the island. The discovery sparked two decades of diplomatic correspondence. Unable to 
agree on ownership, in 1925 the Netherlands and U.S. agreed to send the case to 
arbitration, entrusting the decision to Max Huber, a judge on the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and the PCIJ.12 Prior to hearing the case, Huber decided that the critical date 	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9 Cornelis G. Roelofsen, “International Arbitration and Courts,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law, Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 167. 
Gillian Triggs has asserted that Huber’s “opinion on the subject of effective occupation has achieved 
oracular importance.” Triggs, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5. 
10 Huber prepared his decision to meet his objective. According to Daniel-Erasmus Khan, “the Palmas 
award owes its continuing success” to the feeling “that what had been delivered here was not just another 
merely technical decision on territorial ownership, but that the significance of Huber’s deliberations went 
far beyond the rather marginal issue actually at stake.” Daniel-Erasmus Khan, “Max Huber as Arbitrator: 
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11 Donald Rothwell, Stuart Kaye, Afshin Akhtarkhavari and Ruth Davis, International Law: Cases and 
Materials with Australian Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 272. 
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in the dispute was the day that Spain and the U.S. signed the Treaty of Paris – 10 
December 1898. At this point, Spain’s title to the island must have been clearly 
established to allow the country to effectively transfer its sovereign rights to the U.S. The 
arbiter also determined that actions taken by either state after the critical date could not 
affect the outcome of the case.13  
With the critical date set at the moment they took the territory from Spain, the 
Americans had no chance to fulfill the requirements of settlement and use set out in the 
Hughes Doctrine. As a result, they turned to legal arguments based on discovery, 
acquiescence and contiguity to prove they had gained legitimate title to Palmas Island 
from Spain. The Americans pointed out that Spain first discovered and claimed the 
islands in the sixteenth century, an act that had to be viewed in light of the “law of the 
time it was done.” They admitted that in the twentieth century the acquisition of territory 
required effective occupation, but insisted that in the sixteenth century discovery still 
provided a state with a title of “unquestioned validity.” For several hundred years, the 
Americans argued, authors, cartographers and diplomatic treaties recognized Spain’s 
sovereignty over Palmas Island. No state protested Spain’s title during this period, 
indicating the international community’s “general acquiescence.”14  
The American application of the doctrine of contiguity accepted that “definite 
comprehensive rules of international law have not been formulated with regard to the 
rights accruing to a nation by reason of the geographic situation of territory.” They cited, 
however, the decision in the British Guiana Case, which indicated effective possession of 
part of a region gave a state rights to whatever land could be considered a “single 
geographic whole.” As a result, they argued that Palmas Island should be considered a 
part of the “geographical unit” that constituted the Philippine Archipelago, an area that 
was clearly and indisputably under Spanish sovereignty for centuries. The Americans 
acknowledged that “they obviously could not show specific acts of Spanish 
administration in every inch of the Philippines, but that it was sufficient merely to show 	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the occupation and control of the unit.”15 The consequences of their contiguity argument, 
and its impact on Canada’s legal position in regards to the Arctic Archipelago, were far 
from the American mindset.  
The Netherlands offered a strong rebuttal to the American arguments about 
discovery and contiguity. Their counter-memorandum stressed that when considering the 
legal value of territorial claims, which “instead of being consummated and terminated at 
one single moment, are of a permanent character,” changes in the law had to be taken into 
consideration. Since Spain’s discovery of the island, effective occupation had become an 
essential part of the law of territorial acquisition. Spain established neither occupation nor 
administration of the island.16 In sharp contrast, the Dutch argued that they made trade 
and political agreements with the Indigenous rulers of the island inhabitants as early as 
the seventeenth century (through the East India Company), and on-going administrative 
arrangements including barring foreign visits, outlawing slavery and piracy, applying 
taxation and distributing flags. The Dutch opposed the American use of contiguity 
doctrine, arguing that Palmas could not be considered part of the Philippines any more 
than they could consider it part of the Dutch-administered Talaud Islands just six miles 
from Palmas.17 
Huber’s decision on the case explained that territorial sovereignty “involves the 
exclusive right to display the activities of a State.” The “constituent elements of territorial 
sovereignty,” Huber insisted, consisted of the “actual continuous and peaceful display of 
state functions.”18 He ruled that the Netherlands displayed “acts characteristic of state 
authority” on Palmas over the course of several centuries and therefore secured its title to 
the island. Huber admitted that “gaps” existed in the continuous display of Dutch 
sovereignty, but allowed that state activity could be less frequent in such a small, sparsely 	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Arbitration,” 743. See Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States v Netherlands, Award, (1928) II 
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populated island. “Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised in 
fact at every moment on every point of territory,” Huber concluded. Further, it was not 
necessary that “the display of sovereignty should go back to a very far distant period.” 
Instead, the “establishment of sovereignty may be the outcome of a slow evolution, of a 
progressive intensification of state control.” Huber found that territorial sovereignty was 
a flexible concept – a collection of legal rights and duties that depended on the 
circumstances of a given case.19 Huber’s emphasis on state activity rather than actual 
settlement, and the allowances he made for a sparsely populated and isolated island, 
supported the British and Commonwealth officials approach towards polar sovereignty. 
Huber’s theory of “intertemporal law,” however, provided a caveat to his 
comments about effective occupation; an idea that should have worried all officials 
dealing with polar claims. Huber utilized this theory of intertemporal law to oppose the 
American arguments about title by discovery. According to legal scholar Taslim Olawale 
Elias, Huber’s theory contains two elements. The first is that acts “should be judged in 
light of the law contemporary with their creation,” as evident by Huber’s willingness to 
concede Spain’s title may have been created by discovery in the sixteenth century. The 
second part of the law, however, insists that the maintenance of this right has to “follow 
the conditions required by the evolution of law.” Plainly stated, a state could lose its title 
to territory if it did not comply with new developments in international law. “A right or 
title, once acquired, must not in a dynamic and constantly changing system of law be 
regarded as good for all time,” notes Elias, “particularly if the occupation has not been 
continuous or if the exercise or manifestation of authority or sovereignty over the 
territory has not been constantly kept up by whoever wants to claim a valid title 
subsequently.”20  
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Legal scholars immediately understood the ramifications of Huber’s theory of 
intertemporal law on territorial claims. Commenting shortly after Huber’s ruling, 
American legal expert Philip Jessup warned that the theory meant every state would have 
to constantly re-examine its title to every section of its territory to determine whether any 
changes to the law had necessitated a “reacquisition.”21 Subsequent scholars stressed the 
need to cautiously apply Huber’s theory, given the instability it could lead to in the 
international system.22 Without this caution, David Bederman recently pointed out, “no 
international claim is ever safe from challenge because some party or other can assert that 
there has been a change in the law favourable to its position.”23 
Huber’s ruling also threatened the doctrine of contiguity, a core aspect of the 
sector principle. The arbiter stated, “The title of contiguity, understood as a basis of 
territorial sovereignty, has no foundation in international law.”24 In the 1950s, legal 
scholar Hersch Lauterpacht posited that Huber may not have wished to completely do 
away with the doctrine of contiguity. The arbiter, after all, implied that control could be 
exercised over a section of territory from another adjacent section of territory. Huber 
explained that a group of islands may form “in law a unit, and that the fate of the 
principal part may involve the rest” – similar to how the Canadians viewed the Arctic 
Archipelago. Lauterpacht argued that Huber, instead of invalidating the doctrine of 
contiguity, simply meant to show that the only considerations to which contiguity must 
“cede is that of actual adverse display of sovereignty by the competing state.”25 Even if 
Huber intended to assert that international law did not recognize contiguity, Lauterpacht 
stated, “it is doubtful whether, notwithstanding the high authority of the arbitrator, it 	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23 David Bederman also pointed out that the critical date had the chance to solve the problem of 
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could dispose of a doctrine which has figured prominently in the practice of states.”26  
While Huber’s theory of intertemporal law and his comments on contiguity 
proved open to interpretation, his arguments about sovereignty provided an exercise in 
logic and effective juridical writing. Huber wrote his decision hoping the words would 
have lasting and universal appeal. Not every arbitrator contextualized their conclusions as 
a significant contribution to the formation of the rule of law, however, as the Clipperton 
Island decision illustrates.27  
French explorers first discovered Clipperton Island – a virtually uninhabitable 
Pacific island off the coast of Mexico – at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In 
1858, a French naval vessel reached the island and made careful geographic observations. 
Its crew landed ashore, claimed the island, but left no marks of sovereignty. When the 
vessel’s commander notified the French consulate in Honolulu of his claim, it published 
the declaration of sovereignty in a local journal. Years passed and the French never again 
landed on the island. The concession to exploit the island’s guano deposits granted by the 
French government to a private company went unused. Despite such neglect, France 
formally protested when several guano collectors raised the American flag on the island. 
In 1897, the Mexican government asserted its sovereignty over the island as Clipperton’s 
self-declared rightful and historic owner, and sent military governors to oversee its 
occupation. In 1909, Mexico and France submitted the territorial dispute to Italian king 
Victor Emmanuel III for arbitration. His legal representatives prepared a decision for the 
king’s release in 1931.28 
The decision upheld that France took effective possession of the island in 1858, 
and sufficiently exercised its authority there.  Just two pages in length, the decision 
admitted that a state was usually required to establish an organization in the territory to 	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administer its laws, but that this was sometimes “unnecessary.”29 If an uninhabited 
territory is, “from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, 
at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state,” a state’s occupation should be 
considered complete through its initial assertion of possession. Furthermore, France 
displayed animus occupandi, the will to act as sovereign, consistently, including a formal 
protest when the guano collectors raised the American flag. While the Mexican 
government argued that France had not fulfilled the requirements of occupation and 
notification set down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Berlin Act, the decision insisted that 
these were limited principles and inapplicable to the case. The ruling concluded that 
because France never had the intention of abandoning the island the fact that “she had not 
exercised her authority there in a positive manner” did not imply the forfeiture of its 
title.30  
Reporting on the case for the American Journal of International Law shortly after 
the decision, Edwin Dickinson concluded that the “doctrine of occupation had obviously 
lost its vitality.” The Clipperton decision highlighted that the requisite level of 
occupation was dictated by circumstance, which he thought an “altogether satisfactory 
solution from the legal point of view.” He immediately recognized the impact that the 
decision could have on territorial claims in the uninhabited and polar regions of the 
world.31 Writing a few decades after the ruling, legal scholar Hersch Lauterpacht further 
explained that the Clipperton Island case showed “that the notion of occupation, as 
traditionally understood, may be valueless, in relation to some areas, for the purpose of 
acquiring title.” In short, the case showed that effective occupation was not a “magic 
formula applicable to all situations.”32  
Taken together, the decisions in Palmas Island and Clipperton Island changed the 
requirements of effective occupation from the actual settlement demanded in older legal 	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30 Triggs, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 10. 
31 Edwin D. Dickinson, “The Clipperton Island Case,” The American Journal of International Law 27, no. 
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treatises to control – in the latter case, the barest semblance of control – and the display 
and exercise of the functions of government.33 As the 1931 edition of Pitt Cobbet’s Cases 
on International explained, “in determining the area affected by occupation, some regard 
must be had to the local configuration of the country, including its geographic unity, 
access and means of communication, the character and extent of existing population, and 
the requirements of security although it does not appear possible to formulate any precise 
rules on the subject.”34Australian legal scholar Gillian Triggs points out that these cases 
presented a view of “effective occupation as satisfied by flexible and comparative 
standards, which depend upon the degree and kind of control appropriate to the particular 
circumstances and character of the territory.”35 Control did not have to be continuous in 
every part of the territory, just regular. Legal scholar Surya P. Sharma argues these cases 
highlighted that state title to sparsely populated or uninhabited territory rested on a 
genuine exercise of domestic jurisdiction, or a genuine exercise of international dealing 
with the territory (a protest, or treaty).36  
The Palmas Island (1928) and Clipperton Island (1931) decisions clarified 
important elements of the law and set a modest limit for the level of state control required 
in sparsely populated and uninhabited territories. The arguments used to justify the 
decisions in the two cases could be used by British and Commonwealth officials to 
defend their claims in the polar regions. Nevertheless, the two cases failed to provide a 
clear formula for territorial acquisition and left fundamental questions about the specific 
requirements of effective occupation, contiguity doctrine and the theory of intertemporal 
law unanswered.37 In the end, arbitration settled disputes, but did not establish rules of 
law.38 The cases considered divergent opinions and allowed choice in the application of 
the rules. As Annaliese Quast Mertsch has explained, arbitration decisions often suffered 	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from a lack of continuity. The major issue remained that “cases were decided in isolation 
from one another; accordingly, the case law emanating from the various tribunals was not 
necessarily coherent, and did not make the desired contribution to the establishment and 
further development of international law.” Thus, in arbitration, the possibility of different 
or opposing decisions on similar legal issues increased.39 State officials had to wonder if 
the next legal case dealing with a territorial dispute would uphold the Palmas Island and 
Clipperton Island rulings.40 Furthermore, both decisions involved small, isolated islands 
– very different environments than the vast interiors of the Antarctic or the Arctic 
Archipelago. Would a legal ruling on a territorial dispute involving the polar regions use 
the two cases as precedents or would a new case establish completely new principles for 
the acquisition of territory?41 Perhaps these considerations contributed to the limited 
appearances of Palmas Island and Clipperton Island in state legal appraisals until after 
the Eastern Greenland decision.  
In his 1928 review of the Palmas Island decision, Philip Jessup stressed that 
“controversies concerning boundaries and the sovereignty over territories” would 
continue, and international law required more clarity to the “fundamental concepts” of 
territorial acquisition.42 The legal community hoped that in the Eastern Greenland ruling 
the PCIJ would further “define the law, now unsettled” for the acquisition of territory – 
not only to benefit the polar regions, but other uninhabited and sparsely populated areas 
more generally.43  
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arguments presented in the Palmas Island and Clipperton Island decisions as precedents. Legal scholar 
J.K.T. Chao has criticized the use of the cases as precedents, because it showed a “lack of consideration of 
the relative scale of the disproportion between the size of the landmass and the exiguous display of 
authority.” J.K.T. Chao, “The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case: a Note on its Legal Aspects,” 
Chengchi Law Review 27 (1983): 202. 
42 Jessup, “The Palmas Island Arbitration,” 752. See also Donald Greig, “Sovereignty, Territory and the 
International Lawyer’s Dilemma,” Osgoode Hall Law Review 26, no. 1 (1988): 166.  
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5.2 The Eastern Greenland Decision as a Problematic 
Precedent  
In the Eastern Greenland case, the PCIJ needed to decide if the Norwegian claim to Erik 
Raudes Land (71° 3’N and 75° 4’N) constituted a “violation of the existing legal situation” 
and was “accordingly unlawful and invalid.” If the court decided Denmark did not have 
sovereignty over the area and judged Norway’s claim legal, it then had to determine if 
Norway had acquired a valid title. The court found that 10 July 1931 – when Norway 
officially declared its sovereignty over Erik Raudes Land – was the critical date for the 
dispute. If the court found that Denmark had successfully established its sovereignty over 
Eastern Greenland prior to the critical date, the Norwegian claim would be invalidated.44  
Norway’s legal case tried to prove that Denmark never displayed the level of 
occupation necessary to establish sovereignty over Erik Raudes Land. The Norwegians 
echoed Smedal’s legal treatise and maintained that the level of occupation required in the 
polar regions should not be significantly reduced.45 As a minimum, they argued that an 
effective occupation required police or magisterial power, and the physical presence of 
government authority to be complete.46 The Danish administration in Greenland rarely 
visited Erik Raudes Land, let alone achieved this level of occupation. The Norwegians 
argued that the land outside the limits of the Danish settlements on Greenland should be 
considered as terra nullius – territory open to the first state to successfully occupy it.47 
The Norwegians also insisted that the Danish government’s attempts to attain foreign 
recognition between 1915 and 1921 proved that even Denmark itself did not believe in 
their historic sovereignty over all of Greenland.48 In any case, no amount of foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For an effective survey of the background of the Eastern Greenland case, see Oscar Svarlien, The 
Eastern Greenland Case in Historical Perspective (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964). For an 
examination of the case’s impact on the development of dispute resolution in the interwar years see 
Dorothy Jones, Toward a Just World: The Critical Years in the Search for International Justice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 89-98. 
45 Expose of M. Arne Sunde, 12 December 1932, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, 
Series C, No. 66, Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents, 3154-3158. 
46 Expositions of M. Per Rygh and Professor Gilbert Gidel, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) 
(1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 66, Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents, 2981 and 3220-3278. 
47 Norway’s Counter-Memorial, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 62 
373-430.  
48 Denmark had secured recognition from the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and Japan and other minor powers. 
Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 53, 44.  
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recognition should be allowed to replace the need for occupation.49 Within this 
undetermined context, Norway had every right to occupy Erik Raudes Land. Furthermore, 
the Norwegian lawyers cited the Palmas Island and Clipperton Island cases to support 
their argument that Norway’s wireless station, magistrate and locally residing parties in 
Erik Raudes Land fulfilled the legal requirements of territorial acquisition.50  
The Danish legal defence centred on the argument that Denmark had enjoyed “an 
ancient, uninterrupted, peaceful, public and undisputed development of this sovereignty 
over the whole of Greenland, including the East coast” – a clear reference to Huber’s 
decision in the Palmas case.51 Gustav Rasmussen, from Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, highlighted the Clipperton Island ruling’s emphasis on animus occupandi – the 
will to act as sovereign – as proof of a state’s sovereignty, even if unsupported by the 
continuous display of activity. The Danish crown, Rasmussen argued, had displayed the 
intent to act as sovereign for Greenland ever since the union of Norway and Denmark in 
1380, when it inherited the rights created by the Norse colonies on the island’s 
southwestern coast.52  
Charles de Visscher, counsel for Denmark and close friend of Huber, used the 
judge’s arguments to insist that the law could not require the same degree of occupation 
over vast, uninhabited and difficult territories as it expected in temperate zones.53 In 
Canada’s immense Eastern Arctic Archipelago, the Danes pointed out, a mere nineteen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 63, Norway’s Rejoinder, 1373-
1380.  
50 Expose, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 66, Pleadings, Oral 
Statements and Documents, Professor Gidel, 3276-3278. 
51 Kristian Steglich-Petersen, advocate of the supreme court of Denmark, made this statement. He also 
stressed that “the consecutive chain of acts of sovereignty and clear and incontrovertible statements by 
which the Danish government has manifested Denmark’s sovereignty.” Exposition by M. Steglich-Petersen, 
Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 66, Pleadings, Oral Statements and 
Documents, 2674. Gustav Rasmussen argued that Denmark had never lost the will to act as sovereign for 
all of Greenland, and pointed to the conclusions of the Clipperton Island case to argue that a display of the 
will to retain sovereignty could avoid a loss of territory by dereliction. Exposition of M. Gustav Rasmussen, 
Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 66, Pleadings, Oral Statements and 
Documents, 2660-2662. 
52 Exposition of M. Gustav Rasmussen, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, 
No. 66, Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents, 2660-2662, 2651-2658 and 2665. 
53 He also agreed with Huber’s comments that contiguity was an imprecise and arbitrary theory. P. 
Couvreur, “Charles de Visscher and International Justice,” European Journal of International Law 11, no. 
4 (2000): 905-938, at 919-923. 
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policemen maintained state authority, which was enough given the nature of the territory 
involved.54 Likewise, they admitted that the displays of state authority in Eastern 
Greenland had been neither continuous nor widespread, but maintained that Denmark 
achieved the necessary level of control. The display of state authority and government 
functions included legislation that applied to all of Greenland, administrative efforts, 
exploratory and scientific expeditions, concessions that granted economic rights in the 
contested area, and the reservation of hunting and fishing rights off the entire coast. 
Further, the establishment of the settlements at Angmagssalik in 1894 (65° 36’ N) and 
Scoresbysund in 1925 (76° 32’ N), along with the inspection tours of government vessels, 
brought a physical government organization to the eastern coast.55 De Visscher failed to 
mention that at least some Danish officials had doubted whether Denmark had effectively 
extended its authority into northern Greenland as recently as 1910.56 
 The Danes put even greater stock in the international community’s recognition of 
their sovereignty over all of Greenland. Importantly, the Treaty of Kiel (1814) provided 
for the cession of the Kingdom of Norway to Sweden, but accepted that Denmark would 
retain Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. The Danes pointed to several historic 
commercial conventions in which states accepted Denmark’s right to exclude all of 
Greenland from the application of the treaties. Lastly, they highlighted the recognition of 
Danish sovereignty achieved by their diplomatic overtures between 1915 and 1921.57 De 
Visscher stressed that no land could be considered terra nullius, or open for the taking, if 
the international community recognized it as a state’s territory for a long period of time. 
This question rose above the conflict between the two states and concerned the “general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Exposition of Gudmund Hatt, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 64, 
Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents, 1865. 
55 See Exposition of Charles de Visscher, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, 
No. 66, Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents, 2843-2890. 
56 Historian Janice Cavell has highlighted that in 1910 officials from the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Royal Greenland Company called northern Greenland a no man’s land. Based on this new historical 
evidence, she argues that the Danes clearly thought much of northern and eastern Greenland was no man’s 
land before 1920, and did believe they had full sovereignty over the entire island. Janice Cavell, “Historical 
Evidence and the Eastern Greenland Case,” Arctic 61, no. 4 (2008): 433-441. 
57 The Danes attained recognition from the United States, the British Empire, Italy, France, Japan and 
Sweden. Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 62, Danish Memorial, 101-
107.  
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international order.”58 When Norwegian lawyers argued that Norway could not be bound 
by the declarations of recognition made by foreign states, de Visscher stressed that 
Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland did not require the complete consent of the 
international community. He argued that “International practice on the contrary shows 
that many international positions have regularly been established throughout history from 
the effect of an agreement among a restricted number of Powers.”59 Regardless, the 
Danes stressed that Norway had agreed not to object to the extension of Danish 
sovereignty over all Greenland through the verbal declaration made by the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Nils Claus Ilhen at the Paris Peace Conference (the Ilhen 
Declaration).60  
After deliberating on the arguments presented by the Danish and Norwegian legal 
teams, the PCIJ released its decision in April 1933. The PCIJ ruled that a claim to 
territorial sovereignty must be based on a “continued display of authority” that 
showcased two elements: “the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual 
exercise or display of such authority.” The court further observed that “it is impossible to 
read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial sovereignty without observing 
that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual 
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make out a superior 
claim.” This was particularly true, the court noted, in claims to sovereignty over 
uninhabited or thinly populated areas.61 In the court’s opinion, Denmark had displayed 
the necessary intent and actual exercise of state authority to secure its sovereignty over all 
of Greenland. 
The court concluded that the sovereign right established by the Norse colonies on 
Greenland’s southwestern coast and passed to the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway, 
survived the disappearance of the settlements in the fifteenth century and formed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Jones, Toward a Just World, 93. 
59 Couvreur, “Charles de Visscher and International Justice,” 920. 
60 Kristian Steglich-Petersen, advocate of the supreme court of Denmark, insisted that the statement of a 
foreign minister must be considered binding to the state he represented. Exposition by M Kristian Steglich-
Petersen, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series C, No. 66, Pleadings, Oral 
Statements and Documents, 2749 and 2761. 
61 Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 53, 22, 45-46. 
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foundation on which to build a claim.62 From 1721, when the Kingdom of Denmark-
Norway supported the establishment of a colony at Godthåb, to the Treaty of Kiel in 1814, 
the Danish crown sufficiently established a claim to all of Greenland through the 
concessions it granted to its citizens and the General Trading Company of Copenhagen, 
and through ordinances that the government applied to the island as a whole.63 As proof 
of the exercise of Danish sovereignty between 1814 and 1915, the court accepted several 
abortive trading concessions, legislation which never applied outside the south-west coast 
settlements, provisions for the non-application of bilateral treaties to Greenland, and the 
absence of competing claims as sufficient proof of Denmark’s sovereignty. The court 
clearly established legislation as “one of the most obvious forms of the exercise of 
sovereign power.”64 The establishment of Angmagssalik on the southeastern coast in 
1894 and the work of Danish scientific expeditions supported these administrative 
efforts.65  
Between 1915 and 1921, the Danes managed to secure foreign recognition of their 
sovereignty from many of the leading world powers including Norway’s Foreign 
Minister.66 Pivotally, the court ruled “beyond all dispute” that the Ilhen Declaration 
represented an official reply from a Minister of Foreign Affairs to a diplomatic request 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Hyde, “The Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,” 734. 
63 Ole Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise 
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(Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 53, at 48, also 46, 47, 53, 62. 
64 Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice, 345-346; 
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65 Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 53, 54. Chao, “The Legal Status 
of Eastern Greenland Case,” 208. The Court found that at the beginning of the twentieth century, private 
Danish citizens had felt that the absence of effective occupation in the uncolonized parts of Greenland 
exposed the area to the risk of permanent occupation by a foreign state. This opinion led to more effective 
occupation by the Danish authorities. Nevertheless, while private officials may have expressed doubts, the 
court found that Danish government had always maintained “there was no doubt as to the existence of the 
Danish sovereignty over the East coast of Greenland.” Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) 
PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 53, 33-35, 55. 
66 The court found that in the four notes of recognition from France, Japan, Italy and Britain, the first two 
countries accepted an extension of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland, while the last pair recognized 
that Danish sovereignty already existed over all Greenland. The court concluded that in judging the impact 
of these notes, “too much importance must not be attached to particular expressions here and there. The 
correspondence must be judged as a whole.” Although the word ‘extension’ had been used, the court 
accepted the Danish viewpoint that the state was actually seeking acknowledgement of its pre-existing 
sovereignty over all of Greenland. Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 
53, 55. 
	   278	  
from another power that bound Norway to respect Denmark’s sovereignty.67 The court 
also accepted Denmark’s argument that Norway’s failure to protest its sovereignty over 
Greenland until 1921 was essential, supporting Danish Supreme Court advocate Kristian 
Steglich-Petersen’s observation, “silence here means consent.”68 
Finally, the court found that between 1921 and 1931, Danish activity on the 
eastern coast of Greenland increased considerably. The Danish authority legislated for 
hunting and fishing, closed the territorial waters to foreign ships, sent a naval vessel on 
inspection tours of the coast, established the settlement of Scoresbysund, and sent 
government-supported hunting and scientific expeditions to the area. These facts led the 
court to conclude that, even if this decade was “taken by itself and without reference to 
the preceding periods, the conclusion reached by the Court is that during this time 
Denmark regarded herself as possessing sovereignty over all Greenland and displayed 
and exercised her sovereign rights to an extent sufficient to constitute a valid title to 
sovereignty.”69  
The PCIJ’s decision in the Eastern Greenland case reinforced the low bar set for 
effective occupation established by the Palmas Island and Clipperton Island cases. The 
decision focused on the display and exercise of government authority, rather than actual 
settlement and use. As such, the court gave legal value to legislation (even if unenforced), 
periodic patrols, hunting parties and scientific expeditions, and demanded no permanent 
occupation. After reviewing the case, legal scholar Hersch Lauterpacht argued that in 
“modern international judicial practice the borderline between the attenuated conditions 
of effectiveness of occupation and the total relinquishment of the requirement of 
effectiveness has become shadowy to the point of obliteration.” The historical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ, Series A-B, No. 53, 71. 
68 Steglich-Petersen also commented that, “In order to escape the legal consequences of silence, an 
objection (protest) must be uttered.” Exposition by M. Steglich-Petersen, Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. 
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requirement of effective occupation had, he concluded, only a “bare existence.”70  
Certainly, many in the international legal community at the time recognized the 
potential impact of the Eastern Greenland decision on the doctrine of effective 
occupation and polar claims. Law expert Jesse Reeves conceded that the case showed a 
state could support its claim to territory upon bases other than effective and permanent 
occupation.71 A review of the decision published in The Geographical Journal in August 
1933 underlined the PCIJ’s conclusions on occupation and insisted that they were of 
“profound importance beyond the limits of the immediate case, not least in showing 
grounds upon which similar cases which may arise in the future will be decided.” The 
decision held particular significance for Britain, “with her large arctic and antarctic 
territories that cannot be closely settled or administered.”72 In the view of the last author, 
Eastern Greenland would provide an important precedent in future polar disputes.73 But 
what precedent had the PCIJ actually set in the Eastern Greenland decision?   
Charles Cheney Hyde, the former solicitor at the State Department who had 
helped craft the Hughes Doctrine, and professor of international law at Columbia 
University, doubted the significance of the precedent. In 1933, Hyde (and other 
contemporary experts) wrote that several variables restricted the value of the case as a 
model, including the long history of Danish settlement and activity in Greenland, the 
foreign recognition, the court’s finding of a decisive Norwegian acknowledgement of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas,” 416. Legal scholar Gillian Triggs has pointed out 
that the three decisions showcased the great degree to which special circumstances could modify 
occupation doctrine. Some territory reduced “the doctrine of effective occupation to an absurdity, or at least 
to an empty, valueless and vague criterion.” Triggs, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in 
Antarctica, 19. 
71 J.S. Reeves, “George V Land,” The American Journal of International Law 28, no. 1 (Jan., 1934): 119. 
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2012), 197. Sir Cecil Hurst always maintained that the international legal community should view the 
“decisions of the Court as precedents building up international law.” Ijaz Hussain, Dissenting and Separate 
Opinions at the World Court (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 21. On factors influencing the 
weight given to judicial opinions see Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 302-310. 
	   280	  
Danish sovereignty, and the lack of competing claims.74 The international legal expert 
also pointed out that the court was more concerned with establishing the extent of the 
polar territory to be assigned to a claimant state, rather than identifying the acts “to be 
regarded as requisite for the creation of right of sovereignty therein.”75 In view of these 
factors, Hyde concluded, the Eastern Greenland decision “may perhaps be deemed to lack 
the significance otherwise to be assigned to it as an enunciation of legal principle 
concerning” the acquisition of territorial sovereignty.76  
In the following years, many other legal scholars struggled to determine clear 
legal principles amongst the tangle of points and considerations within the PCIJ’s 
judgment. To Wilhelm Grewe, the PCIJ accepted “a more or less fictitious or symbolic 
occupation” and offered no “clear-cut decision” on the requirements of acquisition. 
Instead, Grewe thought that the court gave sovereignty to Denmark on the grounds “that 
it had exercised sovereignty for a long time without having encountered opposition,” 
basing its decision on the tacit recognition of the international community rather than 
occupation.77 Humphrey Waldock and Hersch Lauterpacht argued that the doctrine of 
contiguity played a far larger role in the court’s decision than the judges admitted. It 
seemed the court extended the legal consequences of displays of sovereignty “to 
uninhabited and uncolonized parts of Greenland forming an integral part of the territories 
which the Court considered to have been occupied.”78 Lauterpacht also argued that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Hyde did find significance in the “the readiness of the court to find in the conduct in behalf of the 
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international legal stability was the court’s foremost consideration. After all, had the 
court “adhered to the rigid requirement of complete occupation” it would have declared 
the territory “terra nullius and open henceforth to a competitive scramble between the 
two countries – and others – with the ensuing uncertainty and confusion.” That decision 
would have been contrary to the principles of finality and stability held by the court.79 
Lauterpacht raised the unsettling prospect that the desired outcome drove the doctrinal 
findings, not the reverse, in the Eastern Greenland decision.80 
Legal scholar Ole Spiermann has recently argued that two principles derived from 
international jurisprudence motivated the court. First, the judges decided between the 
competing claims to territory by considering “which of the two is the stronger.” Secondly, 
if a “superior claim” existed, the court made do “with very little in the way of the actual 
exercise of sovereign rights.” The intention and will to act as sovereign superseded the 
actual exercise of sovereignty. Rather than provide a clear elucidation of legal principle, 
in settling the dispute, the court “carried out a hugely complicated act of balancing the 
competing claims, which indicated that no rule met the imperative need for a solution.”81 
 Martti Koskenniemi has adopted a similar position. The argumentative structure 
of the Eastern Greenland case highlighted the dispute between which element was more 
critical to proving territorial title: effective possession or foreign recognition.82 While 	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state title based on general recognition seemed to lack a factual foundation, title based on 
effective possession went against the consent of the international community. As a result, 
Koskenniemi argued, the Court decided to uphold the value of both arguments by making 
each point in Denmark’s direction. “The conduct of third States implied recognition of 
Danish sovereignty; Danish conduct constituted effective possession; Norway had 
recognized Danish sovereignty…The decision was overdetermined: the same conclusion 
was drawn from conflicting premises.”83 In its choice not to indicate “a preference 
between fact (possession) and views about fact (recognition)” the court failed to provide 
any guidance to dispute resolution at all, Koskenniemi concluded.84  
The PCIJ’s use of dissenting opinions added to the ambiguity surrounding the 
Eastern Greenland decision. In the PCIJ’s judgment, Judge Dionisio Anzilotti issued a 
strong dissenting viewpoint.85 He questioned whether Denmark indeed had sovereign 
control over Eastern Greenland. Anzilotti maintained that in the area in question, “there 
were perhaps laws in force but no authority to enforce them.” Unlike his peers, he refused 
to accept that the mere existence of legislation covering a territory could create title if no 
one had ever been appointed to ensure it was followed. Sounding much like Max Huber, 
Anzilotti argued that international law “established an ever closer connection between the 
existence of sovereignty and the effective exercise thereof, and States successfully 
disputed any claim not accompanied by such exercise.” He further opined that the legal 
situation had changed due to “technological improvements” opening up the previously 
inaccessible eastern coast of Greenland to “human activities,” which demanded more 
occupation and control. Considering these technological developments, the questions of 
Danish sovereignty “presented itself in a new light.”86  
Anzilotti also believed the Danes, in their overtures to foreign government, asked 
for the right to extend their sovereignty over all of Greenland, not for formal recognition 	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85 Anzolotti was one of three judges who served on the PCIJ from its creation in 1922, to its end in 1946. 
Jose Maria Ruda, “The Opinions of Judge Dionisio Anzilotti at the Permanent Court of International 
Justice,” European Journal of International Law 3 (1992): 100-122. 
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of their existing sovereignty.87 States agreed to recognize the extension, not the existence, 
of Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland. For these reasons, Anzilotti found that the 
Norwegian occupation was invalid only insofar as it violated the Ilhen Declaration, 
which he deemed binding.88 Anzilotti wanted the court to base its decision on just the 
guarantee given in the Ilhen Declaration and not on Denmark’s non-existent occupation 
of the area.89  
The separate opinions offered by Judges Walther Schücking and Wang Chung-hui 
concurred with the Court’s final decision, but echoed Anzolotti’s concerns about Danish 
occupation. The judges observed that the Danes based their case largely on legislative 
acts, the “effective application of which” was an “indispensable requirement under the 
international law,” and they deemed Denmark’s application lacking.90 Norway’s ad hoc 
judge, Benjamin Vogt, agreed. In his dissenting opinion, he questioned Denmark’s 
display of intent to act as sovereign on the eastern coast of Greenland. In a region visited 
by the citizens of Norway since at least 1889, Denmark never established police powers. 
Danish officials based in Angmagssalik and Scoresby Sound had never attempted any 
kind of authority outside their limited districts.91 Vogt believed that the court’s decision 
made a mockery of the doctrine of effective occupation. 
In future disputes over polar claims, especially ones that lacked the long list of 
historic variables present in the Eastern Greenland case, these dissenting and separate 
opinions could have played an important role. Legal scholar Ijaz Hussain noted that when 
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the PCIJ, the advocates for their inclusion argued that they would serve as a “vehicle for 
the development of international law.” In 1929, when the Committee of Jurists met to 
discuss revising the PCIJ statute and the court’s use of dissenting opinions, Sir Cecil 
Hurst commented that views of dissenting judges, even if the minority, “were as 
important to the building-up of an international system of law as the views of the 
majority.”92 Legal scholar Hersch Lauterpacht maintained that dissenting opinions 
contributed a great deal to the development of international law. Far from detracting from 
the PCIJ’s judgments, Lauterpacht felt that dissenting opinions added “to their vitality, 
comprehension and usefulness and greatly facilitate the fulfillment of the indirect purpose 
of the Court, which is to develop and to clarify international law.”93  
Dissenting opinions could be cited as an authority in future cases to inspire 
changes in the law. In 1928, Charles Evans Hughes – chief justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, judge of the PCIJ, and the former Secretary of State who gave the Hughes 
Doctrine its name – characterized dissenting opinions as “appeal[s] to the brooding spirit 
of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct 
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”94 
Lauterpacht agreed and added that the formal authority of the court could not “in the long 
run shield a defective decision from the impact, in proportion to its merits, of a dissent. 
Mere dissent cannot weaken the authority of the decision. The merits of the dissent may 
have that effect.”95 In short, the polar claimants could not be sure that the clear and 
coherent dissent offered by Anzilotti, and the separate opinions given by Schücking and 
Wang, would not be referenced in a future polar territorial dispute to “correct the error” 
on the requirements of occupation that they believed the PCIJ had committed. 
From its release in 1933, various legal scholars questioned the value of the 
Eastern Greenland decision as a precedent. Commentators underlined the volume of 	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variables that complicated the case, the role played by foreign recognition, the length of 
time involved, the careful balancing of legal values carried out by the court and its failure 
to lay out the acts required to create and maintain a right to sovereignty. The Eastern 
Greenland ruling reflected a common problem with the PCIJ’s decisions: they were often 
too specific and focused on the particular circumstances of each case to establish general 
principles of international law.96 The dissenting and separate opinions on the case only 
added to its ambiguity. No one could predict how the arguments, conclusions and 
opinions of the Eastern Greenland decision would be applied to any future polar dispute 
with any degree of certainty. Former judge of the International Court of Justice, Arnold 
McNair, has highlighted this reality, explaining, “when I have been confronted with the 
same rule of law in the course of writing a professional opinion or of contributing to a 
judgment, I have been struck by the different appearance that the rule of law may assume 
when it is being examined for the purpose of its application in practice to a set of 
ascertained facts.”97 For all these reasons, the Eastern Greenland decision failed to 
provide a simple solution to the problems of polar sovereignty for state officials 
investigating territorial claims in the 1930s and beyond.  
5.3 The Confusion Continues 
Historians examining state territorial claims in the Arctic and Antarctic often 
adopt the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and, in particular, Eastern Greenland 
decisions as pivotal benchmarks in the legal development of the polar regions. They 
present these legal decisions as if they brought instant certainty to the uncertainty of the 
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bi-polar legal landscape.98 Historians Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes provide an example 
of this uncritical sentiment in their comment that “the Eastern Greenland case stands as 
an important milestone. Although the sector theory remained controversial, the 1933 
decision of the PCIJ demonstrated the validity of the overall approach taken by Canada.” 
Likewise, Canadian scholar Gordon Smith concluded that the decision immediately 
provided a “potent precedent” to states dealing with polar claims in the 1930s. In his 
Antarctic history, Adrian Howkins simply concludes that the PCIJ’s ruling “reduced the 
requirements for effective occupation of Polar Regions” – a verdict that states 
immediately accepted and applied to their claims.99 These assessments fail to explain 
how historical actors viewed these cases and legal developments as they unfolded. They 
ignore many of the complex issues that have been identified in the decisions, and how 
these limitations affected state officials charged with appraising state legal titles in the 
immediate aftermath of the cases. Further, they tend to minimize or ignore the 
uncertainty that remained about the requirements of polar sovereignty and the rules of 
territorial acquisition.  
In sharp contrast, many modern legal scholars have highlighted the confusion and 
uncertainty that continued to surround the rules of territorial acquisition and the doctrine 
of effective occupation after the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland 
cases. After reviewing the three decisions in 1970, F.M. Auburn concluded the cases only 
cast “further darkness on the question” of territorial acquisition.100 The confusing and 
unclear snarl of legal points and administrative, geographical, political and historical 
variables on which the decisions of each case rested greatly diminished their value as 
legal precedents.101 In the end, all three cases highlighted how malleable and expendable 
the doctrine of effective occupation had become. As legal scholar Steven Ratner points, 
the danger in such a fluid situation is that “one cannot be sure to what extent the doctrine 
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is malleable enough to justify numerous outcomes.”102 Accordingly, legal scholar Jeffrey 
Myhre has argued that, “in synthesizing the results of these cases, one finds the law on 
title by occupation neither black nor white but an unsatisfying shade of grey.”103 
The confusion about the rules of territorial acquisition is best represented by the 
very different conclusions reached in two articles on polar claims written shortly after 
Eastern Greenland. After reviewing the results of the three cases, German legal scholar 
Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte felt he could argue that “sovereignty over a 
region completely uninhabited and seldom frequented is acquired merely by symbolic 
annexation.” Once a state acquired a territory, it was not required to extend its occupation 
to every “nook and cranny” as long as it had enough power to provide for the minimum 
requirements of control. In places that had no people and no property, however, there 
could be no jurisdiction. At this point, the exercise of jurisdiction was no longer 
necessary for the maintenance of sovereign rights.104 Von der Heydte also maintained 
“geographic contiguity with an occupied region gives the same full and perfect 
sovereignty rights as an actual occupation.” The doctrine of contiguity could produce 
sovereignty because “boundary lines of any application of the rule of contiguity are 
drawn, precisely, by its very origin from the general principle of effectiveness.” In other 
words, the boundary lines drawn using the doctrine of contiguity emanated from territory 
clearly under state control. In von der Heydte’s eyes, polar sectors were “sphere[s] of 
virtual effectiveness” – extending the state’s authority throughout the area enclosed by 
the sector lines.105  
Thomas Edward Maurice McKitterick took strong issue with von der Heydte’s 
views. He agreed with the PCIJ that the “acid test of the admissibility of a claim” should 
be the “intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such 
authority,” as determined in the Eastern Greenland case. He maintained that the exercise 
or display of such authority must be “reasonably permanent and not merely intermittent.” 	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To secure title, the state must “have some effective and permanent means of controlling 
those who wish to visit the region claimed.” Referencing Canada and the Arctic 
Archipelago, McKitterick posited that if Ottawa was incapable of exercising its 
jurisdiction over the islands, “the only conclusion which could be reached would be that 
she did not possess a good title to the ownership of those areas.” A state could lose its 
legal title if it did not continuously make effective its claims.106 McKitterick and von der 
Heydte studied the same legal decisions, but came to very different conclusions on 
effective occupation and the doctrine of contiguity.  
State officials involved in analyzing or validating polar claims also carefully 
studied the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland cases. They pulled 
out principles and ideas from the decisions that provided guidance or support for the 
claims of their countries in the Arctic and Antarctic, including the importance of foreign 
recognition and acquiescence in territorial disputes. They recognized that the cases 
changed the doctrine of effective occupation to require that a state must showcase the 
“intention and will to act as sovereign” as well as “some actual exercise or display of 
such authority” in any territory it claimed. The law, it seemed, would not require the 
same degree of occupation over enormous, uninhabited and environmentally challenging 
places as it expected in temperate and populated zones.107 
However, these officials, many of them the leading lawyers and legal experts of 
their day, also acknowledged the limitations of the cases and the uncertainty they left. 
How much uninhabited or sparsely populated territory could a state claim to occupy 
through a settlement or an administrative post? How continuous and permanent did state 
control have to be? Although the Danes could point to two settlements on the eastern 	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coast of Greenland to support their claim, what about polar territory that lacked 
permanent presence? While the cases decided that state control was not constantly 
required for every nook and cranny, countries still struggled to determine the limits that 
the PCIJ or an arbiter would place on this allowance in future disputes. When did official 
state protests play a role in the preservation of a territorial claim? How much foreign 
recognition did the law require to secure a claim? More important than the questions left 
unanswered was knowledge that the doctrine of effective occupation had been malleable 
and expendable in the three cases. That malleability kept the door open for claims based 
on previously used arguments of contiguity, symbolic annexation, periodic visits and the 
sector principle.108 The elusiveness of the law allowed states to continue producing 
multiple versions of polar sovereignty and the bi-polar legal landscape remained crowded 
with the different arguments states used to justify their claims. 
State officials involved in researching polar claims, recognized the shades of grey 
that continued to surround the requirements of effective occupation and the rules of 
territorial acquisition. After reviewing all three cases in 1935, William Roy Vallance, 
who worked in the State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser, lamented that 
international law had “not very definitively established” the steps necessary for a state to 
make a successful territorial claim.109 A few years later, the co-founder and director of 
the Scott Polar Research Institute, Frank Debenham, advised the Foreign Office that 
“there being no such thing as a formal code of international law with respect to countries 
which are uninhabitable, claims to polar lands rest upon a variety of evidence, every one 
of which is open to debate and may be upset on other grounds.”110 In 1936, T.L. Cory, the 
solicitor of Canada’s Northwest Territories Branch of the Department of the Interior, 
captured the essence of the problem when he explained that international law had “not 	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definitely” established “what is necessary to constitute absolute sovereignty in the Arctic 
islands.”111  
Over the next two decades, state officials from many of the polar claimants 
expressed concern about the ambiguity of the law. In 1946, the U.S. State Department 
admitted that it struggled to find a coherent set of “clear legal principles” that dictated 
how polar territory was properly acquired,112 while another report lamented “the lack of 
international rules for acquisition of uninhabitable territories.”113 Eight years later, 
departmental legal expert James Bonbright explained that “international law on the 
acquisition of sovereignty in the Polar Regions” was “far from settled.”114 In the postwar 
years, the legal advisers of the Foreign and Colonial Offices could not determine exactly 
how much the local environment could modify the doctrine of effective occupation.115 In 
Australia, Richard Casey complained there was “no general agreement on what suffices” 
to make a claim in the polar regions.116 Meanwhile, after carefully studying the problems 
of polar sovereignty, Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong remarked that the “general rules 
of international law concerning the relative merits of claims based on occupancy, formal 
annexation and discovery” still had to be worked out. He cautioned that there was a “long 
way to go…before a generally recognized definition of what constitutes effective 
occupancy can be developed.”117 To these officials, and others like them in all of the 
polar states, the rules of territorial acquisition and the doctrine of effective occupation 
remained unclear, ambiguous and open to interpretation. 
It was more than just the requirements of effective occupation that confused state 
officials. They also worried about what those requirements might become. Every lawyer 	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114 James Bonbright to Mr. Matthews, G, 15 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, Box 3066, File 
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understood the mutable nature of international law and Huber’s intertemporal theory had 
stressed the impact that changes in the law could have on territorial claims. Officials that 
studied polar claims considered the impact of technological developments on the 
requirements of effective occupation as they opened up inaccessible areas and allowed 
for greater levels of control and habituation (as Anzilotti had mentioned in his dissenting 
opinion). How would long-range aircraft impact the requirements of occupation? What 
about new and more powerful icebreakers? Or advanced stations that could allow people 
to overwinter in the polar regions? All state officials worried about these questions in the 
decades that followed Huber’s ruling in the Palmas Island case. Shortly after the Second 
World War, the Foreign Office legal advisers highlighted, “You can acquire sovereignty 
in 1926 in accordance with the law of 1926, but if you wish to maintain it in 1946 you 
must fulfill the requirements of the law of 1946.”118 Trying to gauge evolving 
requirements proved an incredibly difficult task for state officials. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Law Officers of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office, Paper B on the Legal Authorities, 12 January 
1947, NA, FO 371/61288. 
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Chapter 6 
6 Between Sectors and the Doctrine of Constructive 
Occupation, 1933-1939 
Charles Cheney Hyde served as solicitor for the U.S. State Department between 1923 and 
1925. During his tenure, he grappled with ongoing polar territorial claims, helped draft 
the Hughes Doctrine, analyzed the 1924 Soviet claim and led the review of Canada’s 
Arctic sovereignty during the MacMillan expedition. Afterwards, Hyde became a 
professor of international law at Columbia University, where he continued his attempts to 
unravel the ‘Gordian knot’ of polar sovereignty.1 
The professor identified several major complications for the acquisition of land in 
the polar regions: the unique environmental conditions, the difficulties of actual 
settlement and use, and the contested belief that certain polar areas should be considered 
“geographical prolongation[s]” of existing state territory. Most importantly, Hyde 
observed, the international law on territorial acquisition had never been properly adapted 
to the polar regions. Lacking clear legal guidelines, states “yielded to the temptation to 
rely upon easier and less rigorous modes of acquiring rights of sovereignty,” which led to 
a “recrudescence of ideas and tests that appeared to suffice generally in the sixteenth 
century.” 2 The massive state claims in the polar regions relied on symbolic acts such as 
flag plantings, the reading of official proclamations and the occasional visit. Emphasizing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In his role as the Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, 
Hyde attempted to address the legal issues in the polar regions in articles and through the school’s Joint 
Seminar in International Law in the 1930s. The Joint Seminar in International Law was actually studying 
the idea of terra nullius, but focused on the concept’s role in the polar regions. The seminar was led by 
Hyde and experienced legal expert Phillip Jessup, who was his assistant at the State Department. The 
participants in the seminar included James Simsarian, Arthur Keller and Frederick Mann. The results of the 
seminar led a rapid increase in the use of terra nullius outside the polar regions, where it was applied to 
explain the history of European expansion, especially in Australia. See Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 
Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 319-325. On some of 
the historical research completed by the seminar see Arthur S. Keller, Oliver Lissitzyn and Frederick Mann, 
Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts, 1400-1800 (New York: AMS Press, 1967). The 
book was originally published in 1937. 
2 The sector principle was equally problematic, and Hyde accused states of using it to bypass the need to 
display the “the actual power to control what is claimed to be subject to a right of sovereignty.” Hyde 
elaborated that the sector principle allowed states to claim polar territory based on its “unique relationship 
with the claimant state” or proximity to an explored coastline. Charles Cheney Hyde, “Acquisition of 
Sovereignty Over Polar Areas,” Iowa Law Review 19, no. 293 (1933-34): 286, 289-292.  
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the absurdity of Antarctic claims based on so little, Hyde asked what would happen if “a 
hungry penguin devoured the stars and stripes and never let them wave bravely over the 
land of those free and brave birds – would that make a difference?”3  
The American legal expert believed that a “pertinent law evolved” for the 
acquisition of polar territory was overdue and he took it upon himself to outline such a 
legal regime.4 In a radical departure for the Hughes Doctrine crafter, Hyde admitted that 
the polar environment demanded a “relaxation of the requirements of the law demanding 
occupation…within rigid bounds.” Although the conditions in the polar regions made 
physical settlement difficult, from a “convenient” strategic point (“point d'appui”) a polar 
state could “exercise regularly a civil or administrative control over a large yet 
unpopulated area.” A claimant state could therefore “actively engage itself, through the 
facilities of transportation by air, over the entire district which it claims as its own.” 
While Hyde admitted that his framework was “not occupation,” he maintained that it was 
also “not contemptuous of the modern requirements of the law of nations that demands 
the exercise of control over what a state claims as its own.”5 Hyde’s formula for polar 
sovereignty closely resembled the system of RCMP posts and patrols that the Canadians 
already employed in the Eastern Arctic Archipelago, but with an additional aerial 
component.6 Hyde’s emphasis on air transportation underlined the impact that technology 
and aerial advancements could have on the law.  
 Hyde wanted the United States to take a more active role in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. If the Eastern Greenland decision provided one clear lesson, Hyde insisted, it 
was how much emphasis the court placed on recognition, acquiescence, and the absence 
of official protest. No doubt recalling his government’s failure to protest the Russian and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Charles Cheney Hyde, “Who Owns Antarctica?” The Independent Journal of Columbia University 21 
(1936). 
4 Hyde, “Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas”: 286. Hyde hoped that the Eastern Greenland 
decision would fulfill this need, but he found that the Permanent Court of International Justice’s decision 
offered no clear road map for how a state could acquire polar sovereignty. Charles Cheney Hyde, “The 
Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,” The American Journal of International Law 27, 
no. 4 (1933), 732-738. See also Hyde, “Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas”: 289 n. 3. 
5 While Hyde was willing to concede that contiguity could bolster state claims to the Arctic islands, there 
had to be proof of “the requisite power to control.” Hyde, “Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas,” 
288-289, 294.  
6 Imperial Conference of 1930, Committee on Polar Questions Report, National Archives (NA), DO 
35/167/7. 
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Canadian annexations in the Arctic during his tenure as solicitor, he advised the U.S. to 
protest rival polar claims and announce its own without delay. Hyde encouraged 
Washington to take immediate action, “lest by inadvertence or perhaps by undue respect 
for the requirements of the law applicable to temperate zones, it may…find itself 
deprived in the estimation of an international tribunal of the slightest vestige of a right in 
something greatly useful to itself, and greatly coveted by a rival.”7  
Scholars have largely ignored Charles Cheney Hyde’s impact on the legal 
development of the polar regions, but his clear and effective arguments on polar 
sovereignty influenced the legal appraisals conducted by polar claimants for the next two 
decades, particularly in the U.S. State Department where his work was effectively 
required reading.8 His views resonated in the department, which, spurred on by the 
activities and annexations of foreign states in the polar regions, including the massive 
sector claim made by Australia, finally gave sustained and “serious consideration…to 
whether this Government should take steps to assert its territorial claims in the Arctic and 
Antarctic…or whether we in fact do not have and do not anticipate having a desire to 
acquire such territories.”9 The exploratory work of Lincoln Ellsworth and Richard Byrd 
in the south polar region, the strength of the Canadian and Soviet Arctic claims and 
Washington’s lack of strategic interest in the North all resulted in the U.S. government 
adopting an Antarctic focus. Reflecting Hyde’s emphasis on protests and the dangers of 
remaining silent, starting in 1934 the State Department took stronger action to safeguard 
its legal position by reserving American rights in the sectors of the British Empire and by 
questioning the foundation of these claims using the Hughes Doctrine. These American 
legal statements reverberated throughout the polar states, and shaped their perceptions, 
concerns, policies and diplomacy. While the United States Antarctic Service Expedition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hyde pointed out the great stock that the British put in “formalities through which assertions of 
sovereignty have been made” and the lack of official protest against them. Hyde, “Who Owns Antarctica?” 
8 See, for example, S.W. Boggs to O’Neill, 15 March 1934, United States National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014, Antarctic 45 ½; S.W. Boggs, 
Division of Research and Publication, Department of State to Mr. R.W. Moore and Mr. Moffat, 17 August 
1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/126; Hugh Cumming, Division of 
European Affairs, Department of State, American Policy Relating to the Polar Regions, 28 July 1938, 
NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/126. 
9 Hugh Cumming, Division of European Affairs, Department of State to Mr. Moffat, 28 July 1938, NARA, 
RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/126. 
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of 1939-1941 or Operation High Jump in 1946 are often viewed as the critical turning 
points in U.S. engagement with the Antarctic,10 the legal action taken by the State 
Department in the 1930s really marked the beginning of America’s replacement of 
Britain as the primary shaper of the bi-polar legal landscape.   
The confident espousal of the Hughes Doctrine by the State Department masked 
an internal debate that questioned whether the principle’s emphasis on settlement and use 
ignored the climatic conditions of the polar regions and developments in the doctrine of 
effective occupation. Department officials took note of the dramatic change in Hyde’s 
opinions on the requirements of polar sovereignty after he approved the Hughes Doctrine. 
Often citing the professor’s arguments, officials slowly began to construct a doctrine of 
constructive occupation – a concept that has been largely ignored by historians and legal 
scholars. The new and less rigorous formula for polar sovereignty was designed 
specifically for the acquisition of territory in the Arctic and Antarctic.11 As the political 
will for an American Antarctic claim grew in the late 1930s, the State Department stood 
on the brink of revoking the Hughes Doctrine and embracing the doctrine of constructive 
occupation.  
Unaware of the internal American discussions about constructive occupation, 
British and Commonwealth officials grew increasingly worried by Washington’s 
continued emphasis on physical settlement and use as the only valid basis for polar 
claims. They started to explore various options to increase the control and physical 
presence of their states in the polar regions. Nevertheless, although the sector principle 
often fades into the background of polar histories that cover the 1930s, this chapter shows 
that the idea remained in the foreground of British and Commonwealth legal thinking.12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Frank G. Klotz, America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues (Washington: National Defence University 
Press, 1990); Christopher Joyner and Ethel Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The US in the Antarctic (Hanover, 
1997); Jason Kendall Moore, “Tethered to an iceberg: United States policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-
1949,” Polar Record 35, no. 193 (1999): 125-134; Jason Kendall Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, Political 
Intervention and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949,” Journal of Latin American 
Studies 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-738. 
11 Deborah Shapley mentioned the doctrine very briefly in The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource 
Age (New York: Earthscan, 2011): 43. 
12 Malcolm Templeton, A Wise Adventure: New Zealand & Antarctica, 1920-1960 (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2000); Shelagh Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North 
America (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2010); David Day, Antarctica: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
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Even as legal experts started to question if the penetration of polar hinterlands by aircraft 
threatened to make the doctrine obsolete, others insisted that it remained the best possible 
solution to the problem of polar sovereignty. By the end of the 1930s, British and 
Commonwealth officials, as well as private legal experts, still believed that the sector 
principle either had or would “become established as a rule of law applying to Arctic and 
Antarctic territory.”13  
6.1 A “More Definite” American Polar Policy? 
Following the Australian sector claim, which encompassed almost half of the Antarctic 
continent, State Department officials realized the British Empire and Soviet Union had 
annexed a vast portion of the polar regions in a little over a decade. American officials 
believed that their country also possessed historic rights based on discovery, exploration 
and use in each of these claim areas.14 Starting in the summer of 1933, State Department 
officials began to advise that Washington had to end its complacency and indifference 
towards the polar regions if it ever hoped to secure these rights.15 As a result, officials 
with experience in polar affairs, such as Samuel Whittemore Boggs, Lawrence Martin 
and the international lawyer, David Hunter Miller (now the Historical Advisor at the 
State Department), worked together to “develop a more definite American policy relating 
to the polar regions.”16  
Before a new American polar policy could be crafted, however, the State 
Department had to firmly decide its position on the requirements of territorial acquisition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Press, 2013), 312-313; Tom Griffiths, Slicing the Silence: Voyaging to Antarctica (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
13 D.F. Howard for Neville Chamberlain to H. Lloyd Thomas, Paris, 16 September 1937, NA, CO 
323/1599/7. 
14 Note by John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, 19 May 1933, 
NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/37 1 1/2. See also Miss Anna O’Neill, the 
Arctic Sector Claimed by Russia and American Claims Therein, 30 October 1933, NARA, RG 59, Entry 
5245, Box 1, Folder 2, File Polar Regions. Sovereignty. Sector Principle and S.W. Boggs, Department of 
State, Office of Historical Adviser, 22 July 1930, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 
Antarctic/28. 
15 See Hickerson to Boggs, 16 August 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 
Antarctic/38-1/4 and P.M. to Phillips, 5 October 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 
800.014 Antarctic/37 3/4. 
16 S.W. Boggs, Department of State, Office of the Historical Adviser, The Polar Regions: Geographical and 
Historical Data in a Study of Claims to Sovereignty in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions, pg. 122, 21 
September 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4522, File 800.014, Arctic/31. 
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and effective occupation in the polar regions.17 The department leaned heavily on its 
recently established Office of the Legal Adviser for advice.18 The office’s head, Green 
Hackworth, displayed a keen interest in the problems of territorial acquisition, as did two 
of his assistants, William Roy Vallance and Anna O’Neill, both of whom had previously 
assessed the legal situation in the Arctic and Antarctic.19 Hackworth instilled a new 
“pragmatic or functional approach to international law” in his office. Officials viewed the 
law as a “flexible tool” for crafting pracical solutions to international problems, rather 
than as a “body of fixed and unchangeable rules.” The approach differed significantly 
from the classical legal ideology that once dominated State Department officials’ 
thinking. Under Hackworth, the office worked on a case-by-case basis, and avoided 
enunciating broad and sweeping principles, such as the Hughes Doctrine.20 The Office of 
the Legal Adviser’s new approach complemented a growing desire by State Department 
officials for pragmatic and realistic solutions to the problems of polar sovereignty.  
In addition to seeking practical solutions to problems, the Office of the Legal 
Adviser also insisted that adopted doctrines should be “calculated to stand the test of 
good conscience, fair dealing, and sound principle of law and practice."21 In the early 
1930s, the State Department finally concluded that the sector principle could not pass 
such a test. The department agreed with Charles Cheney Hyde’s conclusion that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Miss Anna O’Neill, the Arctic Sector Claimed by Russia and American Claims Therein, 30 October 1933, 
NARA, RG 59, Entry 5245, Box 1, Folder 2, File Polar Regions. Sovereignty. Sector Principle. Boggs had 
been urging the State Department to answer the complicated questions of polar sovereignty and occupation 
for years. S.W. Boggs, Department of State, Office of Historical Adviser, 22 July 1930, NARA, RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/28. 
18 In 1931 the office of the solicitor for the State Department had been abolished, replaced by the position 
of legal adviser. 
19 See Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1940), 393-482 especially the section on Polar and Subpolar Regions, 449-476. 
20 Richard Bilder, “The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs,” 
The American Journal of International Law 56, no. 3 (1962): 633-684 at 680. Richard Steinberg and 
Jonathan Zasloff have argued that the death of classical legal thought amongst U.S. decision-makers came 
as a result of the Stimson Doctrine, Henry Stimson’s failed response to the Manchurian Crisis. In 1940, 
Hans Morgenthau launched an attack on classical legal ideology. Unlike those who embraced classical 
legal thought, for legal realists legal rules were simply politics by other means. Richard Steinberg and 
Jonathan Zasloff, “Power and International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 100, no. 64 
(2006): 72-73. For more on the State Department Legal Adviser see Michael P. Scharf and Paul Williams 
eds., Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State Department 
Legal Adviser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
21 Harold Hongjiu Koh, “The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Decades in Peace and War,” 
Faculty Scholarship Series (2012): 1752. 
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Washington had never approved the sector principle nor was it “obliged or prepared to 
admit” that the acceptance of the Treaty of 1867 constituted “approval in principle of the 
sector system.” As a result, the U.S. could ignore sector claims in which a state did not 
display “the requisite power to control.”22 Anna O’Neill and Samuel Boggs suggested if 
the U.S. declared that the sector principle had no legal value, there would be “little basis 
for recognizing” many polar claims – especially in the Antarctic – providing the U.S. 
with more freedom of action. Changing opinions on the sector principle were also 
motivated by the ever diminishing prospect of finding land between Alaska and the North 
Pole, which reinforced the view that the U.S. had little to lose and much to gain by 
challenging the sector principle.23 Hackworth and his legal advisers also condemned the 
symbolic acts that supported the polar claims of the countries of the British Empire.24 “In 
the theory and practice of international law it is laid down that sovereignty over a No-
man’s-land must be acquired by occupation,” stressed O’Neill, “there is no valid reason 
for departing from this rule in the polar regions.”25  
The central debate within the State Department involved the level of occupation 
required to successfully claim polar territory. Boggs (who at this point was an expert on 
polar sovereignty) led a group of officials who believed that the State Department gave 
“undue consideration…to the idea of ‘effective occupation.’” The geographer suggested 
to John D. Hickerson, assistant chief of the Division of West European Affairs, that the 
Hughes Doctrine ignored the unique environmental conditions of the Arctic and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hyde admitted that the U.S. had never admitted that there should be a “a “relaxation of the requirements 
of international law” in the polar regions, but believed it still could. Hyde, “Acquisition of Sovereignty 
Over Polar Areas,” 291. 
23 These opinions on the sector principle were also motivated by the ever diminishing prospect of finding 
land between Alaska and the North Pole, which reinforced the view that the U.S. had little to lose and much 
to gain by challenging the sector principle. At one point, Boggs suggested that the United States could 
stress the differences between the sector principle in the Arctic and Antarctic, and only challenge its use in 
the Antarctic. Miss Anna O’Neill, the Arctic Sector Claimed by Russia and American Claims Therein, 30 
October 1933, NARA, RG 59, Entry 5245, Box 1, Folder 2, File Polar Regions. Sovereignty. Sector 
Principle; and Samuel Boggs, The Sector Principle in the Polar Regions, 1 November 1933, NARA, RG 59, 
Entry 5245, Box 1, Folder 2, File Polar Regions. Sovereignty. Sector Principle. 
24 Legal Adviser, 12 November 1934, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014, Antarctic 39 
½. 
25 Miss Anna O’Neill, the Arctic Sector Claimed by Russia and American Claims Therein, 30 October 1933, 
NARA, RG 59, Entry 5245, Box 1, Folder 2, File Polar Regions. Sovereignty. Sector Principle. 
	  	   299	  
Antarctic.26 Boggs insisted, “actual settlement should not be made a condition of 
establishing sovereignty.” Instead, he urged the U.S. to take the lead in the “special 
development” of the law for the polar regions, which could be agreed upon by the 
claimant countries through multilateral negotiations or an international conference. A key 
point, Boggs suggested, should be the elevation of the role of initial discovery, especially 
in the Antarctic. He also recommended that the U.S. decide whether explorers could 
claim land by dropping flags from airplanes, which he thought would become an 
increasingly common practice.27 Most importantly, Boggs wanted the U.S. to outline a 
“special definition” of occupation for the polar regions. He thought they should be 
classified as “ice deserts” and treated like the deserts of Africa. Echoing Charles Cheney 
Hyde’s arguments, Boggs insisted that the occupation of an “ice desert” should consist of 
physical state control over its points of access and an official notification to interested 
governments. Within this “special definition” of occupation, a state could extend its 
control through aerial activities.28 Beyond his emphasis on aerial control, Boggs’ 
definition of effective occupation matched closely with what British and Canadian 
experts concluded in the 1920s. 
William Roy Vallance supported Boggs’ assessment of effective occupation in 
light of new developments in international law. In 1926, the legal adviser examined 
Canada’s occupation in the Arctic and concluded that its claim was “not worth a damn.” 
In 1933, however, he pointed out that the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and Eastern 
Greenland cases changed the nature of effective occupation and showed how little state 
activity was necessary to support a claim to uninhabited territory. Vallance and 
Hackworth both reflected that the arbiter of the Clipperton Island case accepted an initial 
symbolic act of possession as proof of title. The arbiter upheld France’s claim even 	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27 Boggs also proposed that the U.S. develop a doctrine on the status of permanent ice, which he called 
glacies nullius or glacialis regio nullius (no man’s ice). S.W. Boggs, Department of State, Office of the 
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though its citizens only went ashore once and left no sign of their country’s sovereignty. 
The need for actual settlement in the polar regions stipulated in the Hughes Doctrine 
seemed undone by the current trend in international law.29 Although the permanent 
settlement and formal use of uninhabited territory no longer appeared to be a requirement 
of territorial acquisition, the Office of the Legal Adviser maintained that the specific 
actions required to support a successful claim remained unclear.30 
A draft congressional resolution “Relating to the Arctic and Antarctic Regions” 
drawn up by the State Department at the end of 1933 reflected its changing opinion on 
the doctrine of effective occupation. The document rejected claims that did not meet the 
“accepted requirements of international law” or lacked recognition in an international 
agreement to which the United States was a party. The draft resolution asserted that many 
countries staked claims to polar areas without effective occupation or jurisdiction, based 
only on discovery, official proclamation and the sector principle, which had “no basis in 
international law.” While these statements were all in keeping with the Hughes Doctrine, 
the tone changed when the resolution stated that the Arctic and Antarctic were not 
“adapted to continuous human inhabitations, on account of prevailing climatic 
conditions.” Nevertheless, the authors insisted that sovereignty could not be 
acknowledged in advance of “acts essential to the establishment of sovereignty.” As a 
result, the resolution recommended Congress “authorize and request the President to take 
appropriate steps to lay claim to all land and islands in the polar regions to which the 
United States is entitled to assert a claim because of discoveries, exploration and other 
acts of officers and men of official American expeditions and of American citizens.”31 
Displaying the State Department’s continued uncertainty about the requirements of polar 
sovereignty, the draft resolution offered no elaboration on the “acts essential,” the 
“appropriate steps,” or the level of state activity necessary to acquire sovereignty over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 William Roy Vallance, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, 8 August 1933, NARA, RG 59, 
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Department of State to Mr. R. Walton Moore, 30 March 1935, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, 
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30 Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State to Mr. R. Walton Moore, 30 March 1935, NARA, RG 
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polar territory. Despite its ambiguity, the wording of the resolution would have allowed 
the U.S. to challenge many of the existing polar claims. 
 By the mid-1930s, however, many State Department officials concluded that the 
U.S. would have a difficult time successfully challenging the Arctic claims of the Soviet 
Union and Canada, given the measures taken by both countries to strengthen their 
positions. Stalin’s Soviet Union initiated a dramatic increase in state activity in the High 
Arctic in the 1930s. The Soviets wanted to achieve “physical mastery” of the entire 
region to pave the way for economic development and a “suitable payoff,” historian John 
MacCannon has argued.32 Under the institutional control of the Glavsevmorput – the 
Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route, or the “Commissariat of Ice”– the 
Soviets initiated a frenzy of exploration, meteorological studies, scientific programs, 
aerial advancement and permanent physical occupation in a systematic investigation of 
the region.33 In the High Arctic, their signature projects involved the development of 
aviation and the Northern Sea Route, which a Soviet icebreaker transited for the first time 
in a single season in 1932, raising hope that it could be used as a regular shipping lane.34 
The Soviets also established a system of stations and sub-stations across the Arctic 
islands, which increased to ninety by 1940. These stations fulfilled a wide array of 
practical functions, serving as meteorological posts, storage depots, coal bases for the 
icebreakers, radio stations, and platforms for scientific research.35 Soviet scientific efforts 
peaked in May 1937, when a four-man party landed on the North Pole and maintained a 
station there for three quarters of the year. Meanwhile, three long distance flights across 
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the North Pole to destinations on the western coast of the United States highlighted 
Soviet advancements in polar aviation.36  
The Soviet Union continued to uphold its sector claim, but diplomats and lawyers 
became less vocal about the principle during the 1930s as the state demonstrated 
occupation and use.37 When prominent jurist Evengy Pashukanis discussed the Soviet 
Union’s title in the Arctic in 1935, he explained that “the polar voyages of our 
icebreakers, the work of aviation, the opening up of the Northern Sea Route, the 
organization of the network of stations and settlements (on Franz Josef Land, Severnaya 
Zemlya, Wrangel Island, etc.), the great and systematic scientific work, all these facts 
[provide] evidence about rather effective occupation by the Soviet Union of the adjacent 
polar areas.”38 American legal assessments accepted that Russian efforts at effective 
occupation – which often met the requirements of the Hughes Doctrine – and 
Washington’s failure to protest the Russian sector claim barred the U.S. from challenging 
Soviet title to the islands north of the Siberian coastline.39 
Americans were less impressed by Ottawa’s administrative efforts in the Arctic 
Archipelago, yet admitted that Canada’s title was also growing progressively stronger. 
Despite the State Department’s continued assertion of American interests and possible 
rights in the Canadian Arctic sector, especially to Ellesmere Island, Boggs observed that 
these claims could “not be presented, however meritorious, if allowed to lapse much 	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longer” because the Canadians were “rather effectively” establishing jurisdiction in their 
sector.40 As the State Department considered re-defining its approach to occupation in the 
polar regions, more officials came to support Boggs’ view that Canada’s sovereignty over 
the Arctic Archipelago was becoming more difficult to dispute.41  
Perhaps if more American expeditions had ventured to the northern islands above 
Parry Channel in the 1930s, the U.S. would have been more inclined to question 
Canada’s legal position. U.S. explorers were far more active in the Antarctic than the 
Arctic at this time, making the southern continent the logical focus of U.S. interest. 
Furthermore, when the U.S. government accepted that there was little chance of 
finding undiscovered land above Ellesmere Island much of the incentive to challenge 
Canada’s sector claim was lost. Finally, although American air power advocate Billy 
Mitchell emphasized air power’s amplification of the importance of the Arctic and 
declared Alaska to be “the most important strategic place in the world,” the State 
Department and U.S. military did not yet view Canada’s Arctic islands as essential to 
continental defence – an opinion that would change dramatically after the Second World 
War.42 In the 1930s, the United States saw little advantage in challenging the Arctic 
claims of its neighbour. 
Boggs and other American officials focused their country’s polar ambitions on the 
Antarctic.43 In particular, Boggs argued that the exploration work of Nathaniel Palmer 
and other American sailors combined with the “natural interest” that the U.S. had in the 
Antarctic peninsula, given its proximity to South America, laid the groundwork for an 
American claim in the Falkland Island Dependencies. In the eastern half of the Ross 	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Dependency, Washington could cite Richard Byrd’s work to challenge the Empire’s 
sector claim. Finally, the discoveries of the U.S. Exploring Expedition in the Eastern 
Antarctic in 1840 gave the U.S. the right to contest the recent Australian claim, especially 
if the Americans followed up with additional measures of occupation.44 Official 
American interest in the AAT grew when the State Department observed that Australia 
failed to consolidate her claim following Mawson’s expeditions to the area in 1929-1930 
and 1930-1931.45 The U.S. could find reasons to challenge the Empire’s claims across the 
entire Antarctic.  
The political climate precluded an official dispute with the Britain over polar 
claims.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt foresaw the threat posed by Germany, Italy and 
Japan worsening. Starting in 1934, Roosevelt sought to “get closer” to Britain, “with a 
view to preventing a war or shortening it if it should come.”46 Nevertheless, Boggs felt 
the United States could still claim Marie Byrd Land, the unclaimed area between the 
Ross Dependency and the FID explored by Byrd, or initiate an “international conference, 
perhaps agreeing to a division of rights and responsibilities among several countries” 
without raising Britain’s ire.47 The Great Depression impeded such planning, however, as 
American officials determined it was not in the national interest to invest resources to 
acquire what were seen as “frozen wastes” in the midst of severe economic downturn.  
Despite a growing movement within the State Department to redefine the 
American legal stance on occupation in the polar regions, there was hesitation to leave 
behind the Hughes Doctrine. On the one side, if the U.S. disposed of the Hughes Doctrine 
and accepted less stringent requirements for effective occupation, a claim to Marie Byrd 	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Land based on Richard Byrd’s work existed. At the same time, if the Americans accepted 
something less than “continuous human inhabitations,” they would provide support to the 
Empire’s Antarctic claims, which enclosed areas the State Department viewed as more 
important than Marie Byrd Land. At the end of 1933, the State Department shelved the 
draft congressional resolution challenging existing polar claims and requesting that 
President Roosevelt claim polar territory for the U.S. Until Washington decided what 
areas of the polar regions it wanted to claim, the Hughes Doctrine provided a convenient 
tool to challenge existing polar claims by setting a standard for acquiring sovereignty that 
no state could meet.  
6.2 A Reservation of Rights  
Not ready to annex territory in the Antarctic, the State Department refused to grant 
American explorers Lincoln Ellsworth and Richard Byrd authorization to claim land 
during their expeditions to the Antarctic in 1933. The Ellsworth Trans-Antarctic Flight 
Expedition departed for the Ross Dependency in December 1933 with the intention of 
flying between the Ross Sea and the Weddell Sea.48 Meanwhile, Byrd returned to Little 
America to continue exploring the area east of the Ross Dependency. His expedition 
consisted of a meteorologist, geologists, physicists, biologists, radio engineers, 
geographers, surveyors and aerial surveyors, and the most rigorous photo-surveying 
methods available.49 The fifty-six-man overwintering party planned to spend two years in 
the Antarctic, during which time they would strive to answer whether the continent was 
one land mass or two land masses separated by a channel running from the Weddell Sea 
to the Ross Sea – a waterway connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific at the bottom of the 
world.50 Although the State Department refused authorization of territorial claims, Byrd 
and his brother Harry, a U.S. Senator, convinced their close friend President Roosevelt to 
give the expedition quasi-official support. Not only did the President lend the expedition 
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a government meteorologist, he also agreed to issue a special three-cent stamp for the 
expedition and assign members of the party to act as post officials at Little America.51  
News of Ellsworth’s planned flight and Byrd’s second expedition arrived in 
London the fall of 1933, as the Polar Committee celebrated the unprotested creation of 
the Australian Antarctic Territory. Officials lauded the British policy of extending its 
control over the Antarctic.52 The Antarctic served as an imperial success story at a time 
when the British Empire really needed one. The hardships of the Great Depression, 
Britain’s economic decline, growing nationalism in countries under colonial rule and 
worries over a great power assault on British interests led officials to question the 
Empire’s future. Winston Churchill predicted, in early 1934, that “the storm clouds are 
gathering, others are ready to take our place.”53 In the Antarctic, Britain’s imperial 
dreams seemed alive and well until American expeditions threatened to supplant the 
Empire in the south polar region. 
Worry over Lincoln Ellsworth’s small-scale flight quickly subsided when the 
British realized that the explorer lacked official support from the U.S. government. 
Furthermore, the Polar Committee learned that Hubert Wilkins, Australian explorer and 
supporter of the Empire, accompanied Ellsworth. The British continued the practice 
started with Byrd’s first expedition and directed New Zealand to dispatch a note to 
Ellsworth welcoming him to operate in the Ross Dependency and offering any assistance 
possible. Ellsworth’s small ship, the Wyatt Earp battled its way through thick ice and 
arrived in the Bay of Whales, twelve miles north of Little America, on 9 January 1934. 
The expedition tested its plane in the Antarctic conditions, but the craft was damaged 
beyond repair and the team returned to New Zealand.54  
British officials worried more over Bryd’s large-scale effort, with its 
technological superiority and focus on extended occupancy. The empire took some 	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assurance from the absence of an official claim by State Department based on Byrd’s 
previous occupation of the Ross Dependency. Furthermore, although some officials 
dreamed of annexing the massive sector between the FID and the Ross Dependency 
(where Marie Byrd Land lay), most concluded that a British claim would provoke the 
Americans or Norwegians to challenge existing territorial claims “in which they would 
otherwise acquiesce.”55 In the end, Britain had never sent an expedition to Marie Byrd 
Land and it could not expect the Americans to refrain from claiming the territory.56 By 
the time Byrd’s second mission departed for the Antarctic, many British officials 
halfheartedly resigned themselves to an American claim to Marie Byrd Land.  
Worry about the expedition mounted when the press published a note from 
President Roosevelt to Byrd which stated that “when you re-establish the Post Office at 
Little America be sure to send me a letter for my stamp collection.”57 When the Polar 
Committee learned that Washington planned to issue a special three-cent postal stamp for 
use by the expedition at Little America, and would appoint members of the party to act as 
postal officials, it concluded that “if unchallenged” these actions “might…derogate from 
British sovereignty.” 58 Some relief came when Byrd gave an “emphatic assurance” that 
his expedition had no intention of “encroaching upon British territory or the British 
sphere of influence or discovery within the Antarctic.”59 Still, the Dominions Office 
stressed to the government of New Zealand that London felt “very strongly that although 
Byrd himself may not intend any infringement of British territorial rights, actions of 
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United States Government…infringe British sovereignty, and in view of publicity which 
they have received should not be passed over without comment.”60  
In January 1934, the British, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in New 
Zealand forwarded a welcome and offer of assistance to Byrd’s expedition to the State 
Department. In addition, the British noted that the expedition appeared to have the 
“official backing of the United States Government.” They explained that the use of U.S. 
postage stamps and the establishment of postal services at Little America without the 
permission of the “sovereign owner” could be viewed as an infringement of British 
sovereignty and New Zealand’s administrative rights. The British chastised the 
Americans for failing to apply for permits to fly and establish a wireless station in the 
Ross Dependency.  London and Wellington were willing to recognize their offer of 
assistance as covering the required permissions. However, the British stressed that they 
would have preferred prior notice and an application.61 The note carefully placed on 
record Britain and New Zealand’s opposition to a potential American claim in a carefully 
worded manner that they hoped would avoid a reply from Washington. 
The American response to Britain’s note dramatically changed the legal context 
of the Antarctic.62 In 1928, when the State Department received a similar note from the 
British in response to Byrd’s first expedition, it drafted a response that challenged the 
Empire’s Antarctic claims, but ended up sending a reply that simply acknowledged the 
offer of assistance and offered no comment on claims whatsoever. In 1934, the 
department decided to issue a stronger response. American legal appraisals prepared over 
the previous months had warned that if the U.S. was not ready to immediately annex land 
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in the polar regions, it must take caution not to prejudice any future claims.63 The U.S. 
had to actively protest, or at least actively refrain from recognizing, another state’s claims 
to territory that was of interest. A formal protest would lead to an official legal dispute 
with the British Empire over territory that the U.S. government was unsure it wanted to 
claim. Instead, the State Department’s reply to the British note “reserve[d] all rights 
which United States or its citizens may have with regard to this matter.” The Americans 
told the British that they would not make a claim to the Ross Dependency at that time, 
but reserved the right to do so in the future. The State Department’s reply represented the 
first American reservation of its rights in the polar regions and represented the most 
direct legal and political action yet taken by the United States in relation to polar 
sovereignty.  
Reluctant to escalate the situation and enter into protracted talks on the nature of 
sovereignty in the Ross Dependency, the American response stressed that it did “not 
seem necessary at this time to enter into a discussion of interesting questions which are 
set forth in your note.”64 London also had no desire to escalate the situation and push 
Washington into asserting a claim, and so took the Americans up on their offer not to 
discuss the matter. However, when news reached London in October 1934 that the 
Americans had appointed a postal cancellation expert to Little America to handle all the 
mail that would arrive with the summer re-supply expedition, the British could remain 
silent no longer. British ambassador R.C. Lindsay informally questioned State 
department officials on American intentions and asked for an explanation for “what 
appeared to be the official recognition of a United States Post Office in British territory 
under New Zealand administration.” Lindsay warned that this action “might be construed 
as assertion of American sovereignty.”65  
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The next American reply had far broader ramifications on the bi-polar legal 
landscape than the initial reservation of rights. Provoked by the repeated assertions of 
Britain’s sovereignty over the Ross Dependency, the Americans decided to make their 
position clearer. Under direct orders from Roosevelt, the State Department sent a note 
that challenged the British claim to the Ross Dependency. Even as they debated the 
merits of the Hughes Doctrine in the State Department, the Americans used it to attack 
Britain’s claim to the Ross Dependency. The Americans explained that they “understood” 
that the British Empire based its title to the Ross Dependency on discovery of a portion of 
the area. The note, signed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, then asserted that “in the 
light of long established principles of international law…I can not admit that sovereignty 
accrues from mere discovery unaccompanied by occupancy and use.” For the first time 
since 1924, the Americans revealed their opposition to all polar claims that did not meet 
their rigid requirements for occupancy and use.  
Although forced to be more explicit, the Americans still hoped to avoid “detailed 
discussion of the subject at this time.”66 To officials in London, however, the American 
response was “unnecessary and gratuitous and a definite challenge to British sovereignty 
as well as an abuse of the hospitality extended to the Byrd expedition.” More than that, if 
the Americans rejected the claim to the Ross Dependency, what would keep them from 
challenging the Empire’s other polar annexations? The British drafted a response on 
behalf of New Zealand that insisted the Americans were “quite wrong” in alleging that 
the Empire based its claim to the Ross Dependency only on discovery. The Ross 
Dependency had been “formally annexed” and placed under New Zealand’s 
administration. Since then, New Zealand had “continuously” upheld the Empire’s title by 
the “very definite exercise” of “administrative and governmental powers,” including the 
issue of whaling licenses and the appointment of magistrates, which to British officials 
represented a suitable demonstration of state sovereignty in the polar regions. Due to 
these efforts, the Ross Dependency must be considered “indubitably British territory.” On 	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top of these written observations, the British ambassador would explain that although the 
Americans had put London in a difficult position, it did not wish to dwell on the issue. 
The whole conflict would be resolved if the U.S. provided “formal written assurance” 
that the visitation of the postal cancellation expert was not an “official exercise” of the 
U.S. postal service.67 At the end of November 1934, the British passed this plan to the 
government of New Zealand.  
Historian Malcolm Templeton has shown that, in a rare display of concern over 
Antarctic politics, government of New Zealand officials from the Prime Minister’s 
Department, Marine Department and Post Office met to discuss the problem. They 
worried about how the Americans might respond to such a strong British approach and 
reminded London that, “no officer of the Dependency has ever set foot in the territory” 
and “there has been no occupation of the Territory whatsoever.” Any extended 
discussions on the dispute with the State Department would bring these compromising 
facts to light. Furthermore, the New Zealanders could see little reason to aggravate the 
situation, and suggested that London and Wellington simply accept that the American 
“postal proposals” were of “little importance.”68 The British agreed, and decided to treat 
the American postal plans as legally and politically meaningless. A toned down version 
of the British draft note formed the basis of New Zealand’s reply on 27 December 1934. 
The note explained that Britain based its claim to the Ross Dependency on 
administration, regulations, whaling licenses, appointment of a magistrate and other 
governmental powers. It admitted that there was no postal service in the Dependency, so 
New Zealand willingly recognized the need for the American postal plans. Had the 
British and New Zealanders thought that the actions taken by the U.S. constituted an 
assertion of sovereignty, rather than a “matter of philatelic interest,” they would have 
been “compelled to make a protest.”69 The U.S. responded that no useful purpose could 	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be served by any further discussion of these points at the time, but concluded the 
disagreement with another reservation of its rights. 
 “I reserve all rights which the United States or its citizens may have with respect 
to this matter,” became the standard American response to state claims in the Antarctic.70 
Both Samuel Boggs and William Vallance concluded that a private communication 
reserving U.S. rights adequately preserved the American legal position.71 For such a 
reservation of rights to succeed, the Americans understood that it had to be persistent and 
thorough. In the Eastern Greenland decision, for example, the PCIJ found that Norway’s 
ratification of the Universal Postal Conventions of 1920, 1924 and 1929, which described 
Greenland as being part of Denmark, debarred the Norwegians from contesting Danish 
sovereignty.72 A similar scenario started to unfold when, in the spring of 1935, the British 
tried to include the Falkland Islands and Dependencies in a schedule of territories 
covered by an international arrangement concerning the operation of civil aircraft. The 
State Department caught the inclusion of the FID in the agreement and sent a note to 
London explaining that the U.S. could not accept the addition of the Dependencies in the 
agreement, nor could its ratification of the convention imply its acceptance of Britain’s 
sovereignty in the Antarctic.73 The response represented the first American non-
recognition of the FID.  
As the State Department took action to preserve its legal position in the Antarctic, 
American explorers continued to lay the basis for an eventual territorial claim. Byrd’s 
expedition successfully established its base at Little America – the most technically 
advanced party to overwinter on the continent to that point. The expedition’s 
communications equipment allowed for the first successful broadcast of human voices 
directly from the Antarctic. Generating plants provided the base with a constant supply of 	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electrical power. Scientific studies included seismic investigations, meteorological 
observations, and various geological and biological programs. Charles Anderson, the 
American postal cancellation expert, made it to Little America in January 1935 and 
processed more than 70,000 letters that had been sent to the expedition. The Americans 
again performed aerial surveys of Marie Byrd Land and its coastline. A sledging party 
explored 862 miles of new territory in 77 days. During the first winter, Byrd set up his 
famous Advance Base, some 160 km from Little America, where he stayed by himself 
taking meteorological observations, until he suffered carbon monoxide poisoning and had 
to be rescued.  
Byrd’s second expedition ended in February 1935 and the party returned home to 
a hero’s welcome. Upon his return, Byrd told the American public that he had 
“discovered, explored and photographed about 200,000 square miles additional territory 
to the east of the 150th meridian, to all of which the name ‘Marie Byrd Land’ is applied.” 
In contrast to his first expedition, Byrd spoke far more openly about the possibility of the 
U.S. taking possession of Marie Byrd Land. 74 
After the failure of his expedition to the Ross Dependency, Lincoln Ellsworth 
decided to fly from a base in the South Shetlands to the Ross Sea on a one-way flight. 
Once again, the State Department refused to grant Ellsworth permission to claim any new 
territory he discovered for the U.S.75 To the department’s annoyance and Britain’s 
delight, the explorer sought permission from the Governor of the Falkland Islands to 
establish a base in the South Shetlands.76 Ellsworth made it to Deception Island in late 
1934, but mechanical problems and weather conditions made the planned flight 
impossible. He tried again the following year and, on 23 November 1935, he successfully 
took off from Dundee Island on his way to the Bay of Whales, a distance of 4600 km. 
During a stop mid way through the flight, Ellsworth claimed the 350,000 square miles of 
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territory adjacent to Marie Byrd Land (80°W and 120°W) for the U.S. and named it 
James Ellsworth Land.77  
In a dramatic episode, Ellsworth lost radio contact and was forced to land 16 
miles short of his destination, Little America. Even though Ellsworth lost contact over the 
Ross Dependency, not the AAT, Canberra quickly took the lead in organizing a search 
and rescue mission, which it believed would provide a fine demonstration of the Empire’s 
sovereignty in the Antarctic. With financial support from Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand, the Discovery II (the Discovery Committee’s vessel) and two Royal Australian 
Air Force planes set off for the Ross Dependency, where they quickly located Ellsworth 
and his Canadian pilot, Herbert Hollick-Kenyon, at Little America.78  
The personal claims made by Byrd and Ellsworth of Marie Byrd Land and James 
Ellsworth Land underlined for State Department officials that the U.S. had never 
officially annexed territory in the Antarctic.79 Green Hackworth warned that an admission 
by the U.S. of the absence of an Antarctic claim would “prove extremely embarrassing” 
in future arbitration.80 International lawyer David Hunter Miller insisted at the time, “The 
United States will always have to admit in any future discussion of the subject that up to 
this date it has made no formal claim to any such territory. Accordingly, I do not see how 
it can become embarrassing to state now a fact which of necessity will have to be 
admitted to be a fact whenever the question is raised.”81 In the months that followed, the 
American public’s interest and excitement over the Byrd and Ellsworth expeditions 
increased the political will in Congress for an Antarctic claim. In June 1936, Congress 
took an important step forward by adopting an act permitting President Roosevelt to 	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present Ellsworth with a gold medal for “claiming on behalf of the United States 
approximately three hundred and fifty thousand square miles of land in Antarctica 
between the eightieth and one hundred and twentieth meridians west of Greenwich, 
representing the last unclaimed territory in the world.”82  
6.3 The Commonwealth, the Hughes Doctrine and Polar 
Sovereignty  
In the 1930s, the American emphasis on “occupancy and use” levied a greater impact on 
the legal appraisals of officials in London, Canberra, Ottawa and even for a short time 
Wellington, than the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland cases did. 
To the annoyance of British and Commonwealth officials, despite the modest threshold 
for effective occupation set by the three cases, the U.S. continued to uphold the rigid 
standards set by the Hughes Doctrine. Worse, the Americans seemed ready to support 
their legal position through actual physical occupation in the Antarctic, as shown by the 
Byrd expedition’s two-year occupancy of the Ross Dependency.  
Initially, the British argued that the Eastern Greenland decision established that 
the “principle of permanent human occupation” that the U.S. upheld as a necessity to 
create a good title could not be applied to the polar environment.83 The Foreign Office 
legal advisers insisted that the exercise of sovereignty in the polar regions did not demand 
settlers or police forces, only legislation, administrative functions, the occasional visit, 
and the appointment of magistrates.84 In the Antarctic, Britain’s control of the whaling 	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industry, the legislation it passed for the region, as well as the charting, surveying and 
scientific studies performed by the Discovery Committee represented sufficient 
demonstrations of the Empire’s sovereignty.85 Furthermore, the Foreign Office trumpeted 
the successful search for Ellsworth as proof that “the British administration of the Ross 
Dependency had been effectively exercised” by ensuring the “safety of visitors to the 
region.”86  
Despite the optimism in the Foreign Office about the strength of the Empire’s 
polar claims, legal adviser William Eric Beckett pointed out that the three legal cases left 
an unclear formula of effectiveness, and advised that the specific facts of each case be 
considered. Furthermore, Beckett stressed that the PCIJ’s decision in Eastern Greenland 
came down to competition and which state submitted the stronger claim.87 The British 
could critique the Hughes Doctrine all they wanted, but if the Americans continued to 
send expeditions to occupy Britain’s Antarctic territory, the U.S. would soon establish a 
stronger claim. As a result, some officials believed that more British acts of occupation 
might be necessary to keep pace with the Americans.  
The warning of Frank Debenham, Director of the Scott Polar Research Institute at 
the University of Cambridge, rang loud. Debenham often discussed polar claims with the 
officials and private experts of foreign powers. In these situations, he was “frequently 
reminded…of the slender grounds upon which we claim the Falkland Islands sector of 
the Antarctic Continent.” While French, Belgium, Swedish and German expeditions had 
all wintered in the region, only Shackleton’s Endurance expedition had done so for the 
British. “It appears, then, that whatever may be our activities outside the Antarctic Circle 
in the Dependencies, we have little to be proud of inside it.”88 At this point, the British 	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did not even know whether or not Graham Land was separated from the continental 
interior by a strait. Given Ellsworth’s activities in the FID, the British government felt it 
time for another expedition to the area.  
John Rymill, an Australian polar explorer and pilot, volunteered to lead an 
expedition to overwinter on Graham Land.89 Rymill wanted his small party of nine men 
to explore and survey the southernmost parts of the FID. With only £10,000 from the 
Colonial Office, the British hoped that the Graham Land Expedition would bolster their 
claim. Rymill’s Graham Land Expedition was one of the last predominately privately 
sponsored Antarctic expeditions. The three-year expedition set out in 1934 and made an 
intensive geographical survey of Graham Land, with a shore party of nine men, dog 
sledges and a De Havilland Fox Moth based at the Debenham Islands in Marguerite Bay, 
on the west side of the peninsula. Rymill and his men performed geological, 
glaciological, zoological, biological and meteorological studies. They named many 
geographic features and disproved the existence of a channel separating Graham Land 
from the rest of the continent, determining that the Antarctic was a single continent.90 
Rymill’s efforts provided London with some reassurance about its sovereignty over the 
FID, and laid the groundwork for the more rigorous acts of occupation carried out by the 
British in subsequent years. 
Rymill’s aerial exploration, along with the flights carried out by American and 
Norwegian expeditions, resulted in new considerations in British legal appraisals. 
Technological developments could clearly change international law, and aerial 
exploration embodied this idea. Foreign Office legal adviser Gerald Fitzmaurice saw no 
difference between dropping a flag from an airplane or hoisting one on the ground, and 
believed that such actions could create an inchoate right, at least for a short time. A 
perfect title, however, could only be acquired by establishing an administration and state 
control over the area.91  	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More importantly, the flights finally led some in the Foreign Office to doubt “the 
validity of the sector principle.” Throughout the early 1930s, British officials remained, 
as the Foreign Office representative on the Polar Committee pointed out, “deeply 
committed to the sector principle.”92 Only Norway had publicly protested the use of the 
principle in the Arctic and Antarctic. Although the U.S. State Department stressed the 
need for occupancy and use, it had not yet expressly spoken out against sectors. As a 
result, the British continued to argue that a “definitive occupation” of a polar coastline or 
the “northern fringe of the Antarctic” provided a country with “a right of sovereignty 
over the whole hinterland.” 93 In British eyes, polar sectors made sense because only a 
state that controlled the points of access into a territory (the coastline) could regulate the 
hinterland. As a result, by allowing a state complete access to any polar hinterland, aerial 
flights threatened the very core of the sector principle.94  
Even as concerns about the validity of sector claims grew, British officials, 
including the Foreign Office legal advisers, acknowledged that the claims to the FID and 
the AAT depended on the principle.95 Furthermore, many officials continued to argue that 
the sector principle offered a “convenient and plausible” solution to the complexities of 
polar sovereignty.96 The new Hydrographer, Rear Admiral J.A. Edgell explained to an 
interdepartmental committee looking at polar affairs that “I cannot help thinking that the 
Sector principle is the most satisfactory method by which we can deal with Antarctic 	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Territorial Claims. It is simple to apply, easily understood and had already a large 
measure of acceptance by other nations.” Really, if the British Empire adopted “some 
new method of staking out claims” it would only “arouse suspicion and antagonism.” 
This position represented a complete reversal of the views adopted by the Admiralty prior 
to the Imperial Conference of 1926, when it had been so critical of the sector principle. 
Ignoring the occupancy accomplished by Byrd and his expedition, Edgell concluded that 
while effective occupation was “a fine phrase…it must remain meaningless for a very, 
very long time.” On the other hand, if claims were based on discovery, or on exploratory 
work, and held to what the human eye had actually seen, one country could claim a swath 
of territory some 60 km wide by sledging or overflight, and then another country could 
make a claim to the next 60 km stretch. Very quickly, the Antarctic would become a 
confusing hodgepodge of claims. The sector principle remained the best solution to the 
problem of polar sovereignty, Edgell concluded. He suggested that the British Empire 
should encourage Norway and France to take up sectors of their own, cementing the 
principle’s status as a rule of law in the polar regions.97  
The British put Arctic and Antarctic affairs on the agenda of the next Imperial 
Conference, to be held in May and June 1937. The situation report prepared for the 
Conference highlighted the Empire’s continued reliance on the sector principle, 
Norway’s sustained opposition to the theory, and the emphasis the U.S. placed on 
occupancy and use.98 As with the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, the British 
hoped that the meetings of the Committee on Polar Questions would provide a clear 
roadmap for the Empire’s polar policy.  
The Australians were also keen to discuss the Empire’s Antarctic claims and the 
sector principle at the upcoming Imperial Conference.99 Canberra had not sent an 
expedition to the Antarctic since the creation of the Australian Antarctic Territory in 	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1933. Australian officials were well aware of the American emphasis on occupancy and 
use, its reservation of rights in the Ross Dependency and the FID, and the expanding 
exploratory work of its citizens. Furthermore, private Norwegian expeditions continued 
to venture into the AAT, often planting Norway’s flag on the continent.100 Historians 
Marie Kawaja and Tom Griffiths have noted that the economic situation in Australia 
simply did not allow for another voyage. Although the search for Ellsworth took place in 
the Ross Dependency, not the AAT, Canberra highlighted the role played by the two 
Royal Australian Air Force planes and their crews as proof of Australia’s exercise of the 
control and state responsibilities required in the Antarctic.101 
Without funds for another expedition, Canberra had sought other ways to justify 
Australia’s Antarctic claim.102 The Australians continued to believe in the validity of the 
sector principle and insisted that their country fell in the best geographic position to 
administer the Eastern Antarctic, but generally avoided discussing the southern limits of 
their territory to avoid antagonizing the Norwegians.103 Cultural geographer Christy 
Collis has looked at the Australian government’s historical use of textual strategies such 
as movies and scientific publications to legitimate its annexation.104 The government 
provided funds for a film production on Australia’s efforts in the BANZAR expedition 
called Siege of the South, which was advertised with the line, “British courage wins a 
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continent for the empire.”105 While the legal value of these textual strategies was limited, 
the Australian plan to publish a map of their new Antarctic Territory carried more 
weight.106 The project soon expanded into a map of the entire Antarctic, based on the best 
available record from every country that had explored in the region.107 The map that 
Canberra released in late 1938 was the most thorough and accurate produced to that time. 
The map and its accompanying handbook recorded the efforts of the BANZARE, 
Norwegian activities, and the recent work completed in by the Americans. In particular, 
the handbook provided a detailed description of the work that the Discovery Committee 
had completed around the Antarctic, including in the waters off the AAT. By the time the 
Australians finished their map, the committee’s achievements included the 
circumnavigation of the continent, extensive survey work, whale marking cruises and 
oceanographical work in the waters off the Ross Dependency, the FID and the AAT.108 
Just like London, Canberra lauded the efforts of the Discovery Committee as a 
demonstration of the Empire’s sovereignty in the Antarctic. 
The Australians also highlighted the role that legislation and administrative efforts 
played in the Eastern Greenland decision.109 Accordingly, laws became an important 
aspect of Australia’s sovereignty, even though there was no one to enforce them in the 
AAT.110 Legal scholar Gillian Triggs has highlighted Australian efforts to legislate the 
whaling industry. The Whaling Act of 1935, for example, applied the League of Nation’s 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling to the Antarctic.111 The 	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Australian whaling ordinance forbade killing right whales, calf or suckling whales, 
female whales accompanied by calves, and demanded that whalers get licenses to work in 
the waters off the AAT.112  
The Australians hoped that the Imperial Conference of 1937 would provide 
further guidance on safeguarding their claim. Canberra submitted a preparatory paper for 
the conference that asked how existing claims could be consolidated, bearing in mind the 
legal principles accepted at previous conferences. In addition, Canberra wanted to know 
how much territory the French actually claimed through Adélie Land. After “exhaustive 
investigation” of the claim, the Australians concluded that Paris should be unable to 
define Adélie Land as a sector. Given that Sébestien César Dumont d’Urville, the only 
French explorer to ever reach the area, had not landed on the continent in 1840, France’s 
claim could “hardly be sustained in international law,” the Australians argued. 
Nevertheless, while they disliked the idea of the French claim becoming a sector, the 
Australians realized that “the non-acceptance of the sector principle to French territory in 
the Antarctic raises an important question of principle.”113  
The Canadian government also welcomed the opportunity to discuss polar affairs. 
During the early 1930’s, the Canadians paid close attention to events in the Antarctic – 
especially American involvement in the region. In the fall of 1933, Richard Byrd asked 
the Canadians for sled dogs to take on his expedition to the Ross Dependency. Concerned 
over the U.S. position on the Empire’s Antarctic claims, however, Canada’s Under 
Secretary of State for External Affairs O.D. Skelton decided not to “lend sanction to the 
present expedition by presenting dogs or other equipment” to Byrd.114 The Canadians 
also took note of the American reservation of rights in the Ross Dependency, and the 
emphasis on occupancy and use in the State Department’s rebuttal of the British claim to 
the Ross Dependency. 	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The actions of the U.S. in the Antarctic struck a chord amongst Canadian officials 
worried about Washington’s intentions in the Arctic. Ottawa distrusted that the 
applications of American expeditions to operate on Baffin Island or other southern 
portions of the Archipelago indicated acceptance “by the United States Government of 
Canadian rights in the doubtful areas (northern parts of Ellesmere Island and Axel 
Heiberg Island).” In fact, the External Affairs Department surmised that the policy of the 
U.S. government was “neither to accept nor to reject Canadian claim to the disputable 
territories” but retain its freedom of action in the islands of the High Arctic.115 The 
Americans’ reiteration of their insistence on occupation as a requirement of polar 
sovereignty came at a time when Canada’s own efforts at effective occupation in the 
northern part of the Arctic Archipelago had diminished. When the Conservative 
government of R.B. Bennett took office in 1930, it cut the administrative budget for the 
North. In the summer of 1933, the government closed the RCMP posts at Dundas 
Harbour, Devon Island and Bache Peninsula, Ellesmere Island, although it re-opened the 
old post at Craig Harbour.116 The government’s administrative efforts continued to 
decline in the Archipelago throughout the decade. A British scientist working in the 
Arctic observed, “the Canadian government in the thirties maintained a low profile in the 
north, so low as to be practically indistinguishable.”117  
Given Canada’s weakened efforts at occupation in the Arctic Archipelago, the 
legal appraisal prepared by T.L. Cory, solicitor of Canada’s Northwest Territories Branch 
of the Department of the Interior, read like a call to action. Cory undertook his lengthy 
study of polar sovereignty and Canada’s title in the Arctic in 1936, responding to what he 
perceived as the heightened level of “activity with regard to sovereignty in the Polar 
regions.” He worried about the strength of Canada’s title and wanted the government to 
invest more in its Arctic. Cory’s legal appraisal highlighted the American demand for 
“rigorous occupation,” and accordingly emphasized the need for a permanent physical 
presence more than any other prepared by British and Commonwealth officials in the 	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1930s. The solicitor based his analysis on documents received from External Affairs on 
sovereignty issues in the Antarctic, the findings of international adjudications and 
arbitrations and the writings of legal scholars. 
Cory feared that the sector principle carried “little if any weight under 
International Law.” Canada, he insisted, must stop leaning so heavily on the sector 
principle and contiguity, and focus on occupation. Despite the placement of several 
RCMP posts along the eastern fringe of Canada’s “vast Arctic claim,” he worried about 
“all the unoccupied islands lying to the west and within the Canadian Arctic sector.” 
Cory accepted that the Palmas Island decision indicated that a state did not have to make 
its authority felt in every corner of its territory all the time. He ignored the results of the 
Eastern Greenland case and cited Gustav Smedal, a Norwegian legal scholar of dubious 
objectivity, to argue the insufficiency of periodic visits to a region and scientific 
expeditions to uphold a claim. Cory also underlined Smedal’s conclusion that efficient 
possession of one polar island did not grant a state sovereignty over all the other islands 
in a group, only to the immediate areas where it exercised control. Cory maintained that 
Canada’s annual Arctic patrol did not extend Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, nor was 
it a “substantial factor in maintaining the claim already established.”  
After laying out the weaknesses of Canada’s Arctic title, Cory presented a 
comprehensive sovereignty strategy that sounded like an amplified version of Charles 
Cheney Hyde’s idea for polar control. The lawyer argued for a new main base on Devon 
Island from which administrators, surveyors and scientists could operate throughout the 
Arctic, to establish more “permanent occupation.” He envisioned parties travelling and 
establishing substations across the Archipelago, assisted and supported by a fleet of 
Arctic capable airplanes. When re-supplied by air, camps and substations could operate 
for months “without fear of being lost or perishing from lack of food and supplies.” 
Subsequently, a second large scale station could be set up in the western half of the 
archipelago, at Baillie Island. From there, parties “empowered to administer the laws of 
Canada” would carry “active jurisdiction into many of our outlying Western islands.” 
Cory believed his plan would effectively secure Canada’s title but he admitted that, “the 
cost of the proposed project will have to be investigated and that this will to a very great 
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extent be the governing factor.”118 In the end, the cost proved prohibitive, and Ottawa 
barely even considered the plan. Although the government dismissed them, Cory’s 
appraisal and plan reflect the influence of the American emphasis on permanent physical 
settlement and use in the 1930s. Furthermore, Cory’s emphasis on physical presence and 
on the ground scientific activity continued to shape Canadian and British legal appraisals 
in the decade that followed.  
Knowing that discussions on polar policy at the upcoming Imperial Conference 
could lead to important decisions on effective occupation and the sector principle, the 
Canadians wanted to participate in discussions “with a view to seeing that no principles 
will be adopted for the Antarctic region that will in any way bear upon the question of 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic regions.”119 This became a long-standing reason for 
Canadian engagement with the Antarctic over the next two decades. At the same time, the 
Canadians viewed the south polar region as a legal testing ground for many of the 
principles that formed the foundation of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Despite Cory’s 
negative opinion on the sector principle and contiguity, both still appeared on the list of 
justifications for Canada’s claims, alongside discovery, reaffirmation of discovery, 
administrative acts, “occupation where feasible,” and the Eastern Arctic Patrol. These 
factors represented the building blocks of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and they matched 
the foundation of the Empire’s Antarctic claims. The central differences, Ottawa 
concluded, were Canada’s focus on more permanent physical presence and Britain’s 
efforts at “quieting the claims of other nations through diplomatic measures.”120 In the 	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1930s, the focus of the international community rested on the Antarctic, not the Arctic. If 
a polar territorial dispute developed that tested the value of the legal principles at the root 
of Canada’s and the Empire’s polar claims, it would be in the south, not the north. 
The Imperial Conference finally convened in May 1937 with long standing polar 
enthusiast Australian Richard Casey sitting as Chair of the Committee on Polar 
Questions. The committee’s membership consisted of officials from Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa and various British departments.121 Its first meeting discussed 
the sector principle. The Australian delegation suggested that the French claim to Adélie 
Land be relegated to the area actually spotted by Dumont D’Urville or rejected 
altogether. The British, including legal adviser Gerald Fitzmaurice, argued that this action 
explicitly rejected the sector principle, and insisted that the Empire’s title required the 
principle, especially in the AAT and the FID. The British title to parts of these areas, “if 
based on other grounds, appeared in fact to be less substantial, if anything, than the 
French title to Adélie Land.” Furthermore, if the Committee agreed to relegate the French 
claim to what D’Urville actually spotted, other states might use this argument against 
Britain, New Zealand and Australia and it would be impossible to counter if the legal 
validity of the sector principle had been “impunged.” Norman Robertson, the Canadian 
representative, warned that any “denial” of the sector principle in the Antarctic should be 
avoided given the broader bi-polar impact such an action would have, especially on 
Canada’s Arctic title.122 In the end, the Committee decided to avoid any action that might 
weaken sector claims, reaffirming the Empire’s need for the continued application of the 
principle in the Arctic and Antarctic.  
British and Commonwealth officials argued that polar sectors flowed from a 
state’s control of the coastline or points of access to a territory. Now the Committee on 	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Polar Questions examined ways to increase that level of control and activity through a 
more robust physical presence. The Committee concluded that the activities of the 
Discovery II were helping to consolidate British title in the Antarctic with its focus on 
whaling and the Antarctic waters, coastal surveys and other oceanographic work. It also 
debated sending another cooperative Dominion expedition to the Empire’s sectors. 
Weather stations, the Committee agreed, would provide even greater foundation for the 
Empire’s title to its Antarctic sectors. These stations could provide long-range forecasts, 
and possibly assist climate predictions.123 J.O. Borley, from the Colonial Office, 
explained that permanent meteorological stations benefit science and, “at the same time, 
assist in consolidating their title.”124 For well over a decade, the British had pointed to the 
scientific activities of the Discovery Committee as a demonstration of Britain’s 
sovereignty in the FID; the proposals at the Imperial Conference gave science an even 
greater legal role. Science could represent the occupancy and the use that the Americans 
required in the polar regions. In the years that followed, weather stations and 
meteorology played a pivotal role in the sovereignty strategies and polar diplomacy of 
claimant states in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
 The Committee on Polar Questions firmly upheld the Empire’s continued 
reliance on the sector principle despite failure to arrive at firm conclusions on weather 
stations or another expedition to the Antarctic. In September, Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain concluded that his government would not challenge the French 
Government’s claim to a “sector extending southwards to the Pole…because there are 
other areas in the Antarctic where His Majesty’s Government might wish to rely on the 
sector principle and it is considered to be in the general interest to allow the sector 
principle to become established as a rule of law applying to Arctic and Antarctic 
territory.”125 London continued to hope that the sector principle would become part of 
customary international law for the polar regions. 	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Canada emerged from the deliberations of the Committee on Polar Questions 
satisfied with its treatment of the sector principle and comments on occupation. The 
conference led to no major changes in Canada’s Arctic policy. The Craig Harbour RCMP 
post on Ellesmere Island remained Canada’s only occupied spot above Parry Channel. 
Meanwhile, the Canadians continued to espouse their faith in the sector principle. In May 
1938, Minister of Mines and Resources T.A. Crerar reiterated in the House of Commons 
that the sector principle was “now very generally recognized, and on the basis of that 
principle…our sovereignty extends right to the pole within the limits of the sector. My 
own view is that our supremacy there is established to a point where it could not be 
successfully challenged by any other country.”126  
The Australians continued to rely on the sector principle and took the Imperial 
Conference’s suggestions on occupation quite seriously. After the Imperial Conference, 
Director of the Scott Polar Research Institute Frank Debenham visited Canberra and, just 
as he had with the British a few years earlier, insisted Australia undertake additional acts 
of occupation in the AAT.127 To strengthen Australia’s sovereignty, especially over the 
vast hinterland and the western end of the claim which he predicted Norway might still 
contest, Debenham laid out a multi-faceted strategy. First, an Australian expedition 
would establish a permanent occupation site in Mac. Robertson Land on the western edge 
of the sector. From the post, an occupying party could conduct scientific activities and 
surveys throughout the AAT. Further, Debenham suggested that Canberra form its own 
Australian Polar Committee. It would update Australia’s map of the Antarctic, publish an 
official history, create a public brochure on the AAT and appoint an expert in Australia’s 
External Affairs department to study territorial issues in the Antarctic, especially the 
sector principle and occupation. In short, Debenham’s message was for the Australians to 
get informed about the AAT and stop relying on the British.128 	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 Debenham’s ideas aligned with Australian officials who were independently 
considering another expedition to the AAT and a permanent meteorological station on the 
coastline of the Australian sector. Historian David Day has pointed out that Canberra sent 
government meteorologist Allan Cornish aboard the Discovery II to the waters off the 
AAT in the Antarctic summer of 1937-1938 with orders to keep a lookout for possible 
sites for meteorological stations, and to report on any foreign landings and whaling 
activities in the AAT. The intent was the exercise of Australia’s control over the AAT, 
but Cornish never actually landed on the continent.129 
In June 1938, William Hughes, Minister of External Affairs, noted that the AAT 
comprised 3 million square miles, along with one thousand miles of coastline largely 
unexplored and even unseen by human eyes. While the Empire’s conception of polar 
sovereignty had only called for occasional visits and some form of control, Hughes 
stressed that the U.S. and Norway believed a more permanent occupation necessary to 
“obtain recognition and title.” As a result, Hughes believed another Australian expedition 
would make a “material contribution” to Australia’s sovereignty.  To give greater weight 
to his argument, Hughes pointed to Lincoln Ellsworth’s new plan to aerially explore the 
Antarctic close to the western boundary of the AAT by air. While Hughes accepted that 
the total cost of a two-year expedition would be a hefty £30,000, he thought this a 
manageable sum for such a necessary task.130  
Unfortunately, no Australian ship was capable of visiting the Antarctic, meaning 
Britain and New Zealand had to be asked for assistance.131 New Zealand quickly rejected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 313-315. From the beginning, Canberra’s plans for an expedition also 
involved the establishment of a semi-permanent or permanent weather station in the AAT to provide long 
range forecasting for Australia. As historian Marie Kawaja has pointed out, “the government’s financial 
support reflected Australia’s strategic objectives.” For a nation reliant on primary production, long-range 
weather forecasting was a primary concern. Marie Kawaja, “Australia in Antarctica: Realising an 
Ambition,” The Polar Journal 3, no.1 (2013): 49. 
130 W.M. Hughes, Minister of External Affairs to Cabinet, Suggestion for an Australian Antarctic 
Expedition, 28 June 1938, NAA: A311, 365/9/1, Suggestion for an Australian Antarctic Expedition- W M 
Hughes 1938. Prime Minister J.A. Lyon also supported another expedition to “give greater weight to 
existing claims to British sovereignty in the Antarctic.” J.A. Lyon, Prime Minister, Commonwealth of 
Australia to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 8 July 1938, NA, DO 35/890/10. 
131 J.A. Lyon, Prime Minister, Commonwealth of Australia to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
8 July 1938, NA, DO 35/890/10. 
	  	   330	  
Australian pleas for a financial contribution.132 When the Polar Committee discussed the 
proposal for an Australian Antarctic expedition at the end of 1938, the British 
representatives offered to provide assistance if the party also ventured to the Empire’s 
other Antarctic Dependencies. In the end, however, the British offer proved hasty. As the 
British increased their military and defence spending in response to the increasing 
strength of Hitler’s Germany, funds for an Antarctic expedition quickly dried up.133 If 
Australia wanted to send an expedition to the Antarctic, it would have to do so on its 
own.  
From 1934 onwards, the American support for the Hughes Doctrine forced 
British, Australian and Canadian officials to consider additional acts of occupation they 
might need to undertake in the polar regions. Nevertheless, these officials continued to 
view sector claims as a viable legal solution to the problems of polar sovereignty. By the 
end of the decade, Britain’s Antarctic diplomacy had only reinforced this belief.  
6.4 Britain’s Polar Diplomacy, Mutual Recognition and the 
Sector Principle  
One of the most important lessons the Foreign Office took from the Eastern Greenland 
case was the impact of foreign recognition and protest on territorial claims.134 When legal 
counsel Charles de Visscher discussed the role of recognition in Denmark’s claim to 
Greenland during the oral proceedings of the case, he had argued that an international 
position could be established “from the effect of an agreement among a restricted number 
of Powers.”135 London concluded that neither the U.S. nor Argentina would come to a 
favourable agreement with Britain over Antarctic claims. The British hoped, however, 
that France and Norway might prove more willing to come to an agreement on the 
Empire’s Antarctic claims.   
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Reflecting upon the 1930s, historian Adrian Howkins has shown that Britain 
attempted to maintain the status quo with Argentina over the FID.136 Officials in London 
feared that the Argentine weather and wireless station on Laurie Island weakened 
Britain’s title. They also worried that attempting to counter the station by occupying the 
island would escalate into an official legal dispute.137 The Foreign Office’s legal advisers 
therefore argued that it was “preferable that any authoritative decision in this class of case 
should, if possible, be avoided.” London continued to worry that a conflict over the 
Dependencies might lead Argentina to challenge Britain’s hold on the Falkland Islands 
(or lead other states to question the Empire’s polar sovereignty elsewhere).138 As a result, 
good relations with Argentina remained essential to Britain’s economic security and the 
country received significant British investment (in excess of £300 million).139  
As the decade wore on, however, it was harder for Britain to maintain good 
relations with Argentina.  While the latter’s focus in the south polar region had remained 
on the South Orkneys, by the late 1930s Argentina had clearly started to consider its 
rights to the Antarctic Peninsula. In June 1937, for instance, in response to remarks made 
by the British delegation at the League of Nations Whaling Convention, the Argentine 
ambassador in London visited the Foreign Office and reserved his country’s rights in the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies. On 22 September 1938, the Argentine government 
announced that its ratification of the 1934 Universal Postal Convention did not imply 
acceptance of Britain’s claims to the Antarctic territories it listed, which included “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Adrian John Howkins, “Frozen Empires: A History of the Antarctic Sovereignty Dispute Between 
Britain, Argentina, and Chile, 1939-1959” (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Texas at Austin, 2008). 
137 William Eric Beckett thought “we can probably say is maintained by the Argentine Government with 
our assent, though the Argentine Government, of course, did not admit the necessity for any such assent.” 
Note, W.E. Beckett, 20 December 1933, NA, FO 371/24168. 
138 While Britain had signed on to the optional clause of the PCIJ, the matter of sovereignty over the FID 
was not one that could not be referred because it was “not a dispute with regard to some issue arising after 
HMG ratification.” H. Godwin, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, 3 February 1936, NA, FO 371/24168. 
See also Confidential of 1936, The Possible Effects of Resorting to Arbitration of the South Orkney Islands 
Dispute in Territorial Claims in the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, 1 May 1945, pg. 176-
177, NAA, A4311, 365/8, [British Document] Territorial Claims in the Antarctic by Research Department, 
Foreign Office, May 1st, 1945. 
139 In addition, the Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933 had guaranteed Argentina continued access to the 
British market in return for lower tariffs on British exports . As Alan Knight has pointed, the Pact 
highlighted Britain’s alliance with the conservative elite, and was actually derided by Argentine nationalists 
in their broader critique of British imperialism. Alan Knight, “Latin America,” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire, eds. Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 635-636. 
See also Roger Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). 
	  	   332	  
territory of the islas Malvinas and dependencies, which belong to the Argentine Nation 
by inalienable right.”140 The British took note of these assertions, but decided to avoid an 
official dispute over the FID.141 Despite London’s best efforts, open conflict between 
Britain and Argentina over the FID loomed just over the polar horizon.  
The British felt far more confident in their negotiations with Paris. In October 
1933, France proposed that the territorial boundaries for Adélie Land be set at 136°E and 
147°E longitude.142 Whitehall responded in April 1934 with a proposal for a boundary of 
136 1/2°E and 142°E longitude, the limits used in D’Urville’s charts published by 
France.143 Paris retorted that it “expected that when the British Empire was annexing with 
a stroke of the pen an expanse of territory in the midst of which Adélie Land constituted 
only a small portion, the British Government would have given the widest definition to 
the sector.” The French based their sector claim on the work completed by D’Urville and 
various legislative decrees they had applied to their Antarctic territory, including the 
creation of a national park for the protection of wildlife, the reservation of economic 
rights, and the region’s attachment to the Government of Madagascar.144  
The Australians understood and grudgingly accepted the reasons why the French 
should be allowed to make Adélie Land into a sector, but they refused to approve of the 
enlarged boundaries suggested by Paris. Canberra maintained that France’s efforts to 
expand its sector were thinly veiled attempts to seize Commonwealth Bay, the most 
accessible anchorage on the Eastern Antarctic coastline. This area represented the key to 
any future development or occupation of the AAT. The Australians insisted that the best 
part of the whole coastline was between 138° and 146° E, all of which lay in the 	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proposed French sector. “When it comes to real coast occupation and production,” the 
Australians argued, “this sector must take first place.” 145 
Armed with the Australian arguments, the British explained to Paris that they 
could not accept an enlarged French sector.  Further, there was no proof that D’Urville 
had even spotted territory past 142°E. Using the main argument made by Canberra, 
London highlighted that the sector proposed by Paris enclosed Cape Denison (the point at 
the head of Commonwealth Bay), which was only 16 miles to the east of the 142nd 
meridian. Cape Denison had been the site of the Australasian Antarctic Expedition’s 
(1911-1914) main base and had been revisited by the BANZAR expedition. The British 
insisted that the site was “indelibly associated with Australian tradition and history.”146 
The French could not have Commonwealth Bay. 
The conclusions on the sector principle reached by the Committee on Polar 
Questions at the Imperial Conference of 1937 provided further impetus for London to 
finish its negotiations with Paris over the borders of Adélie Land. Paris recognized the 
value of British recognition of its Antarctic sovereignty and understood the weaknesses in 
its bargaining position (D’Urville had never landed on the continent proper). Therefore, 
on 5 March 1938, the French government finally advised London that it would limit the 
Adélie Land sector to all of the territory between 136° and 142° East Longitude, the 
limits approved by the Australian government.147 A month later, France, Australia, 
Britain and New Zealand signed a treaty granting one another the right of free aerial 
passage over their respective Antarctic territories, which reflected the mutual recognition 
of their claims.148 The British Empire had secured the first official recognition of its 
claims in the Antarctic and London celebrated this diplomatic coup. Nevertheless, 
Norway’s recognition of the Empire’s Antarctic claims remained the greater prize. 	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During the 1930’s the Americans emerged as the greatest threat to the Empire’s 
polar interests yet Norway continued to worry officials in Canberra and London. After 
the Eastern Greenland decision, British Ambassador Charles Wingfield thought the time 
perfect to offer Norway an Antarctic deal: recognition of Britain’s claims in return for 
recognition of a Norwegian sector between the FID and Enderby Land, to which the 
British had been directing Norwegian efforts since 1928. Given the string of defeats in 
the polar regions over the last decade, Wingfield felt the Norwegian government would 
“swallow their theories about effective occupation which the Hague Court has not 
confirmed.” The Norwegian public, which believed Norway had “moral” and valid legal 
polar claims on the grounds of settlement and use that were ignored because of its status 
as a minor power, would support a government that secured a “considerable portion of 
the Antarctic continent.”149 Attaining official recognition of the Empire’s Antarctic sector 
claims from a country that had persistently objected to the sector principle would be a 
major legal victory for the British.  
The Australians were uninterested in recognizing Norway’s sovereignty in the 
Antarctic. External Affairs official Keith Officer argued that Wingfield’s proposed deal 
would not work and warned that it might lead the Norwegians to contest the Australian 
claim, especially with their tempers still flaring over the PCIJ decision in the Eastern 
Greenland case.150 The Foreign Office proved equally hesitant to bargain with a wounded 
government.151 A few months later, however, Norway forced London to discuss Antarctic 
sovereignty.  
In January 1934, the Norwegians complained to London about the creation of the 
AAT. The British Empire had claimed nearly two-thirds of the continent, and the 
Norwegians worried about their whaling interests in the region. The Australian claim 
enclosed a portion of Haakon VII Land on the south polar plateau, to which the 
Norwegians had persistently asserted their rights. The Norwegians also questioned the 
AAT’s western boundary line, which enclosed a significant portion of Dronning Maud 	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Land, a coastline Norwegian explorers had worked hard to chart. To resolve its 
outstanding disagreements with the Empire, the Norwegians suggested an international 
conference of all interested states with claims or interests in the Antarctic, or bi-lateral 
talks between experts from the two countries.152 As the Norwegian government delivered 
its note, Lars Christensen sent another private expedition to continue his exploration of 
the Antarctic. The Norwegians circumnavigated the continent and explored parts of its 
interior by air, including a section of the Australian sector Norway named King Leopold 
and Queen Astrid Land. Christensen urged his government to officially challenge the 
Australian claim to Enderby Land and Mac. Robertson Land.153 
In the spring of 1934, Wingfield lamented Britain’s lost opportunity to negotiate 
with the Norwegians from a position of power. He believed that Norway would come to a 
conference or bilateral talks entrenched behind its fundamentally different approach to 
polar sovereignty. Rather than make Norwegian officials rethink their approach to claims 
in the Arctic and Antarctic, the Eastern Greenland decision hardened their stance on the 
need for effective occupation. “Encouraged to do so by their professors of international 
law,” Norwegian officials would argue that polar claims demanded “effective occupation 
or utilization” and that sectors claims were “quite untenable.”154 Foreign Office legal 
adviser Gerald Fitzmaurice concurred; an international conference on Antarctic claims 
would only lead to formal challenges to Britain’s Antarctic Dependencies or inspire 
proposals to internationalize the region. Fitzmaurice agreed with Wingfield’s original 
plan: offer the Norwegians recognition of their own Antarctic sector. Both he and the 
members of the Polar Committee believed a deal would tie the Norwegians to the sector 
principle, providing an important legal victory for Britain.155  
The Australians continued to fear that negotiations with the Norwegians would 
lead to challenges of the boundaries of the AAT. Canberra felt that an agreement over 
territory between Britain and Norway might lead other countries – especially the U.S. – 
to think that the two countries were dividing the Antarctic between them. They thought it 	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best not to engage in any discussions at all with the Norwegians.156 Fitzmaurice rebutted 
the Australian viewpoint as ridiculous,157 and explained so at a meeting of the Antarctic 
sub-committee of the Polar Committee. Convinced by Fitzmaurice’s argument, the sub-
committee decided to send a note to the Norwegians admitting that Norway had “special 
interests” in the Antarctic and reiterating that Britain had no intention of claiming land 
between the western boundary of AAT and the eastern Boundary of the FID.158 
The Norwegian government accepted the understanding, just as it had in 1928 and 
1930. As the 1930s progressed, however, private Norwegian expeditions explored parts 
of the AAT, much to Australia’s chagrin. Annoyance grew when Hubert Wilkins reported 
to Canberra the belief held by of his Norwegian colleagues: Australia’s title to the 
western part of the AAT was “defective, as Sir Douglas Mawson had not actually landed 
on the mainland, but had raised the flag at Proclamation Island (Enderby Land), which is 
not attached to the Continent, and that he had never set foot upon the Antarctic 
Continent.”159 Nevertheless, officials in London, and to a certain extent Canberra, 
continued to feel that the Norwegians would not challenge the Empire’s sector claims, 
given the assurances provided over the last few years. At the same time, British officials 
gave up on the idea of trading recognitions with Norway. Oslo could not, after all, 
“recognize British sovereignty over a large area which, in their opinion, did not fulfill 
that condition” of effective occupation.160  
Norway took note of France’s claim and the increasing interest of the U.S. in the 
Antarctic in 1938.161 As the Antarctic grew busier, Norway once again sought out formal 
assurances that Britain and Australia would not expand into the unclaimed sector between 
Enderby and Coats Land (Dronning Maud Land), which had been the site of a great deal 
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of Norwegian exploration work.162 Australia had no interest in extending the western 
boundary of the AAT into Dronning Maud Land, but it also desired to be separated from 
British assurances. In the previous four years, Norwegian explorers had repeatedly 
flouted Australia’s sovereignty by flying over the AAT and naming its features.163 
Eventually, however, Canberra realized that the communication with the Norwegians 
presented an opening to request Norway’s recognition of the boundaries set for the AAT. 
In November 1938, the British and Australians sent a note to Oslo assuring that they 
would not claim any land between the FID and the AAT, but also asking that Norway 
recognize and respect the boundaries of the AAT.164  
Shortly after the British note arrived in Oslo, Adolf Hoel, head of Norway’s 
Institute for the Exploration of Svalbard and Arctic Ocean (NSIU), left on a trip to 
Germany. He learned of the Nazi’s secret plans to send an expedition to the Antarctic.165 
Germany began to establish its own whaling fleet in 1935, which started to operate in the 
waters off Dronning Maud Land.166 Ostensibly to support these whaling efforts, Herman 
Goering authorized an Antarctic expedition as part of the German four-year economic 
plan for development. The Germans would seek out a suitable site for a whaling base, test 
equipment in polar conditions, explore the strategic possibilities of the south polar region 
and establish the basis for a territorial claim. In December 1938, the German Antarctic 
Expedition departed for the Antarctic on board the Schwabenland.167  
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The impending arrival of the German expedition left the Norwegians with little 
choice but to state their claim. On 14 January 1939, five days prior to the arrival of the 
German expedition in the Antarctic, the Norwegians announced that Dronning Maud 
Land, “that portion of the shore of the Antarctic continent which stretches from the 
boundary of the Falkland Island Dependency in the west (Coats Land boundary) to the 
boundary of the Australian Antarctic Dependency in the east (45 east Longitude) with the 
territory lying inside this shore and washing it,” was under Norwegian sovereignty.168 
The Norwegians purposely couched their claim in vague terms that left its southern 
boundary open to interpretation. As legal scholar W.M. Bush has observed, the ambiguity 
in the Norwegian declaration seemed “to allow for the possibility of Norway asserting at 
a later time that its claim extends in a sector from the coast to the Pole.”169 The ambiguity 
of Norway’s statement led many contemporaries to conclude it had claimed a sector. On 
the same day that the Norwegians asserted their claim, they also solidified their 
arrangement with the Empire in the Antarctic by officially recognizing the boundaries of 
the AAT.170  
In the span of a year, the British Empire had secured the recognition of its 
Antarctic claims from France and Norway. Shortly after concluding the agreement with 
France on polar overflights, Britain received welcome news from the Soviet Union. After 
the media spread rumours of a Soviet expedition to the Antarctic, the British had 
questioned Moscow about its intentions. In response, Soviet officials explained that there 
was no such expedition, but that if they ever sent one into any of Britain’s possessions 
they would secure London’s permission. This promise sounded like Soviet recognition of 
the Empire’s Antarctic claims.171 Despite the threat of U.S. and Argentine maneuvers 
against the Empire’s Antarctic interests, British and Commonwealth officials breathed a 
little easier following these diplomatic coups.   	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In 1939, Professor Jesse S. Reeves, a political scientist and active member of the 
American Society of International Law, concluded that Britain, New Zealand, Australia, 
France and Norway had all claimed Antarctic sectors. Importantly, these states also 
recognized one another’s claims. Just six years before, Reeves had been adamantly 
opposed to the sector principle and was an ardent defender of the Hughes Doctrine. He 
had argued that where effective occupation proved impossible, polar territory should be 
considered res communis – land that was internationalized by necessity. He observed that 
the partition of the Antarctic into sectors “involved scarcely greater absurdities” than the 
division of the New World between Spain and Portugal.172 In light of Norway’s claim, 
however, Reeves concluded that, “one may assert that the sector principle as applied at 
least to Antarctica, is now a part of the accepted international legal order.”173 The sector 
principle finally appeared to be on the verge of the major legal transformation that the 
British had been hoping for since 1926: its crystallization into a rule of customary 
international law.  
6.5 The Doctrine of Constructive Occupation  
In his 1939 commentary on Antarctic annexations and the sector principle, Professor 
Reeves pointed out that the sector lying between 80° and 150°W (the site of Marie Byrd 
Land and James Ellsworth Land) remained unclaimed. Like Charles Cheney Hyde, 
Reeves argued that the U.S. should take immediate action, refute the rigid requirements 
of effective occupation set by the Hughes Doctrine and claim the sector. Time was an 
“important factor” and Reeves did not want the U.S. to miss its chance to attain territory 
in the south polar region.174  
At the beginning of 1938 a confluence of external factors led the State 
Department to the same conclusion. The Americans knew that Britain, Canada, New 	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Zealand, Australia and South Africa had discussed polar affairs at the Imperial 
Conference of 1937 and they worried about what action the Empire might take next.175 
The State Department suspected Germany and Japan were growing more interested in the 
Antarctic. As historian Jason Kendall Moore has reflected, this recognition represents the 
first time American officials viewed the south polar region through the lens of national 
security. The Antarctic Peninsula, for example, formed the southern limit of Drake’s 
Passage and the Americans were adamant that potentially hostile states be denied access 
to it.176 Given these new realities, Boggs again pushed for Washington to take more direct 
action in the Antarctic. He cautioned, “in my opinion we should not sleep on whatever 
rights we may have acquired.” Boggs suggested that Washington use the rights it had 
acquired in the Antarctic as leverage to initiate an international regime in the region, 
involving “countries which are entitled to assert any interest in the Antarctic by virtue of 
discovery, exploration and perhaps temporary occupation.”177  
At the same time, Richard Byrd started to push the State Department to annex the 
unclaimed territory he had explored in his previous expeditions. He advised against 
claiming any land in the British Antarctic territories. The explorer thought that there was 
enough territory for both countries in the Antarctic and with international matters as 
critical as they were “elsewhere there [was] no point, in his opinion, in creating any 
unnecessary dispute.” Between the activities of Ellsworth and himself, Byrd believed that 
the U.S. could claim all the land between the Ross Dependency and the FID (80°W to 	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150°W).178 In response, Dr. Ernest Gruening, head of the Division of Territories and 
Island Possessions, Department of the Interior initiated the study of an official state 
expedition to the Antarctic to claim the suggested territory. Richard Black, who had been 
on Byrd’s second Antarctic expedition, wrote up the report for Gruening, and determined 
that, while the U.S. already had a solid claim to Marie Byrd Land, it would be greatly 
strengthened if a party could occupy a part of the coast for a time, and effectively survey 
the area.179 Intrigued by the Department of the Interior’s report and Richard Byrd’s desire 
for a territorial claim, President Roosevelt ordered a complete re-examination of 
American polar policy. The job fell to the department’s newest polar expert, Hugh S. 
Cumming Jr., a graduate of the University of Virginia’s School of Law.  
In his report, Cumming focused on two questions: whether and how the U.S. 
should claim additional territory in the polar regions?180 He believed that the historic 
rights created by American explorers throughout the polar regions, the possibilities of 
future trans-Arctic air routes, the new interest of Germany and Japan in the south polar 
regions, potential mineral wealth and the desire of Americans to explore the Antarctic 
demanded an end to Washington’s “passive” polar policy. Like Boggs, Cumming 
applauded the attempts at permanent physical occupation carried out by the Soviet Union 
and Canada in their respective Arctic sectors. Even in the Antarctic, Cumming noted, the 
British Empire was undertaking activities designed specifically to support its claims.  
Cumming identified three polar policy options for the U.S. government. First, 
Washington could maintain its traditional position and uphold the requirements of actual 
settlement called for in the Hughes Doctrine, even though it was a “condition almost 
impossible of fulfillment in vast areas of such regions.” Meanwhile, other states would 
continue to make claims and establish rights in the region based on their own beliefs 
surrounding the rules of international law. As a second option, a more assertive polar 
policy would see the U.S. issue a Congressional Resolution or an Executive Order to 
notify other interested states that it “does not recognize sovereignty in the Polar regions 	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on the basis of mere unilateral assertion on the part of individual Governments.” This 
alternative borrowed the language of the resolution drawn up by the department in 1933 
to explain that the U.S. would “recognize only such claims of sovereignty as meet the 
requirements of international law, or such claims as shall be recognized by international 
agreement to which the United States is a party.” Third, drawing heavily on the 
arguments made by Charles Cheney Hyde, Cumming suggested that the U.S. assert its 
own claims in the polar regions without delay.  
The first option would allow more acts of possession from other states, and the 
more time passed the weaker the U.S. position would be in any future arbitration or in 
front of the PCIJ. Official protests against other sovereign claims might defend American 
legal rights throughout the polar regions, but Cumming established that it would give the 
U.S. few tangible benefits, and instead anger several foreign governments with which 
Washington wanted to maintain closer relations. If Washington adopted the third course, 
the state would have to publicly jettison the Hughes Doctrine, explaining that it gave 
“insufficient consideration of the peculiar climatic conditions” which led to an 
“overemphasis of the principle of effective occupation.” At the same time, the State 
Department must officially and publicly disavow the sector principle as an established 
principle of international law and indicate that the U.S. would not respect sector claims. 
Then, the U.S. would announce that discovery should be regarded as one basis for a 
formal claim to sovereignty, to be supported by “subsequent exploration by air or by 
land, coupled with a formal claim to possession, and other acts short of actual and 
permanent settlement.” Such acts would include the establishment of a regime for fish 
and wildlife regulation, rules for aerial navigation, various administrative acts, consistent 
land based and aerial exploration in which explorers were appointed as magistrates, 
scientific activities and extended occupations like those undertaken by Byrd. Cumming 
called this new formula for acquiring polar sovereignty “constructive occupation.”181 The 
State Department believed that the “traditional” doctrine of effective occupation 
demanded actual settlement and use of territory, coupled with permanent state control 
and administration. With the Hughes Doctrine it had applied these standards – rules 	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crafted for territorial acquisition in the temperate regions – to the polar regions. 
Constructive occupation, however, was specifically crafted for application to the polar 
regions and set much less rigorous standards for state activity. In reality, it represented a 
doctrine of polar occupation. Embracing this doctrine, the U.S. could claim all the 
territory to which it was entitled by the “discoveries, exploration and other acts” of 
American expeditions (both state sponsored and private) throughout the polar regions.  
Cumming stressed that time was running out for the U.S. to claim the polar 
territory in which it had rights. The PCIJ had “paid great respect to the value of early 
formal claims to the sovereignty of Greenland, laying stress upon the face that they had 
never been challenged.” The absence of an official claim to any polar territory discovered 
by Americans in the Arctic or Antarctic weakened its legal position. Even if the U.S. was 
uncertain about claiming territory that had already been annexed, Cumming thought “it 
might be well to do so for bargaining purposes at a later date.” Of course, if the U.S. 
chose this path it could expect disputes with many foreign countries, which would, no 
doubt, intensify their own efforts in the polar regions or lead them to make new claims in 
response to the U.S. actions. Cumming predicted that the end result would be bilateral 
negotiations between interested countries, culminating in a multilateral international 
conference that would finally decide sovereignty in the polar regions.182  
Although Cumming’s proposals applied equally to the Arctic and the Antarctic, 
State Department officials retained their focus on the south polar region – the site of 
recent American activity and interest, and of weaker competing national claims. 
Cumming had suggested that while the government deliberated on what polar areas the 
U.S. should claim, the State Department “give official sanction to future acts and 
explorations of American citizens which would add strength to American sovereignty 
claims.” Boggs indicated Lincoln Ellsworth’s plans to fly over the hinterland of the AAT 
past the coast of Enderby Land. He advised sending a note to Ellsworth telling him to 
claim whatever territory he explored and photographed from the air.183  	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The suggestions made by Cumming and Boggs led to a significant development in 
U.S. Antarctic policy. On their advice, in August 1938 Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
ordered American Embassy staff in Capetown, South Africa, to inform Ellsworth “in 
strict confidence” that he should “assert claims in the name of the United States as an 
American citizen” to all unexplored territory he uncovered, “regardless of whether or not 
it lies within a sector or sphere of influence already claimed by any other country.” 
Ellsworth should also endeavour to re-assert claims to territory previously explored by 
American explorers, such as Wilkes Land. Hull explained that Ellsworth should drop 
notes or personal proclamations, attached to parachutes, containing assertions of 
claims. Of the greatest importance, indicated Hull, was that Ellsworth never 
acknowledge that the U.S. government gave approval to making his claims.184 Hull sent a 
second explanatory telegram to Cape Town in October, thanking Ellsworth for his 
willingness to comply with Washington’s demands, but refused to send him a copy of 
his instructions. Hull explained that the State Department could not provide Ellsworth 
with the extent of territory he should claim. The note from the Secretary of State, 
however, pointed Ellsworth to the work accomplished by American explorers in 
Wilkes Land, Palmer Land (Graham Land) and Marie Byrd Land stressing that the 
U.S. did not recognize the sector principle, and that Ellsworth could ignore existing 
territorial claims.185 
As the State Department seriously considered adopting the doctrine of 
constructive occupation and discarding the Hughes Doctrine, it continued to reserve 
American rights throughout the Antarctic. Learning of the air rights agreement between 
France, New Zealand, Britain and Australia, the Americans sent a note to all four 
countries stating that the “United States reserves all rights which it or its citizens may 
have with respect to the question of aerial navigation in the Antarctic as well as those 	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questions of territorial sovereignty implicit therein.”186 Georges Bonnet, the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, told the American Ambassador in France that the U.S. 
misunderstood the nature of French sovereignty to Adélie Land. “The discovery and 
acquisition were, in conformity with the procedure usual at that time, the object of notices 
published in Moniteur and Annales Martimes as well as in the Sydney Herald.” The 
Americans had been notified of the claim in 1924.187 The Americans bluntly replied that 
no French citizens had ever landed on the continent and that the U.S. could not accept a 
claim with such a weak legal foundation.188 When the Norwegians told the State 
Department about their claim to Dronning Maud Land, the Americans sent the standard 
response: the U.S. “reserves all rights which it or its citizens may have in the area 
mentioned.”189  
 Finally, in January 1939, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles sent a note to 
President Roosevelt (prepared by Cumming, John Hickerson and Jay Pierrepont Moffat 
in the Western European Division) detailing Cumming’s assessment, and suggesting that 
the U.S. adopt his third option. While the State Department had assiduously reserved its 
rights in the Antarctic over the previous six years, a “naked reservation” of rights lacked 
the force of “the positive steps to preserve their territorial rights which have been and are 
being taken by other countries pursuing vigorous and acquisitive Polar politics.”  
Welles argued that, with respect to polar sovereignty, American policy gave 
“undue respect for the requirements of the law applicable to temperate zones.” He 
insisted that the Hughes Doctrine “over-emphasizes the necessity of ‘effective 
occupation.’” Welles pointed out that Charles Cheney Hyde, one of the original architects 
of the Hughes Doctrine, had himself suggested the time had come to change the policy. 
Welles proposed that the State Department determine precisely what land the U.S. should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom, 6 January 1939, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1939, Vol. II, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1956), 1. 
187 Georges Bonnet, The French Minister for Foreign Affairs to American Ambassador to France, Bullit, 21 
February 1939, in FRUS, 1939, Vol. II, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), 4-5. 
188 Walton Moore for Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France, 16 May 1939, in FRUS, 1939, Vol. II, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), 5.  
189 Cordell Hull to Norwegian Minister, 16 January 1939, cited in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 
3, 150. 
	  	   346	  
claim in the polar regions, and publicly assert that the sector principle was not an 
“established principle of international law,” nor were any claims done in advance of “the 
exercise therein of acts essential to the establishment of sovereignty.” Following 
Cumming’s playbook, the State Department could then assume the position that 
discovery and constructive occupation were sufficient grounds on which to base polar 
claims. Welles’ note stressed that the international situation in the polar regions 
warranted “early and serious consideration of the measures which should be taken by the 
United States to assert its claims, before the successful assertion of such claims is 
prejudiced through further undue delay.”190  
 Since 1924, officials and lawyers outside the State Department had viewed the 
Hughes Doctrine as a strong legal position. In reality, the clear doctrine masked a 
department that was often confused and always indecisive on matters of polar 
sovereignty. At the end of the 1930s, however, it finally seemed like the State 
Department was ready to engage with the polar regions in a concrete way. The 
department prepared to step away from the Hughes Doctrine and re-define its legal 
approach towards polar sovereignty, and stood ready to support American polar claims 
based on the doctrine of constructive occupation. In the eyes of the State Department, it 
was time for the United States to take a well-deserved leading role in the polar regions. 
Nevertheless, the plan still required President Roosevelt’s approval. 
6.6 The Bi-Polar Legal Landscape in January 1939 
In 1909 and 1910, James Brown Scott, Thomas Willing Balch and René Dollot had laid 
out four ways that states could approach territorial acquisition in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
The American lawyers, Balch and Scott, insisted that governments treat polar territory 
like land in temperate zones and only consider it under state sovereignty when effectively 
occupied and used. Balch deemed such occupation impossible in parts of the Arctic and 
Antarctic, and suggested that states view this polar land as the common possession of all 
mankind. Dollot suggested that states accept the exceptional nature of the polar 
environment and modify the rules for the acquisition of territory. Finally, all three authors 	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acknowledged that states could use spheres of influence or the hinterland theory to claim 
vast portions of territory where they had done little to establish their title, just as they had 
during the partition of Africa.  
Three decades later, the same approaches to polar sovereignty continued to 
dominate the bi-polar legal landscape. Legal experts of the time kept alive the opinion 
that states view the polar regions as the common heritage of mankind. Professor Thomas 
Edward Maurice McKitterick, for example, advocated for “these territories to be put 
permanently outside the sphere of colonial acquisition by any state, and for them to be 
governed by an international commission, which would have the power to further and 
regulate their development for the common benefit.”191 For their part, state officials from 
the Commonwealth, Soviet Union and France continued to uphold the sector principle – 
which bore a close resemblance to the hinterland theory – as the best solution to the 
complicated problem of polar sovereignty. Furthermore, by the beginning of 1939, 
advocates could reasonably argue that the principle had become part of the accepted 
international legal order. Commonwealth officials also emphasized the need for control, 
rather than occupation, in the polar regions, echoing the arguments made by Dollot. They 
insisted that in the harsh polar environment control could consist of legislation, 
administrative acts, the occasional visit and, in the Canadian context, a thin network of 
occupied police posts. Officially, the Americans remained tied to the Hughes Doctrine 
and its demand for permanent occupation and use, even while they prepared to embrace 
the less stringent requirements of the doctrine of constructive occupation.  
By the end of the 1930s, the U.S. espousal of the Hughes Doctrine began to have 
a major impact on the way other states conceptualized the polar regions as legal space. 
The State Department’s public focus on occupancy and use led Commonwealth officials 
to examine more permanent forms of occupation in their own polar claims, unware of 
internal American discussions about constructive occupation. As America’s engagement 
with the polar regions increased over the years it started to challenge the British Empire 
as the primary architect of the bi-polar legal landscape. All of the polar claimants had to 	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wonder which ways of looking at the legal space of the polar regions would survive the 
American legal re-construction of the Arctic and Antarctic. 
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Chapter 7 
7 More Than “Two Men and a Dog”: Permanent Occupation 
and the Polar Regions, 1939-1945 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had a long-standing interest in the polar regions, 
especially the Antarctic, driven initially by his close friendship with explorer Richard 
Byrd.1 At the beginning of January 1939, the President reviewed Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles’ proposal that government officials undertake “early and serious 
consideration of the measures” to ensure a “successful assertion” of American claims in 
the Arctic and Antarctic. At the time, Roosevelt accepted that the southern continent 
could become valuable for mineral exploitation and in the development of 
communications, meteorology, and southern air routes. Uncertainty over the intentions of 
Germany and Japan in the Antarctic and the threat that it might fall into unfriendly hands 
increased the region’s importance.2 The President gave Welles approval to consult with 
the Departments of War, the Navy and the Interior to “work out concrete suggestions” for 
staking out an American claim to the “South Polar area.”  
Roosevelt inserted one important caveat. The President disagreed with Welles’ 
suggestion that the U.S. embrace constructive occupation, the new formula for acquiring 
polar sovereignty championed by the State Department. “None of us can be certain,” he 
observed, that legislation, administrative efforts and “making occasional surveys” would 
“obtain international recognition of American jurisdiction in the South Polar area.” As a 
result, Roosevelt insisted on “another step” to bolster a future American claim. He 
suggested that the U.S. send “to two separate South Polar regions an expedition every 	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autumn,” representing the first official American venture to the Antarctic since Charles 
Wilkes and the U.S. Exploring Expedition of 1840. Exploratory parties could be placed 
ashore in seasonal bases at Little America in the Ross Dependency and in the area south 
of Cape Good Hope (either Dronning Maud Land or the Australian Antarctic Territory) at 
the start of every Antarctic summer and then disembark in the spring. While there, the 
men would perform useful activities such as meteorological and geological studies – the 
two areas that the President believed offered the greatest chance for economic return in 
the Antarctic.3  
A few months later, Roosevelt’s additional step became ambitious plans to 
establish a permanent occupation in the Antarctic. The President explained to Richard 
Byrd, the commander of the new and official United States Antarctic Service Expedition 
(USASE), “The most important thing is to prove…that human beings can permanently 
occupy a portion of the Continent winter and summer.” Secondly, the expedition had to 
establish the region’s material value and prove that it was “well worth a small annual 
appropriation to maintain such permanent bases.”4  
While scholars have taken note of Roosevelt’s role in creating and supporting the 
USASE, they have largely ignored the pivotal impact he had on American polar legal 
policy.5 His suggestion of “another step” caused the State Department to abruptly shift 
focus from constructive occupation back to the Hughes Doctrine. Roosevelt developed 
strong views on the legal value of permanent occupation through his efforts to secure 
islands for trans-Pacific air routes. Although some have noted a connection between the 
President’s attempt to secure Pacific islands and his interest in the Antarctic, the legal 
implications have not been adequately explored.6 Roosevelt’s experiences with territorial 
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acquisition in the Pacific shaped the legal lens through which he viewed the Antarctic. He 
doubted territorial title based on constructive occupation would secure international 
recognition because he had already rejected claims based on similar grounds in the 
Pacific. Roosevelt’s vision of territorial sovereignty, which he applied equally to the 
small Pacific islands and to the vast spaces of the Antarctic, involved occupation and 
functional use. This choice dramatically altered the nature of polar sovereignty and 
inspired permanent human occupation of the Antarctic continent. Through the President’s 
support of the Hughes Doctrine and its physical manifestation in the USASE, the U.S. 
became the principal architect of the bi-polar legal landscape. 
 Roosevelt’s private suggestion that the U.S. utilize a “new form of sovereignty” 
to claim territory in the Antarctic also significantly impacted the region’s legal evolution. 
Borrowing another idea from his Pacific islands experience, Roosevelt was willing to 
limit American sovereignty in order to establish alternative forms of governance in the 
Antarctic, so long as the resulting agreement protected the rights and goals of the U.S. 
The idea still involved U.S. occupation of the Antarctic, but Roosevelt also tapped into 
the suggestions for an alternative and internationalist approach to polar sovereignty made 
by American legal scholars such as Thomas Willing Balch for decades. 
The dramatic influence that the American emphasis on occupation and use had on 
the legal policies of the polar claimants is not properly appreciated. In the aftermath of 
the official American occupation, Foreign Office legal advisers accepted that a state 
wanting to secure sovereignty over a polar territory had to meet the standards of the 
Hughes Doctrine. Although British legal appraisals highlighted the low bar for effective 
occupation in uninhabited spaces set by the Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland 
decisions, they recognized that the U.S. had not accepted these standards. As the power 
of the U.S. increased, gaining American recognition of territorial claims became pivotal, 
and the British realized that their only chance of attaining their assent rested in permanent 
occupation. In 1937, the British predicted that the sector principle would become 
established as a rule of law for the polar regions, but by 1945 the Foreign Office rejected 	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its legal validity.  
These developments occurred against the backdrop of the Second World War, 
which significantly changed the legal and political status of the polar regions. 
Encouraged by Britain’s involvement in the war, Argentina and Chile challenged its 
position in the FID, spurring on London’s conclusions about the need for permanent 
inhabitation of its Antarctic claim.7 Washington’s legal requirements for polar 
sovereignty struck home in wartime Ottawa. The government faced a massive influx of 
American military and civilian personnel into the Canadian North during the war. 
Although these activities stopped short of the High Arctic, they caused concern about the 
legal status of the unoccupied northern islands, which Washington had never recognized 
as Canadian territory. In the wake of the USASE, Australia also contemplated the 
requirement for greater permanent occupation in the AAT, but its plans were cut short by 
wartime exigencies. While the Canadians and Australians accepted the need for greater 
acts of occupation in their polar territory, they proved more hesitant to move on from the 
sector principle than most British officials. 
Even as the Hughes Doctrine came to dominate the way states envisioned the 
Arctic and Antarctic as legal space, Argentina and Chile introduced new arguments and 
re-introduced old ones into the polar legal landscape while asserting their sovereign rights 
in the south polar region. As Foreign Office legal advisers turned away from the sector 
principle, Argentinean and Chilean legal experts embraced it, along with arguments 
based on the doctrine of contiguity and geographical unity, which they argued formed the 
foundation of “modern polar international law.”8 Further, they introduced “Latin 
American international law” to the Antarctic utilizing the doctrine of uti possidetis juris 
(uti possidetis, ita possideatis – ‘as you possess, you may continue to possess’).  
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Although the bi-polar legal landscape remained a scene of conflicting ideas and 
arguments, the American focus on permanent settlement and use imposed new and more 
rigorous requirements for polar sovereignty by the end of the war. Moving forward, state 
officials and legal advisers considered a permanent physical presence a cornerstone of 
sovereignty in the bi-polar landscape. 
7.1 The Trans-Pacific Air Routes and Permanent 
Occupation 
President Roosevelt’s demand that the State Department consider “another step” to 
successfully acquire sovereignty in the Antarctic emanated from the legal policy he 
adopted to claim islands along the trans-Pacific air routes. By the mid-1930s the small, 
often barren and mostly uninhabited islands of the central Pacific had become essential 
stepping-stones and refueling sites for air clippers travelling across the vast ocean. 
Roosevelt understood the value of these islands to commercial and military aviation, and 
foresaw their potential strategic importance. As a result, he encouraged Pan American 
Airways, the principal international air carrier in the U.S., to develop a service across the 
Pacific. Before a route between Hawaii, New Zealand and Australia could become 
operational, however, Pan American required additional island stopover points, which 
Roosevelt endeavored to provide.9  
In late December 1934, the President signed an executive order placing Kingman 
Reef, Johnston Island and Sand Island – all previously claimed by the U.S. – under the 
Navy Department’s control. Next, Roosevelt considered how to demonstrate America’s 
sovereignty over the islands “in some tangible form.” He told Secretary of the Navy 
Claude Swanson to consult with the State Department about whether the “establishment 
of a small supply base or the fixing up of a landing place would be adequate to sustain 	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sovereignty.” Perhaps, Roosevelt speculated, the planting of trees and grasses represented 
enough government activity. Although the President pondered a model of territorial 
acquisition involving something less than effective occupation, he soon concluded that 
the U.S. claims required a “colony of American citizens.”10 The emphasis on occupation 
matched the 1934 reply on the Ross Dependency that the State Department issued to New 
Zealand, which explained that the U.S. refused to recognize claims “unaccompanied by 
occupancy and use.”  
In 1935, the U.S. placed the uninhabited Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands, 
which all rested on the proposed air route to New Zealand and Australia, under the 
jurisdiction of the Interior Department.11 The U.S. had already taken possession of the 
islands under the broad terms of the Guano Act of 1856. The act established that 
whenever an American citizen discovered a deposit of guano on any “island, rock or key, 
not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other government or occupied by its citizens,” 
the President could declare it a U.S. possession.12 Roosevelt landed parties of soldiers and 
civilian volunteers from Hawaii on the islands.  
At first, Roosevelt estimated that colonization should be maintained for a year; 
which required a ship with replacement personnel every three months. Historian Lowell 
Young has established that the President still felt the need to bolster the claim to the 
islands and a year later increased the American presence, even building landing strips and 
weather stations on Jarvis and Howland.13 The Interior Department administered the 
islands from Honolulu, and the occupation parties consisted of four Hawaiian Americans 
on three-month tours of duty. While on the rocky and austere islands, the occupants 
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performed functional tasks such as gathering and transmitting weather data.14 The 
outbreak of the Second World War in the Pacific led to their evacuation, ending the 
colonization exercise. 
Roosevelt’s program of territorial acquisition in the Pacific hit an obstacle when 
the Americans set their sights on Canton and Enderbury Islands, two small pieces of 
mostly bare coral in the Phoenix Islands group. London, also wanting secure air route 
islands, had officially annexed the Phoenix Islands in March 1937 (it had considered 
them British territory since the late nineteenth century).15 When the U.S. Navy (USN) 
escorted a National Geographic Society party to Canton Island a few months later, they 
found the Union Jack flying over the island with notices of annexation attached. The 
State Department insisted that American whalers first discovered the islands, that 
Washington claimed them through the Guano Act, and that no country had occupied 
them. As a result, the U.S. rejected Britain’s sovereignty over the Phoenix group. The 
USN sent a clear message by installing a cement pad with a painted stainless steel U.S. 
flag on Canton.16 Over the next year, the British and Americans negotiated ownership of 
Canton and Enderbury. Roosevelt desired a mutually favourable solution, noting that in 
the “strong friendship between the United States and the British Empire, an attitude of 
grabbing everything on sight on the part of one of the parties does not exactly 
conform to a Good Neighbor policy.”17  	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FRUS, 1937, vol. II, 129 and Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State, 22 October 
1937, FRUS, 1937, vol. II, 132-133. With Roosevelt’s approval, on 9 August 1937, Hull explained to 
London that the U.S. did not recognize the British claim, and that Canton along with several other 
Pacific islands were subject to conflicting claims. The Americans proposed negotiations with the 
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The President held steadfast to effective occupation while the British based 
their title on exploration, legislation and the occasional visit, just as they justified the 
Empire’s polar claims. Roosevelt insisted that Britain’s legal position was a “sheer 
case of bluff.” Reiterating the Hughes Doctrine, the President insisted only “permanent 
occupation” in a reasonable time after discovery established a title to territory. Roosevelt 
argued that a “purely temporary occupation such as, for example, occupation for the 
purpose of recovering guano and nothing else does not give sovereignty to the country 
to which the guano company belongs.” While the U.S. had not occupied Canton and 
Enderbury Islands, the failure of any other state to settle and use them meant that they 
were “open to occupancy by us today.”18  
News that a British naval force visited Canton Island and deposited two radio 
operators on the island at the end of August 1937 further complicated matters.19 
Roosevelt met with the legal expert Robert Walton Moore and Jay Pierrepont Moffat 
from the State Department, and Dr. Ernest Gruening, Director of the Division of 
Territories at the Department of the Interior, to discuss the Pacific islands in February 
1938. Mocking British efforts, Roosevelt explained to the group that the “only 
occupancy which had any validity was permanent occupancy and by that he meant bona 
fide occupancy and not merely the sending of ‘two men and a dog’ to a given part of the 
world.” In a comment that would have raised Canadian concerns about their Arctic 
Archipelago had they heard it, Roosevelt asserted that even “permanent occupancy of one 
island when speaking of archipelagos did not give a clear title to a whole group of 
islands.” To back up his views on occupation, Roosevelt ordered Gruening to send 
settlers to Canton and Enderbury Islands within the month. 
Despite the President’s dismissal of Britain’s claim to the islands, Roosevelt 
wished to avoid a long drawn out dispute that would slow the development of 
commercial aviation. Joseph Kennedy, the American ambassador in London, explained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
caveat that either side avoid any acts of possession, like occupation. Cordell Hull to British Ambassador, 
9 August 1937, FRUS, 1937, vol. II, 129. 
18 Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, 26 July 1937, FRUS, 1937, vol. II, 127. 
19 The British explained that while they were wiling to enter into negotiation over islands in the 
Pacific, they regarded the Phoenix Group as “definitely British territory.” VAS Mallet, British Charge 
d’Affaires, to the Secretary of State, 20 October 1937, FRUS, 1937, vol. II, 131. 
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the American position on effective occupation to the British. Next, Kennedy drew 
attention to the several hundred Pacific islands over which the two countries had 
conflicting claims. Roosevelt’s administration, however, saw “nothing to be gained by 
entering into legalistic discussions as to the sovereignty of individual islands,” which 
would be a “long drawn out process and possibly acrimonious,” and could inspire a 
race to settle the contested territory. In the end, Kennedy pointed out, both the British 
and Americans wanted to keep Japan from the islands. With this strategic necessity in 
mind, Washington suggested the two countries reach an agreement for mutual use.20  
On 3 March 1938, American settlers rushed to Canton and Enderbury, while 
President Roosevelt claimed the islands for the U.S. and placed them under the 
jurisdiction of the Interior Department.21 On 10 March, he sent a letter to Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain proposing that the U.S. and Britain occupy and hold Canton and 
Enderbury as a condominium for 25 to 50 years, during which the islands would be 
placed under a joint administration.22 After protracted negotiations, the two countries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 If the negotiations with Britain were inconclusive, Roosevelt also planned to issue an Executive Order to 
place under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department all the islands between Samoa and Hawaii, followed 
by the settlement of each island. Memorandum of a Conversation between President Roosevelt, Judge 
Moore (Counselor of the State Department), Dr. Gruening, Director, Division of Territories, Department of 
the Interior, and Pierrepoint Moffat, Chief of European Division, State Department, 16 February 1938, 
FRUS, 1938, vol. II, 77-79. 
21 Memorandum of Conversation, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, 5 March 1938. FRUS 1938, 
vol. II, 81-81. The Americans explained to the press that the U.S. government did not admit that title came 
through mere discovery, but it had assumed the right to occupy the islands based on discovery, former 
occupation, and failure of any other power to settle or use the islands. Memorandum by the Chief of the 
Division of Current Information, M.J. McDermott, White House Press Conference, 7 March 1938, FRUS 
1938, vol. II, 83. Unaware of American plans for occupation, the New York Times highlighted that it 
seemed that the State Department had rejected the “thesis informally put forward by Charles Evans Hughes 
when Secretary of State that discovery alone was not sufficient to lay a basis for a claim of sovereignty but 
that discovery had to be followed by occupation." New York Times, 6 March 1938. 
22 In the meantime, the British had thought up their own proposal. They would offer American citizens free 
access to any island under their jurisdiction on the trans-Pacific route. The British maintained that their 
interest in the Phoenix Island group extended past concern for an air route because they were considered 
removing a part of the population from the over-crowded Gilbert and Ellice Group to the Phoenix group. 
When American overtures that the British give up their idea to transplant Indigenous Peoples to the islands 
so as not to impact the question of title failed, Roosevelt himself got the Interior Department to look at the 
possibility of moving a half dozen families from Samoa or Hawaii to Canton Island. “If the British can do a 
little colonizing, why can’t we also,” asked the President. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the 
Secretary of State, 30 March 1938, FRUS, 1938, vol. II, 84-86 and Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, 28 
June 1938, FRUS 1938, vol. II, 109. The British dug in their heels when the Americans granted a license to 
Pan American Airways to use Canton Island and debate over whether British companies could have access 
to Hawaii for if, “Great Britain can’t use Hawaii it can’t fly the Pacific.” Memorandum of Conversation 
with Ronald Lindsay and Pierrepont Moffat, 11 April 1938, FRUS, 1938, vol. II, 90-91. Both the British 
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created an Anglo-American condominium in April 1939.23 Within months, Pan American 
finished construction of the facilities required to support its flying boat service to New 
Zealand. 
 Roosevelt’s experiences in the Pacific shaped his response to the Antarctic. In his 
mind, little difference existed between the small and barren islands of the Pacific and the 
vast spaces of the Antarctic. In pursuing territory in both places, Roosevelt refused to 
accept that anything less than “bona fide” permanent occupation could give a state title to 
territory. More than that, the President emphasized functional activities (such as 
meteorology) and development, arguing that a state had to do more to claim a territory. 
With these arguments and bold, assertive practice, Roosevelt breathed new life into the 
Hughes Doctrine at a time when international law seemed to accept a more modest 
threshold for effective occupation.  
7.2 Occupying the Antarctic 
Under Roosevelt’s direction, American officials turned to the Antarctic in January 1939. 
Led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the State Department decided that the additional 
step should be permanent, not just recurring seasonal occupation.24 Not every American 
official agreed. Some, including Hugh Cumming, who originally suggested a doctrine of 
constructive occupation, still believed that the U.S. might abandon the Hughes Doctrine, 
especially if settlement attempts failed and proved the impossibility of the legal 
principle’s standards.25 Department of the Interior official Dr. Ernest Gruening also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the Americans were eager to avoid an official dispute. At the time, legal scholar J.S. Reeves pointed 
out that had the dispute gone to arbitration or the Permanent Court of International Justice, it would have 
raised many difficult and potentially far-reaching questions. To what extern had there been abandonment 
by either side? “Was there failure to institute or to maintain those administrative activities which are the 
badges of sovereign possession?” Most importantly, the case would have clarified how much activity was 
“necessary to preserve title as against abandonment in the case of a small island incapable of sustaining 
human life, once valuable for its guano deposits, then becoming worthless, only to become again of value 
for purposes undreamt of until very recently?” Roosevelt and Reeves, “Agreement Over Canton and 
Enderbury Islands,” 521-526 
23 Canton and Enderbury Islands remained under a condominium that last until 1979. Today they are 
administered by the Republic of Kirbati. 
24Cordell Hull to the President, 13 February 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 
Antarctic/155A. 
25 Cumming explained this to British counselor in Washington, R.C. Lindsay. British Embassy Washington 
to the Viscount Halifax, 18 July 1939, National Archives of Australia (NAA), A981/ANT 54 PART 2. In 
June, Lewis Clark, who represented the State Department in hearings before Congress on the advisability of 
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doubted the necessity of permanent occupation, noting that only the U.S. maintained such 
rigid legal standards for the acquisition of polar territory.26 Still, with marching orders 
direct from the President, Gruening and Cumming led polar experts such as Samuel 
Boggs, Lawrence Martin and Richard Byrd in the investigation of where the American 
settlements should be located. Early discussions suggested on bases in Marie Byrd Land, 
James W. Ellsworth Land, Little America in the Ross Dependency, Palmer (Graham) 
Land, Deception Island and in Enderby Land, Princess Elizabeth Land, or Wilkes Land in 
the AAT.27  
The proposed base locations challenged every claim the British Empire had in the 
Antarctic. Planning for Antarctic bases – which Roosevelt kept a close eye on – occurred 
as the President quietly worked to strengthen ties with Britain, whose strength he hoped 
would serve as a bulwark against German and Italian aggression towards the western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an Antarctic expedition, noted the Hughes Doctrine and then remarked, “However, international law on that 
subject is not entirely clear, and it has not been fixed. There is a possibility that we might recede somewhat 
from a strict interpretation of the requirement of occupancy, or permanent occupancy in the Antarctic.” 
Lewis Clark cited in D.A. Graber, “Struggle for a Continent: Who Will Rule Antarctica?” World Affairs 
113, no. 1 (1950): 14. 
26 When asked by Committee on Appropriations for the House of Representatives, Gruening stated that the 
question of permanent occupancy, “is largely a question of whether the legal experts of the State 
Department feel that something of that sort is necessary to perfect our title.” See OIR Report, No. 4296, 
Map Intelligence Division, Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, State Department, History 
and Current Status if Claims in Antarctic, 3 October 1947, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-1949, Box 4074, File 
800.014, Antarctic. 
27 Dr. Ernest Gruening, Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior 
and Mr. Cumming, Division of European Affairs, Proposed Settlements in the Antarctic, 14 January 1939, 
NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/149; Conversation between Dr. Ernest 
Gruening, Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior and Mr. 
Cumming, Division of European Affairs, S.W. Boggs, Commander Earl G. Rose, Coast Guard, 
Commander William Hatch, Hydrographic Department, USN, 17 January 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 
1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/151; Memorandum of Conversation, Colonel Lawrence Martin, 
Library of Congress, Mr. W.L. Joerg, National Archives, Mr. Boggs, Geographer and Mr. Cumming, 
Division of European Affairs, 20 January 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 
Antarctic/152; and Conversation between Richard Byrd, Samuel Boggs and Hugh Cumming, 28 January 
1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/153. See also, Rose, Explorer, 405-
408. Throughout the planning, the Department of the Interior fought for as comprehensive an Antarctic 
claim as possible and was adamant that permanent bases be established in all three areas claimed by the 
British Empire. The Interior Department maintained that permanent bases at strategic posts would fulfill the 
requirements of the Hughes Doctrine, especially if the members were made into postmasters. Based on 
Black’s observations, the Department of the Interior plan evolved into four bases: Base One would be near 
Little America in the Ross Dependency, Base Two on the coast in Princess Elizabeth Land of the AAT, 
Base Three on Heard Island, and Base Four on the coast of Graham Land. For more on the planning of the 
Department of the Interior see Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 333-335. See also Quigg, A Pole Apart, 132.  
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hemisphere.28 Interestingly, these diplomatic considerations were absent from the 
American Antarctic discussions. The Americans knew that their bases would annoy 
Britain, especially in the FID, but discussions centred on legal, rather than political 
considerations.29 Samuel Boggs and Hugh Cumming insisted that the U.S. had the legal 
right to occupy the FID and challenge the weak British claim. To Boggs, it seemed 
“untenable that one nation should maintain that it has sovereignty over an area so little 
known and of so little present utility” – particularly when it represented one of the most 
accessible parts of the Antarctic offering entry to areas to the southeast and southwest 
that usually had impenetrable ice fields along their coasts. America’s espousal of the 
Hughes Doctrine, its reservation of rights to the FID and its rejection of the sector 
principle, gave the U.S. government freedom of action in the area. Furthermore, early 
American exploration activities provided a firm foundation to build a claim through 
further occupation. Even if the Americans did not wish to claim the territory, the mere 
presence of the bases provided “bargaining points in any negotiations which might arise 
with respect to other [Antarctic] territory having a more immediate value to this 
country.”30  
 American desire for a base in the AAT stemmed from their belief that the 
discoveries of the U.S. Exploring Expedition of 1840 and Lincoln Ellsworth’s flight over 
a section of the territory on 11 January 1939 gave them territorial rights in the area. 
Armed with the State Department’s permission to make a claim to whatever territory he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 After the Munich Agreement of September 1938, Roosevelt feared Italian and German aggression more 
than ever. The air superiority of the Axis powers had the potential to threaten the security of the U.S. He 
also realized that the U.S. needed time to rearm and catch up to her potential allies and enemies. In the 
meantime, strengthened times with Britain could provide for American security. In June 1939, Roosevelt 
invited the King and Queen of England to visit Washington. He also reached out to Winston Churchill, who 
the President had hard might become the next Prime Minister. His attempts to provide direct financial and 
material support to Britain were limited by strict neutrality laws and the widespread isolationism in 
Congress. For overviews of these efforts see, Lynne Olson, Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh and 
America’s Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941 (New York: Random House, 2013); and Richard Harrison, 
“A Presidential Demarche: Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Personal Diplomacy and Great Britain,” Diplomatic 
History 5 (1981): 245-272. 
29Secretary of State Cordell Hull wondered if Britain’s history of discovery in the FID, the work of the 
Discovery Committee and the length of time the claim had gone uncontested made the claim too strong to 
challenge. Cordell Hull to the President, 13 February 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 
800.014 Antarctic/155A. 
30 S.W. Boggs, Division of Research and Publication, Department of State, 3 March 1939, NARA, RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014 Antarctic/224; Hugh Cumming, Proposed Location of Bases in the 
Antarctic, 6 March 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014, Antarctic/176.  
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flew over, Ellsworth took off from a point along the coast of Princess Elizabeth Land 
in the AAT and headed inland along longitude 79°E to latitude 72°S. He ignored the 
land lying within 60 miles of the coast which he knew the Australians had surveyed 
during the BANZARE unclaimed. But after he went through half a tank of gas at 210 
miles inland, he dropped a brass cylinder, which claimed for the U.S. “so far as this 
act allows, the area south of latitude 70 and to a distance 150 miles east and 150 miles 
west of my line of flight and to a distance 150 miles south of 72 longitude 79 east.” 
Ellsworth named the claimed area the American Highland.31 The State Department 
considered a base in the area to perfect the American claim through occupation. 
While Ellsworth’s flight encouraged U.S. interest in the AAT, the German 
Antarctic expedition immediately fuelled the State Department’s desire to spread 
American bases around the Antarctic. On 19 January 1939, the M.S. Schwabenland 
reached the coast of Dronning Maud Land, which Norway had claimed just days before. 
Using two aircraft, the Germans started mapping operations in the region. As they flew 
over the continent and took aerial photographs, the expedition dropped specially 
designed, five hundred pound steel javelins, complete with swastikas on their tops, that 
could land upright in the ice. The planes flew over hundreds of thousands of square 
kilometers they called Neu-Schwabenland. In addition, expedition members landed on 
the coast and established a temporary base.32 Shortly after the Germans left at the end of 
the Antarctic summer, Berlin announced plans for follow up expeditions in 1939 and 
1940. Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat, a deputy of Hermann Goring in charge of Germany’s 
Antarctic program, announced that “the acquisition of unclaimed land” required “the 
intention to occupy it, i.e. to people the land and administer and rule it.” The State 
Department anticipated that the Germans would intensify their activities through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Beekman H. Pool, Polar Extremes: The World of Lincoln Ellsworth (Fairbanks: University of Alaska 
Press, 2002), 224-233, quotation on 233. After his flight, Ellsworth told the press that, “he had claimed the 
inland area he had explored and which no man had seen before for his country, and that it is for 
governments and lawyers concerned with international affairs eventually to consider and rule upon the 
support and permanency of such a claim.” Keith Officer, Antarctic, NAA, A981/ANT 22. 
32 Colin Summerhayes and Peter Beeching, “Hitler’s Antarctic Base: The Myth and the Reality,” Polar 
Record 43, no.224 (2007): 1-21; Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 2-3, 140, 149, 154, and Maria 
Pia Casarini, “Activities in Antarctica Before the Conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty,” in International 
Law for Antarctica, 2nd Ed., Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi eds. (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 
1996), 663-64; Rose, Explorer, 407; D.T. Murphy, German exploration of the Polar World: A History, 
1870–1940 (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 
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occupation and expand their efforts to the unclaimed Pacific sector that contained Marie 
Byrd Land and James W. Ellsworth Land. Fear that the Germans would establish bases in 
the Antarctic, or at the very least challenge the legal rights of the U.S. in the region, 
became a significant factor in American plans.33 
Germany’s Antarctic intentions also played an important role in convincing the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriation, which had little interest in 
funding the project initially, to provide $340,000 for the United States Antarctic Service 
Expedition at the end of June 1939.34 The planners decided that they had enough to funds 
to establish two bases. Despite the temptation to follow up Ellsworth’s flight with a 
physical occupation, Boggs successfully argued against situating bases in the AAT citing 
the lowest temperatures and strongest winds on the continent, and a coastline so often 
beset by impenetrable ice that a ship would be unable to consistently reach a base situated 
there. Eventually, the expedition’s planners and its commander, Richard Byrd, decided to 
situate the two bases in Graham Land and the eastern Ross Dependency. The bases would 
allow the explorers to venture into the unclaimed Pacific sector, which had been the 
scene of most American activity over the last decade. The expedition would utilize a 37-
ton snow cruiser equipped with sleeping quarters, galley, scientific laboratory, and a 
plane carried on the roof. The expedition’s planners hoped the cruiser would serve as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 As one State Department report to Roosevelt stated, “There is strong reason to believe that we will have 
the Germans in the Antarctic ahead of us in the regions in which we are interested if we do not act quickly 
to forestall them.” Quoted in Pool, Polar Extremes, 238. See also Jason Kendall Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, 
Political Intervention and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies 33, no. 4 (2001): 720-721. Raymond H. Geist, Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Berlin 
to Secretary of State, 20 March 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014, 
Antarctic\159. 
34 On 2 May 1939 Congress agreed to provide $10,000 in initial funding for the expedition. When Interior 
Department officials first made their presentations to the Committee on Appropriations, the politicians 
proved reluctant to support the plans. Even when the officials argued that the bases would “establish and 
strengthen the claims of the United States,” the committee questioned whether the expedition was worth the 
cost. Fortunately, as historian David Day has stressed, the State Department used the German intention to 
build the foundation for an Antarctic claim, as well as fears that Japan might do the same, to convince the 
committee that it should invest in the Antarctic expedition. Although the committee rejected additional 
funding twice, eventually these arguments proved persuasive. Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 342-344. See 
OIR Report, No. 4296, Map Intelligence Division, Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, 
State Department, History and Current Status if Claims in Antarctic, 3 October 1947, NARA, RG 59, CDF 
1945-1949, Box 4074, File 800.014, Antarctic. 
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mobile base that could be situated at the South Pole and other locations where the 
Americans wanted to strengthen their legal position.35 
The American occupation plans aimed to give the U.S. the best legal rights 
throughout the parts of the Antarctic that most interested them, including the FID, the 
Ross Dependency and the unclaimed sector. While Roosevelt wanted to secure this 
territory, his Good Neighbor policy and fears of being labeled an imperialist ensured he 
would consult with and involve the American Republics before making any claim. 
Almost from the expedition’s inception, Roosevelt insisted that the American Republics 
be invited to participate.36 The President presented the USASE as an effort to keep 
European states from intruding in the Antarctic area resting in the western hemisphere.37  
Roosevelt pushed the State Department to think about a “new form of 
sovereignty” in which the U.S. claimed the “whole sector lying south of the Americas, on 
behalf of and in trust for, the American Republics as a whole.” Roosevelt had toyed with 
this idea before. Throughout his presidency, he consistently shied away from direct 
territorial acquisition in the western hemisphere and preferred Pan American 
trusteeships.38 His experiences with the Canton and Enderbury condominium also 
underlined that alternative forms of sovereignty could work if they allowed America to 
effectively reach its goals. In the context of the Antarctic, the President suggested that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Antarctic Expeditions, 27 April 1939, NARA, RG 
59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014 Antarctic/227. With funding secured, an Executive Committee 
formed of officials from State, Treasury, Navy, and Interior to guide the operation. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, 13 July 1939, in FRUS, 1939, Vol. II, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1956), 7. On the snow cruiser see Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 344-346. 
36 Upon becoming President, Roosevelt had committed to an internationalist approach to Latin America. 
The Good Neighbor policy centred on non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
Latin American states, but also sought greater general engagement. In the Antarctic expedition, Roosevelt 
thought that Latin American participation could take the form of personnel on the expedition, joint 
sponsorship of the bases, a limited internationalization of the region under the American republics, 
although he admitted that sharing sovereignty would create issues. Participation by other American 
Republics in United States project for settlement and scientific research in the Antarctic, 4 March 1939, 
NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4520, File 800.014 Antarctic/156. On the Good Neighbor policy see 
Frederick D. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1995).  
37 Sumner Welles, Secretary of State, to American Diplomatic Officers, American Republics, 11 December 
1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014, Antarctic\321. 
38 In 1936, for example, Roosevelt suggested that the Galapagos be turned into a Pan American 
International Park with rules against militarization. Fears that Chile would sell Easter Island to Germany or 
Japan led Roosevelt to suggest in March 1939 that a “new form of sovereignty” be embraced, one taken up 
by the “American Republics as a whole.” Young, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and America’s Islets,” 209-211. 
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U.S., “being the only Republic which has taken the initiative in exploring and possibly 
settling the area, would act not only in behalf of its own exclusive sovereignty but would 
include all the other Republics.” If the sector proved valuable in the future, the President 
suggested a joint governing body could manage the region.39 
Assistant legal adviser William Roy Vallance, who had studied polar claims since 
the 1920s, investigated how Roosevelt’s suggestion could be implemented. The obvious 
model was a condominium, in which sovereignty could be shared between the states. The 
lessons from practical experience were, however, mixed. Although the Canton and 
Enderbury condominium had worked well for the Americans, the New Hebrides 
condominium – an island group in the South Pacific governed under an Anglo-French 
administration – was problematic. Vallance explained that the two separate government 
systems only came together in a joint court, and the condominium suffered from 
excessive machinery – two sets of laws, two legal currencies, two groups of postage 
stamps – which created a confusing legal and political situation. An even more confusing 
situation could evolve in the Antarctic if a joint governing body involved all of the 
American Republics. Vallance remembered the failed international condominium 
established for the Samoan Islands consisting of the U.S., Britain and Germany in 1889. 
The U.S. found the condominium so “unsatisfactory” after ten years it simply split the 
islands with Germany. Of one thing Vallance was absolutely certain. The President had 
to be more careful with his language and avoid using the word “sector” to describe any 
claim the U.S. might make, lest it be taken by the international community as 
“acceptance and recognition of certain claims of Great Britain and some of its 
Dominions, including Canada.”40  
As planning for the expedition progressed, the Americans placed questions of 
claims and sovereignty on the backburner. Roosevelt stressed that “any question of 
ultimate or final sovereignty as between individual members of the twenty-one American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Quoted in Quigg, A Pole Apart, 132. See also Moore, “Tethered to an iceberg,” 125-134. 
40 W.R. Vallance, The Legal Adviser, Department of State, 21 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 
Box 4521, File 800.014, Antarctic\237. Other ideas included a condominium of only Chile, Argentina and 
the U.S., with the understanding that they would hold the area in trust for the other American. RA- Mr. 
Briggs, Division of the American Republics, Department of State, 23 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 
1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014, Antarctic\237 ½. 
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Republics is, of course, premature. Good faith and common sense on the line of good 
neighbor, continental ideals will work it out.” Officers in the American Republics 
explained to their hosts that sovereignty questions would be sorted out “along mutually 
satisfactory lines.” They even explained that any vital minerals found by the expedition 
would be used for the mutual benefit of all.41 First, the USASE had to occupy the 
Antarctic and prove its value. 
 As Europe descended into war in September 1939, the Americans continued to 
prepare for their Antarctic mission. On 25 November, Byrd received his official orders 
direct from President Roosevelt. He was to establish an East Base near Charcot Island or 
on the shores of Marguerite Bay, a large bay on the west side of the Antarctic Peninsula, 
and a West Base on the east shore of the Ross Sea or near Little America. A primary 
objective was the delineation of the continental coastline between the meridians 72° W 
and 148° W, and further exploration of James W. Ellsworth Land and Marie Byrd Land. 
Roosevelt explained that “members of the Service may take any appropriate steps such as 
dropping written claims from airplanes, depositing such writings in cairns, et cetera, 
which might assist in supporting a sovereignty claim by the United States Government.” 
The explorers could not discuss the claims publicly, however, without the approval of the 
Secretary of State.42  
As the USASE departed for the Antarctic, Byrd announced to the world that, “the 
idea would be to continue settlement on the ice for some years, possibly five or six. The 
present group would be relieved by others after thirteen months.”43 A total of 125 men 
left the U.S. on the USS Bear and the USMS North Star. Fifty-nine of those men planned 
to overwinter on the continent. In January 1940, the expedition arrived in the Bay of 
Whales in the Ross Sea, established West Base and named the settlement Little America 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Sumner Welles, Secretary of State, to American Diplomatic Officers, American Republics, 11 December 
1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014, Antarctic, 321. 
42 The secondary objective was the delineation of the unknown west coast of the Weddell Sea, and the 
exploration of its hinterland. President Roosevelt to the Richard Byrd, Commanding Officer of the Unites 
States Antarctic Service, 25 November 1939, in FRUS, 1939, Vol. II, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1956), 11-14. See also Rose, Explorer, 423. 
43 Memorandum to the Secretary, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Affairs, from the 
British Embassy, Washington, 15 November 1939, NAA, A981/ANT 54 PART 2; and Byrd Party to 
Survey Vast Antarctic Domain, New York Times, 19 November 1939, NAA, A981, ANT 54 PART 2. 
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III. They brought along the massive snow cruiser, but found the machine utterly useless 
on the ice and snow. In February, the two ships departed for the Antarctic Peninsula, 
surveying the South Pacific coastline of the Antarctic (the coast of the unclaimed sector) 
for the first time and accomplishing one of the mission’s main goals. In March 1940, 
Byrd established a post on an island in Marguerite Bay, near where John Rymill had 
stayed during his Graham Land Expedition (1934-1937). The USASE named the island 
Stonington, after the home-port of Nathaniel Palmer, whom the Americans considered 
the original discoverer of the Antarctic Peninsula. The parties successfully overwintered 
in the bases, flew and sledged over as much territory as possible, and filled in many blank 
spaces on the map. The expedition performed a lot of survey work and made scientific 
observations in multiple disciplines ranging from meteorology to cosmic ray studies. 
During their explorations, the Americans filled out eighteen different claim forms, 
marking where, when and how they had claimed territory for the U.S.44  
Despite the USASE’s surveying and scientific accomplishments, by November 
1940 the dream of permanent occupation of the Antarctic was already failing. Mineral 
deposits remained undiscovered and, with the war spreading in Europe, Congress refused 
further funding, considering the insertion of a new cadre of occupants into the Antarctic 
bases neither wise nor a priority.45 Even Roosevelt’s argument about the need to secure 
the Antarctic for the purposes of western hemispheric defence fell on deaf ears. In 
February and March 1941, the occupants of East Base and West Base left the Antarctic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Rose, Explorer, 408-419; Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 353-359. See also, Richard Black, 
“Geographical Operations from East Base, United States Antarctic Service Expedition, 1939-1941,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 89, no. 1 (1945): 4-12; A.J. English, “Preliminary 
Account of the United States Antarctic Expedition, 1939-1941,” Geographical Review 31, no. 3 (1941): 
466-478. For the technical planning, organization and execution of the files in NARA, RG 126.8, Office of 
Territories, Records of the United States Antarctic Service 
45 Roosevelt, however, also used the war to justify to continued expenditure. “I consider it of great 
importance to the continental defense, to keep for the twenty-one American Republics, at least one more 
year of occupancy of that part of the Antarctic continent south of America. It seems to me vitally important 
to the twenty-one American Republics to keep a clearer title than that of any other non-American country.” 
Roosevelt seemed to think that Antarctic activity should be kept up due to diplomatic swapping that may 
have followed war in Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jed Johnson, House of Representatives, 27 May 
1940, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, Box 3116, File 800.014, Antarctic/498; Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
Edward Taylor, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 27 May 1940, NARA, 
RG 59, CDF 1940-44, Box 3116, File 800.014, Antarctic/498. 
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Roosevelt, retained his interest in the south polar region, and considered the 
withdrawal more a hiatus than an ending. Richard Byrd said the U.S. would return to the 
continent, and left two airplanes, the snow cruiser, food and supplies at the bases as 
proof. The State Department filed the claims forms and converted the aerial photographs 
into maps, complete with American names, to provide support to any future claim. The 
State and Interior Departments collected the other research completed by the expedition 
to help show that the U.S. possessed the greatest knowledge of the Antarctic.  The 
Americans believed these would also bolster their legal rights and, throughout the war, 
continued to study the legal side of an Antarctic claim, in preparation for whatever action 
Washington decided to take after war’s end.46  
The USASE had a profound and lasting impact on the legal landscape of the polar 
regions and the history of the Antarctic more generally. Roosevelt’s emphasis on 
occupation recommitted the State Department to the Hughes Doctrine. Although the 
department would flirt with the doctrine of constructive occupation in the future, it never 
moved past Roosevelt’s demand for “another step.” At the same time, the President’s 
suggestion that a “new form of sovereignty” be created for the Antarctic had a ripple 
effect on American polar policy. The idea tapped into the suggestions for an alternative 
and internationalist approach to polar sovereignty that had circulated amongst the 
American legal community for decades. In the wake of the USASE, the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) picked up the call for the U.S. to 
take the lead on internationalizing the Antarctic. The organization’s President, Gertrude 
Bussey wrote to Secretary of State Hull, “In this crucial time when our hopes are pinned 
on elimination of all the old imperialist land grabbing and the general acceptance of a 
new ethic and a new practice in international relations, we should deplore any policy in 
the Antarctic which looked toward further acquisition of territory by the United States.” 
Emily Greene Balch, who would win a Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 for her work with the 
WILPF, wrote in the New York Times that the U.S. should forgo its own claim in the 
Antarctic and advocate “international administration” of “polar regions” by “a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 S.A. Saucerman, Office of the Geographer, Department of State, 28 July 1942, NARA, RG 59, CDF 
1940-1944, Box 3117, File 800.014, Antarctic/651; and Study of Antarctica in the Department, 25 July 
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consortium of all, a world trust.”47 In the postwar years, the idea of an Antarctic 
condominium and full internationalization of the region gained greater traction in 
Washington. The American quest for a “new form of sovereignty” would eventually lead 
to the Antarctic Treaty. 
7.3 “Leave the Rest of Us Alone” 
The British, Australians and New Zealanders watched the official American interest in 
the Antarctic intensify throughout 1939. Hubert Wilkins served as an advisor on 
Ellsworth’s mission to the American Highland and informed Canberra about the 
explorer’s secret instructions from the State Department while en route to the Antarctic. 
Wilkins reported that if Ellsworth made his claim and it was “taken notice of in official 
circles” the action would “do little more than bring about a definite decision as to the 
legality of claims based on the ‘Sector’ principle.”48 Canberra gave Wilkins secret 
instructions to explore and report on the AAT as a representative of the Australian 
government. Australia’s External Affairs Department hoped Wilkins would “demonstrate 
that it had not been content merely to make a formal claim to territory in the Antarctic, 
but has taken action to enhance the probability of international recognition of that claim 
by the exercise of additional acts of sovereignty over the territory.” 49 As Ellsworth 
conducted his flight and made his claim, Hubert Wilkins landed on small islands off the 
coast and on the mainland at the western end of the Vestfold Hills three times between 8 
and 11 January 1939, flew the Australian flag and left records of his visits.50  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Gertrude C. Bussey, National President, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom to 
Secretary of State, 5 December 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4521, File 800.014, 
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48 Sir Hubert Wilkins to the Minister of External Affairs, 8 February 1939, NAA, A981, ANT 22, Antarctic 
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49 W.R. Hodgson, Secretary, External Affairs, to Alfred Stirling, Australian Counselor in London, 18 
November 1938 and W.R. Hodgson, Department of External Affairs to Sir Hubert Wilkins, 12 September 
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York: Shyhorse Publishing, 2005), 269-272. Sir Hubert Wilkins to the Minister of External Affairs, 8 
February 1939, NAA, A981/ANT 22.  
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The Australians concluded that the flag waving performed by Hubert Wilkins, 
reliance on the sector principle and unenforced administrative acts from Canberra would 
not be enough to forestall American interest in the region or support Australia’s claim. 
The Ellsworth affair reinforced Canberra’s desire for an Australian Antarctic 
expedition.51 Since the Imperial Conference of 1937, the Australians had worked on such 
a venture, only to have their plans thwarted by the lack of funds and a suitable ship. Now, 
Wilkins pushed his government to purchase Ellsworth’s polar equipment, including his 
ship, the Wyatt Earp, and use it to establish permanent weather stations in the AAT.52 
Minister of External Affairs William Hughes agreed that ownership of the Earp would 
help to address the problem that “Australia has, in the eyes of the outside world, done 
very little to keep alive its claim to the Australian Antarctic Territory.”53 The Australians 
purchased the Earp in February 1939 and started to plan for the establishment of 
meteorological bases in the AAT. 
Keith Officer, Australia’s counselor at the British Embassy in Washington, asked 
the State Department about U.S. Antarctic intentions on several occasions.54 During a 
meeting in March, Chief of the State Department’s Western Europe Division, Jay 
Pierrepont Moffat, reported that Officer started in a “jocular tone, ‘Have you been 
claiming any more territory lately?’” Officer, now “seriously speaking,” explained that 	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52 Wilkins wanted a summer cruise of Wyatt Earp, a base on Macquarie Island, a weather station at the 
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his government “hoped very much that we would take no affirmative action in supporting 
Ellsworth’s claim, but leave matters in their present stage.” In response, Moffat simply 
repeated the standard American reply about the reservation of its rights in the Antarctic.55  
Shortly after, Australian and British officials heard about the official American 
expedition to the Antarctic. Early press reports indicated that the Americans would 
support Ellsworth’s claim through an occupation party stationed in the AAT.56 The 
British noted that State Department officials were less than forthcoming about their plans 
and the exact location of their bases.57 The British Embassy sent warnings about the snow 
cruiser, which they feared would give the Americans a mobile base capable of providing 
occupation across the continent, making every historic expedition to the Antarctic seem 
small and insignificant. Mallet further reported that the Americans would establish three 
permanent bases in the three territories claimed by the British Empire, with the sole 
purpose of placing their existing claims to these areas “beyond any question of 
international law.” 58  
On 7 May, Keith Officer told Pierrepont Moffat “he was much disturbed” by the 
news and asked if the U.S. intended to make a formal Antarctic claim. Officer then 
pleaded that “whatever you do, please let us know in advance so there may be no 
‘surprises,’ that is the thing that would be most resented in Australia, New Zealand and 
elsewhere.” Officer then argued that the Americans should direct their attention to the 
unclaimed sector where Byrd had done most of his work. “Why don’t you claim that,” 
demanded Officer, “and leave the rest of us alone?”59  	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The British and Australians had little chance to respond to the American 
expedition, however, with another European war looming on the horizon. London did not 
have the time or resources to counter the American challenge in the Antarctic with an 
expedition of its own. The south polar region fell to the bottom of a very long list of 
British foreign policy priorities. The Polar Committee was quietly suspended. The only 
concrete measure came in the form of letters dispatched by London and Wellington 
offering assistance to the Americans if they intended to operate in the Ross Dependency 
or the FID.60 Hubert Wilkins continued to push Canberra to establish a meteorological 
post in the AAT, but by the summer of 1939 those plans were dead in the water. As much 
as the government wanted to bolster Australia’s territorial claim in the Antarctic, defence 
interests were paramount in Canberra. Instead of sending the Wyatt Earp to the AAT, the 
government loaned it to the Defence Department to haul men and munitions.61  
After September 1939, British, Australian and New Zealander officials 
preoccupied with the war effort could only watch as the wave of American activity 
approached the continent.  As if to reinforce why Washington dispatched the expedition, 
in November 1939 the Americans issued the 1924 edition of Foreign Relations of the 
United States, which included Secretary Hughes’ response to the Norwegian government 
that the “formal taking of possession” had “no significance” beyond heralding the 
“advent of the settler.” The British had known about the Hughes Doctrine for years, but 
they still took note of this “published view” of the U.S. government.62 After referencing 
the document, Keith Officer informed Canberra that the USASE was an attempt to fulfill 
the requirements of the Hughes Doctrine.63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Washington on Meeting with Pierrepont Moffat, 8 May 1939, NAA, A981/ANT 54 PART 2. As the 
summer of 1939 wore on, the Australians only grew more convinced that the Americans intended to claim 
a part of the AAT. Telegram from Lt. Colonel Hodgson, Canberra to the Australian Counsellor, 
Washington, 12 July 1939, NAA, A981, ANT 4 Part 10, Antarctic, Control of. 
60 The Americans responded that they required no assistance. Templeton, A Wise Adventure, 74-76. 
61 Telegram from the Australian Government Trade Commissioner, New York, 20 July 1939, NAA, A981/ 
ANT 4 Part 10, Antarctic, Control of; and Minister of External Affairs to Hubert Wilkins, 3 August 1939, 
NAA, A981/ANT 54 PART 2. 
62 Territorial Claims in the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, pg. 94, 1 May 1945, NAA, 
A4311, 365/8. 
63 Memorandum to the Secretary, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Affairs, from the 
British Embassy, Washington, 15 November 1939, NAA, A981/ANT 54 PART 2; and Byrd Party to 
Survey Vast Antarctic Domain, New York Times, 19 November 1939, NAA, A981, ANT 54 PART 2 
	  	   372	  
When the USASE established its bases in the FID and the Ross Dependency, 
instead of the AAT, the Australians breathed a sigh of relief, while the Colonial Office 
lamented “another case of American aggression.”64 In London, polar explorer and 
scientist Colin Bertram warned that the establishment of East Base at Marguerite Bay, 
just a few miles from the old British Graham Land Expedition base, was a deliberate 
challenge to Britain’s priority of discovery to the Antarctic Peninsula, and would now 
cement American sovereignty over the FID by carrying out an occupation “over a 
number of years.”65 A war of words erupted between British and American academics as 
the latter attempted to justify American interest and territorial rights in the FID by 
proving that Nathaniel Palmer had been the first to discover the Antarctic Peninsula.66 
The official British response to the American intrusion into the FID was far more 
subdued. When news reached London that the Americans had raised the stars and stripes 
at East Base in the FID, the British told the State Department that they hoped the action 
“had no political significance.” The British followed their weak protest up by insisting 
that they had no wish to discuss the matter further. Wartime exigencies demanded a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The Colonial Office called it another case of American “aggression” and suggested objecting to the flag 
raising on British territory. Colonial Office Note, 19 November 1940, NA, CO 78/213/1. 
65 OCL Bertram, University of Cambridge to R.A. Wiseman, Dominions Office, 26 April 1940, NA, FO 
371/24168. 
66As the USASE prepared for the Antarctic, the State Department continued to promote research into the 
whaling logbooks that it hoped would prove the priority of American discovery of the Antarctic continent. 
As historian David Day has maintained, this led to intense academic fighting. Together with geographer 
Professor William Hobbs, Lawrence Martin, now Library of Congress Cartographer, went to international 
geographic conferences and meetings of the American Philosophical Society, and wrote articles, in 1939 
and 1940 to argue that Nathaniel Palmer’s logbook provided definitive proof of American first discovery of 
the Antarctic continent and to discredit the efforts of British explorer, Edward Bransfield. Although 
Bransfield’s charts indicated that he sighted the Antarctic coastline in January 1820, Martin and Hobbs 
argued that this was only the result of a concerted campaign by British officials and writers. When Arthur 
Hinks, a British geographer who worked closely with the Admiralty and Foreign Office rose to Bransfield’s 
defence, the debate intensified. Hinks, who stressed the lack of clarity in the historical record, admitted that 
Palmer had spotted the Antarctic coast on 18 November 1820, but Bransfield had done so on 30 January 
1820. Eventually the debate expanded to include other academics, but the results proved inconclusive, and 
remain so to this day. Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 367-368. See William Hobbs, “The Discoveries of 
Antarctica Within the American Sector, as Revealed by Maps and Documents,” Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society 32, no. 1 (1940): 214-218; R.N. Rudmose Brown, “Antarctic History: A 
Reply to Professor W.H. Hobbs,” Scottish Geographical Magazine 55, no. 3 (1939): 170-173; Arthur Hinks, 
“Review: On Some Misrepresentations of Antarctic History,” Geographical Journal 94, no. 4 (1939): 309-
330; Arthur Hinks, “Antarctica Rediscovered: A Reply,” Geographical Review 31 (1941): 491-498. 
Lawrence Martin, “Antarctica Discovered by a Connecticut Yankee, Captain Nathaniel Brown Parker,” 
Geographical Review 30, no. 4 (1940): 529-552. 
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gentle response.67 In March 1941, shortly before the British issued their protest, military 
cooperation between the two countries tightened with the landmark Lend-Lease 
agreement, which formalized official American aid to Britain. The Colonial Office may 
have privately condemned the “aggression” of the U.S. in the Antarctic, but all British 
officials realized how important American support was to the war effort.  
British experts understood that the USASE had changed the legal and political 
context of the Antarctic. While the American withdrawal in early 1941 provided some 
relief in London, the Colonial Office wondered whether Washington considered “Byrd’s 
‘semi-permanent’ expedition sufficiently near to settlement,” satisfying the Hughes 
Doctrine and justification for a sovereignty claim.68 Colin Bertram warned that, “despite 
the war it would be a short sighted policy for this country to neglect too completely its 
Antarctic possessions, in particular the Graham Land sector, which undoubtedly has the 
greatest potential value.” 69 The British sent ships and men to parts of the FID in 1941, 
but it was for strategic purposes and not to explicitly protect sovereignty. German surface 
ships and U-boats operating in the South Atlantic posed a threat to the pivotal supply 
chain bringing food supplies from Argentina, as well as the free passage around Cape 
Horn that connected Britain to New Zealand. The British erected coastal defence 
batteries in the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the armed merchant cruiser 
HMS Queen of Bermuda destroyed old oil and coal stocks in the South Shetlands to 
prevent them from falling into German hands in March 1941. Later that year, HMS 
Neptune patrolled the islands east of South Georgia looking for evidence of German 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Memorandum of Conversation between Hoyer Miller and Hugh Cumming, 5 August 1941, NARA, RG 
59, CDF 1940-1944, Box 3116, File 800.014 Antarctic/637. Andrew B. Acheson, head of the Pacific and 
Mediterranean Department at the Colonial Office, stressed that “the hoisting of a national flag may in 
certain circumstances be held to confer rights over the territory on which the flag is hoisted.” An official 
photo the Americans released to the press noted, “True to old exploring traditions, a small island in 
Marguerite Bay is established as base by Admiral Byrd and his associates by hoisting an American flag 
over rock-strewn coastline.” The Foreign office responded that, “it was quite natural for Admiral Byrd to 
hoist his own national flag over his camp…[and was] not convinced that this action is liable…to give rise 
to misunderstandings as to the British sovereignty of the territory concerned.” A.B. Acheson to the Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 28 December 1940, NA, FO 371/24168; Colonial Office Note, 19 
November 1940; and Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 14 December 1940, NA, CO 78/213/1. 
68 A.B. Acheson to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 28 December 1940, NA, FO 
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69 John R. Dudeney and David Walton, “From Scotia to ‘Operation Tabarin’: developing British policy for 
Antarctica,” Polar Record 48 (247 (2002): 347-348. 
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activity.70 Legally, these actions did little to counter the occupation efforts of the U.S. in 
the FID. With the British Empire fighting for its life against Hitler’s Germany, Antarctic 
sovereignty would have to wait. In the meantime, another threat to Britain’s sovereignty 
in the FID emerged.  
7.4 New Sectors Claims: Chile, Argentina and the Antarctic  
The USASE and the outbreak of the Second World War opened the door for an 
Argentinean and Chilean challenge to Britain’s FID claim. Historian Adrian Howkins has 
ably charted the renewed interest of the Argentinean and Chilean governments in the 
question of Antarctic sovereignty. Argentina’s interest in the south polar region grew 
steadily since the 1920s, but an invitation from Norway to attend an international polar 
conference in Bergen sparked greater awareness of Antarctic affairs for both the 
Argentinean and Chilean governments. The defence of Argentina’s Antarctic interests 
provided President Roberto Ortiz with a mechanism to appease growing nationalist 
sentiment in the country and to promote the traditional “territorial nationalism” of the 
Argentine elite who dominated his government. In Chile, the government worried that 
Argentinean sovereignty in the Antarctic would pose a direct geopolitical challenge to 
national security and these concerns propelled them to take pre-emptive action.71 
Distrustful of Roosevelt’s assurances of a mutually satisfactory agreement on sovereignty 
issues, both countries believed the Americans might unilaterally claim territory. 
Accordingly, Argentina and Chile established Antarctic Commissions to study their 	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Law 2, 2-3, 140, 149, 154, and Casarini, “Activities in Antarctica,” 663-64. On German raider activities in 
the southern ocean in 1940/41, see J.D.M. Blyth, “German Raiders in the Antarctic during the Second 
World War,” Polar Record 6, no. 43 (1952): 399-403. When Japanese advances in the Pacific in late 1941 
and 1942 amplified fears about South Atlantic security, Winston Churchill ordered that British troops be 
sent to the Falklands to deter the Japanese, given that the loss of the islands “would be a shock to the 
whole Empire.” See Galen R. Perras, “Anglo-Canadian Imperial Relations: The Case of the Garrisoning of 
the Falkland Islands in 1942,” War & Society 14 (1996): 73-97. 
71 Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 41, 46-49, 55. The Argentines also thought it important that the Americans 
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British, who officially claimed the islands. Sumner Welles to Government of Argentina, 25 July 1939, 
Document AR25071939, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 1, 596-597. For background on the 
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Antarctic Mentality from the Colonial Era through the IGY,” in Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences, 
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sovereign rights in the south polar region.72  
With Britain’s attention fixated on stopping German advances, Argentina and 
Chile – both officially neutral until 1945 – saw an opportunity “to pursue their 
reawakened territorial ambitions in Antarctica with relative impunity.” In November 
1940 – to the annoyance of Roosevelt and the State Department – Chile announced they 
had existing sovereign rights over “all lands, islands, reefs of rocks, glaciers, already 
known, or to be discovered, and their respective territorial waters, in the sector between 
longitudes 53°W and 90°W,” a jurisdiction that clearly over-lapped Britain’s FID.73 At a 
meeting of the Argentine and Chilean Antarctic Commissions, disagreements arose 
concerning the boundaries between their countries on the southern continent, yet the 
experts concurred that the Antarctic Peninsula belonged to South America and not a 
distant colonizer. Although Buenos Aires did not immediately advance an official 
declaration akin to Chile’s, it informed Britain of its dominion over an Antarctic “zone” 
which it considered an “inalienable part” of Argentina’s “national territory.” Argentina 
proposed a conference to discuss the legal and political status of the south polar region – 
an idea raised multiple times during and after the war.74  
The Argentineans established a post office at their Laurie Island meteorological 
station in late 1941 and sent the naval ship Primero de Mayo to visit islands and plant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The decree establishing the Argentine committee was poorly worded. While it discussed the special 
interest Argentina had in the region and how “closely connected” the Antarctic lands were to Argentina, the 
decree did not mention pre-existing legal rights. When the press asked if the new committee had been 
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1, 594-596 and Argentine Press Statement, 28 July 1939, Document AR28071939, in Bush, Antarctica and 
International Law 1, 597. 
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flags as ceremonies of possession the following year. The ship visited Deception Island 
and erected an automatic lighthouse at Dallmann Bay, between Brabant Island and 
Anvers Island. In 1942, the Argentineans started to insist they had “sovereign rights over 
all Antarctic lands and dependencies south of 60 degrees latitude South and between 
meridians 25 degrees and 68 degrees longitude West.”75 The Primero de Mayo went 
south again in 1943 and performed acts of possession at Marguerite Bay, Deception 
Island and Port Lockroy, on the northwestern shore of Wiencke Island.76 
During the war, officials and academic experts in Chile and Argentina crafted the 
legal foundations to support the territorial ambitions of their countries in the Antarctic. 
Legal scholar Shirley Scott has observed that the Chileans and Argentineans were not 
“playing the same game” as their European and North American counterparts. Both 
countries appealed to the principle of uti possidetis juris.77 The Latin American Republics 
first utilized the principle in 1810 to establish that their boundaries would be the frontiers 
of the Spanish provinces they succeeded. The new states used the doctrine to prevent 
territorial squabbles and avoid additional attempts at European colonization. The doctrine 
also reflected the historic efforts by many Latin American international lawyers to assert 
a “separate, American international law. In its strongest expression, this particular law 
would rank equal to, and in cases of conflict, trump general or European international 
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Chile over the Antarctic, he noted that the South Americans considered region an “integral part” of their 
national territories, so the British claims represented, “a claim to colonial annexation of their territory.” 
Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 27, 42-74. On Argentina’s moves towards asserting sovereignty in Antarctica, 
see also Bush, Antarctica and International Law 1, 579-87, 594-5, 599-600, and Bush, Antarctica and 
International Law 2, 310-11, 323-24. On Chile’s assertion of rights see Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, Political 
Intervention and the Race to Antarctica,” 722-723.  
77 For an overview of the doctrine of uti possidetis, see Suzanne Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a 
Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2002). “To be sure there were many regions that had not been occupied by the Spanish and many regions 
that were unexplored or uninhabited by uncivilized natives,” explained the Swiss Federal Council during its 
arbitration of the boundary questions between Columbia and Venezuela explained in 1922. “But these 
sections were regarded as belonging in law to the respective republics that had succeeded the Spanish 
provinces to which these lands were connected by virtue of old royal decrees of the Spanish mother 
country.” Although these frontier may not have been effectively occupied in fact, they were occupied in 
law, ruled the arbitration. Arbitral Award of the Swiss Federal Council on Various Boundary Questions 
Pending Between Columbia and Venezuela, 24 March 1922, Document CH24031922 in Bush, Antarctica 
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law.”78  
In the Antarctic context, Chile and Argentina argued that Spain had claimed title 
to all territory discovered and undiscovered west of a line extending “from the Arctic 
pole to the Antarctic pole” as specified by the Bull Inter Caetera (1493) and revised by 
the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Since at least the sixteenth century, Spanish monarchs 
maintained that the boundary of their territory in South America extended to the 
unknown southern continent.79 As a result, both states insisted that they had no need to 
claim what had belonged to them for centuries. While the British and Americans sought 
to establish sovereign rights in the region, in Chile and Argentina’s opinion, they only 
had to delimit an acceptable Antarctic border between one another – something the 
Chileans first proposed in 1907.80 Argentina and Chile continued to use uti possidetis 
juris to justify their territorial ambitions in the Antarctic, but in response to challenges 	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(Santiago: Imprenta universitaria, 1948). 
80 Scott, “Ingenious and Innocuous?” 51-62. In 1907, Chilean officials proposed a treaty that would divide 
between the two countries “the islands and American Antarctic continents,” even over unexplored areas. 
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from Britain and the U.S., the Latin American states felt the need to compete for 
Antarctic sovereignty using the ideas and language of “general” European international 
law.81 
Both states were adamant that it was not “possible to apply to polar regions the 
usual juridical standards for the acquisition of public domain.” Chilean government and 
legal experts even argued that there existed a special legal regime of “modern polar 
international law.”82 To undermine Britain’s position, both states attacked the legal value 
of discovery – which the Chileans labeled a “false method of acquisition” – and 
emphasized the doctrine of contiguity (“contiguidad”) and geographical arguments. Both 
states cited Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier’s original arguments for the sector principle 
to insist that territory in the Arctic and Antarctic should be viewed as a natural extension 
of the countries closest to the Poles. To add strength to their geographic argument, Chile 
and Argentina argued that the Andean Range continued beyond Cape Horn and the Drake 
Passage to the Antarctic Peninsula, which made the continent a prolongation of South 
America and their natural inheritance. Given the separation that existed between Cape 
Horn and the Antarctic continent, Argentina and Chile chose not to draw sector lines 
from their eastern and western borders. In order to fix the lines of meridian, “one must 
take into account the extent of the coastal zone over which sovereignty has been 
exercised, and to project it into the interior, in the form of a triangle, with its apex at the 
Pole.”83 Both sides used language like “geographically dependent,” “geographical unity” 
and “hinterland,” echoing statements used in Canadian legal assessments of their position 	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in the Arctic Archipelago.84 Britain had always feared that Argentina and Chile would 
utilize the sector principle to claim territory in the Antarctic. In anticipation the British 
had insisted that all polar sectors emanated from discovery and control of a polar 
coastline, and not from simple proximity (although they deviated from this philosophy 
during negotiations with Norway using the geographic positions of the Falkland Islands, 
South Africa, Australia and New Zealand to justify their own Antarctic claims).   
International lawyer Oscar Pinochet de la Barra elaborated on Chile’s use of the 
sector principle. First of all, only countries considered direct neighbours could use the 
principle. No state could draw a sector simply because it faced the Antarctic, which 
effectively ruled out claims by countries such as Peru and Brazil. Second, Chile clarified 
that the sector principle granted states a preferential right to sovereignty, not full legal 
title. The principle did, however, imbue Chile’s acts of sovereignty with greater legal 
strength than those completed by non-neighbouring states. De la Barra concluded that, in 
Chile’s opinion, the theory of polar sectors was not “synonymous with proximity: it is the 
combined influence of the legal and economic acts; of a fact of nature which 
complements and perfects acts of will and human endeavour.”85  
Within the context of Chile’s application of the sector principle, acts of state 
legislation and administration played a pivotal role. Having made no attempt to 
physically occupy any part of the south polar region, the Chileans leaned on the historic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Canada’s ambassador to Argentina, Warwick Chapman noted in 1946, “The Argentine legal experts 
proceed then to state the case for Argentina’s rights in the Antarctic specifically by application of Arctic 
jurisprudence.” Warwick Chipman, Canadian Ambassador, Buenos Aires to The Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, 8 January 1947, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, Vol. 3843, File 9091-40, 
pt.1. For arguments using contiguity and the sector principle, see Appendix VIII, The Case for Argentine 
Territorial Claims in the Antarctic, Territorial Claims in the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign 
Office, 1 May 1945, NAA, A4311, 365/8; José Carlos Vittone, La Soberanía Argentina en el Continente 
Antárctico (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1944); Raul Martinez Moreno, Soberenía Antárctica Argentina 
(Tucumáman, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, 1951); “The Question of the Antarctic,” 21 January 1947, 
as reported in El Diario Illustrado, NA, FO 371/61290; Polar Committee: Copy of a Statement on the 
Chilean Antarctic Claim Made by the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Chilean Senate on 22 
January 1947, 24 March 1947, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3843, File 9092-A-40, pt. 1; Chancery, Australian 
Legation, Santiago, Chile to Australian Embassy, Washington, 25 April 1947, NAA, A3300, 541A, [1947 
file - pale blue tab] Territories - Antarctic – claims; Argentine Foreign Minister to Chilean Ambassador, 12 
November 1940, Document AR12111940, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 1, 606; Norman 
Armour, Embassy of the United States, Bueonos Aires, to Secretary of State, 15 November 1940, NARA, 
RG 59, CDF 1940-44, Box 3116, File 800.014, Antarctic/556. 
85 Barra, La Antártida Chilena, 111-113, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 355-356. 
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concessions the government granted to fishermen and sealers at the beginning of the 
century as evidence of sufficient state activity. Between 1902 and 1906, the government 
issued fishing and sealing concessions to companies for the South Shetlands, the islands 
further south, and the “lands of Graham.”86 De la Barra, concluded that, because no 
country protested these concessions in 1906 (Argentina being the sole objector) Chile’s 
“sovereignty over the Antarctic polar regions continued to be universally recognized.”87 
After reviewing these arguments, even the British admitted, “If the decrees are genuine, 
they appear to constitute the best point the Chileans have yet been able to find in favor of 
their claims.”88  
Argentina could apply a substantial legal argument that Chile could not – its 
decades long occupation of the meteorological station at Laurie Island, in operation since 
1904. Argentinean experts and officials insisted that Britain’s title to the FID rested on 
symbolic deeds, while Argentina had exercised “effective and continuous” occupation of 
its Antarctic territory for almost half a century. In the special conditions of the Antarctic, 
that occupation, no matter how modest, had significant legal value.89 Furthermore, the 
Argentineans argued that the station represented the “exercise of a responsible authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Supreme Decree No. 3, 3310 Granting a Fishing Concession to Pedro Pablo Benavides, 31 December 
1902, Document CH31121902, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 290-291; Application from 
Enrique Fabry and Domingo de Toro Herrera for a Concession for Sealing and other Purposes, 9 January 
1906, Document CH09011906, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 291-293; Supreme Decree No. 
260, Granting a Concession For Sealing and Othr Purposes to Enrique Farby and Domingo De Toro 
Herrera, 27 February 1906, Document CH27021906, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 295-296.  
87 See Oscar Pinochet de la Barra quoted in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 297. 
88 South American Department to the Chancery, British Embassy, Santiago, 8 March 1945, NA, CO/217/5. 
89 Argentine Foreign Minister to Chilean Ambassador, 12 November 1940, Document AR12111940, in 
Bush, Antarctica and International Law 1, 606; Norman Armour, Embassy of the United States, Buenos 
Aires, to Secretary of State, 15 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, Box 3116, File 800.014, 
Antarctic/556. Two Argentine papers, La Prensa and El Diaro published Argentine official views. The 
claims of foreign powers were based on “symbolic deeds and aerial explorations during which flags were 
dropped.” The papers argued that Britain’s claim had not fulfilled the requisites of occupation that had been 
set since the Berlin Conference and the rules laid out by the meeting of the Institute of International Law at 
Lausanne in 1889. El Diario, 13 November 1940, Text of Note Addressed by the Argentine Government to 
the Chilean Government; La Prensa, 8 November 1940, Argentine Rights on a Section of Antarctica, 
NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, Box 3116, File 800.014, Antarctic/557. As Canada’s ambassador to 
Argentina, Warwick Chapman noted in 1946, “The Argentine legal experts proceed then to state the case 
for Argentina’s rights in the Antarctic specifically by application of Arctic jurisprudence.” Warwick 
Chipman, Canadian Ambassador, Buenos Aires to The Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 January 
1947, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3843, File 9091-40, pt.1. 
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in the Argentine Antarctic sector, unequalled by any other nation.”90 Trying to derive as 
much legal benefit as possible out of its station, they also insisted that Argentina’s 
sovereignty was “tacitly recognized by all those who availed themselves of the Argentine 
meteorological services of the Orkneys.”91  
Even as Chilean and Argentinean officials laid out legal cases for their countries, 
neither state took concrete action. In Argentina, a military coup led by Juan Domingo 
Perón in June 1943 ousted the government of Ramón Castillo. The overthrow of the 
Concordancia government pushed the country into a three-year period of political 
uncertainty that halted Antarctic activity. Meanwhile, the Chileans simply could not 
secure a ship to attempt a voyage to the south polar region.92 During this lull in activity, 
however, both countries took significant steps to spark the popular and economic interest 
of their citizens in the Antarctic, and worked to convince them that a vast portion of the 
region was their national birthright.93  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Argentina and Chile redoubled their 
efforts in the south polar region and played an important role in political and legal 
developments. They continued to imbue the polar legal landscape with their arguments 
about contiguity, geographic connections and the sector principle. Regardless, both 
countries wholeheartedly joined the rush in the scramble to occupy the Antarctic.94  
7.5 Operation Tabarin: Britain’s Permanent Occupation 
Britain’s survival as an island nation demanded a secure food supply, and Argentina was 
its main supplier of beef. Any action that alienated Argentina might jeopardize this food 
security, putting Britain in a political quagmire. Historians John Dudeney and David 
Walton have pointed out that while officials in the Foreign Office questioned the value 
of the FID and worried about the impact any response might have on Argentina, the 	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91 Warwick Chipman, Canadian Ambassador, Buenos Aires to The Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
8 January 1947, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3843, File 9091-40, pt.1.  
92 Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 76-78, 86-92. On the mission of Carnarvon Castle, see Dudeney and 
Walton, “From Scotia to ‘Operation Tabarin,’” 350-51. 
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Admiralty and Colonial Office were adamant that Britain defend its title to the territory. 
While both departments cited the region’s economic potential and strategic requirements 
(such as the need to control the Drake Passage and bar enemy raiders from using the 
South Orkneys and the South Shetlands as bases), prestige arguments played an 
important role. The thought of giving up territory to Argentina, Chile or the U.S. was out 
of the question. The Colonial Office wanted to send a “reply to those of our American 
friends who are making ready to assist at the dismemberment of the Empire.” In 1942-
1943, the British dispatched the HMS Carnavon Castle on an “administrative tour” of 
the FID (conducted with the pretext of countering Axis raider activity). Although they 
had strict orders to avoid confrontation with the Argentineans, the ship’s crew 
obliterated sovereignty markers left in the South Shetlands by previous Argentine 
expeditions.95  
If Britain wanted to keep the FID, Foreign Office legal adviser William Eric 
Beckett advised its weak legal title must be strengthened. In a radical departure from 
British polar legal policy, Beckett insisted that “if we want to make sure of our title to 
these islands we must establish something permanently there ourselves, difficult and 
tiresome as it may be.” As he explained, “paper protests have some value…the greatest 
weight is attached to actual physical occupation and use.”96 The days of papers 
administration and the occasional visit were over.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden commented on the Foreign Office’s argument that protests would not 
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government.” Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim (West 
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Scotia to ‘Operation Tabarin’,” 349. Beckett had investigated territorial claims in the polar regions before 
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Foreign Minister Anthony Eden agreed with Beckett and the cabinet decided to 
send a military operation ostensibly looking for enemy raiders to establish bases of 
“effective occupation” in the Antarctic.97 The utmost secrecy had to be maintained to 
prevent Argentina and Chile from confronting the British, which might damage the 
Anglo-Argentine commercial relationship.98 Throughout 1943, British officials in the 
Colonial Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office Research Department prepared 
for the expedition, working through the night so frequently that the expedition was 
dubbed Operation Tabarin, after the famous Bal Tabarin nightclub in Paris. The 
operation’s manuals clearly indicated that the objective was to establish occupation not 
necessarily deny access to other states. Marr and his men were to avoid violence, but 
establish bases at selected points in the FID, from which they would conduct scientific 
research and surveys.99  
The British government had utilized scientific research to demonstrate its 
sovereignty in the FID since the Discovery Committee began operations in 1925. The 
scientific program for Operation Tabarin included the study of sea ice, geology and 
physiography, glaciers, surveying, meteorology, zoology, botany, and tidal observations. 
Brian B. Roberts, a Scott Polar Research Institute scientist and member of the British 
Graham Land expedition, assisted with the creation of the research agenda, as did 
prominent polar explorer James Wordie. Both would come to play an important role in 
British Antarctic policy.100 Howkins has observed that “the demonstration of superior 	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1308/22/1; ER, Roberts, Brian. On the impact of Brian Roberts on Britain’s Antarctic policy, see H.G.R. 
	  	   384	  
scientific capabilities offered a convenient way to… prove [Britain’s] sovereignty rights 
without an outright display of physical force.”101 With Operation Tabarin, science served 
both a legal and diplomatic role. 
As the Foreign Office legal advisers accepted the need for occupation, their new 
approach to polar sovereignty clashed with the Colonial Office’s older ideas about the 
legal value of issuing FID postage stamps for use by Tabarin’s personnel. While the legal 
advisers argued that the stamps offered little to the strength of title, the Colonial Office 
considered the act an essential sign of state administration and demonstration of 
sovereign rights. The Foreign Office stressed the need for “utmost secrecy” and pointed 
out that issuing a special stamp for Tabarin would do the opposite. Despite the warning, 
the Colonial Office issued the stamps.102 Learning about the postage stamps, Chile 
reserved its rights in the South Shetlands and Graham Land, to the great annoyance of the 
Foreign Office.103 The clashing of legal ideas – old and new – would continue to 
complicate British decision making. 
The British expedition reached the FID in January 1944. After re-occupying the 
former whaling base at Deception Island, the ships headed for Hope Bay at the very tip of 
the Graham Land peninsula. Poor ice conditions thwarted repeated attempts to enter the 
bay and establish a base on the Antarctic mainland. Instead, the expedition sailed for the 
northwest coast of Graham Land and eventually established a base at Port Lockroy, from 	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which the men could walk to the mainland in the winter. In the summer of 1944-45, the 
expedition established two more bases, including one at Hope Bay and one at Sandefjiord 
Bay. By the end of the war, Operation Tabarin successfully set up four occupied bases in 
the FID, and one unoccupied base on Coronation Island in the South Orkneys. On top of 
the scientific program, Howkins has observed that the bases took six meteorological 
readings a day, hoping functional activity would bolster Britain’s legal position. As a 
demonstration of British authority and state function, the base leaders acted as 
magistrates, postmasters, harbour masters and issued sets of stamps.104  
With the occupation parties of Operation Tabarin in place, British officials 
prepared for a postwar Antarctic. What would the region look like and what policies 
should be adopted? Despite the challenges Argentina and Chile posed to the FID, London 
believed the Americans represented the greatest threat to the Empire’s Antarctic interests 
and they anticipated “a revival of US claims” and renewed American activity in the FID, 
Ross Dependency and the AAT.105 Given the tangle of potential territorial disputes that 
covered the continent, the Foreign Office predicted that the U.S. or Argentina would call 
an international conference. W.E. Beckett insisted the British government decide whether 
it wanted to maintain its entire claim to the FID or strengthen its legal title only to 
improve its bargaining position at a postwar conference, which would involve 
concessions of territory.106  
  The Foreign Office Research Department compiled a comprehensive handbook 
(only recently declassified) on the historical, legal and political elements involved in 
Antarctic claims.107 Brian Roberts, who spearheaded the project, examined a wide array 
of material and solicited opinions from across the Commonwealth. He even drew on the 
report prepared by Canadian solicitor T.L. Cory in 1936, British Sovereignty in the 	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Arctic, which he discussed with its author during a visit to Ottawa.108 The overarching 
conclusion of the volume’s 300-pages astutely predicted that British Antarctic policy had 
“reached the stage when it may be considered necessary for His Majesty’s Governments 
to take a much more active part in the development of these territories if they are not to 
be faced with the alternative of relinquishing some of the British claims.”109 
The handbook highlighted that there existed a “difference of opinion between the 
British and United States Government as to what constitutes definitive occupation for 
Antarctic purposes.” Since 1934, the Americans had demanded occupancy and use to 
support territorial claims in the polar regions, and the USASE had put American beliefs 
into practice. In sharp contrast, Britain had contended that “British title” existed to the 
FID, the AAT and Ross Dependency “on various grounds and is good, whether or not 
expressly recognised by foreign countries.” The British version of “definitive occupation 
and control” amounted to the paper administration of the territories, the issue of whaling 
licenses, the work of the Discovery Committee, the occasional exploratory expedition, 
appointment of magistrates as required, and generally the exercise of “sovereign 
functions so far as the material conditions of the territory call for the exercise of these 
functions.” While the vast majority of this British activity was relegated to the continental 
coastline and the adjacent islands, the sector principle extended the title into the vast and 
mostly unknown Antarctic hinterland.110 
 Brian Roberts and the Foreign Office legal advisers stressed that chinks were 
appearing in Britain’s legal arguments. Terminating support of the sector principle 
represented a significant break. The Foreign Office insisted that Roberts clarify that 
“whatever the validity of the sector principle before the war, it has been impaired by the 
development of aviation.”111 The handbook asserted that “the general agreement on 	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which the ‘sector principle’ has hitherto rested…is that only the Power in effective 
occupation of the coast possessed the means of access to, and subsequently control over, 
the hinterland.” The fact that polar sectors claimed “hinterland which may never have 
been occupied, or even visited” weakened the claim, as did “developments in aviation 
[which] have rendered the hinterland accessible without possession of the coastal fringe.” 
The Foreign Office concluded that some territory within the Empire’s Antarctic sectors 
were “not within definitive British sovereignty, but are rather territories to which one of 
His Majesty’s Governments possess an inchoate right based on discovery and/or some 
formal act of annexation which still remains to be followed up.”112  
 The handbook also laid out the opinions of the Foreign Office legal advisers on 
permanent settlement. They noted the recent decisions in the Clipperton Island and 
Eastern Greenland cases where the judges were satisfied with very little in the way of the 
actual exercise of sovereign rights. Yet, these cases had not established a formula for the 
acquisition of absolute title. Given the ambiguity in the law, what truly mattered in 
territorial disputes was which state had a stronger title. If a state claimed a territory, but a 
different country exercised physical authority over it, the claimant state would not win a 
legal dispute merely by showing that it had annexed the area years previous. The legal 
advisers also took note of Huber’s statement that the requirements of territorial 
sovereignty could change and a state could lose its title if it did not adequately address 
these developments. Britain recognized Washington had remained steadfast in its demand 
for occupation and use, and had in fact displayed the ability to fulfill those requirements 
during the USASE. The American occupation, technological developments that made it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 The handbook noted that the formal annexation of territory served an important purpose as a definite 
indication of “an intention of making a claim” and created an inchoate right. While the normal method was 
“to land and hoist a flag…it would be quite wrong to suppose that there is any magic in that particular 
action or that a claim cannot be legally asserted in other ways.” The inchoate rights such acts created could 
last for three to five years in the Antarctic, the length of time required to dispatch another expedition to the 
area. In reality, the Foreign legal advisers were not even sure if inchoate rights had legal validity, though 
some legal scholars had “shown a strong tendency towards crystallizing” it into one. The British admitted 
that inchoate rights blurred the lines between a legal and political right. It was, after all, impolite to jump on 
territory without giving the discover enough time to administer and occupy the region. Territorial Claims in 
the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, pg. 140, 1 May 1945, NAA, A4311, 365/8. 
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easier to inhabit the polar regions, and aviation had all changed the nature of polar 
sovereignty. Britain had to respond.113  
Having fallen behind during wartime, W.E. Beckett judged that “Over the 
unoccupied territory of the dependencies we have only the inchoate title by discovery 
plus paper annexations, for what they are worth, and if Judge Huber is right these may 
not be worth much legally if any other state establishes and maintains a physical 
occupation.”114 Further, he advised that even an occupation of one or two years would not 
be enough to protect a territorial claim in the Antarctic. If efforts were allowed to lapse 
“someone else can nip in when we give up.”115 Summarizing Beckett’s arguments, 
Roberts’ handbook concluded, “In the view of the Foreign Office it is essential to arrange 
for continuous occupation, summer and winter, or, at least, for a continuous service of 
occupying parties every summer.”116 In short, the Foreign Office advised that if Britain 
wanted to preserve its sovereignty in the Antarctic it had to embrace the Hughes 
Doctrine. In the postwar years, it would.  
7.6 The Second World War and Canada’s Arctic 
Sovereignty  
During the Second World War, the real developments in the evolution of polar 
sovereignty and the shaping of the legal space of the polar regions occurred in the 
Antarctic. The Arctic, however, played a far greater role in world affairs. It fact, the war 
brought more interest and people to the Arctic and sub-Arctic than ever before. As 
historian Charles Emmerson has summarized, parts of the region played an important role 
in the areas of supply, logistics and meteorology including: the Arctic convoys on the 
Murmansk Run, the Russian use of the Northern Sea Route, the establishment of Allied 
and German weather stations on Greenland, Jan Mayen and Svalbard to support aerial 
and naval operations, and the supply line between Ladd Field, Alaska and the Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Territorial Claims in the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, pg. 71, 126-141, 1 May 1945, 
NAA, A4311, 365/8. 
114 W.E. Beckett to Sir Donald Somervell, 14 May 1944, NA, CO 78/217/1. 
115 Beckett, September 1944, NA, FO 371/37730. See also Dudeney and Walton, “From Scotia to 
‘Operation Tabarin’,” 355. 
116 Territorial Claims in the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, pg. 136-141, 1 May 1945, 
NAA, A4311, 365/8. 
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Union. The Arctic and sub-Arctic became the scene of high-intensity conflict, including 
fierce fighting in northern Norway, Finland, and on the Aleutian Islands, and much 
smaller operations on Spitsbergen and Greenland.117  
Greenland played an important role in the Allied war effort and the country 
changed dramatically as a result. The fall of Denmark in April 1940 raised complicated 
questions about the island’s sovereignty.118 Ottawa and London considered occupying 
strategic points on the island, like the cryolite mine at Ivgtut, to ensure the enemy did not 
threaten them. Cryolite constituted a key component used in the production of aluminum, 
and the mine provided the only natural source for the Allied war machine. Washington, 
however, strongly objected to any third party occupation of Greenland. To solve the 
dilemma, the Senate discussed purchasing or taking over the island from the Danes. 
Instead, the Danish administration for Greenland signed a bilateral agreement with the 
U.S. in 1941, giving the Americans blanket approval for all defence activities deemed 
necessary. Between 1941 and 1945, the United States established extensive facilities for 
air and sea transportation in Greenland, as well as radio beacons, radio stations, weather 
stations, defences and search-and-rescue stations.119 Upon Germany’s defeat, Denmark 
resumed administration of the island.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Many of the wartime Arctic operations are well documented in the historiography, especially the Arctic 
convoys in support of the Soviet Union, the Japanese raid on Dutch Harbor, Alaska and the subsequent 
Anglo-Canadian campaign to retake Attu and Kiska in the Aluetian Islands in 1943. Less well known are 
the small-scale military operations that took place on Spitsbergen. During Operation Gauntlet in August 
1941, a Canadian led raid destroyed coal mines, supplies and equipment and evacuated 2000 Soviet miners 
on Spitsbergen. Two years later, the German Navy launched its own raid on the community of Barentsburg 
on the island. For information on the Second World War in the Arctic, see Charles Emmerson, The Future 
History of the Arctic (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 106-108; Thor Arlov, A Short History of Svalbard 
(Oslo: Norwegian Polar Institute, 1994), 74-76; Richard Woodman, Arctic Convoys 1941-1945 (London, 
John Murray, 2004); Wilhelm Dege, War north of 80: the last German Arctic weather station of World War 
II (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004); Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in 
Alaska and the Aleutians (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 1995); Galen Roger Perras, Stepping 
Stones to Nowhere, The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867–1945 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2003); and Shelagh Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic 
Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2010);  
118 In occupied Norway, the polar expert Adolf Hoel, who had become a member of Vidkun Quisling’s 
National Socialist Party after the Eastern Greenland case, went with Gustav Smedal to the Administrative 
Council in charge of civil administration. Hoping to reinvigorate Norway’s rights in Eastern Greenland, the 
two men asked for supplies to establish meteorological stations. The stations would “send an important 
political signal; that even in these dark times, Norway meant to uphold its interests in Greenland.” The 
British intercepted several parties of Norwegians trying to establish the stations. Einar-Arne Drivenes and 
Harald Dag Jølle, Into the Ice: The History of Norway and the Polar Regions (Gyldendal Akademisk, 
2006), 307-308. 
119 Grant, Polar Imperative, 247-257. 
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The face of the Canadian North was also marked by a series of defence projects, 
largely initiated by the U.S. In 1938, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King made 
mutual pledges to work together for continental security. Size dictated that the Americans 
would assume primary responsibility for continental defence, and geography tied 
Canada’s security to that of its southern neighbour. With Britain’s survival in doubt, King 
and Roosevelt signed the Ogdensburg agreement in August 1940, establishing a bilateral 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The North, however, remained a distant priority. “On 
the Dominion’s northern territories those two famous servants of the Czar, Generals 
January and February, mount guard for the Canadian people all year round,” historian 
Charles Stacey wrote in his 1940 study of Canadian defence policy. Aircraft, however, 
could make the Arctic and Subarctic regions more strategically significant, he concluded, 
but hardly constituted an immediate, practical threat.120  
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Canadian 
Northwest became an important strategic link to Alaska. The Americans increased the 
size of their garrison in Alaska from 21,500 to 40,424 men to secure their northern 
defence. Worried the enemy could cut off the sea link between Alaska and the lower 
forty-eight states, the U.S. military looked to northern Canada. The Americans assisted in 
the completion of the Northwest Staging Route (NWSR), establishing a string of airfields 
from Edmonton to Alaska.121 In February 1942, against the backdrop of a potential 
Japanese invasion, the Canadian Government allowed the U.S. to construct an overland 
route to Alaska – at American expense with the promise that at wars end the highway 
would become "an integral part of the Canadian highway system.” The United States 
hastily constructed the Alcan (Alaska) highway – a herculean construction feat that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 “We as good neighbors are true friends,” American President Franklin D. Roosevelt assured Canadians 
in 1938. He promised that the United States would “not stand idly by” if any foreign power threatened 
Canadian territory For his part, Mackenzie King declared that Canada also had its obligations as a friendly 
neighbour and would ensure that no enemy forces would ever to pass through the dominion on their way to 
the United States. C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and 
Strategic Conditions, Past and Present (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940), 5. 
121 Even before 1939, Canada had planned to build a string of aerodromes along an air route from 
Edmonton over northwestern Canada and onward to Alaska. The exigencies of war pushed the project 
forward with two main purposes: first, to supply American bases in Alaska, and second to facilitate the 
transfer of Lend-Lease aircraft to the Russians for use on the Eastern Front. Edwin R. Carr, “Great Falls to 
Nome: the Inland Air Route to Alaska, 1940-45” (Ph.D. disseration: University of Minnesota, 1946); 
Kenneth Charles Eyre, “Custos Borealis: The Military in the Canadian North,” (Ph.D. dissertation: King’s 
College, University of London, 1981), 82-95. 
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transformed northeastern British Columbia, the Yukon, and the Mackenzie Valley.122 
Concurrently, the Canol project – a 1000-km pipeline from the oilfield at Norman 
Wells to a refinery at Whitehorse – was built to support the Alcan with transportation 
and storage facilities.123 The wartime influx of nearly 40,000 American military 
personnel (as well as American and Canadian civilians) into the Northwest – three 
times the pre-war population – had tremendous socio-economic, political, and 
environmental implications.124  
Amidst this changing landscape, the Americans developed several ambitious 
projects in the Northeast, including the Crimson Route, an alternate path for ferrying 
planes and material to Britain.125 The plan fit with the development of the massive 
subarctic airbase at Goose Bay, Labrador, started in 1941, and the prospect of Greenland-
Iceland route to Britain that avoided the fog off the Newfoundland coast. The Crimson 
Route involved installations at Churchill, Manitoba; Southampton Island in Hudson Bay; 
Fort Chimo (Kuujjuaq); Frobisher Bay (Iqaluit); Padloping Island, in Davis Strait’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 At the end of 1943, a 2451 km long, permanent, all-weather, surfaced ‘Alaska Highway’ opened for 
military use, with a final pricetag over $150 million. It proved indispensable to transport thirty million tons 
of supplies and equipment to forces stationed in Alaska in 1944 before its military importance lapsed as the 
tide of the war in the Pacific turned. C.P. Stacey deemed the highway insufficient and with little military 
utility (apart from its connection with the air route). C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War 
Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1970), 382-83. Of the many 
books on the Alaska Highway project, the best remain Ken Coates and William R. Morrison, The Alaska 
Highway in WWII: The U.S. Army of Occupation in Canada’s Northwest (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1992); and Ken Coates and William R. Morrison, Working the North: Labor and the 
Northwest Defense Projects 1942-1946 (Anchorage: University of Alaska Press, 1994). See also Gregory 
Johnson, “Strategic Necessity or Military Blunder: Another Look at the Decision to Build the Alaska 
Highway,” in Three Northern Wartime Projects, ed. Bob Hesketh (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar 
Institute and Edmonton and District Historical Society, 1992), 18, 28; and Stanley W. Dziuban, Military 
Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1959), 217-28. 
123 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1972), 349. 
124 For overviews on wartime developments, see Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security?: Government 
Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), and 
Ken Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William Morrison, and Greg Poelzer, Arctic Front: Defending 
Canada in the Far North (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2008). David Judd estimated that between 1941-46, the 
American military population in northern Canada outnumbered Canadian residents three to one. David 
Judd, “Seventy-Five Years of Resource Administration in Northern Canada,” Polar Record 14, 
no. 93 (1969):791-806. 
125 Two renowned Arctic specialists, the geologist William H. Hobbs and aviation expert Bernt Balchen, 
lobbied the State, Navy, and War Departments to expand the North Atlantic air route through the Arctic. 
On their role, see William S. Carlson, Lifelines Through the Arctic (New York: Meredith Press, 1962), 50-
51. 
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Merchants Bay; and other northern sites.126 Generally, the U.S. paid for the construction 
costs of these projects and operated the completed facilities independent from Canadian 
command.127 Before the Americans completed the required infrastructure, however, the 
Allies managed to lease bases in the Azores from Portugal, allowing for a better trans-
Atlantic route that nullified the need for the Crimson Route. 
When American personnel swept into the Canadian North to complete their tasks, 
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King became paranoid that American 
developments, taken in the name of military security, would undermine Canada’s 
sovereignty and control.128 None of these activities occurred on the northern islands of 
the Arctic Archipelago, where Ottawa had the most concern about its territorial title. The 
only defence projects undertaken in the Archipelago involved air facilities at Frobisher 
Bay (Iqaluit), on southern Baffin Island, and Padloping Island. Instead, Ottawa worried 
that the sheer dominance of the U.S. on the ground ultimately undermined Canada’s de 
facto control over its territory,	  which	  King	  worried	  might	  endanger public support for 
these projects as well as for his government.129	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Coates et al, Arctic Front, 61. The Crimson Route included bases at Frobisher Bay, Southampton Island, 
Churchill and The Pas. Although the projects in the Northeast were large, most of the sovereignty concerns 
revolved around the North-western projects. While historians have questioned the utility of the wartime 
projects in the Canadian North, the American chairman of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense stressed 
that they made since in the context of late 1941 and 1942. The projects had “been done by reason of 
military necessity in the light of the situation as it existed some 18 months ago. It was insurance against a 
worsening of the position. If, however, during this period of time the situation had changed so much in our 
favor as to make the measures put in hand on too large of scale, he could only ask what the public opinion 
would have said if, instead of improving the situation had changed against us.” Maurice Pope, Soldiers and 
Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 220. 
127 See Grant, Sovereignty or Security?; Grant, Polar Imperative; Dziuban, Military Relations between 
United States and Canada, 1939-1945, 358; Gordon W. Smith, “Weather Stations in the Canadian North 
and Sovereignty,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 1-63. On the origins of 
Frobisher Bay, see Melanie Gagnon and Iqaluit Elders, Inuit Recollections on the Military Presence in 
Iqaluit (Iqaluit: Nunavut Arctic College, 2002); Robert V. Eno, “Crystal Two: The Origin of Iqaluit,” 
Arctic 56, no. 1 (2003): 63-75; Matthew Farish and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “High modernism in the 
Arctic: Planning Frobisher Bay and Inuvik,” Journal of Historical Geography 35, no.3 (2009): 517-544; 
and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Shackleton, “When the Skies Rained Boxes: The Air Force and the 
Qikiqtani Inuit, 1941-64,” Working Papers on Arctic Security No. 4, Munk-Gordon Arctic Security 
Program and the ArcticNet Emerging Arctic Security Environment Project (Toronto, 2012). 
128 For overviews on wartime developments, see Grant, Sovereignty or Security?; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, 
“Right and Honourable: Mackenzie King, Canadian-American Bilateral Relations, and Canadian 
Sovereignty in the Northwest, 1943-1948,” in Mackenzie King: Citizenship and Community, eds. John 
English, Ken McLaughlin, and Lackenbauer (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002), 151-168; Ken Coates et 
al, Arctic Front; and Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada. 
129 Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable”; and Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy: Canada and the 
United States in the Northwest Passage, (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 5. See also Randall Lesaffer, 
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Historians Kenneth Coates, W.R. Morrison, Shelagh Grant and others130 have 
pointed out the local and national controversies that accompanied these northern projects. 
Between 1941 and 1943, the King government let American military officials in Canada's 
northern expanses operate virtually unchecked. By 1943, the government's “fit of absence 
of mind,” to borrow Canadian official Norman Robertson's apt characterization, was 
matched by Washington's ignorance of what was actually transpiring on the ground.131 
Although Prime Minister King allowed the Americans onto Canadian soil en masse and 
with few constraints on the “army of occupation,”132 he remained suspicious of their 
intentions. As early as March 1942, King told British High Commissioner Malcolm 
MacDonald that the Alaska Highway “was less intended for protection against the 
Japanese than as one of the fingers of the hand which America is placing more or less 
over the whole of the Western hemisphere.”133  
 In 1943, worrisome reports appeared from Malcolm MacDonald, the British High 
Commissioner, and other concerned Canadian officials and journalists who grew alarmed 
at the scale of American activities when they visited the defence projects. King finally 
moved to regain control of events in the Canadian North.134 The government appointed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription,” The 
European Journal of International Law 16, no.1 (2005): 25-58. 
130 See the chapters by Ken Coates, Julie Cruikshank, and Richard Stuart in The Alaska Highway: Papers of 
the 40th Anniversary Symposium, ed. K.S. Coates (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1985); Ken Coates and William 
R. Morrison, The Alaska Highway in World War II: The U.S. Army of Occupation in Canada’s Northwest 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Ken Coates, North to Alaska (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1992); Grant, Sovereignty or Security?. 
131 J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 323. 
132 The Americans also were given the right of extraterritoriality—that is, their military and civilian 
employees in Canada were answerable only to American, not Canadian authorities Eayrs, In Defence of 
Canada Vol. 3, 349.  
133 William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary, microfiche (Toronto: UTP, 1980), 21 March 1942. The editors of 
King’s diary noted that, despite the prime minister’s “close friendship with Roosevelt,” he “was never 
without suspicions of the ultimate designs of the Americans.” J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The 
Mackenzie King Record 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 436. 
134 MacDonald “points out that whilst on paper the position of Canada is fully safeguarded events show that 
there is some cause for alarm.” Dominion’s Office Note, 26 April 1943, NA, DO 35/1645. See also 
Malcolm Macdonald to Clement Attlee, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 7 April 1943, NA, DO 
35/1645; C. Costley-White, Office of the High Commissioner, Ottawa, to G. Boyd-Shannon, Dominions 
Office, 23 August 1943, NA, DO/1646; and Malcolm Macdonald, Note on Developments in North-Western 
Canada, 6 April 1943, NA, DO 35/1645. See also Clyde Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to 
Empire (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 237-239. Historian Elizabeth 
Elliot Meisel has argued that the failure of External Affairs to properly regulate American defence activities 
in Canada during the war stemmed from its small size and its relative inexperience. With a severe shortage 
of personnel, External Affairs had to set feasible priorities – which did not include the Canadian North 
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special commissioner, Brigadier-General W.W. Foster, to oversee the American defence 
projects in the North, began to set parameters on new American proposals, blocked plans 
to build more roads and air-staging routes and secured assurances that the American 
troops would depart from the North after the war. Furthermore, the Canadians made plans 
to buy back from the United States those facilities and installations that were already built 
or in progress in the North.135 The Americans welcomed Foster’s appointment and 
complied with the King Government's wishes regarding post war turn over. 136 Canadian 
sovereignty emerged unscathed, but senior decision-makers in Ottawa had learned 
valuable lessons about the need to monitor and/or participate in Northern development.137 
They would soon apply these lessons to the High Arctic.  
Although the Americans had respected their northern neighbour’s interests – and 
chronic insecurities – many Canadian officials feared that the wartime activities would 
spread to the northern islands of the Archipelago. With his warning to the King 
government, Malcolm MacDonald noted that American military officers openly 
discussed the need to build Arctic infrastructure for “waging war against the Russians in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
early in the war. Neither did the Department plan for the difficult sovereignty issues that arose during the 
war or develop an effective way of dealing with American pushiness. As the war progressed, however, it 
grew in size and sophistication and began to handle complex problems more effectively. Through trial and 
error, Canadian officials learned how to deal with their far more powerful southern neighbour. Elliot-
Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy, 43, 56.  
135 By the end of the Second World War, Canada had spent $76,811,551 to purchase all American bases on 
Canadian soil. Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy, 56; Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable,” 154. 
136 According to the American Army historian, the American officials found Foster agreeable and 
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87; Dziuban, Military Relations, 137-41. For the wartime debate over Canada’s sovereignty-security 
equilibrium, see Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable,” 154. 
137 Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable,”151-68; and Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “Sovereignty and 
Security: The Department of External Affairs, the United States, and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-68,” in In 
the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, 1909-2009, eds. Greg Donaghy and Michael Carroll (Calgary: University of Calgary Press), 101-
120. The obvious exception was the government’s absolute disregard for Aboriginal rights in the North, a 
subject worthy of additional research. See Coates and Morrison, The Alaska Highway in World War II, 
chapter 3. 
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the next world crisis.”138 Canadians started to envision American run airfields, weather 
stations and permanent bases in the High Arctic.  
Regardless of the respect shown during the last two years of the war, an American 
presence in the remote and rarely-visited northern islands concerned Canadian officials. 
During the war, the Canadian government’s presence all but disappeared from most of 
the Arctic Archipelago. In 1940, the government dispatched the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Arctic patrol vessel, the St. Roch, to venture through to Northwest 
Passage to Greenland. A sovereignty demonstration formed part of the justification, but 
the real purpose was to protect the cryolite supply in Greenland.139 At the same time, 
Ottawa closed the RCMP post at Craig Harbour, Ellesmere Island, leaving no 
government presence in the islands north of Parry Channel – the area of the Archipelago 
to which the U.S. had refused to accept Canada’s sovereignty.140 If the Americans wanted 
to establish airfields or weather stations in the High Arctic, would they ask permission? 
What would happen if the wave of American activity discovered new islands in Canada’s 
sector?  
The Canadians understood the Americans’ prioritization of occupancy and use, 
and knew the Foreign Office had also accepted the need for permanent occupation to 
support polar territorial claims. Canadian officials examined Brian Roberts’ handbook on 
Antarctic sovereignty and saw the opinion on archipelagos articulated by the Foreign 
Office in 1942. Examining the legal status of the South Shetlands and South Orkneys, the 
legal advisers explored whether it was possible to establish effective possession over a 
whole group of islands through a party residing on one island. The answer depended “on 
whether the islands are so situated that a party on one island can maintain control over the 
whole group, that is to say a sufficient control in the light and the character and position 
of the islands in question.” In a “closely packed group of islands” sovereignty could be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Malcolm Macdonald, Note on Developments in North-Western Canada, 6 April 1943, NA, DO 35/1645. 
139 The voyage took two years, and by the time the ship arrived the Americans had already secured 
Greenland. The vessel headed back through the Passage in 1944, becoming the first ship to navigate it in a 
single season. Shelagh Grant, “Why the St. Roch? Why the Northwest Passage? New Answers to Old 
Questions,” Arctic 48, no. 1 (1993): 82-87. 
140 Lyle Dick, Muskox Land: Ellesmere Island in the Age of Contact (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 
2002), 291. 
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maintained by the inhabitation of one island. On the other hand, there were groups of 
closely packed islands in which one power did not have total sovereignty. “One of the 
ways in which this can come about,” the legal advisers argued, “is that one Power 
establishes itself in control of one island, does not look after the others, and then another 
Power comes and occupies the others.”141  
Canadian officials understood that to secure their Arctic title they would need to 
increase their permanent physical presence in the High Arctic, especially if the 
Americans tried to enter the region following the war. An External Affairs report relayed 
that while there was no clear definition of what constituted effective administration and 
control in polar territory, Canada was clearly not “extending enough jurisdiction 
throughout lands already discovered to make her claim to these territories 
unquestionable.” The report mused that in the near future this control should be extended 
throughout the Archipelago through a greater state presence, and expanded to encapsulate 
stricter customs laws, air regulations, immigration control, and the enforcement of 
specific Northwest Territories (NWT) Acts, such as rules against the importation of 
intoxicants and game laws.142 Other government departments focused on providing a 
permanent government presence in the regions through weather and scientific stations. 
Senior officials emphasized that any expansion of weather services in the region should 
fall under Canadian control “to avoid any possible future difficulties with the United 
States.”143 In February 1944, J.G. Wright, a member of the Northwest Territories 
Administration, highlighted the far and western islands were administered “mostly in 
theory” and should have weather and scientific stations established to strengthen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 The Legal Division noted that a similar study conducted for the Arctic “might well reveal the need for 
greater effort on the part of Canada to occupy effectively the larger Arctic islands.” Legal Division, 
External Affairs, Reference to Dominions Office Circular Despatch D. No. 158 Covering Copy No. 40 of 
“Territorial Claims in the Antarctic” prepared by the Research Department, Foreign Office, 1 May 1945, 18 
October 1945, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4765, File 50070-40 pt. 1. See also RAJ Phillips to Hume Wrong, United 
States Claims in the Antarctic, 12 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4765, File 50070-40, pt. 1; and Territorial 
Claims in the Antarctic, Research Department, Foreign Office, 1 May 1945, NAA, A4311, 365/8, [British 
Document].  
142 Memorandum to Legal Adviser, 31 May 1944, Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), 
Vol. 11, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1977); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to 
Director, Lands, Parks and Forests Branch, Department of Mines and Resources, 1 June 1944, LAC, RG 25, 
Vol. 3347, File 9061-A-40. 
143 Minutes and Documents of the C.W.C., Doc. No. 704, memo, Heeney to C.W.C., 3 February, 1944; and 
Minutes of meeting of Canadian officials in Ottawa, 26 January 1944, LAC, RG 85, Vol. 823, File 7140. 
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Canada’s claim, much as his colleague T.L. Cory suggested in 1936.144 The following 
January, Wright’s superior, R.A. Gibson, also suggested that Canada establish weather 
stations in the region to resolve the pressing “sovereignty question.”145 The Americans, 
however, started to plan for weather stations before Ottawa had decided on the matter.  
In March 1945, Lt. Colonel Charles Hubbard of the United States Army Air Force 
(USAAF), veteran of the Crimson Route, met with Canadian diplomats Escott Reid and 
Lester Pearson in the Canadian Embassy in Washington to discuss his plans for a system 
of Arctic weather stations.146 Hubbard opened the meeting by stating that Canada and the 
United States lagged behind the Russians in the study of meteorology and of the north 
polar region. It was impossible to forecast more than twenty-four hours in advance 
without an enormous margin of error and Arctic weather stations would remedy the 
problem. Hubbard envisioned ten weather stations spread across the Arctic from Alaska 
to Greenland at 500-mile intervals. The forecasting capability provided by these stations, 
would potentially allow for an improved economy, better civil aviation and aid 
continental defence activities. Hubbard gave an unofficial personal presentation, but 
expected the U.S. government would formally approach Ottawa.147 When Pearson 
pointed out that officials in Ottawa would be hesitant to allow foreign meteorological 
stations in Canada’s Arctic, Hubbard rebutted, “that some doubt still existed as to the 
extent of our sovereignty over some of these Arctic districts north of Canada.”148 
Whether he made his comment in ignorance of the sensitive chord it would strike in the 
Canadians or intended it as a threat, Hubbard erred politically. When Pearson and Reid 
reported on the meeting, they stressed that the stations represented a potential challenge 
to sovereignty.149 The Canadians quickly rejected his proposal.150 Although a private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Wright to Gibson, 9 February 1944, LAC, RG 85, Vol. 823, File 7140. 
145 R.A. Gibson to Dr. John Patterson, 2, January 1945, LAC, RG 85, Vol. 823, File 7140.  
146 Over the last year he had shared his plans for the system with several prominent Canadians in the Arctic 
Institute of North America, but this was his first approach to External Affairs. C. W. Jackson, Acting 
Deputy Minister Mines and Resources, to Deputy Minister of Transport, 13 October 1944, LAC, RG 25, 
Vol. 3347, File 9061-A-40C. 
147 Escott Reid, Meteorological Stations in the North American polar region, 2 March 1945, LAC, RG 85, 
Vol. 823, File 7140. 
148 L.B. Pearson to N.A. Robertson, 6 March 1945, LAC, RG 85, Vol. 823, File 7140.  
149 L.B. Pearson to Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State, 6 March 1945, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3347, 
File 9061-A-40.  
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endeavour, Hubbard’s proposal validated concerns that the Americans would seek to 
establish defence facilities in the Arctic Archipelago after the war.  
 The U.S. had never recognized Canada’s sovereignty over the islands of the 
Archipelago.151 The Canadian claim also failed to meet the high standards of the Hughes 
Doctrine. Still, the State Department had been disinclined to challenge Canada’s title. In 
1925, the Americans failed to protest the Canadian claim during the MacMillan 
expedition, choosing to protect their positive relationship over disputing polar 
sovereignty. In the 1930s, the State Department’s focus turned to the Antarctic, and its 
respect for the Canadian claim grew. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to a member 
of Congress in April 1944 that “all known land areas in the Arctic regions are under the 
ownership and government of Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Denmark, 
Norway and the United States, and so far as the Department is aware there is no current 
dispute as to the sovereignty over these regions.”152 By the end of the war, however, these 
past sentiments remained private; in public the Americans had reserved their rights, 
interests and position in the polar regions by refusing to recognize anyone else’s claims, 
giving Washington complete freedom of action from a legal standpoint. In previous 
decades, the U.S. had little incentive to challenge the Arctic claims of its neighbour and 
ally. As the Arctic’s strategic importance stood poised to rise in the postwar world, the 
question lingered: What would happen if the United States pressed its interests in the 
Canadian Arctic?  
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7.7 The Dawn of a New Age in the Polar Regions 
The Second World War changed the context and opened a new chapter in the 
international politics and law of the polar regions. The Arctic played an important 
strategic role in the broader military conflict, while legal events in the Antarctic 
dramatically changed the nature and requirements of polar sovereignty. The scramble for 
the Antarctic also intensified as an increased number of claimant states (now Norway, 
France, New Zealand, Australia, Britain, Chile and Argentina) sought to bolster their 
claims. The U.S. also strengthened its position throughout the continent while the Soviet 
Union insisted it had rights in the region as well. Meanwhile, the Arctic emerged as a 
critical strategic space, particularly as relations between the Soviet Union and the United 
States deteriorated post-War. Polar projection maps made the United States’ proximity to 
the Soviet Union strikingly obvious. Strategists made nightmarish predictions of hostile 
bombers flooding over the northern approaches to wreak havoc on the continent’s urban, 
industrial heartland, and some planners contemplated ambitious projects to serve the 
broader interests of continental defence.153 American defence interests in the Arctic 
Archipelago would force Canada and the U.S. to confront their differing ideas on 
sovereignty and international law. 
As the polar regions entered a new era, President Roosevelt and the United States 
Antarctic Service Expedition ensured permanent occupation played the central role in 
their legal and political development. Given the ambiguity in the law on territorial 
acquisition, what truly mattered in territorial disputes was which state had a stronger title. 
As legal scholar Steven Ratner has concluded, “in the absence of clear title, to the state 
with the strongest display of governmental authority go the spoils.”154 A permanent 
physical presence always trumped the occasional visit and legislative acts. Furthermore, 
as Foreign Office legal advisers reiterated on several occasions when studying polar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s much publicized idea of the Arctic becoming the world’s ‘new Mediterranean’ 
no longer seemed so far-fetched. Indeed, what seemed prophetic in 1922, now seemed a reality. In 1945 
Stefannsson noted that “If you shoot robot bombs (As heaven preserve us from ever doing) they will cross 
the Arctic on their way from London to Seattle, from Pieping to New York, from San Francisco to Moscow. 
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sovereignty, international law was “not static.” If a state wanted to maintain its 
sovereignty over a territory, it had to fulfill changing requirements. Technological 
developments and the USASE had brought that kind of change to the polar regions, by 
showcasing the possibilities of polar settlement.155 Even as the polar claimant states 
developed new occupation strategies centred on the Hughes Doctrine, the requirements 
remained elusive. How much presence was enough, especially considering another state 
could move in while you were absent? How important was presence for the sake of 
presence? What kind of state powers should the polar occupants be given? Was the true 
importance of occupation in the useful activities undertaken by the resident state 
representatives? Within the context of occupation, what role did contiguity, geographical 
unity and even the sector principle play? In recognition of the postwar power of the U.S. 
and its interests in the polar region, for many states the questions boiled down to one 
consideration: what kind of occupation would win American recognition? 
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Chapter 8 
8 No Room for Dogs in the Manger: Occupancy, Use and 
Recognition, 1946-1955 
On 31 October 1946, Foreign Office legal adviser William Eric Beckett delivered a 
presentation on the necessity of “physical occupation as a means of securing sovereignty 
in the polar regions” to British and Commonwealth officials on the Polar Committee. 
Beckett cited Max Huber’s decision in the Palmas Island case to argue that the 
requirements of polar sovereignty could evolve. To Beckett, a change had been “quite 
perceptible in the last twenty years.” Technological developments, increased international 
competition and, in particular, the legal position of the United States, had made the 
requirements of effective occupation more “onerous.” In Beckett’s eyes, permanent 
human settlement of the Antarctic was a proven possibility, making the continuous 
physical presence of state representatives a necessity. “International law abhors a 
vacuum…it does not permit the dog in the manger,” Beckett explained. “If you do not 
maintain effective control over your territory, someone else may step in and establish 
physical possession.” 
The legal adviser laid out the dynamics and norms that determined the standing of 
claims in the polar regions. If a polar claimant provided only a paper administration and 
visited its claimed territory occasionally, but no other competing claims existed and 
expeditions only ventured into the region with its permission, Beckett explained that the 
“light is “green,” indicating that the state had a strong legal position. If foreign 
expeditions went to the claimant’s territory without permission, however, the “light may 
be amber,” and the state should take action to strengthen its claim. If another state made a 
claim to the area and maintained a physical occupation, however, “then the light is red.” 
For Britain, the light in the Falkland Islands Dependencies had turned red during the 
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war.1 At various points over the last two decades, the lights had flashed amber in the 
polar claims of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
Beckett’s allusion to the “dog in the manger,” referenced an ancient Greek fable 
in which a dog lays in a manger full of grain and prevents other animals from eating it, 
even though he took no action to eat the grain himself.2 To avoid becoming the dog in the 
manger, Beckett suggested that a polar claimant needed to be physically present in its 
territory to effectively control the area. At the same time, states had to show they were 
developing and using their polar territory, which provided visible proof of the exercise of 
sovereignty. In other words, a state should not establish a presence for the sake of 
presence, but presence for a purpose. Within this context, science, surveying and other 
functional tasks reached new levels of importance in the polar regions, particularly in the 
Antarctic. These functional tasks became the grain in the polar manger that every 
claimant state felt it had to eat to secure sovereignty.  
In the immediate postwar years, legal experts and state officials continued to 
visualize the Arctic and Antarctic as the same legal space. In early 1947, Philip Jessup 
noted that, “Any decision in regard to [the Antarctic] would obviously be a powerful 
precedent for the settlement of comparable claims in the Arctic.”3 By this point, however, 
the legal trajectories of the polar regions had started to diverge significantly. This chapter 
explains the complex interplay between legal and political considerations, continental 	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security and America’s Antarctic policy that led to Washington’s recognition of Canada’s 
terrestrial Arctic sovereignty in early 1947. Although the U.S. could have used the 
Hughes Doctrine to challenge Canada’s sovereignty, once again politics constrained 
American legal action. Careful appraisal of the archival record suggests that the United 
States quietly and privately conceded to Canada what it was not prepared to acknowledge 
in international law more generally: a more relaxed interpretation of effective occupation 
and ownership of uninhabited territories in polar regions than the Hughes Doctrine 
allowed. This stance served a broader political ‘good neighbor’ strategy while 
simultaneously defending its legal position.  With American recognition of Canada’s 
sovereignty, the last of the major terrestrial sovereignty disputes was settled in the Arctic. 
With the claims settled, the legal situation in the Arctic finally achieved certainty and 
stability.     
The Antarctic claimants also tried to secure American recognition of their claims 
in the postwar years, without success. The broad strokes of state polar policy in the 
postwar Antarctic, the impact of the Cold War on the region and the origins of the 
Antarctic Treaty have been well covered.4 This chapter sheds new light on this period by 
focusing on how uncertainty about the legal requirements of polar territorial acquisition 
continued to shape state action in the south polar region. Despite a clear focus on physical 
presence and use, a specific formula for polar sovereignty remained elusive. Attempts to 
clarify the rules culminated in 1955, with Britain’s failed attempt to attain a legal 
settlement of its dispute with Argentina and Chile over the FID at the International Court 
of Justice. In the absence of an ICJ judgment on the principles of territorial acquisition in 	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the Antarctic, the region remained an anomalous legal space – a key factor in the creation 
of the Antarctic Treaty. 
8.1 Keeping the Empire’s Antarctic  
As historian David Day has pointed out, after forty years of minimal effort spent on its 
Antarctic possessions, Britain had a choice to make after the Second World War: 
withdraw or defend its territorial claims. By 1945, the Treasury rested on the cusp of 
bankruptcy and Britain entered the “age of austerity.”5 To address this financial crisis, the 
British withdrew from troublesome foreign entanglements such as the Greek Civil War, 
and increasingly depended on American financial and strategic support. London was 
immersed in the long process of dismantling the British Empire, granting independence 
to India and Pakistan in 1947, followed by Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 
1948. Despite reducing some of its overseas commitments, Britain still funded a large air 
force and conscript army in an attempt to remain a global power. Furthermore, its defence 
responsibilities in central Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia remained 
considerable.6 At a time when the British government was making hard decisions about 
where to exert itself and where to retrench, the Antarctic seemed a natural place to 
withdraw from, saving money and resources for more strategically important areas. “That 
might have happened,” Day concludes, “had Britain not established the four bases in the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies, which made it a matter of prestige for the waning empire 
not to concede to any challenges from its territorial rivals.” 7  
Historian John Darwin points out that even as postwar British governments came 
to understand the sharp decline of the nation’s power, they sought to retain as much 
visible authority and stature as possible.8 Political geographer Klaus Dodds has argued 
that the Antarctic became a venue where Britain could still demonstrate its influence over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 On Britain’s age of austerity see, David Kynaston, Austerity Britain (New York: Walker & Company, 
2008). 
6 William Roger Louis, “The Dissolution of the British Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, eds. Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 329-356. 
7 Day, Antarctica: A Biography, 380. 
8 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991), 
18; John Darwin, “Imperial Twilight, or When Did the Empire End,” in Canada and the End of Empire, ed. 
Phillip Buckner (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 15-24. 
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international affairs.9 “Unlike other parts of the empire, the Antarctic offered national 
prestige safe from any interference by an indigenous population,” Dodds explains.10 
Darwin has further argued that London took drastic action to avoid appearing weak, in 
particular refusing to give in to threats or military posturing, especially challenges from 
lesser powers. In the Antarctic, national pride was at stake, and no British government 
wanted to explain why they lost a treasured possession to the Argentineans, Chileans or 
Americans.11 As a result, even as the strategic importance of the region declined in the 
eyes of British officials, arguments about prestige consistently led to government 
investment in the 1940s and 1950s.   
To assist in planning Britain’s strategy in the Antarctic, London reconstituted the 
Polar Committee in the spring of 1945.12 As Dodds has shown, Britain wanted to increase 
its engagement with the old Commonwealth countries on polar issues, an expression of 
the “belief that Britain’s legal position was precarious and thus Commonwealth support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Klaus Dodds, “To Photograph the Antarctic: British Polar Exploration and the Falkland Islands and 
Dependencies Aerial Survey Expedition (FIDASE),” Cultural Geographies 3, no. 1 (1996): 63-89. 
10 Dodds, Pink Ice, xviii. 
11 Darwin, The End of the British Empire, 18. In Britain, the public angrily recalled that Chile and 
Argentina had tried to steal away the FID as the British fought to Hitler’s Germany. In Parliament, the main 
arguments centred on how to counter the South Americans, rather than withdrawal from the Antarctic. As 
one Member of Parliament, a Brigadier Rayner, proclaimed, “Does not the right hon. Gentleman realize 
that these small countries would never, in their wildest dreams, have contemplated facing us in this way in 
the hundred years leading up to July 1945?” House of Commons, Debates 16 June 1948, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 
4765, File 50070-40, pt. 1. See also His Excellency the Governor Broadcasts from Government House on 
“OUR DEPENDENCIES,” 22 February 1948, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4765, File 50070-40, pt. 1.  
12 James Wordie first called for the revival of the committee in November 1943, noting that Operation 
Tabarin should have involved the Dominions to a far greater extent than it did. Wordie insisted that the 
Polar Committee had “served a very useful purpose in associating the Dominions with our polar policy and 
in focusing political issues in the Arctic and Antarctic, which are the concern of several Departments of 
State…it would be a pity to lose any organ which associates the Dominions with our policy at the 
departmental level.” The Committee would better facilitate the sharing of key ideas and perspective and 
allow for joint action. By the spring of 1945, plans to re-start the Polar Committee were in full swing, with 
experts from the Foreign, Dominions and Colonial Offices concluded it would serve as “useful piece of 
inter-Imperial machinery” for discussions between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. 
Notes by G.E. Boyd Shannon, Dominions Office, 3 November 1943 and 17 November 1943, NA, DO 
35/1423; Memo by James Wordie, 14 February 1945, NA, DO 35/1424. Proposed Revival of Polar 
Committee, Note of a Meeting in the Dominions Office, 9 March 1945, NA, FO 371/50431; Dominions 
Office, Draft Note on the Polar Committee, March 1945, NA, FO 371/50431; G.ST.J. Chadwick, Polar 
Committee, 17 April 1945, NA, FO 371/50341; High Commissioner, London to the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, 12 April 1945, LAC, RG 77, Vol. 281, File 25-1-14. 
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was crucial in maintaining the UK’s title to the FID.”13 Much as it had since the 1920s, 
the Dominions Office (renamed Commonwealth Relations in 1947) ensured that any 
discussion of Antarctic actions considered their possible impact on Canada’s position in 
the Arctic.14  
In one of its first moves to assist in the “maintenance and strengthening of 
territorial claims,” the Polar Committee advised that the Discovery Committee continue 
its operation.15 They listened to the arguments of polar explorer and scientist James 
Wordie, who insisted there was still much work to be done in the areas of surveying, 
oceanography, meteorology, the exploration of air routes and radio communication.16 The 
Polar Committee insisted that these state activities would significantly bolster Britain’s 
legal position.  
The British government decided to maintain its permanent physical presence in 
the FID even before the war ended. On 30 May 1945, an interdepartmental meeting 
agreed that Operation Tabarin would be renamed the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
Survey (FIDS) and managed by the Colonial Office.17 As Klaus Dodds has highlighted, 
the FIDS would support the claim, address the problem of intruders, assess economic 
value and evaluate the region’s strategic importance.18 Between twenty and forty men 
mapped and surveyed the FID, while carrying out other scientific research, particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Dodds, Pink Ice, 17. British officials accepted that polar policy was “essentially a matter requiring the 
cooperation of the Dominions and cannot be settled by the U.K. Govt alone.” Dominions Office, 24 
November 1943, NA, DO 35/1423. 
14 R.A. Wiseman, Dominions Office, to J.V. Perowne, Foreign Office, 25 November 1943, NA, DO 
35/1423; and Proposed Revival of Polar Committee, Note of a Meeting in the Dominions Office, 9 March 
1945, NA, FO 371/50431. 
15 Minutes of the Polar Committee Meeting, 16 May 1945, NA, DO 35/1171; Boyd Shannon to Roberts, 7 
July 1945, NA, DO 35/1414 
16 J.M. Wordie, Discovery Committee, to Captain Hayward, Colonial Office, 18 January 1944, NA, DO 
35/1171. See also J.M. Wordie, Chairman, Scientific Sub-Committee, Discovery Committee, J. Middleton, 
S.W. Kemp, N.A. MacKintosh, Memorandum by the Scientific Sub-Committee of the ‘Discovery’ 
Committee on the Future Prospects of the Committee’s Work, NA, DO 35/1171; and Discovery 
Committee: Report of the Sub-committee appointed to the future of the Committee, 21 November 1944, 
NA, DO 35/1171 .  
17 The Colonial Office was adamant that when referring to British attempts at occupation in the FID, 
the word expedition had to be avoided as sounding too temporary. .E.V. Luke, Colonial Office, to Brian 
Roberts, 19 June 1945, NA, DO 35/1414. 
18 Klaus Dodds, “The End of a Polar Empire? The Falkland Islands Dependencies and Commonwealth 
Reactions to British Polar Policy, 1945-61,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24, no. 3 
(1996): 397. 
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meteorology.19 London gave the British surveyors administrative titles, such as 
postmaster, justice of the peace and magistrate with orders to protest the presence of any 
Argentinean and Chilean groups they encountered, and to remove the symbols of 
sovereignty left by “intruders.”20 In the 1945-1946 Antarctic summer, the FIDS opened a 
base close to the Argentinean meteorological station on Laurie Island in the South 
Orkneys and another at Marguerite Bay, at the site of the United States Antarctic Service 
Expedition post abandoned in 1941.  
The dual role assumed by the British surveyors as scientists and government 
representatives reflected British legal thinking on polar sovereignty. The legal advisers of 
the Colonial and Foreign Offices emerged from the war convinced of the need for a 
“policy of continuous occupation” to support state polar claims.21 The exact requirements 
of territorial acquisition remained unclear, however, and William Eric Beckett admitted 
he could give only an “oracular” answer to what the law expected from a state. Of course 
in uninhabited areas, large sections of territory could be controlled from small 
settlements, and if these posts were situated at the access points of a territory, “there is 
probably no need to do much about the interior.22 Still, the legal advisers ruled that to 
protect Britain’s rights the FIDS must extend state jurisdiction to as wide an area as 
possible.23 Brian Roberts, who was central in convincing officials in the Foreign Office 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Between November and February they undertook field work, while between March and October they 
would hunker down and survive. Dodds, “The Great Game in Antarctic,” 55. For activities of the FIDS see 
also Note on the history of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey Committee, Brian Roberts, 1 January 
1962, Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), MS 1308/22/1; ER, Roberts, Brian; Vivian Fuchs, Of Ice and 
Men (Oswestry: Anthony Nelson, 1982); Vivian Fuchs, “Exploration in British Antarctica,” Geographical 
Journal 116 (1951): 399-421; and Dodds, “To Photograph the Antarctic: British Polar Exploration and the 
Falkland Islands and Dependencies Aerial Survey Expedition (FIDASE).” 
20 The political instructions given to the leaders of the FIDS parties that would encounter Americans were 
softer. Involved notes assuming that American marks of sovereignty were not to make a claim. The 
Colonial Office insisted that the leader of the FIDS, Vivian Fuchs, brought his army uniform with him in 
case he ran into intruders and need visible proof of his administrative authority. Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to the Governor, Falkland Islands, Miles Clifford, 20 January 1947, NA, FO 371/61285. 
21 R.H. Allen, Falkland Islands Dependencies, 9 January 1946, NA, DO 35/1171. 
22 Law Officers of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office, Paper B on the Legal Authorities, 12 January 
1947, NA, FO 371/61288. See also Law Officers of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office, Paper A on the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies, January 1947, NA, FO 371/61288; and Statement by Foreign Office Legal 
Adviser on the Necessity of Physical Occupation as a Means of Securing Sovereignty in the Polar Regions, 
Polar Committee Meeting, 31 October 1946, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3347, File 9092-A-40. 
23 Minute Sheet, R. Best, Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, 10 May 1946, NA, FO 371/51821. 
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of the need to invest in the FID,24 suggested in early 1946 that an aerial survey would be 
the best means of expanding British control in the territory. Furthermore, an aerial 
reconnaissance could identify valuable areas where Britain could strengthen its claim.25 
Monetary and resource constraints delayed an aerial survey of the FID until 1955. 
The legal advisers also insisted on the importance of “continuous use.” The 
British considered it insufficient to “just to have small parties living at certain places.”26 
British scientific research had to be strong, so that it “could be used if necessary to 
demonstrate to foreign Government or to a Tribunal that HM Government is taking all 
reasonable steps to develop, and exercise sovereignty over, the area and is not merely 
attempting to prevent foreign encroachments.”27 At this point, no government could show 
they knew more about the region than the British, and London believed that this 
strengthened its legal position.28 Thus, when the FIDS established its base on Laurie 
Island, the Foreign Office stressed that, “With our much more fully equipped 
meteorological station now working at Cape Geddes, the scientific value of the Argentine 
station will be very small.”29 The British reports would be more reliable, making the old 
Argentinean station obsolete and unnecessary. The science carried out by the FIDS 
proved particularly important, given London’s decision not to expel foreign intruders by 
force, which would further destabilize relations with Chile and Argentina and possibly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Klaus Dodds, “The Great Game in Antarctic,” 44. 
25 Brian Roberts, FORD, to G.W. Henlen, 6 May 1946, NA, FO 371/51821; and Minutes of a meeting held 
in Air Ministry on 18 June 1947: Colonial Office Request for an Aerial Survey of Graham Land, NA, FO 
371/61296. See also Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 149. 
26 Minute Sheet, Brian Roberts, Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, 6 May 1946, NA, FO 371/51821. 
In September 1946, Roberts noted that, “There is no doubt that both the Chilean and Argentine 
Governments would like to set up meteorological stations in the Dependencies for political reasons. It is 
essential therefore that while we have to exclude them from doing so we must take every possible step to 
ensure that we do not lay ourselves open to the same charge.” While FIDS was political in origin, “it is 
important to maintain it as far as possible as a normal administrative activity in which motives of research, 
exploration and development predominate.” Meeting between Brian Roberts and Gordin Howkins, head of 
the Falkland Islands Meteorological Service, September 1946, in Adrian Howkins, “Political Meteorology: 
Weather, Climate and the Contest for Antarctic Sovereignty, 1939-1959,” History of Meteorology 4 (2008): 
27- 40. 
27 J.V. Perowne to J. Barton, 1 June 1946, NA, FO 371/51821; J.V. Perowne, Foreign Office, to J. Barton, 
Colonial Office, 6 July 1946, NA, DO 35/1171; and Minute Sheet, R. Best, Falkland Islands Dependencies 
Survey, 10 May 1946, NA, FO 371/51821. 
28 Wrong to Pearson, 7 February 1947, Some Questions and Answers About Antarctica, from the 
Information Office, British Embassy, 5 February 1947, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4765, file 50070-40, pt. 1. 
29 Note, Brian Roberts, 20 February 1946, NA, FO 371/51821. 
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lead to violence.30 Unwilling to carry out one of the most basic functions of a state in the 
FID (keeping out trespassers), scientific research became one of the clearest proofs of the 
exercise of sovereignty.  
In early 1946, Beckett insisted that Britain must act quickly to strengthen its legal 
position because Chile and Argentina showed no signs of giving up their Antarctic 
interests after the war.31 Chilean officials publicly espoused the legal defence that they 
crafted for their country. Government official Antonio Huneeus Gana summarized these 
arguments succinctly, writing that, “Nature, the uti possidetis, polar possessions and 
fisheries exploitation have given it to her. And it is ratified by her own spirit of frank and 
constant full mastership.”32 In 1946, the Argentinean National Antarctic Commission set 
new limits for the Argentine Antarctica between latitude 25° and 74° West, and prepared 
to send an expedition to its sector. Both Argentina and Chile protested when Britain 
issued new postage stamps for the FID in early 1946.33 
In March 1946, the British learned that the Argentineans planned to erect a cross 
and build a chapel at the meteorological station at Laurie Island. A priest would bring the 
cross, which had the fitting inscription, “He shall extend His rule unto the uttermost end 
of the earth.” Foreign Office official J.D. Murray worried that the “Catholic chapel 
[would] constitute a kind of implicit symbol of sovereignty” since it could “only have 
been put there by the Argentines.” Murray admitted “this looks like a rather wily move 
by the Argentines, since we obviously cannot start tearing down crosses and chapels.”34 
The construction of the chapel only highlighted what British officials had already 
grudgingly accepted: Argentina had definitely acquired legal title to Laurie Island. 
Although some officials suggested that London should negotiate with the Argentineans to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 C.A.E. Shuckburgh to Secretary of the Admiralty, 3 November 1947, NA, FO 371/61300. 
31 In early 1946, Beckett predicted that Argentina or Chile would take their Antarctic dispute with Britain to 
the International Court of Justice. W.E. Beckett, 11 July 1946, NA, FO 371/51821. The British got “the 
Law Officers to examine and set out our claims so that we can respond, if necessary, to any challenge 
before the International Court.” M. Butler to Sir Orme Sargent, The Antarctic, 17 January 1947, NA, FO 
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32 From Santiago Chancery, Translations of Extracts from Sr. Antonio Huneeus Gana’s Article on the 
Antarctic, 6,7,8, January 1945, NA, CO/217/5. 
33 Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 107-134. 
34 Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 26 January 1946 and J.D. Murray, Foreign Office, to J. Barton, 22 
March 1946, NA, FO 371/51821. 
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draw a boundary line down the middle of Laurie Island, the Foreign Office realized this 
would be counterproductive to their other interests in the FID. The British certainly 
wanted “to argue that a post on polar and uninhabited territory carried with it something 
very much more than a circumference of 15 miles.”35 London privately conceded that 
Argentina’s meteorological post secured its title over Laurie Island, and in the 1947 
season, the FIDS moved their post from Cape Geddes to Signy Island in the South 
Orkneys.  
Throughout 1946, the British anticipated that Chilean, Argentinean and American 
activity in the Antarctic would increase. While the first two would focus on the FID, the 
latter might venture anywhere in the Antarctic without warning. Caught up in postwar 
reconstruction, New Zealand and Australia had done nothing to strengthen their claims to 
the Ross Dependency and the AAT.36 Brian Roberts argued that the New Zealanders and 
Australians had to be warned that the British no longer considered administration and the 
occasional visit as sufficient, and that permanent occupation, coupled with an active 
programme of research and exploration should be considered the new standard of 
sovereignty in the Antarctic.37 Thus, on 31 October 1946, William Eric Beckett gave his 
talk to the Polar Committee on the necessity of physical occupation and warned that 
Australia and New Zealand were failing to safeguard their territorial claims.38 The 
Dominions Office followed this up with a plea that Canberra and Wellington must “take 
some prompt and active measures of settlement in their own sectors.”39 The Americans 
were coming, the British predicted, and everyone had to be ready. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 J.V. Perowne to H.A. Meyer, Admiralty, Januarty 1947, NA, FO 371/61285. 
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considered the claim to the Ross Dependency. Crown Solictor AE Currie highlighted that the American 
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37 Brian Roberts, Foreign Office, to John Chadwick, Dominions Office, 25 October 1946, NA, DO 35/1171. 
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Figure 8: Map of Graham Land 1945-1946. Law Officers of the Foreign Office and 
Colonial Office, Paper A on the Falkland Islands Dependencies, January 1947, NA, 
FO 371/61288. 
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Figure 9: Map of South Shetland Islands 1946. Law Officers of the Foreign Office 
and Colonial Office, Paper A on the Falkland Islands Dependencies, January 1947, 
NA, FO 371/61288. 
	  
Figure 10: Map of South Orkney Islands 1946. Law Officers of the Foreign Office 
and Colonial Office, Paper A on the Falkland Islands Dependencies, January 1947, 
NA, FO 371/61288. 
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8.2 Defending North America, Defending Canada’s Arctic 
Sovereignty  
In the months following the end of the Second World War, Washington’s focus lingered 
on the Arctic, rather than the Antarctic.40 As relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union deteriorated, North American defense analysts replaced the Mercator 
projections with polar projection maps, which emphasized the United States’ proximity to 
the Soviet Union. American officials looked to the Arctic Archipelago and saw an 
undefended attic. On 5 December 1945, General Henry H. Arnold, the retiring 
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army Air Force declared publicly that the Arctic would 
become the frontline in a potential conflict.41 Accordingly, U.S. defence planners 
contemplated ambitious Arctic projects to serve the broader interests of continental 
security. 
 Samuel Boggs, the resident polar explorer at the State Department, anticipated 
that Ottawa would deny the United States full access to the Arctic Archipelago because 
of sovereignty concerns. This problem could be easily resolved if Washington simply 
acknowledged Canada’s sovereignty “over all of the land which is now known to lie 
north of Canada and west of Greenland.” Boggs concluded that the U.S. could recognize 
Canada’s sovereignty without acknowledging “the sector principle as a principle.”42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Several proposals for Antarctic activity did come to the State Department. Shortly after watching the 
Japanese surrender on board USS Missouri, Richard Byrd wrote out a plan for the U.S. to establish 
permanent bases on the Antarctic continent. He wanted to have the United States Antarctic Service 
reinstated and aircraft carrier based planes to complete a massive survey of the continent. Lisle A. Rose, 
Explorer: The Life of Richard E. Byrd (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 426-428. Lawrence 
Martin, still the chief of the map division at the Library of Congress, crafted a less ambitious plan to set up 
permanent bases on the Antarctic Peninsula and Deception Island using volunteer Alaskan Inupiat for 
colonization. Albert H. Gerberich, OSA, to Bernbaum and Barall, OSA, 10 April 1953, NARA, RG 59, 
CDF 1950-54, Box 3066, File 702.022/3-151. 
41 Referred to in David Beatty, The Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (Ann 
Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1969), 117. This matched a recent assessment made by Prime 
Minister King remarked that “if there is another war, it will come against America by way of Canada from 
Russia.” On 11 September 1945, this became all too apparent to the King government, which desperately 
wanted to avoid involvement in another global crisis. Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy 
in Ottawa, provided evidence of an extensive spy network that reached into the Department of External 
Affairs, the labs of Canada’s atomic program, and the bureaucracies of its senior allies. King, 11 September 
1945. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of 
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42 Boggs argued that recognition of Canada’s sovereignty over the Archipelago had recently heard from 
several of his Canadian friends that Canada’s Department of External Affairs had recognized the 
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Graham Parsons of the British Commonwealth Affairs division at the State Department 
rejected the proposal, stating that he “would not think it necessary to make any 
pronouncement by way of quid pro quo for the concession from Canada of permitting 
Americans to participate in these Arctic exercises…Our joint defence cooperation is now 
so close that we could secure any participation desired by asking for it.”43 Events proved 
he was overly optimistic. 
In the spring of 1946, Washington peppered Ottawa with proposals to improve 
American capabilities in the Arctic, including the establishment of several permanent 
weather stations on uninhabited islands (Melville, Prince Patrick, Axel Heiberg and 
Ellesmere) in the northern part of the Archipelago.44 The United States repeatedly 
assured Canadian officials that the weather stations program would not jeopardize 
Canadian sovereignty, but never offered to recognize Canada’s sector claim or title to the 
islands of the entire Archipelago.45 Canadian politicians and civil servants quietly raised 
concerns about whether Canada had established clear sovereignty over its remotest Arctic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
limitations of the sector principle, and would not commit Canada to the theory.  Samuel Boggs to J.G. 
Parsons, 27 November 1945, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945–49, box 6037, file 842.9243 / 12-745. 
43 J.G. Parsons to Mr. Wailes, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, 7 December 1945, NARA, RG 
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44 The major American focus at this point, rested on the establishment of meteorological stations across the 
North American Arctic. After his dismissal by the Canadians in early 1945, Charles Hubbard had worked 
to gain political support for the construction of weather stations. On 12 February 1946, the House of 
Representatives passed the legislation as Public Law 296, which authorized the weather bureau to construct 
and operate weather stations in cooperation with the meteorological services of other countries. Personnel 
from the U.S. Weather Bureau noted that “given the wartime cooperation in the Canadian North, “we have 
every reason to believe that the Canadians would agree to any reasonable arrangement for us to establish 
and maintain stations at points that would be of benefit to them but which they cannot establish and 
maintain under present circumstances.” Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture, House of 
Representatives, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session on H.R. 4611 (S.765), 22 January 1946, NARA, 
RG XPOLA, Entry 17, Charles Hubbard Papers, Box 1, File Miscellaneous. On these U.S. proposals, see: 
Shelagh Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver: Douglas 
& McIntyre, 2011), 283-300; David Bercuson, “Continental Defense and Arctic Security, 1945-50: Solving 
the Canadian Dilemma,” in The Cold War and Defense, eds. K. Neilson and R.G. Haycock (New York: 
Praeger, 1990), 153-170; and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “Sovereignty and Security: The 
Department of External Affairs, the United States, and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-68,” in In the National 
Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-
2009, eds. Greg Donaghy and Michael Carroll (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), 101-120. 
45 Though usually concerned by U.S. activities, even R.M. Macdonnell noted that “[i]n presenting this 
request, the United States Embassy made it clear that there was no question of interfering in any way with 
Canadian sovereignty. I think that their approach to the problem should reassure your minister if he is 
troubled by any thought of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic being called into question by the United 
States.” R.M. Macdonnell, Associate Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Dr. Charles Camsell, 
11 May 1946, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3347, File 9061-A-40. 
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islands – particularly areas in which the Americans now proposed development projects. 
Officials cautioned that the Americans wanted to establish permanent bases on islands 
that had not been effectively explored, let alone policed.46 Having received the Foreign 
Office arguments about the need for continuous effective possession, Ottawa’s 
bureaucrats realized Canada lacked this level of control in much of the Archipelago.47 
While the government had re-opened the police post at Dundas Harbour, Devon Island in 
1945, re-establishing a permanent presence north of Lancaster Sound, this seemed 
insignificant next to Washington’s plans. Doubts about the strength of Canada’s Arctic 
sovereignty were aptly summed up by Hume Wrong, Under Secretary for External 
Affairs, who concluded that Canada’s title remained “unchallenged, but not 
unchallengeable.”48 Accordingly, Ottawa delayed approving the weather station 
program.49  
A U.S. Air Coordinating Committee report from December 1945 exacerbated 
Canadian worries by recommending American reconnaissance flights look for 
undiscovered Arctic islands in the unexplored area north of Prince Patrick Island and 
west of Grant’s Land (Ellesmere) – areas theoretically within Canada’s sector – which 
the United States could use as platforms for weather stations and polar communications. 
The report indicated that “the U.S. may not have recognized” Canada’s claims to 
everything within its sector and requested more research on the Canadian position.50 
Although the report’s rejection of the sector principle caused alarm in Ottawa, Canada 	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Resources to Louis St. Laurent, 25 May 1946, LAC, RG 25, vol. 3347, file 9061-A-40; and Memorandum 
by the Department of Mines and Resources, 18 May 1946, Documents on Canadian External Relations 
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47 Legal Division, External Affairs, Reference to Dominions Office Circular Despatch D. No. 158 Covering 
Copy No. 40 of “Territorial Claims in the Antarctic” prepared by the Research Department, Foreign Office, 
1 May 1945, 18 October 1945, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4765, File 50070-40 pt. 1 
48 Hume Wrong to A.D.P. Heeney, 24 Jun 1946, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3347, File 9061-A-40, part 1.  
49 Memo for file by R.M. Macdonnell, 28 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3347, File 9061-A-40. At the same 
time, Ottawa granted permission for a aerial reconnaissance of the Arctic, and allowed an American naval 
task force, Operation Nanook, to carry out operations in the waters of Baffin Bay and Lancaster Sound.  
50 For the December 1945 Air Coordinating Committee reports, see: LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3047, PJBD File 
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of the Department of State, War, Navy, Commerce and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 
appointed a Sub-committee on the Arctic. The sub-committee held meetings all summer and fall, and in 
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should have taken comfort in the document’s general tenor. By focusing on potential 
“undiscovered” islands, the report implicitly acknowledged that all discovered islands 
belonged to Canada – a significant outcome for Canadian sovereignty. 
The 1946 Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee’s study on Arctic sovereignty 
issues, largely written by Vice Chief of the General Staff D.C. Spry, highlighted the 
vulnerability of Canada’s sovereignty claims in the “Canadian sector.” Spry defined 
sovereignty as “power, right or authority over a clearly defined and delimited area.” 
Unfortunately, Spry argued that Canada’s claims were largely based on contiguity and 
exploration, with “little support on the grounds of effective occupation, settlement or 
development.” Canada’s claim to sovereignty was “at best somewhat tenuous and weak.” 
While Canada’s claims had gone unchallenged when the Arctic “represented little but 
empty space,” the region’s new strategic importance changed this situation. Spry worried 
that “hitherto unknown islands may be discovered within the Canadian sector by a 
foreign power, and claim laid to them by right of discovery and primary occupation.” 
Even though Spry admitted that the U.S. “tacitly acknowledges Canadian sovereignty 
over…discovered islands,” he warned that Canada had to “carefully safeguard her sover-
eignty in the Arctic at all points and at all times, lest the acceptance of an initial 
infringement of her sovereignty invalidate her entire claim.” 
Despite his warning, Spry also stressed that the Canadian Arctic had an important 
role to play in continental defence, “considered as vital to the United States as a defence 
frontier as to Canada, and its military security requires closely coordinated action.” Spry 
did not advocate closing the Canadian frontier to the Americans, but recommended 
allowing access while balancing the twin imperatives of sovereignty and regional 
security. The “problem is thus seen to devolve into finding a suitable modus operandi,” 
Spry suggested. Canada must find a way of granting essential facilities and rights to the 
U.S. without infringing its sovereignty.51 Historian David Bercuson has concluded, “The 
dilemma then was this: how could Canada help protect the continent against the Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Department of National Defence to Cabinet Defence Committee, “Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic in 
Relation to Joint Defence Undertakings,” [May 1946], and marginalia, D.M. Page, ed., DCER, Vol. 12, 
1946, 1556-1558. Hume Wrong noted that Canada’s claim was stronger than Spry’s memorandum sug-
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Union – a job Ottawa agreed needed doing – while, at the same time, it protected the 
Canadian north against the United States?”52  
In Ottawa, a major debate over how to proceed arose between those who wanted 
to force the United States into a public recognition of Canada’s sovereignty along the 
lines of the sector principle and those who thought more informal guarantees were the 
best option. Lester Pearson, Canadian Ambassador in Washington, argued Ottawa should 
secure “public recognition of our sovereignty of the total area above our northern coasts, 
based on the sector principle.” Pearson had been a supporter of the sector principle since 
he first worked on Canada’s Arctic file in 1929. He thought that the Americans could be 
persuaded that “it would be in their own interest at this time to reinforce our claim to the 
area under the sector principle.” Pearson reasoned that in the past the Americans had 
been reticent to recognize Canada’s sovereignty in case they might occupy the islands at 
some point in the future. If the situation remained “undetermined in international law,” 
however, there was always the chance that some other country, notably Russia, might try 
and establish an occupation over the islands. “An open and formal statement on some 
suitable occasion by the United States that Canada’s sovereignty over this area is 
recognized might remove the possibility of such a contingency; or at least make it more 
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difficult to bring it about,” he concluded. Pearson would trade public recognition of 
Canada’s sovereignty for access to Canada’s Arctic.53  
Although several senior civil servants advocated for Pearson’s approach, Ottawa 
rejected the proposed course.54 Appraisals by Hume Wrong and RAJ Phillips attributed 
the reluctance of the “United States to take any step which would confirm or deny 
Canada’s claims to sovereignty in the Arctic…to the United States interests in the 
Antarctic.” Recognizing Canada’s sector claim would have implied U.S. recognition of 
the sector principle more broadly, thereby strengthening various states’ Antarctic claims. 
As long as the sector principle remained unestablished in international law, the U.S. 
government could contemplate claiming Antarctic territory within other claimant states’ 
sectors and operate freely throughout the southern continent. This freedom also had 
strategic implications, given the U.S. military’s conclusion in the summer of 1946 that 
the Antarctic could serve as a valuable area for polar training and experimentation – far 
away from the Arctic borders of the Soviet Union.55 More significant than validating the 
sector principle, public American recognition of Canada’s claims would have invalidated 
the Hughes Doctrine and broadcast to the world that the United States considered the 
Canadians’ efforts at effective occupation acceptable, setting a precedent for the required 
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level of effective state activity in the polar regions.56 As Phillips concluded: the United 
States “has never officially recognized the basis of Britain’s claims in the Antarctic. It 
might be difficult for the United States not to do so if they recognized Canada’s claims in 
the Arctic.”57 
Most External Affairs officials recommended avoiding a position that could 
trigger an outright rejection by the U.S. of Canada’s application of the sector principle. 
They argued that Canada should continue to assume that sovereignty existed over all land 
in the Canadian sector, while quietly improving its position in the region.58 In the 
meantime, Wrong recommended that Canada wait to see how international law on 
sovereignty in polar regions developed before taking a firm stand.59 Wrong urged 
Canadian officials to cooperate with the Americans, on the basis of practical, mutual 
interest, rather than forcing them into a legal corner. It was politically and legally astute 
to work with the United States and avoid provoking a challenge.60 In the end, Ottawa 
adopted a prudent and cautious strategy that encouraged joint projects where Canada 
retained full title and control over its territory and any permanent facilities, and the 
United States helped to build, equip and operate Arctic stations that served broader North 
American interests.61  
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8.3 An American Challenge or American Recognition?  
Coming to this cooperative conclusion took Ottawa much of the fall and summer of 1946, 
during which time the Americans contemplated applying the strict standards set by the 
Hughes Doctrine to challenge Canada’s sovereignty. The intelligence branch of the 
Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command, asked whether, and on what grounds, the 
United States could, “either by pleading military necessity, or by establishing a legal 
claim to one or more Arctic areas…justify undertaking a program of polar defence 
without the consent of Canada.”62  
Intelligence officer Lt.-Colonel James Brewster pointed out that the Canadian 
Arctic was “little-known, only incompletely explored, and inadequately administered and 
patrolled.” In his view, Canada had done little to actually “settle” the Arctic, and its 
decision to close police posts in remote regions such as Ellesmere Island in the interwar 
years eroded its claim to effective occupation in the northern half of the Archipelago.63  
A second report entitled, “Problems of Canadian-United States Cooperation in the 
Arctic,” from the intelligence branch of the Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command, 
concluded that Canada’s activities in the Arctic Archipelago did not “meet the rigid 
standards which the American Government has steadfastly maintained were a 
prerequisite to the assumption of sovereignty over uninhabited areas.” The report 
described Canadian exploration and state activity as “meager and sporadic.” Most of 
Grant Land, Prince Patrick Island and Banks Island have “remained virtually untouched 
insofar as the establishment of local administrative agencies or the maintenance of a 
regular patrolling system are concerned.” Meanwhile, Washington had “consistently 
maintained that sovereignty cannot be claimed without a degree of effective occupation, 
colonization and use.” As a result, the U.S. could make a strong legal case if it tried to 
unilaterally establish an American presence in Melville Island, Prince Patrick Island, and 
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Grant Land (northern Ellesmere Island).64 In short, the U.S. reports justified a challenge 
to Canada’s claims on the basis of the Hughes Doctrine. 
These criticisms of Canada’s claim fit with concurrent American critiques of 
British efforts in the Antarctic. The State Department viewed the outposts of the FIDS as 
“token settlements” that could not represent “true colonization.” It doubted “whether any 
of these stations could be regarded as fulfilling the conditions of occupation in the 
accepted sense. No occupant plans to spend his life there and no families have been 
established or are likely to be established in the Antarctic.” Appraisals questioned 
whether the operation of such posts gave title to anything more than the limited area 
visited regularly by station personnel.65 The Americans could have applied the same 
criticisms to Canada’s Arctic RCMP post on Devon Island. 
Despite these legal arguments, neither American 1946 report recommended 
challenging Canada’s Arctic claims. First, there was no guarantee that a legal challenge 
would succeed. While Canada’s claims did not meet U.S. standards for effective 
occupation, because of the Eastern Greenland Case outcome (that polar sovereignty did 
not appear to require development or mass settlement comparable to benchmarks for 
occupation in temperate regions), the United States concluded that an international 
judicial body would likely find in Canada’s favor. The State Department reached the 
same conclusion in its July 1946 classified policy statement on the polar regions. 
Although the United States had not “formally recognized Canadian claims within any 
alleged ‘sector’ nor recognized Canadian title to any specific islands,” there was little 
incentive or “inclination to challenge Canadian claims.” By this point, the State 
Department had conceded that state sovereignty in the Arctic was virtually settled. Both 
the Canadians and Russians were “in a position to support their claims to superior title by 	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concrete evidence of acts of possession and control exercised without challenge for a 
considerable period.”66 In the State Department’s opinion, the U.S could claim only 
undiscovered Arctic islands.  
Political considerations also militated against American actions in the Arctic. 
Although the Hughes Doctrine provided legal grounds for the United States to challenge 
Canada’s claims, the repercussions for bilateral relations would be “so severe that the 
violation, except in the case of emergency, would not be worth it.” The breach would 
deal a greater blow to the “American security system than a failure to obtain Arctic 
bases.” Consequently, U.S. experts advocated cooperation and joint defense, 
recommending that the United States make it “unequivocally clear that this country 
entertains no possessive design upon the polar territories to which Canada lays claim.”67 
Although the Americans could not explicitly recognize Canada’s sector, “the dictates of 
political expediency…forbid [U.S.] encroachment” on any territory lying within it.68 The 
United States would respect Canada’s claims – even to new lands discovered in the so-
called Canadian sector – to avoid a pyrrhic victory that might serve short-term defense 
interests and reinforce international legal principles, but would irreparably harm bilateral 
relations. 
Accordingly, during the negotiations between November 1946 and January 1947 
that laid the foundation for Canadian-American defence cooperation in the Arctic, 
American officials avoided discussions of the sector principle, given the incompatibility 
of the two countries’ positions on it.69 The U.S. never offered to publicly recognize 
Canada’s claims, given that this would have required articulating a legal basis for this 
acquiescence. Behind closed doors, however, the U.S. accepted Canadian guidelines for 
defence projects that confirmed Canada’s sovereignty over the High Arctic islands, which 
amounted to American recognition. In practical terms, the U.S. avoided legal 	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confrontation and reinforced the excellent relations it enjoyed with its neighbor and 
closest ally.  
The United States chose a middle road, enhancing its relationship with Canada in 
the Arctic without setting formal precedents that could have undermined the Hughes 
Doctrine and American interests in the polar regions more generally. The early postwar 
negotiations between Canada and the United States reveal a careful dance by both 
countries aimed at avoiding prejudicing their respective international legal positions. The 
Canadian government had adopted a cautious and gradualist strategy, avoiding 
internecine battles with its American allies over controversial legal issues like the sector 
principle. It was an approach that allowed the country to perfect its terrestrial sovereignty 
in the postwar period through U.S. recognition.  At the same time, although the U.S. 
officially adhered to the Hughes Doctrine and avoided an undermining declaratory 
stance, they applied it selectively and in the process began to separate the unified legal 
environment of the polar regions. 
8.4 The End of Canada’s Terrestrial Sovereignty Concerns  
Canadian legal appraisals prepared in the late 1940s, stressed that Canada’s title to the 
Arctic islands had achieved near “universal recognition.” E.R. Hopkins posited that 
Canada could base its claims on the effective occupation and control that it had achieved 
throughout the Archipelago, concluding that Canada could use discovery, geographical 
dependency, contiguity, prescription and the sector principle as backup legal arguments. 
Unlike the legal advisers in the Foreign Office who stressed a permanent physical 
presence on the ground, Hopkins argued that international legal developments made it 
“possible for a state to exercise effective control over a polar territory without 
establishing a local authority within the limits of this territory. Thus, control may be 
exercised, exceptionally, from a point located either in the temperate zone or in another 
polar territory” – exactly what Charles Cheney Hyde argued in 1933. In Hopkins’ view, 
sovereignty meant control, specifically of the means of access into the Archipelago, 
which Canada had exercised since the start of the twentieth century. Vincent MacDonald, 
the dean of the Dalhousie Law School commissioned to study Canada’s sovereignty by 
the government, agreed. He concluded “that Canada has made so many displays of 
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sovereignty, in so many respects, in so many places, for so long a period, and with so 
little challenge, as to establish its title to the whole of the Canadian Arctic region by 
effective occupation in conformity with international law.”70  
 In early 1948, William Eric Beckett explained to Canada’s representative on the 
Polar Committee that “no one would dispute” Canada’s sovereignty. Still, he argued that 
Canada should continue to develop and use the Arctic.71 Ottawa agreed. Through the 
Advisory Committee on Northern Development, officials attempted to control and 
coordinate activities in the Arctic, while improving Canada’s capabilities in the region. 
The ACND promoted the “government policy of Canadianization” designed to keep “the 
Canadian Arctic Canadian.” The policy’s goal was for Canada to develop its own 
capabilities (such as the construction of new icebreakers for service in Arctic waters and 
air transport by RCAF) and end its dependence on the Americans for transportation and 
communications to isolated stations.72  
Despite American recognition, and increased Canadian Arctic capabilities, lack of 
clarity on the rules and requirements of polar territorial acquisition remained a significant 
concern. In 1954, for instance, K.J. Burbridge from External Affairs’ Legal Division 
asserted that that Canadian sovereignty over Arctic areas “remains to be perfected by the 
continuous and actual exercise of state activity in this region. In time, this will be 
sufficient to confer an absolute title in international law.”73 Evidence of the continued 
concern expressed by Canadian officials has led some historians to conclude that Ottawa 	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relocated Inuit from Inukjuak in Northern Quebec to Craig Harbour and Resolute solely 
to provide a permanent human presence and bolster Canada’s title.74  
External Affairs concluded that Canada’s title in the Archipelago still required the 
legal justification that the sector principle provided. The department doubted that the 
theory could “by itself be a sufficient legal root of title,” but noted it offered practical 
value “by affording a convenient geographical area within which our intention to exercise 
sovereignty over territory is evident to all and the actual display of Canadian sovereignty 
increasingly effective.” The sector principle operated “to give Canada the benefit of the 
rule that effective occupation need not be felt in every nook and cranny of the territories 
claimed.”75 Accordingly, Canadian officials viewed the Antarctic as a testing ground for 
the requirements of polar sovereignty, particularly the sector principle.76 Although 
Canada had no claims in the Antarctic, its officials studied the region knowing that the 
resolution of disputes between Britain, Argentina and Chile might produce an 
“authoritative legal opinion” on the validity of sector claims.77  
While Canada’s bureaucrats kept a watchful eye on the southern pole, during the 
1950s, Washington and Ottawa further entrenched their Arctic defense cooperation 
relationship. The U.S. recognized Canada’s sovereignty every time it sought permission 	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for a new defence project in the northern islands and then followed Canadian rules and 
regulations. U.S. legal appraisals continued to reiterate the different approaches that 
Canada and the U.S. took towards polar sovereignty, especially concerning the sector 
principle and the requirements of effective occupation. Some American officials 
continued to question whether Canada had done enough to occupy parts of the 
Archipelago, as indicated in a May 1955 report from the U.S. Embassy in Washington: 
“Canadian claims in the area which have heretofore been weak because the islands are 
almost unoccupied and other countries might have claims on the basis of earlier 
exploration.”78 Nonetheless, American officials accepted that following Ottawa’s 
established parameters for continental defence projects meant the U.S. implicitly 
acknowledged Canada’s sovereignty over all the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.79 
They understood that the bilateral relationship in the Arctic had changed significantly 
since the controversy over the MacMillan expedition in 1925. By the mid-1950s, the U.S. 
sought Canadian “authorization for every move we make on known lands in the northern 
archipelago, and we have long since all but foresworn any rights that might have 
devolved to us by reason of the early explorations.”80 
In 1955, the final agreement between Canada and the U.S. to construct the Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Arctic radar chain that provided advanced warning of a 
transpolar Soviet bomber attack, further showcased American acceptance and recognition 
of Canadian sovereignty that Washington had given since early 1947. The development 
finally alleviated Ottawa’s residual concerns about Canada’s terrestrial sovereignty over 
the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.81 During diplomatic negotiations leading up to the 
DEW Line agreement, the United States again quietly acceded to Canadians demands 
without providing public recognition of the sector principle. The list of conditions in the 	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bilateral treaty “read like a litany of Canadian sovereignty sensitivities and desire for 
control,” historian Alexander Herd notes.82 With the conclusion of the DEW Line 
agreement in 1955, the federal government’s primary de jure sovereignty concerns 
shifted from the mainland and archipelagic islands to the water (ice) between and around 
the islands. 
8.5 The Poles Diverge  
 On 27 December 1946, as Canadian and American diplomats finished the negotiations 
that secured Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, U.S. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
announced that America recognized no claims in the Antarctic, and reserved all rights it 
had acquired in the region. Given that Britain, New Zealand, and Australia claimed three-
quarters of the Antarctic between themselves, the Americans knew the British Empire 
would “bleed over” their actions and worried about the reaction of their closest ally. 
Nevertheless, they decided it was necessary to “disabuse our British friends of any belief 
we consider Antarctica British.”83 For too long the U.S. had played the “ostrich sticking 
its head in the sand” as other states tried to take control of the region.84  
With Operation Highjump, a massive wave of American activity descended upon 
the Antarctic. The operation consisted of twelve naval ships, an aircraft carrier, 4700 men 
and 33 aircraft – by far the largest expedition ever to the region. Although the operation’s 
primary objective was to test personnel and equipment in polar conditions, Washington 
also used the massive venture to bolster’s America’s territorial rights throughout the 
Antarctic. In January 1947, the Americans set up Little America IV at the Bay of Whales, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Alexander W.G. Herd, “As Practicable: Canada-United States Continental Air Defense Cooperation 
1953–1954” (M.A. thesis: Kansas State University, 2005), 86. Canadian strategist R.J. Sutherland 
explained that his country “secured what the United States had up to that time assiduously endeavoured to 
avoid, namely, an explicit recognition of Canadian [terrestrial] claims to the exercise of sovereignty in the 
Far North.” R.J. Sutherland, “The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” in The Arctic Frontier, ed. 
R. St. J Macdonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 271. 
83 Ellis Briggs to Hickerson, 13 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, Box 4073, File 800.014, 
Antarctic/11-1247. 
84 Brief For Use in Conference with State Department Representatives Relative to Ulterior Mission and 
Objectives of Naval Expedition to Antarctica, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 21 
November 1946, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, Box 4073, File 800.014 Antarctic, 11-2246. Frank G. 
Klotz has characterized the U.S. polar policy in the first half of the twentieth century one of “benign 
neglect.” Frank G. Klotz, America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues (Washington: National Defence 
University Press, 1990), 18. 
	  	   428	  
in the Ross Dependency. From an ice strip, large DC-4 transport planes conducted an 
extensive aerial mapping program. Another group sailed along the coast of the AAT and 
Dronning Maud Land, and conducted additional aerial mapping inland. Meanwhile, an 
additional part of the operation sailed in the waters off Marie Byrd Land and Ellsworth 
Land. The Americans took thousands of aerial photographs and periodically dropped 
claims sheets that read, “We have discovered and investigated the following land and 
seas areas…And thereby claim this territory in the name of the United States of 
America.” Inclement weather cut short the Americans’ plan to circle the entire continent; 
in February 1947 the ships headed home.85 
 As Operation Highjump fanned out across the south polar region, a private 
American expedition led by Finn Ronne established a base at the old USASE site in 
Marguerite Bay, next to the FIDS station established the previous year.86 British officials 
took a “dark view” of Ronne, describing him as a “plausible rogue whom they know to 
have deposited claims papers during his previous visits to Antarctica.”87 Tension at the 
shared site grew when Ronne raised the stars and stripes.88 Problems continued when the 
Americans discovered the British still used the American toilet at the old USASE base; 
Jennie Darlington (one of two women on the expedition), noted “arguments over the 
‘facilities’ took time to resolve. Despite having their own hutments the British still 
maintained a territorial toehold on the American-built camp. The Anglo-American toilet 
became a major issue.”89 Foreign Office legal adviser William Eric Beckett urged that the 
British and Americans must get along; the success of Britain’s polar program was 	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“dependent on avoiding serious controversy with the Americans.”90 In the end, the British 
and American teams worked out their toilet disagreement, and worked together on 
geographic and scientific activities as they overwintered at Marguerite Bay.91 
As the British and Americans worked together on the Antarctic Peninsula, Chile 
sent three naval vessels into Antarctic waters, and established a permanent station on 
Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands it called Soberania Base (Sovereignty). Three 
Argentinean naval ships also ventured south and constructed Melchior Base on Gamma 
Island.92 Americans, Chileans, Argentineans and British all overwintered in the FID 
between 1947 and 1948.  
The American recognition of Canada’s sovereignty settled the last potential 
source of a large-scale terrestrial territorial dispute in the Arctic. In sharp contrast, the 
Americans refused to recognize any claims in the Antarctic, and the region devolved into 
what the press labeled a new “polar race” for territory.93 The legal trajectories of the 
Arctic and Antarctic diverged. Although many legal scholars, state officials and members 
of the public continued to argue that two regions suffered from the same legal problem 
and required a bi-polar solution,94 it was becoming apparent that terrestrial claims in the 	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Arctic had been settled, while those in the Antarctic remained completely unsettled.95 In 
late 1947, Samuel Whittemore Boggs, still the leading polar expert in the State 
Department, reflected on how different the legal situations in the Arctic and Antarctic had 
become since the end of the war. With his government’s recognition of Canada’s 
sovereignty over the Archipelago, Boggs concluded, “In the Arctic there is no known 
land over which sovereignty of some nation is not generally recognized.” In the 
Antarctic, however, “vast areas are not even claimed, and none of the claims asserted to 
segments of the continent have been recognized by the United States or by more than two 
or three countries. Conflicting territorial claims are a potential source of difficulty only in 
the Antarctic.”96    
8.6 The Americans and the Antarctic Problem 
Scholars examining America’s postwar Antarctic policy have established that 
Washington viewed the south polar region as an area of marginal strategic significance. 
Initially important as a cold weather training zone, its value decreased as U.S. activities 
in the Canadian Arctic and Greenland intensified.97 The central American objectives in 
the Antarctic quickly became freedom of exploration and science, free access to develop 
resources, and the establishment of an orderly administration for the area.98 Furthermore, 
as historian Jason Kendall Moore has observed, the State Department consistently viewed 
the situation in the Antarctic as an opportunity to enhance “America’s global prestige by 
promoting harmonious settlement of claims.” To accomplish these goals, the U.S. worked 
to manage “the conflicting polar aspirations of its allies while simultaneously attempting 
to prevent encroachment by potential enemies,” particularly the Soviet Union.99  
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 Alongside these important factors, new archival research reveals that uncertainty 
over the requirements of polar sovereignty continued to play a key role in shaping 
postwar U.S. polar policy.100 The State Department lamented the lack of “clear legal 
principles” for the “acquisition of uninhabitable territory.”101 The United States tried to 
ascertain an acceptable pattern or level of state occupation but failed to arrive at a clear 
set of guidelines to evaluate state sovereignty in the south polar region. In the Antarctic 
context, the State Department found it “doubtful whether continued activity on the part of 
individual countries will ever bring the situation to maturity for settlement on clear legal 
principles.”102 The tendency of international lawyers to champion self-interested legal 
interpretations that brought maximum benefit to their own nation only heightened this 
confusion.103  
In the first years after the war, American opinion remained divided about how to 
approach the legal uncertainty surrounding territorial claims in the Antarctic. For many, 
the Hughes Doctrine still held sway. Its supporters argued that the U.S. should continue 
to emphasize settlement and use as requirements for polar sovereignty. This group 
maintained rigorous standards and felt that the “token settlements” set up by the FIDS 
were insufficient.104 Ironically, as the British and other claimants tried to meet the 
requirements of the Hughes Doctrine, other American officials argued that the State 	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Department should resurrect the doctrine of constructive occupation proposed by Hugh 
Cumming in 1938 to claim territory. The department defined the doctrine as “a 
combination of exploration, repeated visits, and maintenance of semi-permanent stations, 
but rejects as inapplicable to polar regions the standard concept of occupation.”105 Legal 
adviser Jack Tate noted that, “It is clear that the requirements of international law have 
not been framed with reference to polar regions, and that, if polar regions are to be 
subject to sovereignty, there must be an evolution of the law in the nature of a relaxation 
of the minimum requirements of effective occupation.” He drew upon the arguments of 
Charles Cheney Hyde to assert that regular aerial surveillance should constitute an 
acceptable form of state occupation in the Antarctic.106 The lawyers from Office of the 
Judge Advocate General of the Navy concurred, urging Washington to justify a large 
scale Antarctic claim on the basis of the doctrine of constructive occupation. They noted, 
regardless of Washington’s policy of non-recognition, that Antarctic claimants would 
continue “building up a valid case for themselves” on the understanding that “the 
international law rule of effective occupation as embodying occupation by habitation is 
untenable for Polar regions and will eventually be relaxed and modified.”107 Even as 
some officials urged Washington to reject the Hughes Doctrine, they stopped short of 
suggesting the U.S. adopt the sector principle in either polar region.108 
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Beyond the Hughes Doctrine and constructive occupation, some State Department 
officials concluded that a legal settlement of the conflicting claims in the Antarctic was 
impossible, suggesting that the Antarctic should be governed under an international 
agreement, preferably through the United Nations.109 This idea was adopted in an in-
depth study of the Antarctic situation completed by the department in September 1947. 
The document cautioned against unnecessary efforts to claim sovereignty, arguing that 
any move by the U.S. to annex territory in the Antarctic would require “aggressive steps 
to strengthen the basis of American claims,” thereby leading to an unwarranted “race for 
the Antarctic.” The resulting instability would “not be in keeping with the American 
tradition of peaceful settlement of disputes.” Settling the claims using traditional 
applications of law would be “a lengthy and contentious process and highly uncertain as 
to outcome.” By establishing the Antarctic as a “common dominion” under the United 
Nations, however, the U.S. could broaden the area of international cooperation and 
strengthen the new organization. Under the administration of the U.N., the scientific 
investigations performed in the Antarctic could benefit “mankind in general.” In this 
scenario, competition would decrease, allowing for cooperation towards common goals in 
the south polar region.110 The suggestion to turn the Antarctic into a U.N. trusteeship is 
reflective of the new and complex postwar approach in the U.S. that, according to 
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historian Mark Mazower, “saw international institutions become a vital instrument for 
Washington in its pursuit of global power.”111 
In late 1947, the State Department suggested the Antarctic U.N. trusteeship to the 
British. In response, Britain highlighted the “Achilles Heel of the whole idea:” the 
Soviets would use the opening provided by the U.N. trusteeship to force their way into 
the Antarctic, based on the “historical right” created by Bellingshausen’s early 
exploratory efforts in the region.112 The Americans returned with the suggestion for an 
eight-power condominium. State Department official G.H. Raynor stressed that a 
condominium “would certainly make it less likely that the problem would become 
international football, and would be more likely to retain authority and control in the 
hands of directly interested states.”113 The seven claimants and the U.S. could pool 
sovereignty, establish a Commission with full legislative and executive authority, which 
would cooperate with the U.N.114 The claimants were allies and Washington anticipated 
that the condominium would function well and not endanger U.S. interests.  
 In the lead up to the anticipated condominium agreement, the State Department 
made concrete plans to announce an American Antarctic claim. Their assertion would 
place the U.S. on equal footing with the other claimant states.115 Ignoring all sector 
claims on the continent, the U.S. formulated a claim to all of the territory explored, 
mapped and temporarily occupied by Americans – essentially justifying the U.S. claim 
with the doctrine of constructive occupation. As a result, the American claim featured 
sections of territory spread across the entire Antarctic. By upsetting the existing sectors 
and creating such a confusing legal situation the Americans could create a scenario where 
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alternative solutions would be welcomed. The State Department predicted that the claim 
would propel the other claimant states towards accepting its condominium proposal. 116  
As the Americans worked out the parameters of their claim, the Foreign Office 
became increasingly enamoured with the condominium proposal. It would give the 
British Commonwealth three votes out of eight, effectively excluded the Soviet Union, 
and could end Britain’s worsening dispute with Chile and Argentina.117 The appeal of the 
condominium grew in the spring of 1948, after Chile, Argentina and the U.S. rejected 
Britain’s proposal for round table talks on the status of the FID.118 The head of the 
Foreign Office’s South American Department, C.A. Evelyn Shuckburgh, recognized that 
Chile and Argentine would keep pressing the FID, and argued that the U.S. had given 
London a welcome way out from the “humiliating position into which we are drifting 
over the Antarctic.” Eventually, Shuckburgh insisted, the British would have to accept an 
international initiative to “get us out of the mess.” Although the Colonial Office called 
the condominium solution a form of “appeasement,” the Foreign Office suggested it was 
the best choice.119 William Eric Beckett agreed that any kind of international settlement 
on the Antarctic was worth almost any sacrifice of individual rights in the area.120 
By October 1948, however, the American condominium proposal had floundered. 
Showcasing the postwar emphasis that Canberra placed on distinctly Australian 
policies,121 the Australians argued that their title to the AAT was clear, “unchallenged” 	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and widely recognized, and stated that they had no interest in the American proposal.122 
New Zealand insisted the Antarctic be fully internationalized under the UN, and also 
rejected the condominium.123 After the negative reaction of its Commonwealth partners, 
the British felt obliged to oppose the plan. France and Norway both explained to 
Washington that they too had no desire to sacrifice their territorial rights, while Chile and 
Argentina dismissed the idea as “unacceptable.” In March 1949, State Department 
officials dropped the condominium idea.124 
Even though the American plan for a condominium failed, 1948 was nonetheless 
“a turning-point in the international politics of the region.” Claimant states became aware 
of the possibility of an American claim and prepared for increased pressure from 
Washington to internationalize the Antarctic.125 Soon Washington decided to support a 
Chilean proposal for a standstill agreement in the south polar region. Julio Escudero 
Guzmán, a member of the Chilean Antarctic Commission who had worked on the legal 
basis of Chile’s claim, suggested that claimant states simply freeze the unresolved issue 
of territorial claims for five years, during which states could embrace scientific 
cooperation under a joint coordinating committee, facilitating the free movement of all 
expeditions and the exchange of information. New bases and expeditions would have no 
bearing on existing or future claims.126 Escudero’s plan was motivated, in part, by self-
interest, because the Chileans realized they could not compete with Argentina or Britain 
in the Antarctic.127  	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In September 1949, the Americans handed the British their new draft plan based 
on the Chilean proposal.128 Shuckburgh was less supportive of the new idea, which he 
thought combined all the dangers of the present status quo with the difficulties of 
internationalization. He maintained that nothing would be gained by a “policy of 
postponement.”129 Still, the British thought the proposal offered a potential way out of the 
ongoing dispute over the FID,130 and the best alternative to the use of force.131 New 
Zealand, however, retained its belief that the UN should be involved in any resolution for 
the Antarctic, and the Australians refused to be lumped into an agreement with other 
claimant states. Canberra told London that, “by associating themselves with Government 
whose claims are in dispute, Australian claims would ultimately be weakened.”132 Lack 
of support for the plan and the outbreak of the Korean War diverted American attention, 
and the initiative lost steam.  
The arrival of the Soviet Union on the Antarctic scene changed the diplomatic 
context significantly. On 9 June 1950, the Soviet government told the U.S. and the 
claimant states that Thaddeus von Bellingshausen had been the first to discover large 
parts of the Antarctic during his 1819-1821 voyage. The Russians held historic rights to 
the region, and argued that they had to be included in discussions about its future.133 The 
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State Department worried that any territorial claim it might make in the Antarctic would 
be met by a Soviet counterclaim.134 Although the State Department toyed with making a 
unilateral claim in 1952, it concluded that the U.S. had little to gain by such a move and 
doubted it could legally support such an annexation.135 As the U.S. stood on the sidelines, 
the department admitted that the other claimant countries were tenaciously “perfecting 
their Antarctic claims, whittling away the potential area claimable by the United 
States.”136  
In 1954, the approach of the International Geophysical Year (1956-1957),137 
promised to bring international scientific activity to the Antarctic on an unprecedented 
scale. It was during this period that the Eisenhower administration determined that the 
U.S. had more to gain from access to the whole continent than from making a territorial 
claim of dubious legal value that would irritate and alienate some of America’s key 
allies.138 Though Washington based this decision primarily on alliance politics, the 
region’s limited strategic value, and a desire to operate freely around the entire Antarctic, 
legal uncertainty about the requirements of polar sovereignty continued to impact 
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American policy-making. In the lead-up to the 1954 decision, the National Security 
Council concluded that, “Delineation of a U.S. claim to full sovereignty, even if we could 
identify our major interests at this time, might prove to be an abortive effort because of 
the lack of internationally agreed rules for acquiring sovereignty in the Antarctic.” 
Additionally, an American annexation would represent “a sharp break with our past 
policy of refusing to recognize claims to sovereignty when not accompanied by 
occupation.”139 Instead, the U.S. would pursue an “orderly progress toward a solution of 
the territorial problem of Antarctica.”140 While there would be setbacks, policy changes, 
and more proposed claims along the way, after 1955 the U.S. moved steadily down the 
path towards the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.   
8.7 The Undecipherable Formula for Polar Sovereignty  
In the midst of the American proposals for trusteeships and condominiums during the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the Antarctic claimant states continued to strengthen their 
territorial claims. Although arguments based on contiguity and the sector principle 
continued, every state tried to create a physical presence, and demonstrate use and 
development within their claims. No state wanted to risk being seen as the dog in the 
manger.  
In January 1950, the French established a permanent research base at Pointe 
Géologie, on a small island off the coast of Adélie Land, primarily to study Emperor 
Penguins. In 1955, the French renamed their territory Terres Australes et Antarctiques 
Français, and placed it under the control of the Colonial Ministry in Paris.141 Operation 
Highjump particularly concerned the Norwegians, who noted that the American flights 
covered extensive parts of Dronning Maud Land. Norway responded with the 
Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition, the first south polar venture involving 	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an international team of scientists. For two seasons the parties carried out air surveys of 
Dronning Maud Land and glaciological, geological and meteorological research. 
Historian Peder Roberts has explained that Britain engaged in an expedition outside the 
FID so that the world would see it as a cooperative Antarctic state, in contrast to their 
escalating dispute with Chile and Argentina. The Norwegians, however, utilized the 
expedition and its work to show their effective exercise of sovereignty over Dronning 
Maud Land.142  
In the postwar years, the Australian government assumed full responsibility for 
Antarctic exploration, researching and financing all activities.143 After Operation 
Highjump, Canberra resurrected its plan from 1939 for a permanent Antarctic base. The 
Australians viewed the AAT as a potential source of valuable minerals, whaling and 
fishing grounds, meteorological information and scientific research, and they wanted to 
secure their sovereignty over the territory.144 Although the Australians established an 
Executive Planning Committee and the Australian National Antarctic Research 
Expedition in May 1947, the absence of a ship capable of establishing and supplying a 
base in the AAT delayed its plans for seven years.145  
The Australians continued to participate in the Polar Committee and received a 
steady stream of British legal appraisals insisting on physical occupancy and use. At one 
meeting in 1947, William Eric Beckett pronounced that the AAT might be regarded “as 
land which has been forfeited because they have not been occupied effectively.”146 
During the long wait for an Australian Antarctic base, some Australian External Affairs 
officials questioned the necessity of a continuous physical presence in the Antarctic. 
Australian legal appraisals stressed how little had been necessary to sustain state title in 	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the Eastern Greenland and Clipperton Island cases, noting that a sustained display of 
official interest had been sufficient. They critiqued the opinions coming out of the 
Foreign Office for “veering towards the views held by the State Department” bemoaning 
that “recent British practice based largely on these opinions has gone even further than 
the effective control posited by [Charles Cheney] Hyde as a condition of the occupation 
of polar areas.”147 In 1947, the Australians asked if state control in the Antarctic could be 
effectively “maintained by means of aerial flights” as Hyde had proposed in his 1933 
article.148 Canberra also placed a great deal of faith in the “lack of opposition by other 
nations” to its claim, which “has generally been accepted as recognition and acceptance” 
of Australia’s sovereignty. Futhermore, this tacit acquiescence from the international 
community was augmented by “express recognition” from Britain, New Zealand, France 
and Norway.149 
Nevertheless, as the Australians engaged in more independent studies of territorial 
claims in the polar regions150 and realized that the “non-British world” did not “accept the 
view that incontestable British title exists” to the AAT,151 they increasingly agreed with 
William Eric Beckett’s call for continuity of effective physical possession.152 Thus, when 
the Australians decided to claim the Heard and Macquarie Islands in the Subantarctic in 
1947-1948 (discovered by Britain in 1833, but used extensively by American sealers and 
whalers),153 they concluded that the islands were open, “to any other country to establish 
a legally valid claim by open, peaceful and continuous occupation.” The leader of the 
expedition to the islands had orders to make formal claims, and “initiate a program of 
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activity that will evidence continuous and effective Australian occupation.”154 Upon 
becoming head of the Antarctic Division at External Affairs in June 1950, Phillip Law 
drew up plans for a permanent station in the AAT, from which to “implement a long term 
scientific programme.”155 In a speech to the Royal Empire Society in June 1949, Law 
announced, “One thing, however, is certain: No nation can hope to rope off a section of 
the earth as its property unless it sustains its claims by actively occupying a portion of 
that area and carrying out useful work there.”156 Australia, Law argued, claimed roughly 
half the continent, and the International Court of Justice would never recognize its claim 
if it failed to occupy and develop the AAT.157  
Even when Canberra accepted Law’s plan for a permanent base, he needed to 
convince many who “thought putting a hut down there with some men was occupation 
and that was all you needed to do for your claims,” of the necessity of an excellent 
scientific program. He referenced the territorial dispute in the FID, noting that Britain’s 
main advantage arose from performing better science.158 Law crafted an extensive 
scientific plan for the personnel of the proposed base, including meteorology, 
cartography, survey, geology and biology, and aerial mapping.159 In November 1953, the 
Executive Planning Committee highlighted that these scientific efforts represented the 
“practical exercise of sovereignty.”160 
As the Australians searched for a suitable ship to assist in the establishment of an 
Antarctic base, they released new editions of their leading Antarctic map to provide 
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evidence of the “strength” of Australia’s claim.161 Minister of External Affairs Richard 
Casey also became the primary proponent of a long-range survey fight to the AAT, as a 
demonstration aimed at “fortifying Australian claims to sovereignty.” Casey felt his 
presence would add even more power and legitimacy to the flight. Speaking to Canada’s 
High Commissioner at a party in Canberra, Australian External Affairs officials relayed 
that they “were horrified at the Minister’s ‘madcap’ scheme and were doing their best to 
throw cold water on it.”162 Given that the flight would have no safety net if anything went 
wrong while over the AAT, Canberrra cancelled the plan.163 
Finally in early 1953, the Australian government secured the Kista Dan, a ship 
capable of supporting the construction and resupply of the proposed Antarctic base.164 
Law chose Horseshoe Bay, Mac. Robertson Land, the scene of much American activity 
during Operation Highjump, as the site for the base. Although visited by Douglas 
Mawson in 1930, Law argued that the American flights had “overrun the Australian 
work, and if Australia’s claim to its Antarctic territory were to stand up, the original 
reconnaissance of Mawson’s...expedition would have to be consolidated.”165 Given that 
the AAT was about to have its first permanent human presence, the Australian 
government decided to create a body of law to govern relations between personnel at the 
base and machinery for the appointment of magistrates, coroners and other government 
representatives. The Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 applied the laws of the 
Australian Capital Territory to the AAT. The act gave the Governor General power to 
make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the region, to control the 
exploitation of mineral resources, and for the preservation of wildlife, as well as 	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authorization to appoint the necessary officials.166 Australian External Affairs suggested 
that “this is the type of immediate exercise of sovereign power which seems to help most 
in confirming title to terra nullius.”167 Canberra hoped that the laws, a permanent base 
and science would cement Australia’s title to the AAT. 
In January 1954 the Kista Dan sailed into Horseshoe Bay and by early February 
Mawson Station had been commissioned. By 1955 the base had nineteen buildings in 
operation, and represented the most elaborate scientific effort in the Antarctic to date. 
Canberra considered the cosmic ray studies program the most impressive – the project’s 
instrumentation included two large meson telescopes encased in concrete piers weighing 
four tons and screened with one ton of lead.168 From the base, the overwintering parties 
spread out along the coast of the AAT and explored inland.169  
Law always envisioned Mawson Station as the first toehold on the continent, from 
which the Australians would expand their occupation and scientific activities into the 
AAT’s still largely unknown interior.170 Many Australian officials, however, continued to 
put their faith in the sector principle and the “view that the power in effective control of 
the coast is to be regarded as controlling the hinterland.”171 Casey explained to his 
Canadian counterpart, Secretary of State Lester Pearson in 1955, that “The Australians 
stood firmly on the Sector Principle which gave them a great slice of this part of the 
world, but, for pretty obvious reasons, they had never been able to persuade the 
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Americans to accept this theory.”172 On several occasions in the 1950s, Canberra tried to 
convince the Americans to recognize the AAT and make a sector claim of their own.173 
Australian External Affairs argued that, “international law is what international 
agreement makes it,” and hoped that a treaty would enshrine the sector principle as the 
foundation of an Antarctic legal regime.174 If the dispute between Britain, Chile and 
Argentina ever went to arbitration or the ICJ, Canberra hoped that the judgment might 
enshrine the sector principle as a legitimate way to partition the Antarctic.175 To the 
Australians, any formula for polar sovereignty had to include the sector principle. 
The Australians were relieved that they had avoided the kind of open territorial 
dispute that Britain faced in the FID. The competition in the region steadily intensified 
after 1947, as all three countries strengthened their legal positions.176 By 1948, the British 
had seven stations and thirty-nine men overwintering in the FID, the Argentineans had 
three bases and twenty-five men, and the Chileans counted two and thirteen men. That 
summer, over a dozen ships from the three states operated in the southern waters. A tri-
partite naval declaration signed between the three countries, which established that no 
warships would be sent south of 60ºS save for “routine movements such as have been 
customary for a number of years,” alleviated some of the tension in the region. Noting the 
important role the naval agreement played in deescalating tensions, the states renewed it 
every year until 1959.177  
The Antarctic dispute was important to both Chile and Argentina, and particularly 
so for the latter’s Perón government, which caste itself as the principled opponent of 	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British imperialism.178 In March 1948, the two South American countries signed a mutual 
agreement pledging to act together to protect and defend their legal rights in the 
Antarctic.179 Even as both states started to actively occupy parts of their Antarctic 
territory, they continued to lean on geological and geographical arguments, the sector 
principle, as well as their historical rights and the doctrine of uti possidetis juris.180 In the 
early postwar years, both countries repeatedly called for a discussion of the Antarctic 
situation at a multilateral conference in either Buenos Aires or Santiago, where they 
could possess a stronger and united voice as they negotiated the political and legal status 
of the Antarctic.181  
In general, however, Argentina’s Antarctic strategy focused on quickly expanding 
the number of bases, overwintering personnel and aircraft operating in its polar territory. 
In the early 1950s, President Perón promised to “saturate” Argentina’s Antarctic claim 
with state activity.182 By 1954, the Argentineans ran eight bases with a winter presence of 
sixty-eight, who utilized mechanized vehicles to extend their presence. That summer, 
they sent seven support ships, six aircraft and three helicopters into their sector. In 
comparison, Britain had six bases, thirty-eight surveyors overwintering, one ship and no 
aircraft whatsoever.183 In 1954-1955, Argentina expanded its footprint using its brand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 234. 
179 Meanwhile, they continued to work towards a mutually acceptable boundary for their polar frontiers. 
Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 161-162. 
180 Juan Bramuglia to R. Leeper, Argentine Claims to the Falklands, 15 February 1947, NA, FO 371/61290; 
Argentina Memorandum Setting Out the Grounds for the Argentine Claims to the Falkland (Malvinas) 
Islands and Antarctic Territories, 21 April 1948, Document AR21041948A, in Bush, Antarctica and 
International Law 2, 665-668; Argentine Note to the United Kingdom Protesting at British Action to 
Remove Argentine Personnel and Buildings from Deception Island, South Shetland Islands, 20 February 
1953, Document AR20021953, Bush, Antarctica and International Law 1, 698-701; Speech Concerning 
the Grounds of Chile’s Claim to Antarctica Delivered to the Senate by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 
January 1947, Document CH210110947 in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 334-367; Speech of 
the Chilean President at the Inauguration of the Bernardo O’Higgins Military Base, 18 February 1948, 
Document CH18021948, in Bush, Antarctica and International Law 2, 379-380; Chilean Note to the 
United Kingdom Rejecting the British Note of Protest at the Establishment of a Chilean Base on Penguin 
Island, Paradise Harbour, 17 May 1951, Document CH17051951, in Bush, Antarctica and International 
Law 2, 388-392. Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, La Antártida Chilena (Santiago: Imprenta universitaria, 1948). 
181 Canadian Ambassador, Argentina, to L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 February 
1948 Re: Special Bulletin No. 1, from the Embassy of Argentina, Ottawa, addressed to Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, “Argentine Sovereignty in the Antarctic.” LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3843, File 9091-40 pt. 1. 
See also Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 233.  
182 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
28 July 1954, NA, CAB 129/70. 
183 Draft Cabinet Paper, July 1954, NA, CO 1024/132. 
	  	   447	  
new icebreaker, General San Martín (built in West Germany),184 to push into the 
Weddell Sea (to the east of the Antarctic Peninsula), where they built Base Belgrano, 
roughly 800 miles from the South Pole.185 The British lamented that the Belgrano Base 
was “beyond our present reach,” and noted that the Argentineans were “well equipped for 
survey and exploration work, and it is clear that they intend increasingly to strike out 
from their bases into the unexplored land mass.”186 In terms of sheer physical presence, 
the Argentineans led the way by the mid-1950s. 
Chile quickly realized that it could not keep pace in the race. As a result, Howkins 
explains, the Chileans “withdrew, to some extent, from direct participation in the struggle 
for scientific supremacy.187 Beyond promoting an international solution through 
Escudero’s standstill proposal, they utilized unique legal argumentation. Chile responded 
to British protests with the statement, “da valor de actos de mera tolerancia” (“has passed 
over in the spirit of tolerance”).  The British embassy in Santiago had no idea what it 
meant. A local lawyer explained that Chileans used the expression when, for instance, a 
person poached on the preserves of another with permission. Through the statement, the 
Chileans called the British intruders, who were simply being tolerated for the time.188 The 
statement was akin to the permissions Britain and the Commonwealth countries had 
historically sent to the U.S. when American expeditions intruded into their polar 
territories. Unable to conduct a great deal of polar science in the early 1950s, the 	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Chileans started to pronounce “discovery and the scientific expeditions carried out in the 
Antarctic do not and cannot constitute any title over this region.” Chile’s geographic 
proximity and geological connection through the Andes represented a far stronger claim 
to title, Santiago argued. Science could never create rights “in a region which forms part 
of the national territory of another State and over which Chile exercises, and has 
exercised, full sovereignty.”189  
New archival research highlights the extent that British strategy was influenced 
by Foreign Office legal appraisals in face of the growing South American challenge. In 
the summer of 1947, as foreign activity in the region started to increase, British Cabinet 
accepted a Foreign Office suggestion that London reach an agreement with Chile and 
Argentina to settle the dispute at the ICJ.190 At this point, the legal advisers believed 
Britain would win the case on its historic record of state activity, and because Chile and 
Argentina had not yet matched British efforts at administration and physical occupation. 
The Foreign Office hoped the ICJ would determine the legal requirements for territorial 
acquisition in the Antarctic more generally, providing the claimant states with a firm 
legal foundation from which to support their claims.191 Some officials worried that an ICJ 
decision might only recognize British sovereignty over the areas actually occupied by its 
FIDS stations and where it had historically posted magistrates (such as Deception Island), 
“leaving open for international scramble hinterland areas.”192 Another contingent thought 
that the ICJ would agree that the purpose of international law was stability, and realize 
that anything other than exclusive British sovereignty to the whole FID sector would add 
fuel to the race for polar territory, fostering instability in the Antarctic.  
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To bring the dispute to the ICJ, however, the British needed the approval of Chile 
and Argentina in a special agreement.193 In December 1947, London sent its proposals for 
adjudication to Santiago and Chile. Hoping to place pressure on Argentina, the British 
note included a statement by the Argentinean delegation to the UN in September 1947, 
which argued that “we must strive for all the States Members of the United Nations to 
give up a little more of their sovereignty by accepting arbitration as a compulsory method 
of settling disputes…We believe that we have preached by example, for this peace-loving 
attitude has always been the policy of Argentina in international affairs.” Nevertheless, 
Argentina and Chile rejected the British plan arguing that they held “irrefutable” titles to 
their Antarctic territories. Neither country would submit their national sovereignty for 
judgment by the ICJ.194 The British repeated their offer to bring the dispute to the ICJ in 
1948, 1951 and 1953, receiving the same negative reply each time.195  
Without a decision by the ICJ, the British found another way to have their judicial 
defence heard by the larger legal community. The Foreign Office legal advisers handed 
Humphrey Waldock, Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford, their 
Antarctic legal assessments in 1947. Beckett defended the decision, noting that because 
the work of the Foreign Office so often fell within the sphere of international law, it had 
an “established tradition” of giving the “principal professors of International Law” 
confidential material so that the British standpoint could “appear in the books.” The 	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Foreign Office had no “objection to the writer, if he thinks fits, adopting purely as his 
own arguments” those made by the legal advisers.196 Using government material, 
Waldock wrote an article on the FID dispute. His conclusions, Beckett noted, were a 
“little more optimistic” than that reached by the Foreign Office. In a published article, 
Beckett explained, an “English Professor will naturally not…in a case of doubt weight 
the scales against his own country.”197  
Waldock’s paper in the British Yearbook on International Law attacked Chilean 
and Argentinean arguments about proximity, stating that, “international law had 
decisively rejected geographical doctrines as distinct legal roots of title.” While Foreign 
Office assessments emphasized the need for a permanent physical occupation of the FID, 
Waldock insisted that polar sovereignty did not require settlement or use. He argued that 
sovereignty stemmed from a state’s peaceful display of its control over an area, which 
only had to be present “as and when occasion demands.”198 Britain had clearly displayed 
this control over Graham Land, South Georgia, the South Shetlands, South Orkneys, and 
South Sandwich Islands since the beginning of the twentieth century through licenses, 
leases, concessions, and the presence of magistrates and customs officers. Waldock 
admitted that the presence of these state representatives had been “seasonal or 
occasional,” but attributed it to seasonal or occasional human activity in the region.199 
Britain had definitively established its sovereignty over these territories by the 1920s, and 
the Chilean and Argentinean activities in them amounted to an illegal attempt to usurp 
this valid title.  
Waldock conceded that Britain had not sufficiently established ownership over 
the largely unknown polar hinterland beyond the Antarctic Peninsula. Previously, the 
sector principle offered the British a tool to justify its claim to this interior land, but, 
unlike some of his peers in the 1930s, Waldock believed that it was “scarcely possible to 	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regard state practice as sufficiently certain and general to establish [the theory] as a new 
rule of international law.”200 Still, like the Australians, he thought that “in the desolate, 
uninhabited areas of the South Pole,” the ICJ might rule that sectors provided a 
“convenient method of defining the extent of the area covered by an effective occupation 
of any part of the coast of the Antarctic mainland.”201  
 Alongside Waldock’s article, British diplomats advanced their country’s legal 
position far more than they had before the war. They consistently criticized Chilean and 
Argentinean arguments about geographic proximity and geological connection.202 Trying 
to win the support of other states, the British likened a claim based on geographic 
proximity to Pakistan annexing the moon because they had the highest mountain in the 
world, or the country with the deepest mines claiming the earth’s core.203 The geological 
connection between South America and the Antarctica was as “absurd” as Spain claiming 
North Africa or Norway claiming Scotland. 204 Britain countered American criticism of 
the minimal British occupation efforts in the FID by arguing that the Gobi Desert, 
Himalayas, and Rocky Mountains were also not “effectively administered unless through 
a few chosen key-points which dominated the whole, for the use and convenience of 
man.”205  
To preserve its position, present its legal case and attack the arguments used by its 
competitors, Britain dispatched a steady stream of protests to Buenos Aires and Santiago. 
These protests increased after the 1953 Minquiers and Ecrehos case206 – a territorial 
dispute between France and Britain over the uninhabited islets and rocks between the 	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British Channel Island of Jersey and the coast of France – emphasized “the importance of 
leaving no act unprotested which can be represented by a competing Power as implying 
sovereignty over a disputed territory.” London became more astute at protesting every 
new base, light beacon and navigation aid established by Chile and Argentina, as well as 
every chart, map, and postage stamp the two states released.207 The Foreign Office even 
considered protesting the annual Christmas card from the Argentinean Hydrographer to 
his British counterpart, which included a map of Argentina with the Antarctic attached. In 
the end, the British ruled it was a personal greeting that did not demand an official 
response.208 
As London filed it protests, internal policy discussions attempted to determine the 
best methods to preserve Britain’s claim to the FID. With a government that rarely 
invested substantial amounts into the annual FIDS budget and refused to expel the 
Argentineans and Chileans through force, the Foreign Office tried to determine the legal 
value of each activity carried out by the FIDS in the Antarctic.209 In short, the Foreign 
Office worked harder than ever to figure out the formula for achieving polar sovereignty. 
To assist in the process, the British collected legal studies from the Commonwealth 
countries and information on the approaches and opinions of the other polar claimant 
states.210  
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In London, legal advisers and Antarctic experts stressed the need for “practical 
use,”211 and discussed the judicial impact of surveys and maps,212 a permanent 
meteorological service,213 expeditions,214 the re-establishment of a whaling station at 
Deception Island, and other commercial activity that would serve to make Britain “not 
appear [the] dog-in-the-manger.”215 London continued to emphasize meteorology as one 
of the most important proofs that it was exercising sovereignty. In support, the British 
installed a weather forecasting service in Port Stanley, Falkland Islands to analyze and 
report on the data coming from the FIDS stations.216 Brian Roberts argued for automatic 
weather stations to bolster this network and provide physical evidence of Britain’s will to 
occupy the territory. 217 By the late 1940s, Roberts believed that the most “genuine 
administrative activities” carried out in the FID were meteorological observations, 
topographical surveying, geological exploration, the investigation of natural resources 
and, last, other forms of scientific research.218 
By 1950, the Foreign and Colonial Offices began to debate the legal value of 
patrolling and surveying away from the FIDS bases. By this point, the Colonial Office 
wanted to make the maximum withdrawal possible consistent with political essentials, 
and reduce its FIDS operation to four “static” bases focused on meteorology. The 
Colonial Office determined sledge journeys had little legal value, and refused to consider 
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the impact that aircraft might have on bolstering a state’s control over a region.219 The 
Foreign Office insisted that seasonal visits by ships or temporary expeditions could never 
replace on the ground occupation.220 A handful of men sitting at the FIDS bases meant 
nothing. Sledging journeys allowed the FIDS to “patrol areas and thus to increase our 
title to them.”221 Beckett strongly supported the need for sledging patrols. He referenced 
the Canadian government, which had “widely spaced” meteorological stations and police 
posts often hundreds of miles apart. Every year the RCMP carried out sledge journeys as 
widely as possible, “ensuring that their administration covers the whole area and not only 
the immediate vicinity of the occupied posts.”222 The Foreign Office believed that a 
minimum of six bases needed to be maintained and advised that new stations be placed 
close to previous activity to build up continuity of possession.223 The bases should also be 
located away from isolated islands and, if not on the mainland, close to it, where the most 
land was accessible for patrolling. Additionally, the sites had to be close to where 
valuable scientific work could be conducted, “since the amount of useful work achieved 
in a territory constitutes a factor in assessing a claim to sovereignty over that territory.”224 
With the Argentineans and Chileans increasing their presence in the Antarctic, British 
Cabinet approved more funding for FIDS in March 1951.225 
The Foreign Office pushed the FIDS to increase their mapping activities to 
provide visible and public proof “that we have not merely sat at our bases recording 	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‘politico-meteorological’ observations.” British maps had to be better than the 
Argentineans and Chileans.226 Roberts advocated for an extensive aerial survey of the 
FIDS. Although Britain could claim more ground patrols than any other country, he 
wondered if arbitration might compare these efforts unfavorably with the aerial flights 
and surveys of the Argentineans.227 The Foreign Office stressed that the Antarctic Place 
Names Committee should insert British names on as many geographical features as 
possible.228 Unfortunately, a lack of funds impaired efforts to turn FIDS surveys into 
accurate maps for public consumption, leading one official to lament, “It is absurd for all 
the cost and trouble to have taken in producing this material without our being able to put 
it in the shop window and demonstrate to other countries in the tangible form of maps, 
how much we have done.”229  
Although in 1946 the Foreign Office advised that British activities should be as 
widespread as possible, by the early 1950s legal adviser Gerald Fitzmaurice believed that 
Britain’s strategy of “keeping up a general claim to the area as a whole…was not and 
probably never could be, sufficient for that purpose in the face of the competing 
claims.”230 Too many officials in the Colonial Office believed that Britain had title to its 
whole sector, “treating it as an indivisible whole and inferring that occupation of a part of 
it is an occupation of the whole as an entity.” The legal advisers considered this opinion a 
“highly dubious claim” that placed too much faith in arguments of contiguity.231 In short, 
Fitzmaurice argued that the belief in a sector claim actually hurt Britain’s position. The 
best strategy, the legal advisers insisted, would concentrate Britain’s limited resources on 
the intense development of valuable points, ensuring sovereignty over limited areas with 
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bases, patrols, mapping and scientific research.232 Most Foreign Office officials started to 
envision Britain’s claim to the FID as pockets of sovereignty, emanating from the FIDS 
bases and extending only to areas actively patrolled, rather than a sector. 
To its great annoyance, as the Foreign Office argued for a concentration of 
activities, the Colonial Office supported the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition, 
“a proposal for the biggest dispersal of British effort over the whole continent ever 
planned.”233 The plan’s supporters hoped the expedition would become the first party to 
complete the overland crossing of the Antarctic. The Colonial and Commonwealth 
Relations Offices presented the venture as a clear sign of Britain’s presence in the 
Antarctic, something “imaginative, adventurous Elizabethan,”234 that would boost British 
“prestige,” and “provide a valuable demonstration of the Commonwealth solidarity in the 
Antarctic.”235 Foreign Office legal advisers believed the idea a legally meaningless 
venture that absorbed precious resources better used to bolster Britain’s position in the 
FID.236 The project enjoyed lukewarm support from Australia and outright rejection by 
Canada,237 but it actually led New Zealand to construct a support base for the expedition 
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in the Ross Dependency (Scott Base, which is still in operation today).238 The expedition 
finished its historic crossing in 1958, travelling 3,473 km.239 
As internal debates within the British government over its Antarctic strategy 
escalated, so to did the tension in the FID. In 1952, the occupants of an Argentinean base 
at Hope Bay fired their weapons over the heads of a British party trying to re-establish 
the FIDS station there.240 In 1953, trouble erupted on Deception Island, where a 
permanent British base had been located since 1943, and an Argentinean base since 1947. 
The Argentineans erected another hut just a few hundred metres from the British and 
Chile also built a new base nearby. Britain, the Colonial Office argued, could not display 
“supine acquiescence in what is, in effect, aggression in Deception Island.”241 After both 
states ignored another British protest and a proposal to take the case to the ICJ, Gerald 
Fitzmaurice explained that Britain could use force, just as if a party of Russians had 
landed on the Scilly Isles, off the coast of Cornwall, England.242 On 15 February, HMS 
Snipe arrived bearing Falkland Islands Governor Colin Campbell, two police officers and 
15 marines. They arrested two Argentineans from the new base, and then dismantled it 
and the unoccupied Chilean hut. Argentineans protested in the streets of Buenos Aires.243 
Most British officials recognized that the show of force accomplished little, save 
for irritating the South Americans and making Britain look like the aggressor. Morgan 
Man, head of the American Department at the Foreign Office reflected that, “We taught 
both Argentina and Chile a lesson in 1953 but the effect only lasted one season and in 	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1954-55 Argentina proceeded to set up a new base” and the Chileans returned to 
Deception Island.244 Force was not the answer. Britain’s Antarctic strategy cost great 
sums of money, caused friction, and created the “possibility of humiliation at the hands of 
two minor Powers in a distant quarter of the globe,” for uncertain sovereignty gains.245 In 
the end, Chile and Argentina’s geographic location ensured a far better position to 
operate in the region than Britain. Their activities would only grow more extensive, as 
evidenced by Argentina’s purchase of its icebreaker in 1954. The Foreign Office decided 
that the best recourse would be to try and force Chile and Argentina to accept a reference 
to the ICJ246 hoping a judicial decision would finally clarify the general requirements of 
polar sovereignty. Furthermore, in turning to the world court, Britain expected to 
countermand the bad publicity that resulted from its use of force in the FID and regain the 
superior moral position. As the British prepared their case and tried to convince Buenos 
Aires and Santiago to go to the ICJ, they expanded ground survey operations and finally 
began an aerial mapping program to determine the exact areas that Britain should demand 
if the court recommended that the three states divide the FID.  
Scholars have discussed Britain’s 1955 offer to take the FID dispute to the ICJ, 
but have not emphasized the great importance that the Foreign Office legal advisers 
attached to the action.247 Even if Argentina and Chile again rejected Britain’s proposal, 
Fitzmaurice – the strongest proponent of the action – convinced the government to make 
a unilateral application to the world court. He believed that this application represented 
“short of the drastic use of force, the only effective thing we can do now to stop the 
gradual whittling away of our position in the Antarctic.”248 In a unilateral application, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Note, Morgan Man, 30 September 1955, NA, FO 371/113976. 
245 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 4 July 1953, NA, CAB 129/61; and Note, T.W. Garvey, 24 January 1953, NA, FO 371/103163. 
246 R.E. Barclay to Sir John Martin, Colonial Office, 6 March 1953, NA, FO 371/103163. 
247 For a detailed summary of the actual case the British submitted, along with Chilean and Argentinean 
reactions, see Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 229-240. 
248 Gerald Fitzmaurice, 6 April 1955, NA, FO 371/113972; Secretary of State, Antarctica, 13 April 1955, 
NA, FO 371/113972. Fitzmaurice suggested that Britain could take the dispute to the UN Security Council. 
The Security Council would likely rule that the dispute called for a legal settlement, and instruct the parties 
to take the matter to the ICJ, which the all sides involved would be hard-pressed to ignore. In the end, the 
option was considered too dangerous, for Britain would “find that many of the members of the Council 
were basically out of sympathy with us.” G.G. Fitzmaurice, 17 February 1953, NA, FO 371/103163; and 
United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York to Anthony Eden, 7 April 1953, NA, FO 
371/103163. 
	  	   459	  
Britain could place a statement of their legal position on record. Furthermore, 
Fitzmaurice thought Britain might force the Chileans and Argentineans to issue 
corresponding statements presenting their legal cases. If worded incorrectly or carelessly, 
the ICJ judges might argue that these submissions represented voluntarily acceptance of 
the court’s jurisdiction.249 With a little luck, Britain might still get its day in court, where 
Fitzmaurice firmly believed it had a chance to win much of the territory it wanted.  
Even if the application never led to a court hearing, Fitzmaurice thought it would 
set the critical date for the dispute, which he believed was of the utmost importance. An 
expert on the theory of the critical date, Fitzmaurice had argued, during the Minquiers 
and Ecrehos case, “whatever was the position at the date determined to be the critical 
date, such is still the position now. Whatever were the rights of the Parties then, those are 
still the rights of the Parties now. If one of them then had sovereignty, it has it now…If 
neither had it, then neither has it now.” Time stopped with the date, and “nothing that 
happens afterwards can operate to change the situation as it then existed.”250 In territorial 
disputes, the whole case could turn on the establishment of the critical date, and it 
represented one of the most important decisions made by a tribunal. Although the date 
was usually accepted as the point when both sides actually submitted the case to 
adjudication, it could also be when the challenging country first made its claim, when the 
dispute clearly crystallized, or when one party first proposed a settlement through 
negotiations, mediation or judicial means.251 A critical date could protect states from 
other governments that refused offers to adjudicate a dispute, only to improve their 
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position until they could win a legal decision – which is what Fitzmaurice accused 
Argentina and Chile of doing.252 
In Fitzmaurice’s eyes, Britain could either dramatically increase its level of 
activity in the FID, in a competition with the Argentineans he did not think his country 
could win, or it could try to establish the dispute’s critical date. The critical date had the 
power to freeze the dispute in time or, preferably, turn the clock back to an earlier 
moment when the British were clearly in the lead. From the time Britain submitted its 
application in March 1955, Fitzmaurice felt certain that if the dispute ever actually went 
before arbitration or the ICJ in the future, the latest the critical date would be set was 
1955. He believed a court or judge would likely set the date at 1947, when London first 
proposed a judicial settlement. If set before the Second World War, however, Fitzmaurice 
suggested that the British could avoid the more onerous additional requirements that the 
legal advisers insisted had been brought on by time, competition and the impact of 
Huber’s theory of intertemporal law. Thus, in the application, crafted with the assistance 
of Humphrey Waldock, Fitzmaurice aimed for earlier critical dates. For the British-
Chilean dispute he argued for 1940, when Santiago first officially asserted it rights to a 
polar sector. He believed 1925 constituted the critical date for the British-Argentine 
dispute over the South Orkneys, when Buenos Aires first told London it considered the 
archipelago national territory. Finally, Fitzmaurice set the critical date for the broader 
dispute over the FID at 1937, when Argentina informed the Foreign Office that it had 
rights in the area.253 If Britain could set these as the critical dates, nothing any of the 
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states did afterwards would matter, and the frantic postwar efforts at physical occupation 
would be rendered meaningless. 
The British application to the ICJ copied Waldock’s earlier argument that Britain 
had enjoyed the “long-standing and peaceful exercise of sovereignty over the territories 
concerned” well before the critical date of the first dispute in 1925. As such, it focused 
extensively on the early period of Britain’s activity in the FID. In addition, the British 
highlighted their efforts in specific locations, such as Deception Island and Signy Island, 
rather than trying to defend the sector claim as a whole (they basically ignored the polar 
hinterland beyond Graham Land). The application argued that the first discoveries of 
South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands and 
Graham Land had all been by British nationals. When whaling increased at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the “renewed activity called for a corresponding exercise of State 
authority,” which Britain had provided through licenses, and the presence of magistrates 
and customs officers as and when required. In 1925, the Discovery Committee began 
operations in the FID, adding its surveys and scientific research to Britain’s state activity 
in the region. In the meantime, neither Buenos Aires nor Santiago had protested Britain’s 
Letters Patent. While Britain had responded to increased activity in the sector by 
providing an appropriate level of control, Chile and Argentina had done nothing. The 
subsequent actions of both states reflected governments “seeking gradually to manoeuvre 
another State out of its possession and rights,” which represented an illegal “policy of 
usurpation.”254 The application laid out the postwar activities of the FIDS as well, but its 
focus was clearly on establishing that Britain had created a definitive title in the first 
decades of the century.  
Fitzmaurice and Waldock had crafted a detailed case, but would never get the 
chance to argue it in court. In January 1955, Argentina and Chile rejected Britain’s 
overtures to take the dispute to the ICJ. Britain proceeded to file its unilateral application 
in May. Fitzmaurice’s hopes that the Chileans and Argentineans might mistakenly submit 
to the authority of the ICJ were dashed when both states issued detailed statements on 	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why they refused to accept the court’s jurisdiction. They repeated their arguments that the 
Antarctic constituted an “integral part” of their national territories, which could not be 
subjected to adjudication.255 In the spring of 1956, the ICJ removed the unilateral 
application from its list. There would be no legal settlement of the FID dispute, and no 
judicial ruling on the requirements of territorial acquisition in the Antarctic. The ICJ 
would not help decipher the formula for polar sovereignty. Although disappointed, 
Fitzmaurice remained convinced that the application had set the critical date for the FID 
dispute at May 1955 or earlier. 
8.8 Towards the Antarctic Treaty 
Britain’s failed unilateral application to the ICJ represents a pivotal moment in the 
political and legal development of the Antarctic. Without a definitive judgment on the 
validity of the sector principle, the doctrine of contiguity, or the standards of effective 
occupation in polar territory, states could continue interpreting and using these concepts 
as they saw fit. No clear formula for polar sovereignty materialized and the Antarctic 
remained an anomalous legal space crowded with different principles and opposing 
justifications. The legal and territorial status of the Antarctic remained even more 
uncertain than it had been at the beginning of the century. The path from 1955 to the 
Antarctic Treaty was not a straight one, and many other factors played a significant role 
in bringing states to the negotiating table in 1959. Nevertheless, the agreement never 
would have happened if the ICJ established a clearer formula for polar sovereignty, 
providing states with a stronger and more certain legal foundation from which to defend 
their claims. In the end, the legal uncertainty of the Antarctic became the cornerstone of 
the Antarctic Treaty. 
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After the the failure of Britain’s ICJ strategy, a feeling grew amongst officials in 
London that a key turning point had been reached in the Antarctic.256 Most officials 
recognized that the application to the ICJ had represented Britain’s best chance to secure 
its sovereignty in the Antarctic. With that hope now gone, most agreed with Brian 
Roberts’ succinct assessment that, “Since we cannot secure a legal settlement and we are 
not prepared to use force, we should now plan for a political settlement.”257 Meanwhile, 
in Washington, the Eisenhower administration continued to emphasize the benefits that 
the U.S. would enjoy by free access to the entire Antarctic, rather than a territorial claim, 
and renewed its efforts to bring a political settlement to the territorial problems in the 
south polar region.  
Since 1924, the U.S. and Britain had embraced polar opposite polar policies, 
viewing the legal and territorial status of the Antarctic from fundamentally different 
perspectives. By 1955, however, the two states had arrived at the same conclusion and 
increasingly worked together to bring a political solution to the territorial problems in the 
Antarctic. Together, Britain and the U.S. – the past and present architects of the polar 
legal landscape – would guide the region towards the Antarctic Treaty.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
I think that we must, at all costs, adhere rigidly to the view that there is no 
analogy whatever between the Arctic and the Antarctic...Apart from the 
geographical difference there is a very important legal difference. There are no 
international disputes whatever as to sovereignty over the land areas in the north. 
So far as one can see there is no probability that there will be any conflicting 
claims. In this situation any thought of applying an international regime of any 
sort, or even if discussing the situation, would only create uncertainty where no 
uncertainty now exists. 
 
Robert Gordon Robertson, Canadian Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs 
and National Resources, 5 October 1955.1 
 
 
 
 The International Geophysical Year ran for 18 months between July 1957 and 
December 1958 and saw twelve states – Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Chile, 
France, Japan, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States – establish 
over fifty research stations throughout the Antarctic.2 Each of the claimant countries 
constructed new bases within their territorial claims and invested considerable resources 
in scientific research and construction projects. The centerpieces of the Soviet effort, 
Mirny Station on the Eastern Antarctic coast and Vostok Station at the Pole of 
Inaccessibility, were both located in the Australian Antarctic Territory – to the great 
annoyance of Canberra, which feared the bases might be used for hostile purposes after 
the IGY.3 For their part, the Americans established stations across various territorial 
claims on the continent. The quintessential physical manifestation of this strategy was the 
American Amundsen-Scott South Pole Base, which by virtue of its polar location gave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 R.G. Robertson, Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources to Jules Leger, 5 October 
1955, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6510, file 9057-40 pt. 6.1. 
2 See Roger D. Launius, James Rodger Fleming and David DeVorkin, eds., Globalizing Polar Science: 
Reconsidering the International Polar and Geophysical Years (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); 
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the U.S. a permanent foothold in each of the Antarctic sectors.4 
“Although it is somewhat naive to interpret the IGY and the Antarctic Treaty as 
cause and effect – the treaty’s origins prove rather more complex and wide-ranging – the 
two events were inter-connected,” historian Peter Beck aptly concludes.5 The research 
bases and the scientific research that they facilitated ushered the Antarctic into its new 
role as a global laboratory. The international goodwill and cooperation that stemmed 
from IGY’s scientific activities fostered the negotiations that culminated in the creation 
of a continent dedicated to peace and science. As Adrian Howkins has successfully 
argued, however, the results of the scientific research mattered almost as much as the 
scientific cooperation, for they offered concrete proof to state officials that (at least for 
the time being) the Antarctic was not a polar El Dorado ready for exploitation.6 Finally, 
as this dissertation has demonstrated, the Antarctic’s continued status as an anomalous 
legal space in which the formula for polar sovereignty remained undecipherable also 
brought states to the negotiating table.  
Beginning in August 1957, officials from the U.S., Australia, Britain and New 
Zealand met periodically to discuss the political future of the south polar region.7 Initial 
discussions resurrected proposals for a condominium and a United Nations trusteeship, 
but in February 1958 Washington began to promote a multilateral treaty involving the 
countries with special interests in the region, including the Soviet Union. While Britain 
and New Zealand supported the proposal, Australia bitterly opposed any solution that 
denigrated its territorial sovereignty and involved the Soviets, who had established a 
strong presence in the AAT. Nevertheless, Canberra bowed to pressure from Washington 
and London and supported the State Department’s April 1958 invitation to the eleven 
other IGY countries to discuss their views on scientific cooperation, demilitarization, and 
the freezing of claims. After fourteen months of preliminary negotiations that often 
became mired in disagreements over how to deal with sovereignty and territorial claims, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Frank G. Klotz, America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues (Washington: National Defence University 
Press, 1990), 29. 
5 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 53. 
6 Adrian John Howkins, “Frozen Empires: A History of the Antarctic Sovereignty Dispute Between Britain, 
Argentina, and Chile, 1939-1959” (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Texas at Austin, 2008), 302. 
7 Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 309. 
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the twelve states finally convened an official conference in Washington in October 1959. 
On 1 December, the seven claimant states and five non-claimants signed the Antarctic 
Treaty.8 
The Antarctic Treaty continued the freedom of scientific cooperation and 
investigation that characterized the IGY. It also demilitarized the region and imposed a 
ban on nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste. Article IV, which 
effectively froze all territorial rights and claims in the Antarctic, lies at the heart of the 
agreement. Nothing in the treaty can be interpreted as a renunciation of asserted rights or 
claims, or as a recognition or non-recognition of these rights or claims. Furthermore, no 
activities conducted while the treaty is in force can serve as the basis for asserting, 
supporting or rejecting a claim, or create any new territorial rights. Finally, no new 
claims or extensions of existing ones are permitted while the treaty is in force.9 As a 
result, Marie Byrd Land – along with the Bir Tawil Triangle between Egypt and the 
Sudan – constitutes the last unclaimed land on earth. 
As the Antarctic Treaty negotiations unfolded throughout 1958 and 1959, 
Canadian officials paid close attention, worried that one of the participating states would 
try to generalize that all uninhabited “polar areas are properly international areas over 
which no one country or group of countries should expect to maintain effective legal 
sovereignty, or that polar areas, because of their frigid characteristics, cannot be 
considered as coming within accepted concepts of sovereignty.”10 Ottawa insisted that 
there were no analogies to be drawn between the legal situations in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. Terrestrial territorial claims were settled in the North and unsettled in the 
South. Although the publicity surrounding the Antarctic Treaty inspired the press to 
suggest a similar Arctic agreement, no serious proposals ever developed, and Canada’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For the purposes of the treaty, the Antarctic is defined as all the land and ice shelves south of 60ºS latitude.  
Paul Arthur Berkman, “President Eisenhower, the Antarctic Treaty and the Origin of International Spaces,” 
in Science Diplomacy: Antarctic, Science, and the Governance of International Spaces, eds. Paul Arthur 
Berman, Michael Land, David Walton and Oran Young (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly 
Press, 2011), 17-27. For more on the origins and development of the Antarctic Treaty, see part one of this 
collection, Science as a Tool of Diplomacy. 
9 On the Antarctic Treaty, see, for example, Gillian Triggs, ed., The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, 
Environment and Resources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
10 Mr. Cleveland to G.E. Hardy, Antarctica, 11 June 1959, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4766, File 50070-40 pt. 7 
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fears went unrealized.11  
The creation of the Antarctic Treaty highlighted how fundamentally the legal and 
political paths of the two polar regions had diverged since 1947. Regardless of these 
different routes, both regions arrived at the same destination in 1959: legal stability. 
While the terrestrial claims had been fixed in the Arctic and frozen in the Antarctic, both 
scenarios brought significant clarity and consistency to regions that had been beset in 
legal uncertainty since the beginning of the twentieth century.  
This dissertation has shown that sustained legal uncertainty represents the most 
important and prevalent force shaping the international legal history of the polar regions. 
When states began to seriously consider acquiring polar land at the turn of the century, 
the territorial and legal status of both the Arctic and Antarctic remained unknown. State 
officials and international lawyers struggled to determine who owned what territory, and 
how to apply international law to the unique and harsh polar environment. The body of 
rules and practices on territorial acquisition were murky, vague and open to 
interpretation, hampering lawyer’s efforts to determine the requirements of polar 
sovereignty. Even after international legal decisions in important cases such as Palmas 
Island, Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland clarified the requirements of territorial 
acquisition in the 1920s and 1930s, practitioners at the time believed the judicial nature 
of polar sovereignty remained ambiguous. This lack of clarity on the rules and the 
difficulties of applying them to the unique polar environment defined the legal 
development of the polar regions in the decades leading up to the Antarctic Treaty.  
In their attempt to impart clarity upon the uncertainty, state officials and 
international lawyers constructed a transnational web of ideas, best practices, arguments, 
and innovations. These experts visualized the legal space of the polar regions as a bi-
polar nexus of connections, intersections and networks. They understood that legal 
concepts often evolved and took on new meanings as they flowed between the poles and 
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across the borders of the polar claimants. They realized that legal developments and state 
practice in one region had a dramatic impact on the other. State officials and legal 
scholars created a bi-polar legal landscape filled with competing visions of polar 
sovereignty, crafted out of a wide array of legal opinions and principles. 
In the legal uncertainty that surrounded territorial claims in the polar regions, 
official appraisals and the opinions of private international lawyers often guided state 
decision-making, decided internal debates, and created policy. Rather than operate in the 
context of decided strategies, legal advisers often pushed the agenda in state decision-
making concerning the Arctic and Antarctic. International legal scholars played a pivotal 
role in providing states with new ideas and justifications, and often defended the 
positions of their respective nation. Through their legal advice and assessments, state 
officials and legal scholars such as the Americans Charles Cheney Hyde and Samuel 
Whittemore Boggs, the Canadians James White and Hume Wrong, and the British Cecil 
Hurst, William Eric Beckett and Gerald Fitzmaurice left a profound mark on the legal, 
political and human history of the polar regions. Their opinions explain, for example, the 
Canadian government’s decision to establish remote police posts on uninhabited islands, 
how permanent human inhabitation came to the Antarctic, why states so actively pursued 
and supported polar science, and the reasons behind Britain’s unilateral application to the 
International Court of Justice.  
The legal arguments crafted by these officials and experts mattered to the polar 
claimants, all of whom struggled to display a sufficient level of settlement, control, or 
government activity that would clearly indicate their ownership of austere, uninhabited 
polar spaces. Legal arguments and justifications provided a cheap and useful tool for 
polar claimants to support their claims to territory in which they had minimal physical 
presence, and provided state officials with the means to influence other governments into 
recognition.  
The ongoing legal uncertainty that marked the polar regions forced state legal 
experts and international lawyers to decide how far they could push the boundaries of 
international law to defend state claims. Many treated the law as a flexible and elastic 
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tool they could adapt to unique polar conditions, and employed creative legal 
argumentation to defend territorial titles. They breathed life into ideas such as the 
doctrine of contiguity and relaxed definitions of effective occupation. British and 
Commonwealth officials utilized the sector principle, which they articulated and argued 
as a convenient solution to a problem that traditional international law could not solve. In 
sharp contrast, the U.S. responded to the legal uncertainty in the Arctic and Antarctic by 
crafting the Hughes Doctrine, thus entrenching itself in the traditional and accepted rules 
used for the acquisition of territory in the temperate zones.  
As states tried to guide the polar regions on a path towards legal stability and 
certainty, Britain and the U.S. left the deepest marks in the bi-polar legal landscape, 
highlighting the role that powerful states play in the creation and shaping of law. Britain 
and the Commonwealth attempted to guide the Arctic and Antarctic down the road to 
legal stability and certainty through the sector principle. They located the origins of the 
principle in treaty law, arguments of contiguity and a novel conception of the doctrine of 
effective occupation, which insisted that a state required only a modicum of control over 
the points of access and coastline of a polar hinterland. British legal advisers argued that 
this control could be achieved through occasional visits by state officials, administrative 
acts, legislation, and in the Canadian case a thin line of occupied police posts. As Britain, 
New Zealand, Canada, Australia, the Soviet Union, France, and possibly Norway asserted 
sector claims in the interwar years, many state officials and legal scholars found it 
possible that the polar regions were heading towards a legal regime based on the sector 
principle. Beginning in the 1930s, however, this pathway encountered an insurmountable 
obstacle: the United States and the Hughes Doctrine.  
Through its enunciation and support of the Hughes Doctrine, the U.S. 
substantively influenced the legal development of the polar regions, even though 
Washington’s selective application of the principle was often constrained by political 
considerations. Careful appraisal of the archival record suggests that, between 1924 and 
1959 – and even when the State Department flirted with the lesser requirements of 
constructive occupation – the U.S. carefully maintained the Hughes Doctrine as a 
defensive legal strategy, thus protecting American rights and possible interests in the 
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polar regions while avoiding the political fallout of official territorial disputes. 
Accordingly, this dissertation’s careful reconstruction of the historical record confirms 
the enduring relationship between international law and politics. 
The Hughes Doctrine’s emphasis on physical settlement and use gradually 
changed the legal trajectory of the polar regions. By the middle of the Second World 
War, the U.S. legal position, mixed with technological developments and increased 
international competition, led state officials and legal advisers in Britain, the 
Commonwealth, and the other polar claimants to believe in the necessity of permanent 
occupancy and use to secure title to polar territory. Legal appraisals and state practice in 
the polar regions reflected this changing conception of polar sovereignty. In the most 
dramatic reflection of this changing legal context, by the early 1950s the Foreign Office 
legal advisers began viewing their claim in the FID not as a sector, but as pockets of 
sovereignty emanating from the area covered by their bases and patrols, and supported by 
their scientific research.   
State appraisals of the evolving legal situations in the Arctic and Antarctic and the 
changing requirements of polar sovereignty illustrate how officials came to grips with the 
perceived impact that the passage of time had on territorial claims. State officials were 
forced to deal with the central tension in the relationship between time and the law: “how 
to adjust in creative and timely fashion, the legal order of yesterday to the new societal 
conditions and demands of today and the emerging tomorrow.”12 Judge Huber’s 
intertemporal theory significantly influenced state legal assessments, particularly those 
prepared by the international lawyers in the Foreign Office. His important distinction 
between the creation of a right and the maintenance of a right stressed the malleability of 
law in concept and practice. No state title could be considered perfected for all time, 
particularly if a country had exercised control and administrative functions inconsistently. 
Time brought new ideas about the law and technological improvements that opened up 
the polar regions to human activity like never before, changing legal expectations and 
requirements. Thus, it was more than just the contemporary requirements of effective 	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occupation that confused state officials, but what those requirements might become in the 
future.  
Officials understood that recognition was the strongest defence against Huber’s 
theory of intertemporal law and the general legal uncertainty in the polar regions. States 
had to determine whether to aggressively seek international recognition and risk inspiring 
official foreign rejection – as Denmark did for its sovereignty over Greenland between 
1915 and 1921 – or quietly strengthen their position and hope that in time other states 
would consider it unchallengeable – the route pursued by Canada. Although the passage 
of time could potentially bring new requirements and expectations for the acquisition of 
territory, it could also bring silence from other would-be claimants or competitors. If the 
latter, a state could argue that other governments had tacitly acquiesced to their claims. 
No matter how a state achieved recognition, in the anomalous legal space of the polar 
regions it remained the only dependable and sure tool with which to cut the “Gordian 
knot” of polar sovereignty.  
As this dissertation reveals, Cold War exigencies led the Americans to forgo the 
Hughes Doctrine and recognize Canada’s Arctic sovereignty during continental defence 
negotiations in 1946 and 1947. With America’s recognition of Canada’s title, the last 
major potential terrestrial sovereignty dispute in the Arctic was resolved and the region 
finally arrived at legal stability. In the south polar region, however, the U.S. continued its 
policy of non-recognition. Consequently, legal and political instability actually increased 
in the postwar years, particularly in the Falkland Islands Dependencies where Britain, 
Chile and Argentina squared off in a race to physically occupy territory. Britain’s 
attempts to achieve legal certainty and stability by referring the conflict to the 
International Court of Justice failed. With the failure of Britain’s unilateral application 
and the non-recognition of all claims by the U.S. and later the Soviet Union, legal 
uncertainty continued to characterize the Antarctic.  
In a sense, while recognition of claims finally brought the Arctic to legal stability, 
non-recognition of claims achieved a similar result for the Antarctic. The tangle of claims 
and rights, the disputes and the uncertainty that non-recognition inspired in the Antarctic 
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eventually drove states towards the legal stability offered by a multilateral treaty that 
could freeze these problems in time. With the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, 
both polar regions arrived at legal stability. 
Nevertheless, legal stability is fragile. In the decades since 1959, both the Arctic 
and Antarctic fell back into legal uncertainty. In the Arctic, disputes over maritime 
domain, continental shelves, and the Northwest Passage intensified after the 1950s. 
Although the Law of the Sea has managed this uncertainty, instability remains. In the 
Antarctic, legal uncertainty about terrestrial territorial claims lies dormant, just under the 
surface of the treaty. Indeed, the assertion and maintenance of territorial sovereignty is as 
much an issue today as in the pre-treaty years.13 As legal scholar Donald Rothwell 
observes, “sovereignty was and still remains one of the principal reasons for human 
endeavour in Antarctica.”14 Claimant states continue to support bases and scientific 
research programs in their sectors to maintain their sovereign rights through permanent 
presence and use. The motto of Argentina’s Esperanza Base captures the sentiment best: 
“Permanence: An Act of Sacrifice” (“Permanencia, un acto de sacrificio“). Peter Beck 
has explained that the treaty keeps “the lid closed upon a veritable Pandora’s box of 
difficulties,” but warns that “its collapse might re-activate the sovereignty problem.”15  
The Antarctic Treaty System expires in 2048, when legal uncertainty may once 
again engulf the Antarctic. Should states scramble to entrench their sovereignty, the 
history of each state’s territorial claim, as well as the historic development of polar 
sovereignty more generally, will once again be integral to international recognition. 
Indeed, as legal scholar Ian Brownlie notes, “In one sense at least law is history, and the 
lawyer’s appreciation of the meaning of rules relating to acquisition of territory, and of 
the manner of their application in particular cases, will be rendered more keen by a 
knowledge of the historical development of the law.”16 As nations continue to grasp for 	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the ends of the earth, they will return to the history of polar sovereignty in their search for 
clarity amidst the uncertainty. 
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“The Disappointing Arctic: Will More Shipping Dreams Be Shattered on the Ice?” 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 2012): 539-552.  
 
“Promoting National Interests and Fostering Cooperation: Canada and the Development 
of a Polar Code.” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 2012): 
319-334. 
 
“Kurt Meyer and Canadian Memory: Villain and Monster, Hero and Victim or worse – a 
German?” Canadian Military History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 2012): 33-44.   
 
“Setting an Arctic Course: Task Force 80 and Canadian Control in the Arctic.” Northern 
Mariner, Vol. XXI (October 2011): 327-358. (With Whitney Lackenbauer) 
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“Rising Above the Rhetoric: Northern Voices and the Strengthening of Canada’s 
Capacity to Maintain a Stable Circumpolar World.” Northern Review 33 (Spring 2011): 
29-45. 
 
“The Polaris Incident: “Going to the Mat” with the Americans.” Journal of Military and 
Strategic Studies 11/3 (Spring 2009): 1-29. Available online at 
http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/issue/view/11.  
 
 
Book Chapters 
 
“The Dog in the Manger – and Letting Sleeping Dogs Lie: The United States, Canada and 
the Sector Principle, 1924-1955.’” The Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honour of Donat 
Pharand. Edited by Suzanne Lalonde and Ted McDorman. Leiden: Brill, 2014. 216-239. 
(With P. Whitney Lackenbauer.) 
 
“Constructing a Role: The Royal Canadian Air Force in the Arctic, 1945-1953.” In De-
Icing Required! The Canadian Air Force’s Experience in the Arctic, ed. W.A. March. Sic 
Itur Ad Astra: Canadian Aerospace Power Studies Series vol.4. Trenton: Canadian Forces 
Air Warfare Centre, 2012. 
 
“Sovereignty and Security: The Department of External Affairs, the United States, and 
Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-68.” In Serving the National Interest, ed. Greg Donaghy and 
Michael Stevenson. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011. 101-20. (With Whitney 
Lackenbauer). E-book available at http://uofcpress.com/books/9781552385388.  
 
“1946: The Year Canada Chose Its Path in the Arctic.” In Calgary Papers on Military 
and Strategic Studies: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security Historical Perspectives. 
Edited by Whitney Lackenbauer. Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 
2010. 69-110. E-book at http://cpmss.synergiesprairies.ca/cpmss/index.php/cpmss.  
 
“Building on ‘Shifting Sands’: The Canadian Armed Forces, Sovereignty and the Arctic, 
1968-1972,” In Calgary Papers on Military and Strategic Studies: Canadian Arctic 
Sovereignty and Security Historical Perspectives. Edited by Whitney Lackenbauer. 
Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2010. 283-308. (With Whitney 
Lackenbauer). E-book at http://cpmss.synergiesprairies.ca/cpmss/index.php/cpmss. 
 
 
 
Academic Presentations: 
 
“An ‘Anomalous Legal Space’: Sovereignty, the Polar Regions and the International 
Legal Landscape.” Paper presented at Understanding Arctic Sovereignty and Security: A 
Generative Workshop, St. Jerome’s University, 8 June 2015. 
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“Hardly what one would expect of an ‘old’ Commonwealth Government:” Canada, the 
Commonwealth and Antarctic Sovereignty.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Canadian Historical Association, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 June 2015. 
 
“No Room for 'Dogs in the Manger': Science and State Sovereignty Strategies in the 
Arctic and Antarctic, 1920-1960.” Paper presented at the SSHA Conference, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada, 6 November 2014.  
 
“The Army’s Arctic Operations: Lessons Learned and Contemporary Operations.” Paper 
presented at the 23rd Military History Colloquium, London, Ontario, 4 May 2012.  
 
“‘A Bright Light in the North’: Father J.M. Mouchet and the Territorial Experimental Ski 
Training Program.” Paper presented at the 18th Annual Tri-U Graduate History 
Conference, Waterloo, Ontario, 3 March 2012. 
 
“1946: The Year Canada Chose its Path in the Arctic.” Paper presented at the 18th Annual 
Tri-U Graduate History Conference, Waterloo, Ontario, 3 March 2012.  
 
“Winning as a Community: The Territorial Experimental Ski Training Program.” Paper 
presented at the University of Western Ontario History Graduate Conference, London, 
Ontario, 22 March 2011. 
 
“The Disappointing Arctic: Are Current Shipping Dreams Once Again on Thin Ice?” 
Invited Paper presented at the Graduate Student Conference on Canada and the 
Circumpolar World, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 17 March 
2011.  
 
“Constructing a Role: The Royal Canadian Air Force in the Arctic, 1945-1953.” Invited 
Paper presented at De-icing Required: The Historical Dimension of the Canadian Air 
Force’s Experience in the Arctic,16th Annual Air Force Historical Workshop, Montreal, 
Quebec, 1-2 June, 2010.  
 
“The Way Forward: Listening to Northern Voices in a Rapidly Changing Circumpolar 
World.” Invited Paper presented at the State of the Arctic Conference, Miami, Florida, 
16-19 March 2010.  
 
“Sharing Whiskey and Flying the Flag: The Role of the Canadian Navy in the Arctic 
since the Second World War.” Invited Paper presented at the Fifth Military Studies 
Conference, Windsor, Ontario, 5-6 February 2010.  
 
“Rising Above the Rhetoric: Northern Voices and the Strengthening of Canada’s 
Capacity to Maintain a Stable Circumpolar World.” Invited Paper presented at the 
Graduate Student Conference on Canada and the Circumpolar World, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, March 2009.  
 
“Sovereignty and Security: The Department of External Affairs, the United States, and 
Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-68.” Invited paper presented at the Department of Foreign 
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Affairs and International Trade/Centre for Military and Strategic Studies Conference 
“Serving the National Interest,” Calgary, Alberta, January 2009 (with Whitney 
Lackenbauer). 
“Kurt Meyer in the Eyes of the Canadian People: Victim and Hero, Villain and Monster, 
or worse - a German?” Paper presented at the Tri-University History Conference, 
Waterloo, Ontario, 15 November 2008.  
 
 
Academic Awards: 
 
2009-12 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), J. 
Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship 
 
2011 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and 
University of the Arctic Graduate Student Fellowship 
 
2010  State of the Arctic Student Scholarship, U.S. Department of Energy 
 
2010 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and 
University of the Arctic Graduate Student Fellowship 
 
2009-10 Western Graduate Research Scholarship, University of Western Ontario 
 
2009 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and 
University of the Arctic Graduate Student Fellowship 
 
2008-09 Balsillie Master’s Fellowship 
 
2008-09 President’s Graduate Scholarship, University of Waterloo  
 
2008-09  SSHRC, J. Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship 
 
2008 Dan Watt Scholarship 
 
2008-09 UW/Faculty Arts Graduate Scholarship, University of Waterloo 
 
2008-09 Arts Graduate Experience Award, University of Waterloo 
 
2008 Faculty of Arts Award for Distinguished Academic Achievement  
 
2008 Shortlisted for the Betty G. Headley Senior Essay Award, St. Jerome’s 
University  
 
2007-08 Queen Elizabeth Aiming for the Top Scholarship 
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2007-08 David E. Wright Scholarship, University of Waterloo 
 
2007-08 Faculty of Arts Upper-Year Scholarship, University of Waterloo 
 
2007 Elliot T. Grasset Award 
 
2006-07 Queen Elizabeth Aiming for the Top Scholarship 
 
2006-07 David E. Wright Scholarship, University of Waterloo 
 
2005-06 Queen Elizabeth Aiming for the Top Scholarship 
 
2004-08 University of Waterloo Dean’s Honours List 
 
2005-06 Arts Alumni Entrance Scholarship, University of Waterloo 
 
2004-05 Queen Elizabeth Aiming for the Top Scholarship 
 
2004-05  Arts Alumni Entrance Scholarship, University of Waterloo 
 
Service Awards: 
 
2014  President’s Recognition for Service, Aurora College 
 
2014  Community Volunteer Award, Aurora College 
 
 
Invited Events, Workshops, and Seminars: 
 
Participant. Indigenizing Psychology Symposium: Education and Healing, 22-23 May 
2014, Aurora College, Yellowknife Campus. 
 Participant.	  Training	  exercise	  with	  the	  Cambridge	  Bay	  Ranger	  Patrol,	  Nunavut,	  August	  2012.	  	  Participant.	  Igloo	  Building	  Winter	  Camp,	  Cambridge	  Bay,	  February	  2012. 
 Participant	  in	  training	  exercise	  with	  the	  Cambridge	  Bay	  Ranger	  Patrol,	  Nunavut,	  September	  2011. 
 
Observer. Operation Nanook, Resolute Bay, Nunavut, 20-22 August 2011.  
 
Observer. Commander Joint Task Force North February Outreach Trip, 7-11 February 
2011.  
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Participant. Department of National Defence (Security and Defence Forum), FSE – 
Canada’s Strategic North, Iqaluit, Nunavut, 1-5 November 2009.  
 
Participant. Canadian Forces College – Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and 
Disarmament Studies, Arctic Sovereignty and Security Symposium, 15-16 October 2009.  
 
Participant. Young Leaders’ Summit on Northern Climate Change Inuvik, Northwest 
Territories, 17-20 August 2009.  
 
 
Service: 
 
Professional  
 
2013  Organizer, Aurora College’s NWT Youth Symposium, Thebacha Campus,  
Aurora College, Fort Smth 
 
2012-14 Ethics Committee, Aurora College  
 
2012-14 The Weekly Writer’s Workshop, Aurora College, Fort Smith, NWT 
 
2010-11 History Representative to the GTA Union 
 
2010-11 Co-Organizer, 1st Annual University of Western Ontario Graduate History 
Conference 
 
Community Outreach 
 
Keynote Speaker, “How Canada Remembers the World Wars,” Remembrance Day 
Ceremony, Aurora College, Fort Smith, NWT, 11 November 2013. 
 
Keynote Speaker, “Remembering the Canadian Soldier,” Remembrance Day Dinner, 
Royal Canadian Legion, Exeter, Ontario, Canada, 11 November 2011. 
 
Keynote Speaker, “The Canadians in Holland,” Victory in Europe Day Commemoration, 
Royal Canadian Legion, Exeter, Ontario, Canada, 5 May 2010. 
 
